Battle for Outpost Vegas

In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division redeployed from east-central to western Korea, to join US I Corps where they were assigned a 35-mile (56 km) sector to defend on the Main Line of Resistance (MLR). The specific sector on the MLR was called the Jamestown Line. This sector was located between PVA forces to the north and the South Korean capital of Seoul to the south. The 1st Division was supported by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, who had also been recently deployed to western Korea.[4][1]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines defended the Nevada Cities, reportedly coined as such by Lieutenant Colonel Tony Caputa because "it's a gamble if we can hold them."[1]^:76 Lieutenant Colonel Jonas M. Platt commanded 1st Battalion, while Colonel Lew Walt commanded the 5th Marine Regiment. The 1st Division's formations from left to right comprised the Republic of Korea Army (ROK) Kimpo Provisional Regiment, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Marines and the 5th Marines. The 1st Marines had replaced the 7th Marines earlier in March.[4]^:265 The 1st Marine Division was supported by separate units of artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The 11th Marines commanded by Colonel Mills provided artillery support.[4]^:268 Three of four companies of the 1st Tank Battalion supported with M46 Pattons, flame tanks, and retrievers.[4]^:270 The 1st Marine Air Wing, with 6,400 personal located throughout Korea, supported with helicopter evacuations of night frontline combat casualties, artillery spotting flights, airborne control of airstrikes and routine liaison and reconnaissance, administrative, and resupply flights.

Opposing the Marines was the PVA line of formations, from left to right: the 19th Division of the 65th Army, who had three regiments forward; and the 120th Division of the 40th Army (under the control of the 46th Army), who had three regiments forward. According to the 1st Marine Division Diaries, the Chinese were active in patrolling and ambushing in defense of positions during the first part of March. During the last part of March the PVA began "limited objective attacks" against US outposts. These attacks varied from a squad to two battalions in strength against outposts Reno and Vegas, in order to deny the US observation into the PVA rear areas.[4]^:270

I Corps commander General Bruce C. Clarke advocated defense on the hills north of the MLR to deny the tactical advantage they offered to the PVA. Vegas was the highest of the "Nevada Cities" and 1,310-yard (1,200 m) north from the MLR. "From North to South this observation included in its 180-degree sweep, enemy hill mass 57 to the right, friendly outpost Berlin, the MLR, key Marine defense highpoints, Hills 229 and 181 in the 1st Marines sector, and intervening terrain."[4]^:276 However, soldiers on Vegas could not see Reno. A rifle platoon of 40 Marines and two Navy corpsmen manned each outpost.[4]^:265 250-yard (230 m) of trench line surrounded the outpost, which ranged from 4–8-foot (1.2–2.4 m) deep. Beyond the trenches two parallel lines of barbed wire lay, linked with more parallel aprons of wire connecting the two, sometimes referred to as the "Canadian system.[1] Outpost Reno, formerly Outpost Bruce, had been the scene of intense fighting from 5–6 September 1952 during the Battle of Bunker Hill and 3 Marines were awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions there, 2 posthumously.[5]

The three outposts of Carson, Reno and Vegas differed from one another according to their location, the terrain to be defended, and the threat they faced. Outpost Carson, on the left, guarded a largely barren hilltop where a cave provided living quarters for the Marines, who manned an oval perimeter protected by barbed wire and including bunkers, tunnels and a main trench with fighting holes. Except for the slope nearest the Jamestown Line, where a deeper entrenchment was being dug, the main trench on Carson averaged 5 feet (1.5 m) deep by 2 feet (0.61 m) wide. Most of the 28 fighting holes had excellent fields of fire, though the overhead cover on some of them had reduced the opening for observation and firing. During darkness, two listening posts covered the likeliest avenues of PVA attack, from the Ungok hills to the west and Hill 67 to the north. Reno, in the center, was the most vulnerable of the three. It not only lay closest to PVA lines, but also occupied a ridge that forced the defenders into a perimeter vaguely resembling the wishbone of a turkey, open end to the north. As at Carson, a cave served as living quarters and might also become a last-ditch redoubt. A tunnel provided access to the cave from the main trench, which varied from 5–7 feet (1.5–2.1 m) deep. The Marines at Reno built no bunkers, relying exclusively on fighting holes in the trenches and, as a last resort, the cave itself. Outpost Reno had limited fields of fire in the direction of PVA-held Hill 67, also called Arrowhead Hill, but Outpost Carson, on the left, provided fire support in this area. As a result, the approach that seemed to pose the greatest danger to Reno’s defenders followed a ridge extending generally southward from Hill 150. Like the Marines defending the other outposts, those at Reno relied on C-rations and tossed the empty cans into nearby gullies. At night, when the tin cans clattered, the source of the noise might be PVA moving close to attack behind a sudden barrage. To the south of Reno lay Reno Block, an L-shaped trench with a small bunker at the end of the shorter leg and a machine gun position at the point where the legs joined. At night a reinforced squad manned the blocking position, which served as a listening post, helped screen the movement of supplies and reinforcements, and provided a rallying point for relief columns ambushed by PVA patrols. Perched on a hilltop, Reno Block afforded excellent visibility, but conversely it could easily be seen from PVA lines. Marines manning Reno’s east-west trench could fire in support of the blocking position, as could the garrison at Carson. To the right of Reno loomed Outpost Vegas, which as the tallest of the three, afforded the best fields of observation. Barbed wire and a well-constructed trench encircled the egg-shaped perimeter on Vegas, with its one warming and two living bunkers. Although the fields of fire on Vegas were less than ideal, handicapped in places by a steeply-pitched slope too irregular for grazing fire and also by the small firing apertures in some of the covered fighting holes, weapons there could support Reno with long-range fire. By day, Vegas proved a magnet for sniper fire and harassment by mortars and artillery, forcing the Marines to remain under cover.[5]^:543–5

