Lightning Brigade (US Army of the Cumberland 1863)

On June 23, 1863, Rosecrans deployed forces to feign an attack on Shelbyville while massing forces against Bragg's right.[19] His troops moved out toward Liberty, Bellbuckle, and Hoover's Gaps through the Highland Rim (near Beechgrove, Tennessee). On June 24 in pouring rain that would persist for 17 days (Union soldiers spread the humorous rumor during the campaign that the name Tullahoma was a combination of the Greek words "tulla", meaning "mud", and "homa", meaning "more mud".)[20][21] MGEN George H. Thomas's men, spearheaded by Colonel John T. Wilder's "Lightning Brigade",[22] made for Hoover's Gap. The brigade showed the advantage of their speed despite the weather by reaching the gap nearly 9 miles ahead of Thomas's main body.[23] Despite orders from the divisional commander, General Joseph J. Reynolds to fall back to his infantry, which was still six miles away, Wilder decided to take and hold the position.

The command surprised Confederate Colonel J. Russell Butler's 1st (3rd) Kentucky Cavalry Regiment at the entrance of the gap.[24] After skirmishing briefly and withdrawing under pressure, the rebels were unable to reach the gap before the better-fed horses of the Lightning Brigade. The Kentuckians fell apart as a unit and, unluckily for the Confederates, failed in their cavalry mission to provide intelligence of the Union movement to their higher headquarters. Although Wilder's main infantry support was well behind his mounted brigade and his division commander Major General Joseph J. Reynolds had directed him to fall back to the main force after contact, he determined to continue pushing through to seize and hold the Gap before the Confederate reinforcements could prevent him. The brigade drove the 1st Kentucky through the entire seven mile length of Hoover's Gap. At the other end, they were met with artillery fire and found out that the brigade and its one battery were outnumbered four-to-one.[25][15] The brigade had met BGEN William B. Bate's brigade of MGEN Alexander P. Stewart's division.

Wilder entrenched on the hills south of the gap and determined to hold this extremely advanced position.[23] The Bate's brigade, supported by BGEN Bushrod Johnson's brigade and some artillery, assaulted Wilder's position, but was driven back by the concentrated fire of the Spencers, losing 146 killed and wounded (almost a quarter of his force) to Wilder's 61. Colonel James Connolly, commander of the 123rd Illinois, wrote:

As soon as the enemy opened on us with their artillery we dismounted and formed line of battle on a hill just at the south entrance to the "Gap," and our battery of light artillery was opened on them, a courier was dispatched to the rear to hurry up reinforcements, our horses were sent back some distance out of the way of bursting shells, our regiment was assigned to support the battery, the other three regiments were properly disposed, and not a moment too soon, for these preparations were scarcely completed when the enemy opened on us a terrific fire of shot and shell from five different points, and their masses of infantry, with flags flying, moved out of the woods on our right in splendid style; there were three or four times our number already in sight and still others came pouring out of the woods beyond. Our regiment lay on the hill side in mud and water, the rain pouring down in torrents, while each shell screamed so close to us as to make it seem that the next would tear us to pieces.
Presently the enemy got near enough to us to make a charge on our battery, and on they came; our men are on their feet in an instant and a terrible fire from the "Spencers" causes the advancing regiment to reel and its colors fall to the ground, but in an instant their colors are up again and on they come, thinking to reach the battery before our guns can be reloaded, but they "reckoned without their host," they didn't know we had the "Spencers," and their charging yell was answered by another terrible volley, and another and another without cessation, until the poor regiment was literally cut to pieces, and but few men of that 20th Tennessee that attempted the charge will ever charge again. During all the rest of the fight at "Hoover's Gap" they never again attempted to take that battery. After the charge they moved four regiments around to our right and attempted to get in our rear, but they were met by two of our regiments posted in the woods, and in five minutes were driven back in the greatest disorder, with a loss of 250 killed and wounded.[26][25]

