Thomas Metzinger
Thomas Metzinger (born 12 March 1958) is a German philosopher and professor of theoretical philosophy at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz. As of 2011, he is an Adjunct Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, a co-founder of the German Effective Altruism Foundation, president of the Barbara Wengeler Foundation, and on the advisory board of the Giordano Bruno Foundation. From 2008 to 2009 he served as a Fellow at the Berlin Institute for Advanced Study; from 2014 to 2019 he was a Fellow at the Gutenberg Research College; from 2019 to 2021 he was awarded a Senior-Forschungsprofessur by the Ministry of Science, Education and Culture. From 2018 to 2020 Metzinger worked as a member of the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence.
Thomas Metzinger | |
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Metzinger in 2011 | |
Born | |
Era | Contemporary philosophy |
Region | Western philosophy |
Main interests | |
Notable ideas | Phenomenal Self model (PSM) |
Influenced
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Work
Metzinger has been active since the early 1990s in the promotion of consciousness studies as an academic endeavour. As a co-founder, he has been particularly active in the organization of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC), and sat on the board of directors of that organisation from 1995 to 2008. He served as president of the ASSC in 2009/10. Metzinger is director of the MIND group and was president of the German cognitive science society from 2005 to 2007. In English he has published two edited works, Conscious Experience (1995), and Neural correlates of consciousness: empirical and conceptual issues (2000). The latter book arose out of the second ASSC meeting, for which he acted as local organizer. In 2015, together with Jennifer M. Windt, he published the Open MIND-collection, containing more than 100 original, peer-reviewed open access-papers from philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and neuroscience. A follow-up project (2017) was Philosophy and Predictive Processing-collection.
In 2003 Metzinger published the monograph Being No One. In this book he argues that no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. He argues that the phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In 2009 Metzinger published a follow-up book to Being No One for a general audience: The Ego Tunnel (Basic Books, New York, ISBN 0-465-04567-7).
Metzinger's work addresses some of the fundamental issues in neurobiology, consciousness, and the relationship between mind and body.
Metzinger's interests include:
- Philosophy of mind (esp. philosophical aspects of empirical theories in the neuro- and cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence, and related areas of research).
- Ethics (esp. conceptual connections between applied ethics, the philosophy of mind and anthropology)
He is currently serving on the editorial board for the journal Neuroscience of Consciousness.
Bibliography
- Monographs
- (1985) Neuere Beiträge zur Diskussion des Leib-Seele-Problems. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, ISBN 3-8204-8927-4
- (1993) Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation. mentis, Paderborn, ISBN 3-89785-081-8
- (2003) Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts., ISBN 0-262-13417-9 (Hardcover)/ISBN 0262633086 (Paperback)
- (2009) The Ego Tunnel - The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self Basic Books, New York, ISBN 0-465-04567-7
- (2009) Der Ego-Tunnel - Eine neue Philosophie des Selbst: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinsethik Berlin Verlag, Berlin, ISBN 3-8270-0630-9
- (2010) Der Ego Tunnel. Eine neue Philosophie des Selbst: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinsethik. Berlin: Berlin Verlag. eBook ISBN 978-3-8270-7037-1
- (2011) Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Kindle edition; ASIN: B004ELBJ56
- Editorship
- (1995) Bewußtsein – Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie., Paderborn, mentis, Paderborn, ISBN 3-89785-012-5
- (1995) Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic, Thorverton und mentis, Paderborn, ISBN 0-907845-10-X (Hardcover)
- (2000) Neural Correlates of Consciousness – Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts., ISBN 0-262-13370-9 (Hardcover)
- (2006) Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes – Band 1: Phänomenales Bewusstsein mentis, Paderborn, ISBN 3-89785-551-8
- (2007) Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes – Band 2: Das Leib-Seele-Problem mentis, Paderborn, ISBN 3-89785-552-6
- (2010) Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes – Band 3: Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation mentis Paderborn, ISBN 978-3-89785-553-3. All three volumes can be purchased for 78 Euros, ISBN 978-3-89785-554-0.
- (2015, with Jennifer M. Windt). Open MIND-collection, Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. ISBN 978-3-95857-102-0.
- (2017, with Wanja Wiese). Philosophy and Predictive Processing-collection, Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. ISBN 978-3-95857-138-9.
- (2020, with Raphaël Millière). Radical Disruptions of Self-Consciousness, Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. ISSN 2699-0369.
- Selected articles and book chapters
- (2003; with Vittorio Gallese) The emergence of a shared action ontology: building blocks for a theory In G. Knoblich, B. Elsner, G. von Aschersleben, und T. Metzinger (eds), Self and Action. Special issue of Consciousness and Cognition (12:4), 549-571.
- (2003) Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 353-393. doi:10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb.
