5th Division (South Vietnam)

The Division was originally established as the 3rd Field Division and redesignated as the 5th Infantry Division in 1960.[1]^:298

In the 1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt, the loyalist Colonel Nguyễn Văn Thiệu used the Division to storm into Saigon to save President Ngô Đình Diệm.

However, in the successful coup attempt of 1963, Thiệu rebelled and the Division along with the rest of the III Corps of Tôn Thất Đính, attacked Saigon. Thiệu himself led the successful siege on Gia Long Palace. As a result, the leading generals made Thiệu a general.

The Division was largely composed of Nùng people until about 1965 when its composition was increasingly ethnic Vietnamese and the Nùngs moved into MIKE Force units.[2]^:72

The principal sub-units of the division were the 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Regiments and the 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 9th Infantry Regiment (Divine Elephant) was based at Quan Loi near An Lộc. The 1st ACR was based at the division's forward base camp at Lai Khe.

On the morning of 10 June 1965 during the Battle of Đồng Xoài, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment was landed by helicopter near the Thuận Lợi rubber plantation, about 4 kilometres north of Đồng Xoài where they were ambushed by Viet Cong forces suffering heavy losses.[3]^:339 The Division's US adviser reported that the commander, General Phạm Quốc Thuần, had "gone to pieces" over the mauling his 7th Regiment had received and the unit was notorious for its high desertion rate.[2]^:115

In 1966 US advisers regarded the Division and the 25th Division as the two worst units in the ARVN. Both divisions guarded the approaches to Saigon, but the brunt of the fighting had been assumed by US combat units, the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions and three separate brigades. Under their protection, the two divisions performed static security missions, but rather than using this respite to regroup and retrain their forces, or to hunt down the local VC, the Vietnamese commanders had let their units degenerate through inactivity, and US advisers now rated them lower than even the neighboring RF/PF. In early May General Westmoreland ordered the US 1st and 25th Divisions to "start working more closely with elements of these two [South Vietnamese] divisions on operations in order to improve their morale, efficiency and effectiveness." He suggested a "buddy" effort, matching the US 1st and the Division and the US 25th and the ARVN 25th Divisions.[2]^:184–5 In mid-May the new US 1st Division commander, General William E. DePuy had one of his three brigades supporting the Division. Initially each unit contributed one infantry battalion to the project. Combined activities consisted of small unit patrolling, village seals and searches, propaganda campaigns, intelligence collection efforts, and various civic improvement projects. In July, however, with the bulk of his units engaged in heavy fighting north of Saigon, DePuy had to abandon the combined operations task force concept. Thereafter, DePuy monitored and supported the Division's activities in Bình Dương Province through his 2nd Brigade headquarters, only occasionally assigning ground units to the effort.[2]^:185–6

From 24 April to 17 May 1966 the Division participated in Operation Birmingham with the US 1st Infantry Division against the VC 9th Division in Tây Ninh Province.[4]^:308

From 19 May to 13 July 1966 the Division participated in Operation El Paso with the US 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in Bình Long Province against the VC 9th Division.[4]^:309–24

From 8–26 January 1967 4 battalions of the Division participated in Operation Cedar Falls a large US search and destroy mission against the Iron Triangle, Bình Dương Province. The ARVN role was primarily as a blocking force and population screening and evacuation while the US forces undertook offensive operations, nevertheless the Division lost 11 killed while total VC losses were 720 killed and 218 captured.[5]^:99–112

On 11 July 1967, a month following the beginnings of CORDS pacification project near Tan Hung, Bình Long Province, the first major program of civilian pacification and effective counterinsurgency, the HQ and HQ Company and two other companies would earn a Presidential Unit Citation from Lyndon Johnson. As CORDS would in-effect undermine the continual insurgency war, the PAVN 141st Regiment had launched a full-scale attack against the division HQ in hopes of quashing the experiment. The successful defence of the HQ and base had not only secured the continual pacification of the hamlet, but would demonstrate the effectiveness of the CORDS project which would by 1970 secure 93% of all villages and effectively end the VC insurgency.[6]

