George P. Steele

Early in 1975, ships deployments had been reduced and as a cost-saving measure, CTF 73 staff, Logistics Force Seventh Fleet, had moved into buildings ashore and now lacked the ability to provide an on-scene command presence afloat near the other fleet units congregating around Vung Tau. Things were happening too fast among the ships present on scene for us back in Sasebo to be able to keep up with events from such a remote location. RADM Johnson, our commander, rightly felt we needed someone on scene who could keep him current about was happening and thus improve his ability to logistically assist fleet needs.

For that purpose, he decided to put together and activate a mobile mini-staff to fly to the area and take charge of our fleet units as on scene commander while at the same time reporting real-time activities back to the home staff. The plan was that I,then LCDR Barry N. Kaye, would act as the operations officer under our chief of staff, Capt Keller, who would assume on-scene command of our logistics assets. Seemed like a great idea, and we immediately set out to make it happen.

Nevertheless, all of this was easier said than done. First, it involved a military aircraft ride down to the naval airbase at Cubi Point and then flying from Cubi to land onboard one of the carriers in the area via a COD aircraft. After that, we would have to hopscotch by boat and helo out to our eventual destination, our pre-designated command ship, the USS KAWISHIWI AO 146, a large but older fleet oiler, that was off station away from the immediate Vung Tau holding area refueling fleet units.

Our first hop by helo was set up take us to the USS BLUE RIDGE, the amphibious command ship where the officer in tactical command of the operation was headquartered. Although the fleet flagship, USS OKLAHOMA CITY CG 5, was present, she did not have the best communications and command and control facilities such as NTDS (navy tactical data system) or the latest satellite communications systems just coming into fleet service. For that reason, VADM Steele, then COMSEVENTHFLT, had also flown over to BLUE RIDGE to observe what seemed to be the eminent evacuation of remaining American personnel from Saigon. He came without staff. I was very familiar with many of VADM Steele's officers and did not observe anyone I recognized. As a result, he depended upon support from the embarked BLUE RIDGE staff, RADM Whitmire who was Commander Amphibious Forces (CTF-76). Additionally, I'm not positive but I believe his flag remained in OKC the entire time and was not broken as would be normal for reason(s) I have never understood. Nevertheless, simply by his presence, he not only became the on-scene commander of all naval units present as COMSEVENTHFLT himself, he became directly involved with the conduct of the evacuation. Once aboard, he never left the command center, at least not while I was present. It seemed to me he was plainly commanding the entire operation. Meanwhile, RADM Whitmire and his Navy/Marine staff ran tactical operations in the background.

How did I come to know this you might ask? Well, while Capt Keller and I waited for KAWISHIWI's return to our immediate area so we could transfer over to her, the balloon went up for all units to standby for implementation evacuation operations, and orders were given for the all units to focus entirely on the requirements leading up to the start of the mass departure of Americans – Operation Frequent Wind. Capt Keller and I we were now stranded aboard BLUE RIDGE until further notice. As a well-known fellow staff officer to the amphibious task force (CTF 76) commander's staff, I was invited by one of my colleagues into the command center to observe the operation. As events started to unfold, both VADM Steele and RADM Whitmire were present in the command center and, as I stated earlier, it appeared to me that Steele had assumed overall command although using Whitmire and his staff as his own for consultation, issuing directions and personally communicating with higher authority about the situation as it developed.

I mean no slight to Whitmire, but with Steele present, actively engaged with everyone deferring to him and Steele doing most of the talking and directing, there did not appear to be any question of who was in charge. Whitmire was clearly deferring to Steele on most issues. Whether he did it formally or not didn't seem important to anyone at the time, getting the operation underway was. Being in the command center allowed me to observe the first hours of the operation literally from a front-row seat. I was able to hear clearly VADM Steele's radio conversations with the embassy in Saigon, discussions with RADM Whitmire as well as deliberations with the various TF 76 coordinators present as the operation went forward. Several times, Steele had to move into an adjoining space to use a special communications link so he could speak directly with higher command, in all probability CINCPAC in Hawaii and possibly the Pentagon, I'm not sure which.

