Megarian decree
The Megarian Decree was a set of economic sanctions levied upon Megara c. 432 BC by the Athenian Empire shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The ostensible reason for the decree was the Megarians' supposed trespass on land sacred to Demeter known as the Hiera Orgas, the killing of the Athenian herald who was sent to their city to reproach them and giving shelter to slaves who had fled from Athens.
In all likelihood, it was an act of revenge by the Athenians for the treacherous behaviour of the Megarians some years earlier. It may also have been a deliberate provocation towards Sparta on the part of Pericles, who was the sponsor of the decree.
The decree banned Megarians from harbours and marketplaces throughout the large Athenian Empire, which effectively strangled the Megarian economy. The sanctions would have also affected Megara's allies and may have been seen as a move by Athens to weaken its rivals and to extend its influence. The ban strained the fragile peace between Athens and Sparta, which was allied with the strategically located Megara.
Significance
The extent to which the decree encouraged the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War is the subject of debate.[1] The primary source for the war, Thucydides, puts very little emphasis upon the decree in his analysis of the cause of the war and treats it as a pretext on the part of the Spartans. Thucydides considers the true cause of the war to be Sparta's fear of Athens' growing empire. He does not describe the decree in detail, unlike for the conflicts over Potidaea and Corcyra.
The main evidence for the significance of the decree is Aristophanes, an ancient playwright and satirist of the time. His play The Acharnians (II.530-7) mentions how the decree left the Megarians "slowly starving" and caused them to appeal to the Spartans for aid. Another of Aristophanes's plays, Peace, also mentions how war was being brewed in Megara by the god of war.
Oblique references to the decree in Thucydides seems to suggest its importance since the Spartans state that "war could be avoided if Athens would revoke the Megarian decree".[2] However, Thucydides also reports that the Spartans had sought a declaration of war from the Peloponnesian League during the rebellion of Samos in 440, well before the Megarian decree had been passed.
Donald Kagan interprets the decree as an attempt by Athens to solve a problem without breaking the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta. Megara had injured Athens in a way that required some meaningful response, but Athens openly attacking the Spartan ally would violate the peace. Athens thus imposed the embargo, which was meant to show other Spartan allies that Athens had commercial means of punishing attackers who were under Sparta's military protection. Thus, the decree could be seen as an attempt to avoid provoking Sparta.[3]
De Ste. Croix's revisionist interpretation
The historical revisionist G. E. M. de Ste. Croix argues that a trade sanction would not significantly affect Megara as the decree applied only to Megarian citizens although the majority of trade in all cities was likely conducted by metics (foreigners or outsiders), who would be unaffected by a ban on citizens of Megara.
De Ste. Croix also highlights the uncertainty regarding the context in which the decree was passed. At the beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War, the Athenians invaded Megara twice a year with large forces to ravage their land and maintained a naval blockade. After six years, there were few or no remaining crops, which may account for the "starvation" suggested in The Acharnians.[4] De Ste. Croix also points out that the decree would have been only effective in a context prior to the war for one year since the Megarians would have had no right of entry to markets in any war situation.
References
- Summarized in Buckley, T., Aspects of Greek History, (London, 1996), chapter 17.
- Thuc. 1.139 (trans. Warner, R. (Penguin, 1954).
- http://oyc.yale.edu/classics/clcv-205/lecture-19 about 18:00-19:00
- Summarized in Buckley, T., Aspects of Greek History, (London, 1996), chapter 17.