After a long day of combat at 1900, the brigade's morale was uplifted by the arrival of a fresh battery at the gallop which meant the XIV Corps were close behind. A half hour later, the Corps' main infantry units arrived to secure the position against any further assaults. The corps commander, General Thomas, shook Wilder's hand and told him, "You have saved the lives of a thousand men by your gallant conduct today. I didn't expect to get to this gap for three days."[27][28][29] Rosecrans also arrived on the scene. Rather than reprimand Wilder for disobeying orders, he congratulated him for doing so, telling him it would have cost thousands of lives to take the position if he had abandoned it.[30][15]

On June 25, Bate and Johnson renewed their attempts to drive the Union men out of Hoover's Gap but failed against the Lightning Brigade now with its parent division and corps. Rosecrans brought the forward movement of the Army of the Cumberland to a halt as the roads had become quagmires. Bragg took no effective action to counter Rosecrans because his cavalry commanders were not relaying intelligence to him reliably—Forrest was not informing of the weak nature of the Union right flank attack and Wheeler failed to report the movement of Crittenden's corps through Bradyville and toward Bragg's rear.[31][32][33]

As the Lighting Brigade and the 5th Division held at Hoover's Gap, Bragg soon came to realize the threat of Thomas. Meanwhile, Rosecrans shifted his forces to reinforce Thomas at the gap.[34][35][33] Unfortunately for Bragg, infrequent direct communication with William J. Hardee, his corps commander who commanded Stewart left an ignorance of Bragg's campaign strategy. That ignorance coupled with a low opinion of his commander's intellect, led Hardee to do what "he deemed best for saving an army whose commander was an idiot."[36][32] That course was to order his battered troops under Stewart at Hoover's Gap to retreat towards Wartrace. His retreat served to only make Thomas's breakout more effective, leaving Bragg with his right flank gone. To keep his army together, he had to order Polk and Hardee to withdraw to Tullahoma on June 27.[37][38][39]

John T. Wilder

The Lightning Brigade reached Manchester at 0800 on June 27, and the remainder of the division occupied the town by noon. On June 28, the brigade left on a raid to damage the railroad infrastructure in Bragg's rear, heading south toward Decherd, a small town on the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. The rain-swollen Elk River proved a significant obstacle, but they disassembled a nearby mill and constructed a raft to float their howitzers across. They defeated a small garrison of Confederates in Decherd, tore up 300 yards of track and a burned the railroad depot filled with Confederate rations. The next morning they rode into the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains, reaching the town of Sewanee where they destroyed a branch rail line. Although pursued by a larger Confederate force, the Lightning Brigade was back in Manchester by noon, June 30. They had not lost a single man on their raid.[40]

The effectiveness of the brigade led to an operational detachment from the division command while maintaining an administrative link to Reynold's division. Operationally, the brigade would act independently as a mobile reserve for the army.

With his corps commanders unnerved by the Lightning Brigade's raid, at 3 p.m. on June 30, Bragg issued orders for a nighttime withdrawal from fortifications in Tullahoma across the Elk River. By leaving before the Union assault, Bragg gave up an opportunity to inflict potentially serious damage on the Army of the Cumberland.[41][42][43][44] Initially positioned below the Elk River, Hardee and Polk felt they should retreat farther south, to the town of Cowan. In turn, their loss of nerve passed to Bragg who deemed Cowan indefensible on July 2. Without consulting his corps commanders, on July 3 Bragg ordered a retreat to Chattanooga. The army crossed the Tennessee River on July 4; a cavalry pursuit under Phil Sheridan was not successful in trapping the rear guard of Bragg's army before they crossed the river. All the Confederate units had encamped near Lookout Mountain by July 7.[45][46][47]

(August 21 – September 8, 1863)

Map of Chattanooga II Battlefield core and study areas by the American Battlefield Protection Program

Having driven Confederate forces from middle Tennessee, the Army of the Cumberland paused to refit and replenish their units. Rosecrans did not immediately pursue Bragg and "give the finishing blow to the rebellion" as Stanton urged. He paused to regroup and study the difficult choices of pursuit into mountainous regions.

