Lao People's Revolutionary Party

The forerunner of the LPRP is the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).[1] It was established by Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh in February 1930 on the orders of the Communist International (Comintern).[1] The party was tasked "to wipe out feudal remnants, to distribute land to the tillers, to overthrow imperialism and to make Indochina completely independent."[1] The ICP was dominated by the Vietnamese, and the party was originally named the "Vietnamese Communist Party".[1] The name changed due to the Comintern's displeasure with the organisation's Vietnamese nationalist tone.[1] The Comintern believed the workers of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had more in common than differences.[1] Despite its claims to be an Indochinese party, the ICP remained a Vietnamese-dominated until its formal dissolution on 11 November 1945.[1] On the same date, the Indochinese National Democratic Revolution was proclaimed.[1] Throughout its existence the ICP had no Cambodian or Laotian members.[1] The ICP began a concerted recruitment drive of Laotian members first in 1946.[1] Half-Vietnamese Kaysone Phomvihan, the LPRP General Secretary from 1955 until he died in 1992, was recruited into the party sometime in 1946–47 during his studies at the University of Hanoi.[1] However, the lack of Lao representation in the ICP would remain a problem, and by February 1951 only 81 of the 2,091 ICP members were Lao.[2]

The ICP convened its 2nd National Congress in February 1951 and changed its name to the Workers' Party of Vietnam (WPV).[3] According to scholar Joseph J. Zasloff "Eliminating the 'Indochinese' label of the Communist party seemed designed to appeal to nationalist sentiments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. To demonstrate close links among the three peoples, the Vietnamese organisers of this congress invited several Cambodian and Lao leaders to attend."[3] In the immediate aftermath of the 2nd National Congress a Viet-Lao-Khmer alliance was announced which declared a shared commitment to fighting against French colonialism and American imperialism in the region.[3] By 1952 the WPV established the Committee for the Organization of the Party, which was composed of five members; Kaysone Phomvihan (as Secretary), Nouhak Phoumsavan, Sisavath Keobounphan, Boun Phommahaxai, and Khamsen.[4][3] The WPV initiated a purifying process of the Lao membership in 1953 that expelled all but seventeen full members and an unknown amount of candidate members.[3] In the following two years several communist cells were established throughout Laos and on 22 March 1955, the founding congress met and established the Lao People's Party.[5] However, not everything went to plan, and the party was nearly annihilated by 1959 after severe government repression.[5] The North Vietnamese reacted by increasing their support to the party and its military, the Pathet Lao.[6] By the early 1960s the party controlled nearly half the country.[6] Despite being the leading force behind the insurgency from 1955 to 1975, the party kept its existence secret, preferring to direct their activities through fronts.[7] This did not forestall organisational activities, and in February 1972 the 2nd National Congress was convened changed the party's name to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party.[7] Few Laotian would therefore know about the party's existence or the name of its leaders in the given period.[7]

After years of warfare, a peace agreement was brokered with the Royal Lao Government on 21 February 1973.[8] A Provisional Government of National Unity (PGNU) was established that was composed of communist sympathisers and led by royalist Souvanna Phouma.[8] Similar to the slow unravelling of South Vietnam, the Royal Lao Government started facing several rebellions from 1974 onwards.[9] By December 1974 − January 1975 royal troops in Houei Sai district of Houa Khong Province and in Khammouane Province began an uprising against the Royal Lao Government.[9] Reacting to unfolding events, the party through the Pathet Lao seized control of the roads leading to Vientiane, effectively cutting supplies to the capitol.[9] In April–May a city-wide protest took place across Vientiane against the sitting government, which led to the resignation of five cabinet members.[10] In a last-ditch attempt to save the monarchy the Royal Lao Government announced new elections for 1976.[11] A couple of months later, on 26 November, LPRP representatives managed to get the monarchy, officially, to "voluntarily" renunciate its royal wealth and abdicate.[12] The party thus convened a convocation of the National Congress of People's Representatives on 1 to 2 December 1975 which dissolved the existing state structure–the Kingdom of Laos–and established the Lao People's Democratic Republic and announced the end of the 30-year old National Democratic Revolution.[11]