Captain Keller and I continued to be stranded aboard BLUE RIDGE. But while in her command center, two unforgettable moments occurred. First, with the entire US SEVENTHFLT standing to seaward within sight of the coast line of Vung Tau harbor, American helicopter evacuation efforts began by the numerous Navy and Marine embarked aboard the assembled task force. The first major decision waypoint occurred as sunset approached on the first day of Eagle Pull when, under normal conditions, American helo operations should close down. These aircraft were normally restricted to VFR/daylight only operations. However, due to the huge numbers of people who desperately sought to depart Saigon, the command decision was made by Steele-Whitmire combo to allow flight operations continuously throughout the night until everything that could be done and everyone who could be evacuated, etc., had been accomplished. Flying through what was described via the helo control radio circuits as an intense lightning storm system, complicated by probable NVA anti-aircraft fire and flares illuminating the sky plus the limited instrumentation of those helos, the lack of night flying and landing experience by the pilots and the war-like conditions encountered around Saigon, this was a very difficult decision made by VADM Steele. But because of this action many, many people who would otherwise have been left behind were successfully evacuated. It goes without saying that the American pilots were nothing short of fantastic!

Watching all this was a lesson in command decision-making that stayed with me for the remainder of my naval career. Sometimes you just have to take a risk if the situation warrants it, especially if involves the risk of life or death. ADMs Steele and Whitmire understood this and chose to save lives as possible.

The second instance involved US Ambassador Martin who was still at the embassy in Saigon. VADM Steele had been in continuous direct voice radio contact with the embassy as well as higher command in Hawaii and Washington (he generally used a handset either directly in front of where I was seated or moved into a compartment just to my left where he spoke with higher authority on a secure long-range system). Various discussions were constantly being conducted up and down the chain of command between Marine and naval staff officers, but I concentrated on observing ADM Steele as he was in charge; I was on the 50-yard line with a front-row seat of this life-and-death event.

Things came to a head towards the latter stages of the evacuation when word was received by the BLUE RIDGE's command center from the embassy in Saigon that the ambassador had instructed his staff that he would not leave until “everyone who wanted to be evacuated was taken out” or words to that effect. It took several moments for the message to sink in, but it was obvious from reports from our limited military force still on the ground around the embassy that this would be an impossible task, even under the most ideal circumstances. There were literally thousands, tens of thousands of Vietnamese and foreign nationals who desperately wanted to escape. The NVA was closing in quickly, and action to evacuate the ambassador and his staff had to be taken as soon as possible.

After consulting with higher command and muttering a few choice words to no one in particular, Steele got on the radio and told the ambassador that he had come out as soon as possible under his own power or Steele would order the Marine guard that was still with him to forcibly put him aboard the next evacuation helicopter. Although I could not hear the response, there appeared to be some argument from Saigon, but finally the ambassador acceded to Steel's requirement and arrived on the BLUE RIDGE shortly thereafter. When we heard the ambassador was about to arrive, several officers, including myself, went down into flag officer country and stood in the passageway as his entourage streamed in along with what looked like his dependents, his pet dog and DOD emissary, Richard L. Armitage, close behind him. A moment I'll never forget. The embassy compound was taken by the NVA within hours after their arrival on the flagship, and the evacuation of Americans et al., for all intents and purposes, was finished.

During the evacuation itself, I took several breaks from the command center and was able to observe and sometimes participate in pushing ARVN helicopters off the flight deck of BLUE RIDGE. Later that evening, the KAWISHIWI returned to the area and sent her boat over to pick Capt Keller's team up. Our mini-mobile team of two officers plus a yeoman had finally arrived at our intended destination but things had wound down and the operation as far as our part was concerned was just about over. Despite the fact that helo evacuation operations had come to an end, support of the evacuation operations were far from over, things simply shifted to the next phase – getting the people who were now in our care to safe harbor became a priority. With Operation FREQUENT WIND complete, the fleet now shifted gears and Operation NEW LIFE commenced.