Subreption
Subreption (Latin: subreptio, the act of stealing, and Latin surripere, to take away secretly;[1] German: Erschleichung) is a legal concept in Roman law and in the canon law of the Catholic Church, and a philosophical concept.
Origin of the term
The term originates from Roman law. Subreption was "a late Roman juridical term describing the introductionof false evidence into a legal proceeding".[2]
Philosophy
In German philosophy, the concept of subreption was used by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant.
Christian Wolff
During early modern period in Europe, the meaning of "subreption" changed. "[W]riters began to speak of the error of subreption in a more general sense, as opposed to the [Ancient Roman] legal concept of a crime of subreption. Among the German rationalist philosophers who continued to circulate, refine, and redefine the term in the eighteenth century, Christian Wolff stands out as particularly significant for Kant's interest in subreption. Wolff defines the vitium subreptionis as a confusion of "knowing" (erkennen) with "experiencing" (erfahren), which we commit whenever we think ourselves to be experiencing something that is merely a product of the intellect. This was the main meaning attached to the term as it was adopted into general scholarly usage in Germany by the middle of the eighteenth century."[3]
Kant
Kant adopted the term subreption in his early work. For Kant in his Inaugural dissertation "[w]hen we attach a predicate involving sensible conditions to a concept of the understanding, we must bear in mind that it merely denotes conditions 'in the absence of which a given concept would not be sensitively cognizable'. If we deceive ourselves into thinking that the predication has some objective force (that is, that it has anything to say about the conditions of possibility of the object itself), we cross over into subreption. For Kant, the error of subreption is thus the conflation of a 'sensitive condition, under which alone the intuition of an object is possible' and 'a condition of the possibility itself of the object'". In the same dissertation, an example of subreption for Kant is the axiom "every actual multiplicity can be given numerically, and thus every magnitude is finite"; Kant considers this axiom to be subreptive because the concept of time is introduced surreptitiously as, Kant says, the "means for giving form to the concept of the predicate". This axiom implies that the infinity is impossible in itself, however Kant argues that infinity is not impossible in itself, but that infinity is only impossible to imagine for the human mind because said mind relies on sensitive conditions.[4]
Catholic canon law
In the canon law of the Catholic Church, obreption and subreption and have specific meanings.[5]
References
- "Definition of SUBREPTION". www.merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 2021-01-19.
- "Kant and the Error of Subreption", The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist, Stanford University Press, p. 78, 2010-07-20, ISBN 978-0-8047-7017-0, retrieved 2021-01-19
- "Kant and the Error of Subreption", The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist, Stanford University Press, pp. 78–79, 2010-07-20, ISBN 978-0-8047-7017-0, retrieved 2021-01-19
- "Kant and the Error of Subreption", The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist, Stanford University Press, pp. 80, 181, 2010-07-20, ISBN 978-0-8047-7017-0, retrieved 2021-01-19
- "CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Subreption". www.newadvent.org. Retrieved 2021-01-19.
Further readings
- Hall, John; Dunlap, Alexander; Mitchell-Nelson, Joe (2016). "Subreption, radical institutionalism, and economic evolution". Panoeconomicus. 63 (4): 475–492. doi:10.2298/PAN1604475H. ISSN 1452-595X.