The collapse of the Royal Government and the ensuing communist takeover produced an exodus.[13] By 1980 ten percent of the population had left the country.[14] In its first years of power the party retained its secretive ways.[14] The leading public voices of the communist movement before 1975, such as Lao Patriotic Front chairman Souphanouvong, were swept after the communist seizure of power.[15] For instance Kaysone Phomvihan, the LPRP General Secretary, was unknown to most people at the time.[14] The new government swiftly closed down independent news publications and organisations.[15] Organisations that were not dissolved were forced to seek membership in the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC), a mass organisation controlled by the LPRP.[16] To spread the new government's word, the LPRP and the LFNC organised meetings around the country to educate the people about the party line and spread Marxist–Leninist doctrine.[15] The end goal of this process was the creation of the new socialist man.[15]

The LPRP continued its socialist transformation policy in 1978 by collectivising agriculture.[17] The LPRP, according to Lao specialist Martin Stuart-Fox, believed that "productivity of agriculture could only be raised through economies of scale (by analogy with an industrial model), and this could only be achieved by collective ownership of the means of production. Cooperatives, they argued, could maximise the use of modern inputs into agriculture."[18] The twin-goal of the collectivisation process was (i) abolishing private ownership in the countryside and (ii) strengthening political control in former areas controlled by the Royal Lao Government.[19] Collectivisation proved hard to implement, and several areas actively resisted the policy.[19] The LPRP Central Committee gave up on collectivisation in 1981.[20] It argued that "Efforts to mobilise farmers to join agricultural cooperatives or set up new ones during the current production season should be immediately and strictly suspended while the people are engaging in production in order rapidly and effectively to increase production."[20] Instead of emphasising collectivisation LPRP began focusing on introducing modern agricultural equipment to improve economic efficiency.[21] By 1988 Kaysone Phomvihan conceded that collectivisation had been a failure; "Our previous cooperative policy was in the old style practised by other socialist countries. After some investigations into the actual situation in Laos, we decided to change direction and start from the family."[21] Two years later, in 1990, virtually all agricultural cooperatives had ceased to exist.[22]

At the 8th National Congress in 1986 the LPRP began dismantling the planning system, which was inspired by the Soviet model.[23] Kaysone Phomvihan in his Political Report of the 3rd Central Committee noted that "Our main shortcomings lie in subjectivism and haste, in our inclination to abolish the non-socialist economic sectors promptly [...] We are bent on egalitarianism. Consequently, we did not encourage good workers with high labour productivity. There was no relationship between responsibility, rights, obligations, and interests."[23] Under the banner term socialist economic accounting the LPRP began severing state enterprises from the state budget, forcing them to survive in the free market.[24] Further reforms were introduced in 1988 in light of the crisis taking place in the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union.[24] A foreign investment code was adopted and joint ventures were encouraged.[24] The most important rationale for these changes were Laos total dependence on foreign assistance, of which 70 per cent originated from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.[24] In 1988 total foreign aid from the Eastern Bloc stood at US$52 million; by 1989 it was US$1 million, and none was received in 1990.[24]

The collapse of communism in Europe had a strong impact on Laos.[25] Some students began criticising the LPRP's monopoly of political power and began calling for a multi-party system.[25] They were supported by the Social Democrat Club, a group of forty Lao intellectuals.[25] Inspired by events LPRP official Thongsouk Saisangkhi, the Vice-Minister for Science and Technology, submitted an open resignation and accused the LPRP of establishing a "communist monarchy" and a "dynasty of the Politburo", a reference to the growing influence of the children of the leaders.[25] The LPRP did not budge, and Thongsouk Saisangkhi together with Vice-Minister of Economics and Planning Latsami Khamphoui and Ministry of Justice official Pheng Sakchittaphong were imprisoned in October 1990 and sentenced for fourteen years in jail in November 1992.[25] Later that same year a new constitution was adopted which stated that Laos was a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the LPRP.[26] Instead of appeasing the critics Khamtai Siphandon, a Politburo member at the time, stated unequivocally that "The Party is also the sole Party whom the people trust. All slanders and attempts designed to undermine the leadership role of the Party are regarded as contradictory to historical reality and the national interest."[25]

