Logical behaviorism

In the philosophy of mind, logical behaviorism (also known as analytical behaviorism)[1] is the thesis that mental concepts can be explained in terms of behavioral concepts.[2]

Logical behaviorism was first stated by the Vienna Circle, especially Rudolf Carnap.[2] Other philosophers with sympathies for behaviorism included C. G. Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine (1960).[2][3] A more moderate form of analytical behaviorism was put forward by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949).[4][2]

See also

References
  1. Alex Barber, Robert J Stainton (eds.), Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Elsevier, 2010, p. 33.
  2. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Behaviorism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Hempel, C. G. The Logical Analysis of psychology. 1935.
  4. Neil Tennant, Introducing Philosophy: God, Mind, World, and Logic, Routledge, 2015, p. 299.


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