Harvey, Illinois train collision

On the day of the accident, the Shawnee train (operating number 392) from Carbondale, IL to Chicago, IL, was made up of Amtrak GE P30CH unit number 715 and 5 Superliner cars. The day before the accident (11 October), these passenger cars were unveiled to the public at the Union Station in Chicago, after which they were taken on a trip towards Lisle, Illinois before returning to Chicago. Locomotive 715 was one of Amtrak's more recent-built units at the time of the accident, having entered service in September 1975. The Superliners were less than a year old at the time of the accident, leaving the Pullman-Standard factories for Amtrak between December 1978 and July 1979.

The Illinois Central (Gulf) freight train (operating number 51) consisted of three EMD GP40 units, which entered service sometime between 1966 and 1971, and 40 freight cars, along with a caboose at the end of the train.

The railroad yard at Harvey is situated on the Metra Electric District (at the time operated by RTA, or Regional Transportation Authority). The RTA-operated line ended at University Park, IL, but the other tracks used by the ICG led to Carbondale, and onwards to New Orleans. Eight tracks were located at the site of the crash, numbered west to east with their roles as follows:

• 1 - Southwards, Suburban - RTA commuter service towards University Park
• 2 - Northwards, Suburban - RTA commuter service towards Union Station
• 3 - Southwards - Passenger and freight towards Bourbonnais, IL
• 4 - Northwards - Passenger and freight towards Chicago
• 5 - Southwards - Freight, sidings
• 6 - Northwards - Freight, sidings
• 7 - Transfer train tracks
• 8 - Private industrial spur tracks

Seven crossovers permitted trains to leave and/or enter Harvey yard, going across all tracks. Switches for tracks number 3 and 4 were equipped with electrically-operated actuators before 1971, but an accident on 23 January 1971 when an experienced switch-tender misaligned a switch which led to a collision that made the ICG (Illinois Central Gulf) introduce timetable special instructions, and also instruct trains passing tracks 3 and 4 to approach the switches at a reduced speed, however this speed was never prescribed. The ICG rule also stated that the trains were to be prepared to stop short of the switch (or any other obstacles), but this could only be done if the train was moving at "walking speed". Switch-tenders at the time were equipped with Motorola MT500 walkie-talkies, to ease the communications between the ICG staff.

Train directors should supervise and record all movements against the flow of traffic, tagging his board as well as insuring that the leverman or switch-tender make similar arrangements at their locations... Plan ahead for train and engine movements by securing line-up, etc. Be precise and accurate and insure that instructions issued by subordinates to crews are the same. This includes just the minimum amount of conversation on the telephone and radio for business purposes only... The above instructions must be literally complied with.

-- ICG instructions for Harvey Yard, issued on 23 June 1975.

There were 10 crew members in total, 4 on the ICG train and 6 on the Amtrak train.

• Conductor Benjamin L. Gardner, aged 37, was employed as a brakeman on 2 May 1963 by the ICG, being later promoted to conductor on 13 May 1969. He was not restricted in any way.
• Engineer Harold Ross Coghlan, aged 55, was employed as a fireman on 5 June 1974 by the ICG, being later promoted to engineer on 21 May 1975. He was not restricted in any way. †
• Head Brakeman Richard O. Kingery, aged 21, was employed as a trackman on 14 June 1977 by the ICG, transferring to the Car Department on 8 January 1979 and later at the Transportation Department as a brakeman on 9 October 1979. He was not restricted in any way. †
• Rear Brakeman Thomas Parker Brown, aged 20, was employed as a trackman on 9 May 1978 by the ICG, transferring to the Transportation Department as a brakeman/switchman on 10 January 1979. He was not restricted in any way.

• Conductor James Lowell Garrison, aged 47, was employed as a brakeman by the ICG on 1 August 1950, being promoted to conductor on 15 December 1958. The only restriction he had was to wear glasses all the time when he was on duty.
• Engineer John Joseph Taksas, aged 65, was employed as a fireman by the ICG on 21 January 1940, being promoted to engineer on 27 January 1949. The only restriction he had was to wear glasses all the time when he was on duty.
• Fireman James Alexander Murray, aged 29, was employed as a fireman by the ICG on 8 June 1973, entering engineer training on 28 June 1978, completing it on 26 April 1979. He was not restricted in any way.
• Baggageman Donald Eugene Schwieger, aged 30, was employed as a brakeman by the ICG on 8 December 1967, being promoted to conductor on 6 October 1972. He was not restricted in any way.
• Flagman John Clarence Washington, aged 48, was employed as a laborer in the Car Department by the ICG on 19 May 1953, working on various positions (including car inspector) up to 26 August 1968, when he transferred to the Transportation Department, being promoted to conductor on 3 March 1973. He was not restricted in any way.

• Train director Norville J. Gapen, aged 49, was employed as an agent-operator by the GM&O on 7 February 1949, and was promoted to train director on 28 October 1974. He was not restricted in any way.
• Yardmaster James Alton Avant, aged 50, was employed as a switchman by the ICG on 26 November 1952, and was promoted to engine foreman on 13 June 1953, then to yardmaster around 1967. He was not restricted in any way.
• Switchman Gregory Harris, aged 18, had been employed as a switchman/brakeman on 10 August 1979, two months prior to the crash. The only restriction he had was to wear glasses at all times when he was on duty.