The governance of the party and state has stabilised since the 1980s.[27] Scholar Clay Wescott notes that "has shown itself to be remarkably resilient. Transitions of power have tended to be smooth, the new generation of leaders has proven more open to reform, and the Politburo now has some ethnic diversity."[27] After serving fourteen years as LPRP General Secretary Khamtai Siphandon left office in 2006, and was succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone who served ten years in office.[28] Choummaly Sayasone was succeeded by Bounnhang Vorachith in 2016 who served until 2021,[29] and he was succeeded by the current LPRP General Secretary Thongloun Sisoulith.[30]

The party's organisational structure is based on democratic centralism, an organisational form conceived by Vladimir Lenin.[31] This form of democracy is premised on a centralised and hierarchical organisational structure.[32] This entails that lower party organs have to follow the decisions of the LPRP Central Committee.[32] It also entails a ban on internal party factions.[32] At last, every decision-making organ has to be guided by the principle of collective leadership, an organisational process that emphasises collegial decision-making in contrast to one-person dominance.[32] Former LPRP General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane, in a speech to the 5th National Congress in 1991, stated "that our Party's democracy is a centralised one. Therefore, we must strictly implement the principle according to which the minority must yield to the majority; the lower leading organisation execute the upper leading organisation's orders. The whole Party follows the Central Committee."[33]

Nepotism, meaning favouritism that is granted to relatives, and patronage, the support a powerful individual bestows to another, is a mainstay in LPRP politics.[34][35] It's estimated that 25 per cent of the 10th Central Committee members are connected through birth or marriage to one of the revolutionary families.[31] The most prominent example is Xaysomphone Phomvihane, the eldest son of Kaysone Phomvihane, whose election to the 10th and 11th Politburos.[36] Kaysone Phomvihane's wife, Thongvin Phomvihane, served as General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union, from 1988 to 1993.[37] Khampheng Saysompheng, the son-in-law of former LPRP General Secretary Khamtai Siphandon, was elected to the 9th Central Committee, was appointed Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in 2015 and elected to the 10th Central Committee in 2016.[36] In 2015 Viengthong Siphandone, the wife of Khampheng Saysompheng and daughter of Khamtai Siphandon, was appointed Chairwoman of the State Audit Organisation and in 2016 she was elected to the 10th Central Committee.[36] Viengthong Siphandone's brother Sonexay Siphandone was transferred from his governorship of Champasak Province and appointed Minister of the Office of Government in 2015, and later elected to the 10th Politburo in 2016, and reelected to the 11th in 2021.[36] This tendency continued under the stewardship of LPRP General Secretary Choummaly Sayasone.[36] Through his patronage network Choummaly Sayasone's brother-in-law Khammeung Phongthady, whose election to the 9th Central Committee, was reassigned from his governorship of Vientiane province to Cabinet Chief of the Office of the Presidency.[38] Khammeung's reassignment opened the door for Choummaly Sayasone to appoint his eldest son Vidong Sayasone to become Secretary of the Vientiane LPRP Provincial Committee.[39] In addition to his secretaryship Vidong Sayasone was later elected to the 9th Central Committee.[39] His two other sons, Phoxay Sayasone and Phokham Sayasone, were also appointed to leading party offices, with Phoxay Sayasone elected as a substitute member of the 10th Central Committee.[39] While the sitting LPRP General Secretary Thongloun Sisoulith married the adopted daughter of former acting president Phoumi Vongvichit.[40]

