Afshar Operation

According to a Human Rights Watch report, "credible and consistent" accounts from several officials who worked in Shura-e-Nazar (the informal politico-military organization headed by Rabbani's defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud) and the Rabbani interim government reveal that a military campaign against Hezb-i Wahdat was planned and approved by officials at the "highest levels" of the Rabbani government.[1]

According to Afghanistan Justice Project although individual commanders cannot be identified, brigade and battalion leaders can be listed. For Jamiat, these include Qasim Fahim, Anwar Dangar, Mullah Ezat, Mohammad Ishaq Pashiri, Haji Bahlol Panshiri, Baba Jalandar Panjshiri, Khanjar Akhund Panshiri, Musdoq Lalai, and Baz Mohammad Ahmadi Badakhshani. From Ittihad these included Haji Shir Alam, Amir Anwar Oryakhail, Zulmai Tufan, Dr. Abdullah, Jaglan Naeem, Mullah Taj Mohammad, Abdullah Shah, Khinjar, Abdul Manan Diwana, Amanullah Kochi, Shirin, Mushtaq Lalai, and Mullah Kachkol.

By February 1993, Massoud had conducted negotiations with dissident Wahdat commanders who signed secret protocols with Massoud in order to avoid a long fight promising to cooperate during the conflict and to capture Mazari and his cabinet.[7]

The men of Mohammad Fahim, who was in charge of special operations, contacted a number of the Shia commanders and obtained their co-operation. This allowed the artillery to be pre-positioned in advance of the battle, with a ZU-23 gun and 30 men being positioned on Aliabad hill, with the purpose of targeting the Central Silo, Afshar, Kart-iSeh, Kart-iChar and Kart-I Sakhi. The forces allied with the government began to bomb the area around Afshar before troops began to move in around 4:00 am on February 11. Troops moved from Badambagh to the top of Radar hill, which was part of the Afshar ridge. According to Afghanistan Justice Project:

A large contingent of both Ittihad and Jamiat forces advanced towards Afshar from the west. The closest point of the front line to the main target of the operation was the Kabul Polytechnic. A Jamiat force advanced along the main Afshar Road, from Kart-iParwan and the Intercontinental Hotel, towards the Social Science Institute, entering Afshar from the east. The ISA forces did not advance along other sections of the front line marking the west Kabul enclave, although they maintained an intense bombardment and had ample forces deployed to maintain a threat of advance.

According to this, by 13:00 the main defense line of Hezb-I Wahdat had failed and the forces, including Mazari and his top commanders, began to flee on foot. By 14:00 the Social Science Institute was captured and troops were in control of Khushal Mina and Afshar.

Mazari re-established a defense line near the Central Silo and Kart-iSakhi, at the edge of Khushhal Mina, keeping control over most of West Kabul. Following this many of the residence fled to Taimani, an Ismali area of the city.

The objectives of the military operation were largely attained during the operation.[7] Wahdat's headquarters and many of their positions were captured so that they were not able to shell Kabul from those positions anymore.[7]

Numerous abuses were reported and large information was collected through interviews by two separate reports – one by Afghanistan Justice Project and another by Human Rights Watch. The abuses largely took place after the military operation itself when forces started to establish posts and to search homes.[7]

The vast majority of testimony regarding the Afshar operation suggests that the abuses were carried out by the Ittihad forces of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and not the Jamiat forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Ittihad forces played a major role in the assault, working directly under Sayyaf and receiving pay from him. The Ittihad forces were not absorbed into the ministry of defense.[7] Sayyaf acted as the de facto general commander of Ittihad forces during the operation and was directly in touch with senior commanders by radio.[7]

According to reports, Wahdat soldiers as well as male Hazara citizens were being arrested and executed mostly by Ittihad forces. Unarmed civilians as well were being killed, with men in particular being targeted. Other men were abducted and taken to the base of Sayyaf's Ittihad in Paghman and made to dig trenches and bury the dead. Those who survived stated they saw on the bodies evidence of torture and mutilations. Human Rights Watch suggests that 70-80 people were killed in the streets fighting, while 700-750 people disappeared. It states that between 80-200 people were later released after ransoms were paid to Sayyaf's Ittihad commanders.

John Jennings, a journalist with the AP present in Afshar during the operation around Massoud's troops, went into considerable detail to debunk allegations of a systematic massacre of civilians.[8] Although he did leave open the possibility that some captured Wahdat fighters were summarily executed rather than being treated as POWs by troops furious at Wahdat atrocities against Kabul civilians during the preceding months. Jennings recounts entering a nearby basement where Wahdat fighters had tied up non-Hazara hostages with wire, shot them and tried to burn the bodies, before fleeing the scene ahead of Massoud's advancing troops.[8] Jennings also describes Ahmad Shah Massoud's followers rescuing a wounded Hazara civilian caught in the crossfire during the height of the battle. Despite these written reference — and although Jennings is quoted as a reliable source on other topics in the Human Rights Watch reports — any account of what he witnessed during and after the Afshar battle was left out by Human Rights Watch editors.[8]

The Afshar campaign and the surrounding violence were ended by the Islamabad Accord between the Islamic State and Hekmatyar's alliance (including Hezb-i Wahdat) fashioned in late February 1993 and signed on March 7, 1993. There were a few weeks of relative calm. Hezb-i Wahdat ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar took the long-offered position of prime minister in the Rabbani government.

The Islamabad Accord among other things stated:

Having agreed to bringing armed hostilities to an end, Recognizing the need for a broad-based Islamic Government in which all parties and groups representing all segments of Muslim Afghan society are represented so that the process of political transition can be advanced in an atmosphere of peace, harmony and stability, [...] All the parties and groups concerned have agreed as follows: To the formation of a Government for a period of 18 months in which President Burhanuddin Rabbani would remain President and Eng. Gulbedin Hikmatyar or his nominee would assume the office of Prime Minister. The powers of the President and Prime Minister and his cabinet which have been formulated through mutual consultations will form part of this Accord and is annexed; The Cabinet shall be formed by the Prime Minister in consultations with the President, and leaders of Mujahideen Parties within two weeks of the signing of this Accord; [...] A cease-fire shall come into force with immediate effect. After the formation of the Cabinet, there shall be permanent cessation of hostilities.[9]

Pulitzer Prize-winning Roy Gutman of the United States Institute of Peace wrote in How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan:

Hekmatyar had become prime minister ... But after chairing one cabinet meeting, Hekmatyar never returned to the capital, fearing, perhaps, a lynching by Kabulis infuriated over his role in destroying their city. Even his close aides were embarrassed. Hekmatyar spokesman Qutbuddin Helal was still setting up shop in the prime minister's palace when the city came under Hezb[-i Islami] rocket fire late that month. "We are here in Kabul and he is rocketing us. Now we have to leave. We can't do anything," he told Massoud aides.[8]

Hekmatyar turned out afraid to enter the city (he had shelled for one year) more than once to take up his post.[8] He attended one cabinet meeting but by late March, unwilling to compromise with other cabinet members not belonging to his faction and while his aides were still in the prime minister's palace, Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami forces were again shelling Kabul.[8]