George Herbert Scott

Proposals for an airship network connecting Britain with its colonies and dominions worldwide emerged in the years following the R34's transatlantic flight, although political and economic difficulties slowed their progress. The Imperial Airship Scheme, providing for the construction of two competing prototype passenger airships (R100, built by the Vickers-controlled Airship Guarantee Company at Howden, and R101, built by the state-owned Royal Airship Works at Cardington), was instigated in 1924. In the same year, Scott assumed the position of Officer in Charge of Flying and Training in the Air Ministry's Airship Directorate. (His title became Assistant Director of Airship Development (Flying) in January 1930.)

The R34's sister ship, R33, was employed on test flights to provide data for the design of the new ships; it was commanded by Flight Lieutenant Irwin, former captain of the R36 and later to command the R101. On the night of 16–17 April 1925, the R33 broke from the Pulham mast during a gale and was blown stern-first to the Netherlands before those aboard—led by the first officer, Flight Lieutenant Ralph Booth, who would later command the R100—could regain control.[14] Following the incident, Booth praised the "valuable guidance" that Scott had provided via radio.[15] Scott was involved more directly in a second incident with the R33, this time on its final flight in November 1925, when the ship hit the shed doors at Pulham while under his control.[4]

The R100 and R101 were finally launched in late 1929. Scott did not himself command either airship (the R100 being commanded by Ralph Booth, who had by now been promoted to Wing Commander, and the R101 by Flight Lieutenant Irwin) but took an active part in both ships' test flights.

At a meeting of an Air Ministry committee held on 27 July 1930, shortly before the R100 left for Canada, the issues of Scott's "lack of recent experience of airship handling" and the difficulties potentially arising if there was "any division of responsibility" between Scott and the ship's captain were discussed. The Air Member for Supply and Research, Sir John Higgins, ruled that captains should have "full responsibility" and that Scott would give no orders to any crew member apart from the captain; moreover, the captain was not bound to take Scott's advice. Higgins described Scott's position as that of "a non-executive Admiral."[16]

Shortly before his death aboard the R101 in 1930, Scott told Flight magazine that, on the R100 and R101's intercontinental flights, he was "officer in command of the flight" and decided "all such points as when the ship would sail, her course, her speed, her altitude." The airships' own captains were "in charge of the crew and discipline."[11] In his book on the R101, The Millionth Chance, James Leasor echoed Higgins's description, likening Scott's position to that of "an Admiral in his flagship", with Irwin being "the flagship captain and responsible for [crew] discipline."[17]

In his capacity as "admiral", Scott flew from Cardington to Montreal and back aboard the R100 in mid-1930. The ship left Cardington in the early hours of 29 July and, despite some encounters with stormy conditions that caused damage to its tail fins (and would later cause some commentators to question Scott's judgement), arrived in Montreal early on 1 August, after 78 hours and 49 minutes of flying time. During its stay in Canada, the R100 made a flight of 25 hours and 57 minutes duration over Quebec and southern Ontario. The return flight set out on the evening of 13 August and arrived in Cardington on the morning of 16 August after 57 hours and 56 minutes of flying time; the trip was generally uneventful.[18][19]

Panel from Hoetger on the Glockenspiel House in Bremen

Both before and after his death, Scott was hailed for his achievements as an aviator, most notably the R34's Atlantic crossing, which, according to the Times's obituary, "immediately placed Great Britain at the head of airship construction and achievement".[39] The Dictionary of National Biography described him as "without doubt the foremost British airship commander of his time" and praised his "cool, alert and expert handling" of the R34 during storms on the outward leg of its transatlantic flight.[2]

