Hybrid institutions and governance

The term ‘institution’ eludes precise definition, and its interpretation in academic literature varies. The dictionary definition: ‘an established law, custom, or practice’[1] is an oft-used and useful starting point. Theoretical discussions have highlighted a distinction between formal (laws, official rules, contracts, standards, procedures) and informal (shared values, behavioural norms, belief systems, codes of conduct, discourses) institutions.[2][3][4] This distinction has emerged from what has been termed the ‘new institutionalism’,[5] which adopts a more critical approach to the study of institutions. Institutions are seen as key actors in guiding the political process, and are shaped by historical struggles, rules and procedures; rather than being merely the aggregation of individual motives. The apparent paradox at play here,[6] that institutions both shape political processes and are themselves the product of political processes, is explored further in the examples below.

The ‘new institutionalism’ is of value in defining what constitutes a ‘hybrid institution’, as it demonstrates “a concern with new arrangements for policy-making rather than a new look at old institutions”.[7] Lowdnes’ concept of the ‘disaggregated institution’ theorises the institutionalisation of relations between governmental and non-governmental actors,[8] providing a useful starting point for conceptualising hybrid institutions. A hybrid institution is as an institution which exists between or across the boundaries of sectors, government departments, geographic units, or combines the governance regimes of “traditional dichotomies” such as the state and the market.[9] They represent a new institutional pluralism, blurring the boundaries between previously distinct policy entities by creating new formal and informal institutions. A definition which includes both formal and informal institutions may be considered problematic in that almost any dialogue or cooperation could be considered an informal hybrid institution. North’s distinction between ‘loosely’ and ‘thickly’ institutionalised policy environments is of use here.[10] Where cooperation is limited, and not enshrined within official documents or a specific policy or contract (loose, informal institutionalisation), the hybrid can be said to be weak. Within ‘thickly’ institutionalised environments, with contracts, rules, joint appointments etc. the hybrid is strong. This distinction is examined further in examples below. Depending on the specific context, a strong or weak hybridisation may determine the legitimacy of the institution.

Institutional theorists stress the need to distinguish between institutions and organisations. Organisations are defined as “purposive entities”,[11] and are “tangible ‘things’”[12] which have remits, offices and staff”.[13] Institutions on the other hand provide the rules, norms and settings within which organisations emerged. With hybrid institutions, such a distinction may be more difficult to draw, or perhaps not so necessary. If two existing organisations collaborate to form a joint department, bureau or agency, this new ‘tangible’ entity may meet the criteria of an organisation, but given its novelty and the specific conditions of its formation (being the result of an explicitly collaborative or ‘hybrid’ approach), it may be considered a hybrid institution. Treating ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ synonymously is perhaps less problematic within the context of hybrid institutions.

While institutionalism relaxes the distinction between organizations and institutions, it is customary to see hybridity in terms of organisations. In practice, many hybrid arrangements exist on meso level as industries or organizational fields such as cleantech industry or innovations systems, as well as on system level (e.g. health policy). Further, in relational terms hybrids can be analysed in terms of single entities, dyads (group of two) or as triads (group of three). For instance global air travel consists of public, private and hybrid airline operators (single entity). The global airtravel is organized according to bilateral agreements (dyad) among public authorities, and global alliances consist of hybrid contracting among the partners in the alliances (triad)[14]

Hybrid institutions, although rarely discussed explicitly in the literature, have existed since the 1980s. The quangos established under the Thatcher Government, for instance, represent state-market institutional hybrids. Quangos also serve to demonstrate the neoliberal context within which the changes in institutional configurations are taking place (the ‘rolling back’ of the state and a more prominent role for the market). Moreover, the IPCC and its predecessor the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (considered below), hybrids operating between science and politics, were first established over two decades ago.

