1957 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties

An International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties was held in Moscow, Soviet Union, November 16–19, 1957.[1] The meeting was attended by 64 political parties from all over the world.[1] The meeting was the first of its kind, marking a new form of forum for the world communist movement following the disbanding of the Communist International and Cominform.[2] Four additional parties (including the Communist Party, USA) attended clandestinely out of fear of repercussions at home.[3]

Background

The 1957 meeting took place midst celebrations of the 40th anniversary (ruby jubilee) celebrations of the October Revolution, for which celebrations had taken place in Moscow on November 6-7, 1957.[4][5] The traditional military parade of the Soviet Army's Moscow Military District forces, military academy cadets and representatives of the Navy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, took place on Red Square in front of the participating leaders and a banquet was held in the Moscow Kremlin. Except for Tito the meeting was attended by the leaders of each of the 13 ruling communist parties around the world.[6] The November 16–19 meeting was preceded by the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, held November 14–16, 1957, at which 12 ruling communist parties signed a joint declaration.[1][7]

The 1957 meeting occurred in the aftermath of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which Stalin had been denounced, and revolts in Hungary and Poland.[8] The 1957 meeting sought to reaffirm communist unity, demarcating against the revisionism represented by the Yugoslav party and the hardliners resisting 'de-Stalinization'.[8] The meeting backed Khrushchev's new line of different national paths towards socialism, peaceful co-existence and popular front tactics.[8] As per the line given by the meeting, transition to people's democracy was possible through parliamentary elections, as long as the communist parties combined electoral work with mass struggles against reactionary forces.[9] The meeting adopted a 'peace manifesto', outlining capitalist monopolies as the main threat to world peace.[1][10][11][2]

Unity and division

Whilst the intended purpose of the meeting was to display unity of the world communist movement, the outcome was quite different.[12] In the debates at the meeting Mao argued for a centralized world communist movement whilst the Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti argued for decentralization of the world communist movement and autonomy of individual parties.[13] For Mao, the talk of "peaceful road to socialism" meant a negotiation of revolutionary politics and a capitulation to electoral politics.[12]

The meeting had lasting impact on the world communist movement. With the Moscow meeting indicating an increased space for independent policy by national communist parties, the Workers Party of Korea organ Rodong Sinmun carried an editorial on the meeting which called for increasingly independent political self-reliance of the Workers Party of Korea.[14] Following the 1957 meeting, the Romanian Workers Party took an increasingly independent political course.[15]

Sino-Soviet split

Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Soong Ching-ling at the 1957 Moscow conference.

The 1957 meeting marked a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations, for the first time the contradictions between the Soviet and Chinese parties came into the forefront (which would later result in the Sino-Soviet split).[16]

Whilst the meeting marked increasing divergence between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, although the Communist Party of China signed both the declaration and peace manifesto after some hesitation.[10] The Chinese communist leader addressed the meeting on November 18, 1957, at which he publicly affirmed support for Khrushchev's leadership in his struggle against the "Anti-Party Group". The speech, released in full by Chinese authorities only in 1985, marks the sole known statement of Mao siding with Khrushchev against the "Anti-Party Group".[17]

Moreover, Mao took advantage of the Moscow meeting to improve Sino-Korean relations, by holding bilateral talks with the Korean leader Kim Il-Sung and expressing remorse over Chinese interference in Korean affairs in 1956.[18] In his speech at the meeting, Kim Il-Sung avoided touching on the Sino-Soviet contradictions.[16]

Yugoslav question

On the other hand, the meeting was preceded by a few months of gradual normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav party was invited to the event.[5] The Yugoslavs rejected the invitation for the preceding meeting of Communist and Workers Parties from the Socialist Countries but attended the broader international meeting.[17] However, the rapprochement backfired as the Yugoslav delegates rejected the political line of recognizing the leading role of the Soviet Union in the struggle for socialism, and the Yugoslavs refused to sign the documents of the meeting.[19] Just a few days before the event, when the Yugoslavs obtained the draft text for the declaration of the meeting, Tito cancelled his trip to Moscow altogether.[20] The Chinese party had managed pushed the Soviets to adopt a tougher stand against Yugoslav revisionism,[21] and at the Moscow meeting Mao was supported by Maurice Thorez and Mikhail Suslov on this point.[22] The Albanian leader Enver Hoxha had published a statement on October 26, 1957 condemning the Yugoslav positions, causing dismay in the Yugoslav leadership.[23] Meanwhile, the Polish communist leader Władysław Gomułka had unsuccessfully lobbied to exclude the wording 'with the Soviet Union at the fore' from the declaration of the meeting.[24] The Italian delegation had been supportive of the Polish position on this matter, whilst the Danish communist leader Aksel Larsen voiced pro-Yugoslav positions (for which he was subsequently expelled from his party).[25][26]

Officially Tito's absence at the October Revolution celebrations was explained by a sudden case of "lumbago".[23] The fallout marked a setback for Khrushchev, who had hoped to be able to gather both Mao and Tito (representing opposite extremes of the increasingly divergent world communist movement) in a show of grand unity at the podium.[23]

Latin American meeting

During the Moscow meeting, a separate meeting of Latin American communists was held.[27] The meeting set up a special commission for Latin American affairs.[28] The Popular Front line of the Chilean communists was based on input from this meeting.[27]

Delegations

Present for both the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries and the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties

Present only at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties

Following the departure of John Gates from the Communist Party USA, the CPUSA subsequently endorsed the declarations of the 1957 meeting.[1]

See also

References

  1. Harvard University. Center for International Affairs; Robert R. Bowie; Harvard University. East Asian Research Center (1962). Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis. Harvard University Press. p. 412. ISBN 978-0-674-14900-7.
  2. R. Craig Nation (5 July 2018). Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917–1991. Cornell University Press. p. 230. ISBN 978-1-5017-2910-2.
  3. Zhihua Shen, Yafeng Xia "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference" in Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall 2009 p.76
  4. Jian Chen (15 March 2010). Mao's China and the Cold War. Univ of North Carolina Press. p. 71. ISBN 978-0-8078-9890-1.
  5. Edvard Kardelj (1982). Reminiscences--the Struggle for Recognition and Independence the New Yugoslavia, 1944-1957. Blond & Briggs. p. 134. ISBN 978-0-85634-135-9.
  6. Owen Pearson (2006). Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy: From Isolation to the Kosovo War, 1946-1998. Centre for Albanian Studies. p. 531.
  7. Cheng Guan Ang (1 January 1997). Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962. McFarland. p. 66. ISBN 978-0-7864-0404-9.
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  9. Thomas Johnson Nossiter (1982). Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation. University of California Press. p. 143. ISBN 978-0-520-04667-2.
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  11. AFL-CIO. Dept. of International Affairs (1961). AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News. Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO. p. 10.
  12. Augusto Varas; Alfredo Riquelme; Marcelo Casals (25 January 2018). El partido comunista en Chile: Una historia presente. Editorial Catalonia. p. 189. ISBN 978-956-324-588-2.
  13. EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA (2017). Socialismos y comunismos. Claves históricas de dos movimientos políticos. Ediciones Paraninfo, S.A. p. 225. ISBN 978-84-283-3850-9.
  14. Ilpyong J. Kim (1975). Communist Politics in North Korea. Praeger. p. 95. ISBN 978-0-275-09190-3.
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  22. Jean Elleinstein; Georges Ayache (1984). Histoire mondiale des socialismes: 1945-1960. Ed. des Lilas. p. 141.
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  25. Eric Robert Terzuolo (1980). Relations Between the Communist Parties of Italy And Yugoslavia, 1941-1960. Stanford University. p. 301.
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