Alongside his achievements with the R34 and R100, Flight highlighted his decision to climb before conducting high-speed trials on the R36, thus (as described above) saving the ship from disaster when it experienced elevator and rudder failures. According to Flight, "there would probably have been one less tragedy on record"[11] had similar precautions been taken in the testing of the US Army's Roma (which struck power lines and burned, with the loss of 34 lives, after experiencing a rudder failure on a test flight in 1922). The same journal predicted that "[i]f airships become...a regular craft either of commerce or of naval patrol, Scott will be ranked with Eckener as the two greatest among the early airship captains" and likened Scott to "his namesake, Captain Scott of South Pole fame" as "a gallant gentleman who gave his life in the attempt to solve great problems".[40] According to the Times, "[n]one who ever had the good fortune to watch [Scott] handle a big airship in good weather or in bad [would] ever forget his consummate capability."[39]

In Bremen are 10 Panels depicting seafarers from the sculptor Bernhard Hoetger on the Glockenspiel House in the Böttcherstraße. One Panel shows Scott as Arthur Whitten Brown and John Alcock, piloted the first non-stop transatlantic flight.

However, some commentators have questioned aspects of Scott's judgement as an aviator. According to Sir Peter Masefield in To Ride the Storm, Scott "had a reputation...for determination and also for 'ham-handedness' [Masefield's quotes]". Masefield cited a series of landing accidents involving Scott, including the previously discussed incidents with the Parseval No. 4 at Barrow in 1915, the R36 at Pulham in 1921 and the R33 at Pulham in 1925.[4] There were also a number of incidents in the R101's early days in which Scott took over control from Irwin during mooring or hangaring operations and made mistakes that resulted in serious delays or, in one case, in damage to the Cardington mooring mast.[41] In another episode, Scott released water ballast without Irwin's knowledge while the latter was conducting a landing.[42] Both Irwin and his first officer, Noël Atherstone, expressed concern over these incidents.[43]

Moreover, according to Masefield, by the time the Imperial Airship Scheme came to fruition, Scott was "not the man he had been" at the time of the R34's Atlantic crossing; his judgement "had frequently been a cause for concern" and he "resented advice". Scott had taken to "unwise lunchtime drink", probably as a result of ill-health, and was "having difficulty in holding the position he had deservedly won".[44] Masefield characterised Scott as "dogmatic, aloof and ill, reluctant to delegate to the Captains of the ships".[45]

Nevil Shute Norway, better known as the novelist Nevil Shute, was chief calculator (and later deputy chief engineer) under Barnes Wallis on the design of the R100 and a passenger on that ship's transatlantic flight. In his 1954 autobiography, Slide Rule, Shute criticised Scott for his decision to pass through, rather than avoid, a thunderstorm on the outbound leg of that flight; according to Shute, "even with the lesser knowledge of those days, Scott should have known better". Shute characterised Scott's decision on this occasion as "a reckless one".[46] To Masefield, the episode was "another example of Scott's predilection to 'press-on regardless' [Masefield's quotes]", something that had been successful on the R34's Atlantic flight but caused "many problems" in later years.[47]

In respect of the R101's ill-fated India flight, Masefield argued that the departure was made at a time when "prudence would have dictated an operational postponement for better weather" and blamed the "known and obvious deterioration in [Scott's] judgement and competence" and the unwillingness of senior officials at the Air Ministry and Cardington to address the issue, as well as Scott's own unwillingness to acknowledge that airships were not "all-weather craft".[48] According to Masefield, it would have been "in character" for Irwin and Atherstone to consider "a temporary and precautionary return to base to await better weather" around 19:00 on 4 October 1930, 24 minutes after departure from Cardington, but equally in character for Scott to be "all for pressing on".[49] Masefield believed that Scott was the "final arbiter" of the decision not to turn back and that this decision was made around 19:19.[50]

Shute also criticised Scott's judgement in relation to the R101's final flight. According to Shute, given that the R101 had "never flown in bad weather" and had undergone "virtually no trials at all" since its lengthening for the India flight, "it now [1954] appears reckless that Scott should have pressed on" when the weather outlook worsened two hours after departure from Cardington. In mitigation, however, Shute noted that in 1930 "a pilot was expected to be brave and resolute, a daredevil who was not afraid to take risks" and that "to turn back would destroy the whole of [Lord Thomson's] political programme."[51] (Shute viewed Lord Thomson as "primarily responsible for the organisation that produced the disaster.")[52]