On August 16, 1863, Rosecrans launched his campaign to take Chattanooga, Tennessee. The Lighting Brigade (now with an added regiment the 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry as of 10 July) played a crucial role in this campaign.[4] Rosecrans ordered the brigade to shell Chattanooga from the western side of the Tennessee River and skirmish with the main Confederate force in the city to divert attention away from the flanking column sent southwest of the city. The Lightning Brigade marched to a location northeast of Chattanooga where the Confederates could see them, reinforcing Gen. Braxton Bragg's expectations of a Union attack on the town from that direction.[48] By August 21, the brigade had deployed along the Tennessee River to the east opposite Chattanooga. Wilder ordered the 18th Indiana Light Artillery (Capt. Eli Lilly's battery) to begin shelling the town. The shells caught many soldiers and civilians in town in church observing a day of prayer and fasting. The bombardment sank two steamers docked at the landing and created a great deal of consternation amongst the Confederates.[48]

Continuing periodically over the next two weeks, the shelling helped keep Bragg's attention to the northeast while the bulk of Rosecrans's army crossed the Tennessee River well west and south of Chattanooga. The diversion was successful, with Bragg concentrating his army east of Chattanooga. When Bragg learned on September 8 that the Union army was in force southwest of the city, he abandoned Chattanooga and marched his Army of Tennessee into Georgia. Bragg's army marched down the LaFayette Road and camped in the city of LaFayette.[48]

(September 11–12, 1863) As Rosecrans moved his forces south and west, the heavily wooded and hilly terrain soon had 60 miles of separation between his three making mutual support nearly impossible. It gradually dawned on him that Bragg's Army was neither demoralized nor in disarray. It was not defeated. Bragg attacked General James S. Negley's isolated division of the Union XIV Corps, commanded by George H. Thomas, before Rosecrans could concentrate the rest of his army across Chickamauga Creek near Davis' Cross Roads. Negley retreated and met up with the rest of the XIV Corps. Thomas confirmed to Rosecrans that the rebels were not falling back as they had previously believed but instead seemed to be massing for an imminent attack. Concerned about mutual support, Thomas and McCook made plans to shift their corps closer together to the north.[49]

Meanwhile on 11 September, the Lightning Brigade, attached to Crittenden's XXI Corps[50] advanced from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Ringgold, GA. There it skirmished with and defeated COL John S. Scott's brigade of John Pegram's Division of Forrest's Cavalry Corps and then drove off Confederate reinforcements. It returned to the mill by nightfall. The following morning, it was again ordered to advance to Ringgold. Four miles short of the town, it again ran into elements of Pegram's Division. After dispersing these units, Wilder found that Strahl's Brigade of Cheatham's Division of Polk's Corps had cut the brigade's route back to the mill. Although the Lightning Brigade was surrounded, the rebels unsure of its identity, size, and strength, did not press home an attack.[16][51]

At nightfall, the Wilder deceived the Confederates by spreading campfires over a large area to make the Confederates believe his force was much larger. He formed four of his regiments and the battery into a defensive perimeter and had the fifth, the 72nd Indiana look for an escape route. After successfully locating an exit, the brigade withdrew back to XXI Corps without the loss of a man.[52] As they rode away at dawn, they heard the rebels attacking their former encampment.[53][54]

(September 19–20, 1863)

September 18 movements on the eve of the Battle of Chickamauga

Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his scattered forces near Stevens Gap.[55][56] For the next four days, both armies attempted to improve their dispositions. Rosecrans continued to concentrate his forces, intending to withdraw as a single body to Chattanooga. By September 17, the three Union corps were now much less vulnerable to individual defeat. Reinforced with two divisions arriving from Virginia under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, and a division from Mississippi under BGEN Bushrod R. Johnson, Bragg decided to move his army northward on the morning of 18th and advance toward Chattanooga, forcing Rosecrans's army to fight or to withdraw. If Rosecrans fought, he risked being driven back into McLemore's Cove.

