Truppenführung

First page of von Moltke's Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, 1869

Truppenführung has its doctrinal origins in the late 19th century Prussian Army although its traditions go back to the Scharnhorst reforms of 1810–1812. The modern basis of this Field Manual can be seen in the reforms of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder in the mid 19th century. It was in Moltke’s "Instructions for Large Unit Commanders" and his concept of separated armies from which modern German doctrine emerged. The system of moving units separately and concentrating as an army before a battle, resulted in more efficient supply and lower vulnerability to modern firepower. To enable a successful flanking attack, he asserted that concentration could only take place after the commencement of a battle. This was a development of the Scharnhorst concept of "March Divided, Fight United".

A consequence of this innovation was the commander's loss of overall control of his forces, due to the limits of means of communication which, at that time were visual (line-of-sight) or couriers, either mounted or on foot. The traditional concept of the elimination of uncertainty by means of total obedience became obsolete and operational initiative had to be delegated to a point further down the chain of command. In this new concept, commanders of distant detachments were required to exercise initiative in their decision making and Moltke emphasised the benefits of developing officers, who could do this within the limits of the senior commander’s intention.

He accomplished this by means of directives stating his intentions, rather than detailed orders and was willing to accept deviations from a directive, provided that it was within the framework of the mission. Moltke held this view firmly and it later became a fundamental of all German military theory. Other theorists were critical but Moltke’s insistence that local commanders be allowed freedom of action, has been defended by many German writers together with the concept that large armies made a loose style of command necessary. Prussian and German Field Service Regulations published after 1870 confirm this concept and it is listed, word for word, in Truppenführung of 1933:

Section 15

Every man, from the youngest soldier upward, must be required at all times and in all situations to commit his whole mental, spiritual and physical strength. Only in this way will the full force of a unit be brought to bear in decisive action. Only thus will men develop, who will in the hour of danger maintain their courage and decisiveness and carry their weaker comrades with them to achieve deeds of daring.

The first criterion in war remains decisive action. Everyone from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must be constantly aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.[3] (emphasis in the original text)

At the beginning of the First World War, the German armed forces were using a set of Field Service Regulations which had been issued in 1905. Their doctrine drew heavily on Clausewitz and von Moltke the Elder but the main influence was that of General Alfred von Schlieffen, then Chief of the General Staff. Many in the German army of the period did not accept some of Clausewitz's concepts such as the importance of the defense and the relationship between war and politics. Although the traditional image of stagnation and trench warfare is correct, this period also produced many of the tactical concepts which are associated with modern warfare. On the defense (1915–1917) they pioneered and mastered: flexible defense, defense-in-depth and reverse-slope defense. On the offense in 1918, they perfected fluid non-linear infiltration tactics supported by artillery (cf. Stormtrooper).

After the end of World War I, the Reichswehr, under the direction of General Hans von Seeckt, very carefully studied the conduct and developments of the war. The result of the von Seeckt reforms was the new tactical doctrine manual H. Dv.487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen ("Command and Battle of the Combined Arms"), now generally known as das Fug, published as Part 1 in 1921 and Part 2 in 1923.

An important introduction in the post-World War I reforms was the introduction of Auftragstaktik, which can be translated as "Mission Command" (U.K. forces definition) or "Mission-Type Orders, or Directive Control" (United States forces) and mission-type tactics (Federal German Army). The principle is that the senior commander states his intention (the mission) to his subordinate commanders. He informs them of the mission, the available means and the timeframe within which the mission has to be accomplished. He then places mission planning and execution in the hands of his subordinates and holds himself available to offer helpful advice and suggestions, but only if requested.

For Auftragstaktik to work, it is necessary that a subordinate leader, or even a common soldier, has to fully understand the commander’s intent, also to the next higher level of command, and the purpose of the mission. If he does not understand, then he has the obligation to ask.

In 1925, von Seeckt noted

The principal thing now is to increase the responsibilities of the individual soldier, particularly his independence of action, with the profitable result of increasing the capability of the individual.

The impact of das Fug and Truppenführung on the Reichswehr and later the Heer, was wide-ranging.

1. The delegation of command responsibility throughout the army, as necessary for the accomplishment of a mission and, if required, down to the individual soldier.
2. The removal of social barriers between officers and men where the command relationship is based upon mutual respect, trust and confidence, as described in Truppenführung sections 7 and 12.
3. The preparation for the introduction of aircraft, armored units and combined-arms units some years before the first armored division was formed in the Heer.
4. The concept that the conduct of operations cannot be defined or laid down in field manuals, or other regulations which inhibit a commanders’ flexibility.

Truppenführung in this sense was not a set of rules but rather a set of intellectual tools which could be consulted at any time and which would provide intellectual stimulus in any given situation. The unpredictable and chaotic nature of warfare is specifically referred to in the following sections of the manual (quoted in full):

Section 2 The conduct of war is subject to continual development. New weapons dictate ever-changing forms. Their appearance must be anticipated and their influence evaluated. They must be placed in service quickly.

Section 4 Lessons in the art of war cannot be exhaustively compiled in the form of regulations. The principles enunciated must be applied in accordance with the situation. Simple actions, logically carried out will lead most surely to the objective.

Section 6 The command of an army and its subordinate units requires leaders capable of judgement, with clear vision and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions and carry them out unwaveringly and positively. Such leaders must be impervious to the changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders.

• Bell, Harry J. & Hughes, Daniel J.; Moltke on The Art of War, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1993; ISBN 0-89141-484-3
• Clausewitz, General Carl von The Campaign of 1812 in Russia; Greenhill Books, London 1992; ISBN 1-85367-114-2
• Cooper, Matthew; The German Army 1933-45; MacDonald and Jane’s, London; ISBN 0-354-01057-3
• Corum, James S.; The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform; University Press of Kansas 1992; ISBN 0-7006-0541-X

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