In 1967 MACV assessed that the three ARVN divisions surrounding Saigon, the Division, 18th and the 25th Division had shown no improvement, and US advisers considered their commanders, Generals Pham Quoc Thuan, Do Ke Giai (18th Division) and Phan Trong Chinh (25th Division), flatly incompetent. The senior Junta generals had repeatedly agreed on the need to replace them, but, for political reasons, had taken no action. Although continually judged by American leaders as corrupt and incapable, General Thuan had strong political ties with the Junta generals, in this case, Thiệu. John Paul Vann noted the "widespread public belief that Thuan not only controlled most of the local bars and prostitution houses but also extorted protection fees for convoys moving through his Division tactical area. General DePuy, commanding the nearby US 1st Infantry Division, agreed. He made the convoy protection charge public, as did a local Vietnamese province chief, perhaps with Vann's encouragement. Westmoreland could do little. He already had taken up the matter previously with Vien, but to no avail. Thuan had been Thieu's chief of staff when the latter had commanded the 5th Division back in 1962, and the division, together with General Dong's airborne units, remained Thiệu's major basis of power. In the interests of political stability, nothing could be done.[2]^:245–6

During the Tet Offensive attacks on Bien Hoa and Long Binh from 31 January to 2 February 1968 the Division and the 3rd Ranger Task Force, consisting of the 35th and 36th Ranger Battalions, successfully defended its headquarters and other key facilities in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex.[7]^:347

From 11 March to 7 April 1968 the Division's 7th and 8th Regiments participated in Operation Quyet Thang in Bình Dương Province with the US 2nd and 3rd Brigades, 1st Infantry Division to reestablish South Vietnamese control over the areas immediately around Saigon in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive.[7]^:460–1

From 8 April to 31 May 1968 the Division participated in Operation Toan Thang I to continue pressure on PAVN/VC forces in III Corps after the successful Operation Quyet Thang. The operation involved nearly every combat unit in III Corps. The operation was a success with allied forces claiming 7645 VC/PAVN killed, however the operation did not prevent the PAVN/VC from launching their May Offensive attacks against Saigon.[7]^:464–6

In September 1968 MACV rated General Thuần as inept and Division advisers noted that the Division had "withdrawn into a shell" and was doing nothing constructive." Minor incidents, like Thuần's daily pot shots at birds from the second story balcony of his home and the subsequent accidental wounding of his intelligence adviser, were not uncommon and at times trivialized and mocked the entire war effort. II Field Force, Vietnam commander Lt. Gen. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr. appealed to COMUSMACV General Creighton Abrams for help, and the MACV commander reportedly "raised hell" with President Thiệu over the matter, but Thiệu did nothing.[2]^:333–4