- (2003) Phänomenale Transparenz und kognitive Selbstbezugnahme In U. Haas-Spohn (Hrsg.), Intentionalität zwischen Subjektivität und Weltbezug. Paderborn: mentis. Seite 411-459.
- (2003) Why are identity-disorders interesting for philosophers? In Thomas Schramme und Johannes Thome (Hrsg.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. Berlin: de Gruyter. S. 311-25.
- Précis of "Being No One" In PSYCHE - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, 11 (5), 1-35.
- (2005) Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a "soul". Mind and Matter, 3(1), 57-84.
- (2005) Die Selbstmodell-Theorie der Subjektivität: Eine Kurzdarstellung in sechs Schritten In C. S. Herrmann, M. Pauen, J. W. Rieger und S. Schicktanz (Hrsg.), Bewusstsein: Philosophie, Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Stuttgart: UTB/Fink . S. 242-269.
- (2006) Being No One – Eine sehr kurze deutsche Zusammenfassung. In Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes – Band 1: Phänomenales Bewusstsein. S. 424-475.
- (2006) Conscious volition and mental representation: Towards a more fine-grained analysis In N. Sebanz und W. Prinz (Hrsg.), Disorders of Volition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. S. 19-48.
- (2007; with B. Lenggenhager, T. Tadi und O. Blanke) Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness Science, 317, 1096-1099.
- (2008) Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: A brief summary with examples In Rahul Banerjee and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 168: 215-246. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- (2009; mit O. Blanke) Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.,Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13(1): 7-13.
- (2010) The No-Self-Alternative Chapter 11 in S. Gallagher (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 279-296.
- (2011a; with Elisabeth Hildt). Cognitive Enhancement . In J. Illes and B.J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. P. 245-264.
- (2013a) Why are dreams interesting for philosophers?? Frontiers in Psychology, 4: 746.
- (2013b) The Myth of Cognitive Agency. Frontiers in Psychology, 4:931.
- (2014d). First-order embodiment, second-order embodiment, third-order embodiment: From spatiotemporal self-location to minimal phenomenal selfhood (Chapter 26). In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. London: Routledge. pp. 272–286.
- (2015c, with Jennifer M. Windt) What does it mean to have an open mind? (General Introduction to Open MIND-collection). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. ISBN 978-3-95857-104-4.
- (2015t). M-Autonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22 (11-12), 270-302.
- (2016c). Suffering. In Kurt Almqvist & Anders Haag (eds.), The Return of Consciousness. Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation.
- (2017e). The Problem of Mental Action: Predictive Control without Sensory Sheets. In T. Metzinger and W. Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
- (2018a). Towards a Global Artificial Intelligence Charter. In European Parliament (ed.), Should we fear artificial intelligence? PE 614.547
- (2018f). Why is virtual reality interesting for philosophers? Frontiers in Robotics and AI 5: 292. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2018.00101.
- (2019). Dretske on Transparency. In M. Frauchiger [ed.], Themes from Dretske. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, ed. by W. K. Essler, D. Føllesdal, and M. Frauchiger, vol. 6) Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
- (2020). Minimal phenomenal experience: Meditation, tonic alertness, and the phenomenology of “pure” consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger, & Raphaël Millière, Radical Disruptions of Self-Consciousness. Special Issue of Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 7. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.46
- DVD set
- (2009) Philosophie des Bewusstseins (5 DVDs)- 15 Vorlesungen an der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz vom Wintersemester 2007/2008 Auditorium-Netzwerk.
External links
- English Homepage
- Open MIND - A large, edited collection of peer-reviewed open-access papers is available there.
- Philosophy and Predictive Processing - A more recent, edited collection of peer-reviewed open-access papers.
- Papers on Mind Wandering
- Papers on Out-of-body experiences
- Guest on the Sam Harris Podcast 2017
- Are We Already Living in Virtual Reality? Profile in The New Yorker, April2, 2018
- Public Lecture on Spirituality and Intellectual Honesty
- Corresponding open-access essay
- Scholarpedia article on Self Models
- "The transparent avatar in your brain", TED talk at TEDx Barcelona, 17 May 2013
- "Are you sleepwalking now?", Aeon, January 2018.
- Benevolent Artificial Anti-Natalism (BAAN) thought experiment, Edge
- Body-representation and self-consciousness, Lecture given at the Max-Planck-Institute for Mathematics (Leipzig, 27 February 2013)
- Video of 2004 Foerster lecture at UC Berkeley
- List of publications
- Free downloads
- Multimedia links
- Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
- Neuroethics Webportal
- MIND Group
- Tony Sobrado Podcast 2017
- Guest on All in the Mind with Natasha Mitchell
- Brain Science Podcast with Dr. Ginger Campbell