6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea

The 1st plenum of the 6th Central Committee, to elect the central party leadership, was held immediately after the 6th Congress.[11] 34 members were elected to the 6th Politburo, an increase from 15 in the 5th Politburo.[8] Of these 34, 19 were full members and 15 candidate members.[8] Five members were elected to the Presidium,[8] and Kim Jong-il was ranked fourth in the hierarchy of the Politburo and the Presidium.[8] The 6th Secretariat was composed of nine members,[12] with Kim Jong-il ranked second.[12] The size of the Secretariat did not change from the 5th Congress, but of its nine members only Kim Il-sung was from the party's "revolutionary generation" (60% of the members of the 5th Secretariat came from that generation).[12] Kim Il-sung and Kim Jung-rin were the only incumbents to be reelected.[13] The elected 6th Central Military Commission (CMC) was composed of 19 members, of which Kim Jong-il ranked third (behind Kim Il-sung and O Jin-u).[13] This marked the first time in the party's history that the CMC membership was made public.[13] Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il became the only officials with seats in all four bodies: the Presidium, Politburo, Secretariat and CMC.[13] While Kim Jong-il was outranked in the Presidium, Politburo and Secretariat, none of the members who outranked him had positions in other bodies (except for O Jin-ju, second-ranked member of the CMC).[13] Below is a list of members (and their respective rankings) of the Presidium, full and candidate members of the Politburo, Secretariat and CMC:[14]

The 1st plenum saw the "revolutionary generation" retire from their executive posts, surrendering them to the new generation of Kim Jong-il; however, they still controlled the highest organs of power: the Presidium and the Politburo.[15] The plenum saw the disappearance of Kim Yong-ju (Kim Il-sung's brother, considered his chosen successor before Kim Jong-il), Kim Dong-gyu, Ryu Jang-sik and Ri Yong-mu from important party positions.[15] The reason for the purge is unknown, but presumably linked to Kim Il-sung's time-consuming consolidation of his son's power base.[15]

Kim Il-sung with his son and chosen successor Kim Jong-il at the congress.

Kim Yong-ju was believed to be Kim Il-sung's first choice as successor, and his authority increased until he became co-chairman of the North–South Coordination Committee.[16] From late 1972 until the 6th Congress, Kim Yong-ju became an increasingly remote figure within the regime; at the 6th Congress, he lost his seats in the Politburo and on the Central Committee.[16] However, rumors were confirmed that Kim Il-sung began grooming Kim Jong-il in 1966.[16] From 1974 until the 6th Congress, Kim Jong-il (called the "Party centre" by North Korean media) became the second-most-powerful man in North Korea.[16]

The choice of Kim Jong-il as Kim Il-sung's successor met with considerable criticism.[17] Critics accused Kim Il-sung of creating a dynasty, turning North Korea into a feudal state.[17] An anonymous South Korean critic said, "Hereditary succession of power [was an] inevitable consequence of the elder Kim's irrevocable commitment to the dream of founding a dynasty of his own and of his family",[17] adding that Kim Jong-il's rise to power was proof of the "degeneration" of the WPK into a "thoroughly personalized family affair built up around a personality cult."[17] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China and other ruling parties of socialist states did not approve Kim Jong-il's appointment as heir apparent.[18] Kim Il-sung's choice of successor arguably concerned the promotion of revolutionary zeal in the country (taking into account the negative treatment Joseph Stalin received from his successor).[19]

At the congress, Kim Il-sung stressed the importance of "achieving the goal of the unification of the fatherland which has been the greatest and long-cherised desire of the whole people is the most important revolutionary task facing the Party".[20] He warned his audience that if Korea remained divided, it might never be unified again because of relations among the big powers.[20] Kim Il-sung called for the establishment of the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea" (DCRK), a national government of North and South Korea.[21] The DCRK would be ruled by a Supreme Confederal National Congress (SCNC), with an equal number of representatives from North and South Korea. The SCNC representatives would elect a Presidium, which would rule on its behalf.[21] Under this system, South Korea would remain capitalist and North Korea socialist.[22] However, the WPK leadership named three conditions for North Korea to join the DCRK: (1) Social democratization of South Korea, the ouster of its current ruling class, repeal of the Anti-Communist and National Security Laws and replacement of its military regime by a democratic one representing the will of the people; (2) Reducing tensions with the establishment of a truce and a peace agreement; (3) Reducing American interference in the region, holding open the possibility of improved relations with the United States if it supported Korean reunification.[23]

The 6th Congress signified a move away from orthodox communism, with the Juche given primacy over Marxism–Leninism; in foreign relations, an independent national policy was given primacy over proletarian internationalism.[15] According to political analyst Kim Nam-sik, "They [changes] represent a marked departure from the fundamental principles of communism, and a new orientation for the North Korean future in the 1980s."[15] In contrast to other ruling communist parties in socialist states, democratic centralism in the WPK did not hold the leader (the WPK General Secretary) accountable.[15] In many ways it functioned the other way around, with the WPK accountable to the leader.[15] This unusual system is rooted in North Korea's leader theory.[15]

In contrast to other socialist states (which upheld the orthodox communist belief that the masses are masters of historical development), WPK ideology asserts that the masses can only initiate revolutionary change through a leader.[25] While other socialist states often emphasized certain historical figures, due weight was still given to the people.[25] The opposite occurred in North Korea, where the party line was "The great revolutionary task of the working class is pioneered and led to victory by the Leader and completed under the leadership of the Leader only."[25] From this perspective, the revolutionary task given the working class by the other socialist regimes became the sole responsibility of the leader in North Korea.[25] The leader theory supports one-man leadership, since all important tasks can only be accomplished by a great leader it argues.[25] This ideological outlook may explain why Kim Il-sung appointed his son, Kim Jong-il, as his successor.[25] In North Korea, Kim Il-sung was considered a "Great Leader" with a decisive role; he was cited by official media as the man who established the WPK and founder of the Juche idea.[26] Because of this, Kim Il-sung was not "elected" WPK General Secretary; the position was bestowed on him by divine right.[26]

While North Korea had already begun to move from a foreign policy based upon proletarian internationalism at the Conference of Party Representatives in 1966, the WPK leadership had never explicitly broken with proletarian internationalism as it did at the 6th Congress.[27] In theory, a communist party supports policy contributing to the world revolution.[27] Communist regimes rarely lived up to this ideal; by the 1950s, ideological schisms within the world communist movement made it all but impossible.[27] From 1966 onwards, North Korea strengthened relations with neutral countries in the global Cold War.[27] Proletarian internationalism was replaced with a national, independent foreign policy;[27] if a socialist and non-socialist country were at war, North Korea could (in theory) support the non-socialist country if it benefited North Korea.[27] At the 6th Congress, Kim Il-sung attached more importance to relations with Third World countries than to unity in the socialist camp.[27] Nevertheless, North Korea still received massive funds and aid from the Soviet bloc, the People's Republic of China and relations with the United States would remain bitterly cold. While North Korea argues that independence and proletarian internationalism are not exclusive, in orthodox communist theory they are.[27]