The Lightning Brigade was sent to defend Alexander's Bridge over the Chickamauga on 17 September. The 92nd Illinois detached to protect the army's line if communication back to Chattanooga. The next day, 18 September, the Lightning Brigade blocked the crossing against the approach of W.H.T. Walker's Corps. Armed with Spencer repeating rifles and Capt. Lilly's four guns of the 18th Indiana Battery, the brigade held off a brigade of BGEN St. John Liddell's division,[57] which suffered 105 casualties against Wilder's superior firepower. Walker moved his men downstream a mile to Lambert's Ford, an unguarded crossing, and was able to cross around 1630, considerably behind schedule. Wilder, concerned about his left flank after Minty's loss of Reed's Bridge, withdrew the brigade to a new blocking position near the Viniard farm.[58][59][60][61] By dark, Bushrod Johnson's division had halted in front of Wilder's position. Walker had crossed the creek, but his troops were well scattered along the road behind Johnson.[62][63][64][65][66]

Although Bragg had achieved some degree of surprise, he failed to exploit it strongly. Rosecrans, observing the dust raised by the marching Confederates in the morning, anticipated Bragg's plan. He ordered Thomas and McCook to Crittenden's support, and while the Confederates were crossing the creek, Thomas began to arrive in Crittenden's rear area.[67][68][69][65][66][64]

Actions, early afternoon of September 19

Through the morning to midday of 19 September, the Lightning Brigade held its position as a reserve near Viniard farm as the battle began. As the battle progressed, the front developed in a north south direction just west of Chickamauga Creek. Viniard farm was just right of the Union Center held by MGEN Alexander McDowell McCook's XX Corps.

At around 2 p.m, the Johnson's division (Hood's corps) forced Union BGEN Jefferson C. Davis's two brigade division of the XX corps back across the LaFayette Road. Johnson to continue the advance with two brigades in line and one in reserve. On the right, COL John Fulton's brigade routed King's brigade and linked up with Bate at Brotherton field. On the left, the Lighting Brigade in its reserve position repulsed BGEN John Gregg's brigade with heavy losses. Gregg was seriously wounded and his brigade advance halted. The brigade also repulsed BGEN Evander McNair's brigade, called up from the rear, when they attacked.[70][71][72][73][74][75]

Actions, late afternoon to dark, September 19

As the battle continued, the Union line was pushed back north to the Viniard house with elements of the XXI Corps attacked by Hood's corps on the brigade's left. These units were pushed behind the brigade's line. Hood's Corps advanced so close to Rosecrans's new headquarters at the Glenn Cabin leading to a significant risk of a Federal rout in this part of the line. At this point the Lighting Brigade's superior firepower from their Spencers eventually held back the Confederate advance, fighting from behind a drainage ditch.[71] [76][77][78][74][79]

Longstreet's Left Wing assaults, mid-day September 20

Starting about 0930 on 20 September, the battle resumed primarily to the left (north) of the brigade. Bragg soon ordered his entire line to advance. By 1100, Longstreet had assembled a column of 10,000 men to attack the Union center. The attack succeeded aided by a gap left by a rearranged Union line.

As the attack rapidly turned into a Union rout in the center around 1300, the Lightning brigade was ordered to counterattack against BGEN Arthur Manigault's brigade of Hood's Division from its reserve position. It launched a strong advance with its superior firepower, driving the enemy around and through what became known as "Bloody Pond". Having blunted the Confederate advance, Wilder planned to capitalize on this success by attacking the flank of Hood's column. His plan was to attack through Hood on Longstreet's left flank and on to Thomas.[80]

Unfortunately, the opportunity was lost when Wilder had to see to Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana who proclaimed that the battle was lost and demanded to be escorted to Chattanooga.[81] Some controversy exists on whether Dana ordered Wilder to not make the attack, but retreat.In the time that Wilder took to arrange a small detachment to escort him back to safety, the opportunity for a successful attack was lost and he ordered his men to withdraw to the west.[82][71][83][84] [85][86]

The brigade remained cut off on the other side of Dyer Road south of Thomas's final position on Horseshoe Ridge. At 1630, Wilder received the order to retreat to Chattanooga. After darkness, the brigade mounted and retreated north. As they withdrew, the collected the details from the 92nd Illinois and kept the road open and the rebels at a distance during Thomas' retreat from Snodgrass Hill.[87][88][89]

Through the battle, the brigade had performed exceedingly well making good use of their Spencers. They were one of the few units south of Horseshoe Ridge that did not panic and retreat but successfully attacked. They departed the field intact and in good order.