In June 1969 the new II Field Force, Vietnam commander Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell initiated the Dong Tien (or "Progress Together") Program with III Corps commander, General Đỗ Cao Trí, to "buddy up US and ARVN units to conduct combined operations [that would]... maximize the effectiveness of both forces [and] achieve in 2, 3, or 4 months a quantum jump in ARVN and RF/PF performance."[2]^:409 The most important Dong Tien operation was between the Division and the US 1st Infantry Division. Both units stood astride Route 13, the major artery connecting the capital region with the Cambodian border and, conversely, a primary avenue to Saigon for PAVN/VC units infiltrating south. Since 1965 the American division had worked the area, driving the regular enemy units across the Cambodian border and slowly rooting out his larger local forces. During the same period the Division, under General Thuần, had generally performed what at best could be described as securing missions in central and southern Bình Dương Province. In 1968 South Vietnamese intelligence estimated that 17,000 PAVN/VC troops were active in the Division's theoretical area of responsibility, but out of almost 2000 combat operations supposedly conducted by one of the Division's regiments that year, only 36 had led to engagements with enemy forces, and these resulted in only 17 PAVN/VC reportedly killed and 5 captured, at a cost of 14 soldiers killed and 3 weapons lost. Such poor track records reflected what Americans derisively called Saigon's "search and avoid" tactics, and were patently unacceptable to Ewell and Trí. Up to 1969, overriding political concerns had forced MACV to live with the marginal performance of the Division. The close friendship between President Thiệu and General Thuần was well known, as was the political role of the Division in stabilizing the old military regime. However, by mid-1969 the political as well as the military situation around the capital had changed, and the threat of a military coup was remote. At the same time, the projected redeployment of US forces from South Vietnam made it all the more necessary that Saigon bring units like the Division back into the mainstream of the war effort as soon as possible.[2]^:412–3 In August 1969 Thuần was finally replaced as Division commander by General Nguyễn Văn Hiếu, however US officials had major reservations about this replacement, not regarding Hiếu as a dynamic leader.[2]^:364 The Dong Tien operation between the two units lasted from July 1969 until the departure of the 1st Infantry Division from South Vietnam in March 1970. During this period infantry battalions of the Division's 7th Regiment worked extensively with those of the 1st Division's 2nd Brigade in central Bình Dương Province, while similar units of the Division's 8th Regiment operated with battalions of the 1st Division's 1st and 3rd Brigades in the northern Bình Dương jungles. In each case, US and ARVN infantry battalions shared common fire support bases and patrolled a common operational area in the dense forests surrounding these strongpoints. The two battalion commanders planned and commanded the operations jointly, with the Americans providing the helicopter support for troop movements and resupply. With the extra push of working with American commanders, staffs, and troops, the lethargic Vietnamese battalions began to wake up. As in the earlier pair-off program, decentralized operations meant that small-unit leaders learned to make decisions on their own, while battalion commanders and staffs learned to control airmobile operations and troop actions over a wider area. Marginal officers were identified and often replaced, and, perhaps most important, ARVN morale began to climb. Drawbacks to the 1st Division's Dong Tien operation were primarily in the areas of scope and duration. Periodically the ARVN regimental commanders rotated participating infantry battalions, but only two were active in the program at anyone time, and neither the regimental nor the Division headquarters became closely involved in the effort. Later, as the program progressed, Hiếu brought a few of his artillery batteries into the endeavor, and approved liaison and training between various 1st and 5th Division support units. But only two Vietnamese artillery batteries ever participated, the involvement of other Division elements remained minimal, and the 9th Regiment took no part in the effort. Almost all helicopter and most artillery support were American. Another significant factor, one that was both helpful and seductive, was the inactivity of PAVN/VC military forces, and thus, as in the other Dong Tien operations, there was no real test of South Vietnamese effectiveness in heavy fighting. However, when the program terminated in March 1970, it had pried the 5th Division out of its safe havens in southern Bình Dương and oriented its soldiers away from the political and economic concerns of the Saigon metropolitan area. As the 1st Infantry Division began its redeployment in early 1970, Hiếu moved his Division headquarters north and, with the help of adjacent American units, gradually took over responsibility for the 1st Division's former operational area without incident.[2]^:412–5

On 30 April 1970 as part of Operation Toan Thang 42 (Total Victory), an early phase of the Cambodian Campaign, a Division infantry regiment and the 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron together with other ARVN forces crossed into the Parrot's Beak region of Svay Rieng Province.

In mid-1970 MACV rated General Hiếu as "unsatisfactory" and recommended his relief.[2]^:367 Regarded by US advisers as the worst ARVN Division commander, General Hieu's forces had been badly handled during the Battle of Snuol, and his troops, according to II Field Force commander Michael S. Davison, were close to mutiny. Pushed by both Abrams and Minh to relieve him, Thiệu finally acceded and in April 1971 brought Col. Lê Văn Hưng up from Phong Dinh Province to take over the battered Division. Unfortunately, Hưng was the one ARVN officer whose candidacy American advisers had specifically recommended against.[2]^:478

Component units:

• 7th Infantry Regiment
• 8th Infantry Regiment
• 9th Infantry Regiment
• 50th, 51st, 52nd and 53rd Artillery Battalions
• 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron
• US Advisory Team 70