The term itself was coined by administrative economist Oliver Williamson. His original use of the term to analyse modes of governance in the private sector conflates nicely with ideas of hybrid governance more generally. Williamson explored hierarchal governance within the firm, and (self)governance of single transaction markets.[15] Williamson’s examination of the efficacy of hybrid modes of governance which combine the responsiveness, efficiency and low transaction costs of markets with the administrative and cooperative capacity within the firm resembles state-market hybrids to some extent.

Although Type II Partnerships were conceived as public-private hybrids, the private sector is involved in just 20% of partnerships, and takes the lead in only 2%.[18] Most partnerships are led by government agencies, NGOs, or existing international organisations, and the vast majority of funding comes from governments. Moreover, only 6% of partnerships involve actors from all the major categories set out: rich countries, poor countries, international organisations, NGOs, and industry. Thus, Type IIs should perhaps be considered state-non-state, rather than public-private hybrid institutions, if they can be considered hybrid institutions at all.

Because they develop out of existing institutional arrangements, hybrid institutions may be seen as reinforcing existing power structures,[19] serving as a “reinvention of existing institutions”,[20] which do not help address key institutional deficits in areas with the greatest need. This is another prominent criticism in literature on partnerships. Existing organisations seek legitimacy through successful initiatives and thus target areas which already enjoy a reasonable level of institutional capacity to boost their chances of success, meaning that weaker states and marginalised areas where the need for governance solutions is greatest are left out of the process.[21] This is rather perverse for an initiative geared toward sustainable development.

Although the partnerships have been criticised, a common criticism both of the Type IIs and multilateral policy more generally is the “minimal degree of institutionalisation”[22] seen. This serves to promote strong hybrid institutions as a potential solution to the low “implementation record of [...] multilateral partnerships”.[23] One of the more successful partnerships, The Andean Biotrade Programme, demonstrates both genuine hybridity and strongly institutionalised outcomes. The governments of 5 Andean countries, rich donor states, local and international organisations, research institutions and local communities all came together to form a Regional Biodiversity Strategy. The Strategy contains agreements on biotrade, technological development for conservation and eco-finance, a “set of intersected [issues] that have been deadlocked at the governmental level by competing interests and power inequalities”.[24] In the context of the Type II Partnerships, strong hybrid institutionalisation is indicative of, indeed a “precondition”[25] for success. By the same token, weak, informal institutionalism which demonstrates only “cosmetic or symbolic”[26] arrangements does not bear positive results.

Strong institutionalisation of partnerships in the form of monitoring procedures or implementation reviews, as well as helping ensure positive outcomes (legitimacy), also helps address a key requirement for institutions, accountability. New hybrid forms of governance make achieving accountability more difficult. Traditionally, (democratic) states are accountable to their voters, and private organisations to their members and shareholders. However, when numerous organisations act together, the picture is more complex. States are still ultimately acting on behalf of their citizens, but when acting in tandem with other sectors, or at the global level, the traditional “lines of accountability”[27] lengthen. Moreover, there is often ‘external’ accountability as well as internal, in that actors are accountable to the people in areas they affect as well as their own constituents and members. By having clear and transparent strategies, policy documents, and reporting procedures, hybrid institutions can ensure their legitimacy and accountability.

In previous examples, successful institutions are defined by strong hybridity. However, hybridity which is too strong can challenge the legitimacy of academic-scientific-private hybrids. Gulbrandsen highlights the dilemma faced by Research Institutions in their engagement with the private sector and universities. Stockholm syndrome, whereby hostages develop loyalty to their captors, is used to describe a scenario where the need for private funding jeopardises the neutrality of the research process in favour of a particular clients’ perspective. Lima syndrome, whereby the captors develop an attachment to their hostages, applies where research bodies lose sight of their role in contributing to society and becoming preoccupied with esoteric academic debates.[39] This example shows that an implied relationship between success and strong hybridity does not apply in all contexts. Indeed, weak and informally institutionalised hybrids may be necessary to retain legitimacy in some cases.