The NTSB report was finalized on 3 April 1980 and released on 20 May 1980.

The report stated that, if the electrically locked switches had not been removed in 1971, then the train would have passed the signal and kept going straight to Chicago, without the interference of the switch-tender, going on to explain how even an experienced switch-tender would make the same mistake. Removal of these switches, thus resulted in removing the only "positive safety feature to prevent switches being operated immediately in front of an approaching train".

Aside from the removal of the switches, the ICG was criticized for the lack of proper training given to switch-tenders. It was considered that "at no time is the new employee provided with adequate information on the switch-tender's position, nor does he receive student training before taking up this job". Train crews in and out of Harvey yard at the time reported improperly aligned switches, including the train that left track 6. It was determined that one of the factors into this crash was the short period of instruction, which could not allow him to become familiar with the physical layout of the switches, tracks, etc. The period of two months between his assignments did not help either.

Another factor was the communication done from the train director to the switch-tender, through the yardmaster. This resulted due to the weak signal that resulted from the Motorola radio units, which were smaller than the original ones used by ICG at Harvey yard. This meant that the train director had to instruct the switch-tender indirectly, through the yardmaster, even for mainline instructions, which was against ICG rules. The instructions for the train leaving Harvey yard and trains 392 and 51 were also relayed together, had the yardmaster relayed only the instructions to prepare the switch only for the train leaving the yard, he would have ignored the passing Amtrak train and would have also avoided the accident. Also during communications, the yardmaster mentioned a passenger train, but since the switch-tender could not tell the difference between a commuter train and intercity train, he misunderstood the information given to him. Even giving out the locomotive number would have, at least, helped the switch-tender. Finally, the switch-tender most likely did not switch onto channel 1 of the radio, which made him not hear the crew of train 51 shouting for help (channel 1 was used for mainline traffic, channel 2 was used for yard traffic).

• Electrically locked switches would have prevented the switch-tender from operating the switch immediately in front of train 392.
• Neither the hand thrown switches, nor the ICG rules prevent switches being operated immediately in front of an oncoming train, therefore, adequate protection does not exist at the Harvey crossovers area.
• Even if signal 2056 showed green, it did not prevent the switch being changed after the train went past it. Same goes for switch targets.
• Except for signal 2056 and the switch targets, there is no other indicator available for the engineer to determine the position of the switches. The "safe speed" of passing through the area is also not specified, and the ICG relied on the discretion of the engineer when passing through this area.
• The train director at Kensington was forced to relay to the switch-tender through the yardmaster at Harvey, against ICC regulations, due to poor capabilities of the mobile radio units they were issued.
• The switch-tender at Harvey was not supervised, so he was supposed to be given out information and tasks through the radio, assuming he had gained enough knowledge for his tasks. The training program failed to train him sufficiently for this task.
• The Amtrak personnel were not used, nor instructed in the new features of the Amtrak cars, making the evacuation slightly difficult.

The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the accident was the switch-tender's manual misalignment of a switch, immediately in advance of a train, which caused train 392 to be directed into a crossover and collide with a standing freight train on the adjacent track. The misalignment was possible due to a lack of interlock or other positive means to prevent this movement. Contributing to the accident was the lack of training and limited experience of the employee assigned as switch-tender, and an inadequate communications system to give directions to the switch-tender.

The first recommendations were issued on 18 December 1979 and it contained the following:

• Provide at the Harvey Yard location an interlocking system or other positive means to prevent the inadvertent misalignment of switches in advance of a train operating within the signal block.
• Until positive safeguards can be provided for the operation of switches, restrict speeds through the area of the Harvey crossover so that trains can be stopped short of a switch which is improperly aligned, but not exceeding 20 mph.
• Immediately qualify all switchmen/brakemen who function as switch-tenders by providing sufficient training in the specific rules that apply to switch-tenders, in the physical layout of tracks and switches, and in train operations in the area of their responsibility

Later another set of recommendations were made:

• Installation of a system that will ensure that the switch-tender at Harvey and train director can have direct communication when necessary for the movement of trains in the Harvey area
• When radios with multiple channels are used in train operations by employees who must use several channels, issue instructions that identify the channel the employee must monitor for receiving instructions
• Instruct supervisors to monitor the activities of the employees performing the switch-tender duties at Harvey for fitness and ability to perform those duties of the assignment
• The NPRC (Amtrak) must ensure that all crew members on Amtrak passenger trains are trained to identify and operate all pertinent features of the equipment.

After the report, the crossovers that connected tracks 3 and 4 were removed. The leading GP40 of the ICG and the P30CH of Amtrak were scrapped, being damaged beyond repair. GP40 3029 of the ICG was repaired, but after another accident later in 1984, it was cannibalized for spare parts. Also, the P30CH was a passenger locomotive with six axles, whereas the GP40s were mostly freight locomotives with four axles, as opposed to today's standards, where six axle locomotives are mostly in charge of freight service, like the SD70ACU, and four axle locomotives are mostly in charge of passenger service, like the Genesis series. There is no memorial plaque at the site of the accident, as this accident was almost forgotten among many people, but it showed grave deficiencies in railroad operations in the US in the late 1970s.