UN intelligence did not expect a PVA attack during late March. Winter had turned to spring, and with the change of temperature, the melting snow turned the roads to mud, making logistics near to impossible. The newly deployed 1st Marines expected a comparatively quiet front in western Korea to the fighting they experienced elsewhere.[4]^:263Furthermore, the lines of resistance had for most of the war remained static. There are different reasons for the PVA attack to come on March 26. According to Elliot Akermann, the Chinese wanted to capture the Nevada Cities north of the MLR in order to gain leverage at the Panmunjom peace talks. If the PVA gained a victory here, they could threaten Seoul, thus embarrassing and putting pressure on the UN negotiators at the talks.[1] For Lieutenant Colonel Pat Meid and Major James M. Yingling, the PVA wanted to take the hills and ridgelines adjacent to the Marine MLR. This would then better their position at the peace talks, and solidify captured territory for North Korea after peace was achieved.[4]^:264

In early May, the 1st Marine Division was replaced by the Turkish Brigade, and the Marines went into reserve after almost a week of heavy fighting in and around the "Nevada Cities" outposts.[1]^:84–5

According to the 1st Marine Division diaries, American casualties in the month of March were at 141 killed in action, 29 died of wounds, 701 wounded and evacuated, 510 wounded and not evacuated, and 104 missing in action. PVA forces suffered 1,351 killed in action, 3,631 wounded, and 4 captured. The Korean Marines had a minor presence during the battle for outpost Vegas, their casualties 26 killed in action, 97 wounded in action, and 5 missing in action.[2]

According to Akermann, the 1st Marine Division had 1,488 killed, wounded, or missing in the month of March. In the "Nevada Cities" sector, the 1st Marine Division had 1,015 casualties (killed, missing, wounded), which was nearly 70% of their total strength. 156 Marines were killed, 441 wounded and evacuated, 360 wounded but not evacuated, and 98 missing including 19 captured. These casualties were from Marines in action; non-combatant casualties are not included.[1]^:101

The PVA would renew their attack on the Nevada Complex on 25 May and after 4 days of heavy fighting the UN Command ordered that it be abandoned.[6]

A young Marine purchased a horse for $250 in October 1952 which was trained as an ammunition carrier for a Recoilless Rifle platoon in the 5th Marines. Sergeant Reckless, as she was later called after the nature of the recoilless rifle and the platoon's radio call sign, went with the 5th Marines as they were put in support of a string of outposts on the MLR. It was there where she had her first taste of battle.[1]^:63 Reckless had been moving about the Nevada Cities when the PVA attacked on March 26, 1953. When artillery began to hit Outposts Vegas and the support network behind it on the MLR, Reckless ran to the nearest bunker, where she remained clearly shocked by the impact of war. The next morning on the 26th, as the 5th Marines recovered from the previous day's fighting, Reckless was readied for her duties as ammunition carrier.[1]^:78–80 Before dawn Reckless was fitted with 8 recoilless rifle projectiles, 192 pounds of weight distributed across her back. Reckless was then led by the other Marines in her platoon to the platoon's firing positions opposite of the southern slopes of outpost Vegas. She continued to haul ammunition, and at one point wounded Marines, up and down the hill.[1]^:84–5