Robert L. Ghormley

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, by the Japanese Imperial Navy using fast offensive aircraft carrier forces wrought destruction on the American battleships there at anchor. This dramatically changed the strategic and tactical (doctrinal) emphasis of the U.S. Navy for the rest of World War II. Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, the battleship was widely accepted and held as the supreme weapon of naval power. The attack from aircraft launched by carriers made it clear that air power had instantly superseded the battleship as the primary asset of naval power. In the days after the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. Navy attempted to immediately reinforce Wake Island, and dispatched Vice Admiral William Halsey Jr.[11] on raids against various enemy held islands.

In addition, naval intelligence had decoded transmissions indicating an attack on Midway Island,[12] which if taken by the Japanese would have immediately threatened Hawaii. All of the pressing needs to protect and retaliate required the use of the few aircraft carriers then available, along with their escort and support ships. Into the summer months of 1942, the United States struggled on a "shoestring" to rush an offensive force consisting of the 1st Marine Division (11,000 men) commanded by Marine Major General Alexander Vandegrift and supported by two carrier task forces (Saratoga and Wasp). The plan, called Operation Watchtower, was to immediately attack, seize, and hold the Solomon Islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi.[13]

Naval Academy Classmates, now admirals, in Pacific in November 1943: Calhoun, Towers, Ghormley and Fitch.

It was into these critical early days of the Solomons Campaign that Vice Admiral Ghormley was rush-assigned command of South Pacific (COMSOPAC) on the recommendations of Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. It is possible that Ghormley was appointed to the position over other commanders with superior carrier and aviation expertise and experience because of his association with President Roosevelt. Nimitz's choice was Admiral William S. Pye, but since Pye had recalled the Wake Island relief attempt, Admiral King was hostile to Pye.[14] Vice Admiral Ghormley had last held sea command in 1938 on the battleship Nevada and had not been back to a sea command since. And, in addition, he had never commanded a carrier. Upon taking command as COMSOPAC, Ghormley had only the carriers Saratoga and Wasp, later joined by Enterprise.

Ghormley's performance appeared to be lackluster and pessimistic, as reflected in his continuing reports to Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor, to which Admiral King took exceptional note. Ghormley had been directed through original operational orders by Admiral King to "personally oversee" the Guadalcanal/Tulagi attacks by U.S. forces, meaning he was expected to be on site or in the immediate area of conflict.[14] However, Ghormley was either absent in the early planning phases and subsequent invasions or else holed up in his headquarters once he finally moved to Nouméa, more than 900 miles (1,400 km) from Guadalcanal. He apparently was overwhelmed by the quick developments of the overall operation as well as lack of immediate resources, paperwork, myriad details and petty political squabbling caused by New Caledonia's French government hosts, rather than being present in the immediate conflict areas. It was noted that Ghormley failed to set foot on Guadalcanal or to make himself "visible" to combat forces as a morale presence.

Ghormley also conveyed weak or indecisive communications to his commanders and was absent at critical planning meetings, which were marked by vociferous arguments between Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Richmond K. Turner over the length of time that carriers would be able to provide air cover to landing forces and supply ships. Fletcher seemed to place more concern on protecting the aircraft carriers and on the overall fuel needs of the fleet over the immediate support requirements of the invasion force. Part of the problem was also due to Fletcher's attempts to interpret Admiral Nimitz's dictum against over-exposure of carriers to attack unless more damage could be inflicted upon the enemy; Admiral Fletcher was left to interpret this rather than Vice Admiral Ghormley, and Fletcher's interpretation was seen as over-cautious. The heated arguments aside, Ghormley had assigned Fletcher as the Commander, Expeditionary Force who had overriding authority to move carrier air support out of the battle area. After only 36 hours, and with at least two to three days (estimate as high as five by Turner) needed to unload supplies to the Marines fighting on Guadalcanal, Fletcher ordered carriers to pull out of the immediate critical invasion operation, leaving many supply ships unloaded and vulnerable to Japanese attack, and with no carrier air support for ground forces.

As a result of all these mitigating circumstances, problems and misjudgments, both Admirals Nimitz and King became highly concerned with the precarious state of the conflict and Ghormley's ability to command in a sound manner. In consequence, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey flew to Nouméa on October 16, 1942 to interview Ghormley and his staff. It became apparent to Admiral Nimitz that Ghormley and his staff did not have answers to serious questions that they should have had.

Ghormley during a inspection of the fire equipment at Manana Naval Barracks, Hawaii, August 1944.

Dismayed by Ghormley's shortcomings, on October 18 Admiral Nimitz replaced him with Vice Admiral Halsey, who quickly and decisively took leadership command and fully restored the balance of trust. Placing Halsey in charge demonstrated that the job had required a decisive, aggressive and trained battle carrier admiral. As Ghormley should have done from the beginning, Halsey had no problem with making frequent numerous appearances and taking the lead.[15] Some time later, according to Elmer B. Potter, the biographer of Nimitz, Ghormley "was found to be suffering from abscessed teeth, possibly the main cause of his shortcomings as ComSoPac."[16]

Following his dismissal from South Pacific Force, Ghormley served in Washington, D.C., attached to the headquarters, United States Fleet under Admiral Ernest J. King, before he was ordered to Hawaii as Commandant of the 14th Naval District in February 1943. While in this capacity, he was responsible for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, and islands to westward, including Midway, and Johnston. Ghormley served in this capacity until October 1944, when he was relieved by Rear admiral William R. Furlong and ordered to European Theater of Operations for new assignment. He was decorated with Legion of Merit for his service on Hawaii.[9][17]

In December 1944, Ghormley became Commander, United States Naval Forces Germany with additional duty as Senior Naval member of the Group Control Council for Germany, and served in that position for the rest of the War and was responsible for the directing of effective organization in carrying out the demilitarization of the German Navy and the collection of valuable intelligence material. He was decorated with Navy Distinguished Service Medal and returned to the United States in December 1945. He spent his last months of active duty as a member of the General Board, at the Navy Department, and retired on August 1, 1946, completing 40 years on active duty.[9][17]