Writing in Politics and Reform in Laos, Stuart-Fox remarks that "senior Party members [after the revolution] soon began to dispense patronage in the traditional Lao way, rewarding extended family members and loyal retainers with favours and jobs, for which they were often poorly qualified, to build a political support base [...] Ironically, this process of political-economic elite formation was powerfully assisted by the introduction of the economic reforms of the 1980s".[35] In this sense Lao political culture has changed little with the communist seizure of power.[35] This inherent tendency in the LPRP could explain the rent-seeking behaviour of some of its members and its limited organisational capacity.[35] In this sense the LPRP differs from its counterparts in China and Vietnam.[41] Stuart-Fox contends that Laos lack of a state bureaucratic tradition throughout its history has made Laotian to rely on their extended families and friends.[42] Lao specialists Keith Barney and Simon Creak disagree with Stuart-Fox's assertion and argue "[that] the relatively institutionalised character of Lao authoritarianism, which has placed the top leadership positions less as powers in themselves, and more under the broad discipline of the LPRP. To express this another way, the LPRP provides a disciplining mechanism for the patron-client relations that continue to function throughout society, which in turn depends on party connections."[43]

The LPRP has a monopoly on state power in the country.

The LPRP has a lawful monopoly over the state.[44] In turn the state maintains a centralised and unitary form of state power based on democratic centralism.[44] Having the status as "the most ethnically diverse" country of Southeast Asia, the Laotian unitary state system is legitimised by socialist integrationism.[44] This school of thought "regard social classes as the key component of social thought and practice, and regard the promotion of distributive justice as the appropriate public priority."[44] In other words; the difference in class, income and status are more important than ethnic differences.[45] The Party controls this unitary state through, in the words of Stuart-Fox, "the government, the bureaucracy, mass organisations and the military. In all four it is virtually de rigueur for leading figures to be Party members. In fact, they would not be in those positions unless they were members of the Party. Party cells operate in all institutions, and there is active recruitment of promising younger personnel into the Party, membership of which is by invitation only."[46] Scholar Bounlonh J.Soukamneuth concurs with Stuart-Fox's assessment and writes that the "Party monopolises political ambition and regulates public life. Party operatives penetrate all institutions of government and many areas of society. All organisations of the party-state (from the government bureaucracy, the mass organisation, to the military) implement party directives and administer its monopoly on power."[47]

The party has established cells in every state institution.[48] The intention is to ensure "the party's all-around absolute and direct leadership over all links, from the mapping out of lines and policies, to the organisation of execution and control."[48] The fruit of this labour is, according to former LPRP General Secretary Khamtai Siphandon, that "the party leadership commands historical events."[49] This means that state institutions, such as the Lao Government, implements party directives.[49] Each government ministry appoints a vice minister responsible for implementing party directives.[49]

The preamble of the Lao constitution states that "the correct leadership of the former Indochinese Communist Party and the present Lao People's Revolutionary Party" explains the party's role in society.[46] Still, unlike the statutory roles of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of Vietnam, in their respective countries, it does not firmly establish the LPRP's leadership over state and society.[46] Rather Article 3 of the constitution states that "The rights of the multi-ethnic people to be masters of the country are exercised and ensured through the functioning of the political system with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party as its leading nucleus."[50] According to law scholar Bui Ngoc Son this article "is not merely expressive of the Marxist orthodoxy of party vanguard but also responsive to the local concern of integration of ethnic diversity. This is an ambiguous constitutional commitment as a response to ethnic plurality."[50] Further the constitution states in Article 10 that the party is subject to the law; "[the Party] must function within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws."[51]

The Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF), the military, is tasked by the state constitution to defend the gains of the revolution and the achievements of LPRP rule.[52] The state constitution says little about civil-military relations and political control over it.[52] The LPRP's own statute clearly states that the political leadership over the military (and other security forces) emanates from the LPRP Central Committee's Defence and Public Security Commission (DPSC) and that the DPSC maintains direct, united and full control of the LPAF.[52]

Election	+/–	Seats
1989	65 / 79	65
1992	85 / 85	20
1997	98 / 99	13
2002	109 / 109	11
2006	113 / 115	4
2011	128 / 132	15
2016	144 / 149	16

Elections to the unicameral National Assembly are held every fifth year.[53] The assembly is defined by the constitution as "the representative of the rights, powers and interests of the multi-ethnic people."[53] The body is elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot.[53] The election laws state that to stand for election a candidate needs to be approved by the Lao Front for National Construction, which controls if the candidate passes criteria outlined in the law.[54] Some of the criteria are quite general, such as a candidate having to "be patriotic, be devoted to the people's democracy, be loyal to the New Economic Mechanism of the Party, be true to the nation, always serve the interests of the people, and have a strong, clear and absolute attitude towards friends and enemies"[55] Other criteria such as candidate having to "have a sufficient level of knowledge of the Party's policies and strategic programs, and off State laws and regulations, and have the capacity to undertake propaganda and motivate people to be aware of and to participate in the implementation of Party policies and State laws" makes it easier for LPRP members to be approved as candidates.[32]

Most candidates, therefore, end up being members of the LPRP.[54] There are, however, more candidates than seats; at the last election in 2016, 210 candidates were competing for the 149 seats in the 7th National Assembly.[53] While elected representatives have used the National Assembly to question the government over a wide range of policies, such as corruption, but it has never punished the government in any sense.[53] Scholar Stuart-Fox opines that it is unlikely that [LPRP members] will jeopardise their chances for promotion within the party by questioning their own leaders too closely."[53] Holly High disagrees, and notes that "While in the past the role of the NA [National Assembly] was often dismissed as a mere symbolic nod towards representational politics and a rubber stamp for party directives, perceptions have changed in recent years with the NA now thought of as a key avenue for popular recourse."[56] She notes that National Assembly chairwoman Pany Yathotou has sought to simplify the process whereby constituents can contact and inform their elected representatives.[56] In the same spirit the National Assembly has established a hotline in which any Lao citizen can contact via free-call, letter or e-mail. At the mid-year plenary session of the National Assembly in 2012 representatives received 280 calls over 17-days.[57] The majority of complaints were about the handling of land issues and compensation.[57]

The LPRP is a Marxist–Leninist party deeply influenced by the Vietnamese and Soviet communists' examples.[58] The party sees itself as "the sole faithful representative of the interests of the working classes, the working people of all Lao nationalities and the entire Lao people."[58] Like the Communist Party of Vietnam, the LPRP nurtures the idea that socialism can only succeed if a disciplined and genuinely revolutionary party is in place.[59] Thus the party considers itself the directing force of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, and sees it as its responsibility to propagate Marxist values.[58] That is, it considers itself to be a vanguard party.[58] Thus, there is no reason, ideologically, for other parties to exist the LPRP contends.[60] In light of this, Kayasone Phomvihane once told the The New York Times that "The Laotian people have faith in and agree with the People's Revolutionary Party's leadership since the party belongs to the people, originates from the people and serves the people. Our Laotian party does not yet see any need for establishing other political parties."[60]

LPRP study material states that earlier revolutionary heroes against French oppression such as Ong Keo, Kommadam, Chao-Fa Patchai and Pho Kadout "were defeated because there was no Party to lead the struggle."[59] Party cadres are therefore told that they are the "vanguard of the revolution" since they've acquired knowledge of the contradictions in Lao society and, during the Laotian Civil War, understood that only way to establish a free Laos was through armed struggle.[61] A good cadre is therefore defined by the LPRP as someone "who is loyal to the nation and willing to serve the people, obeys his leaders without question, keeps good discipline, respects the system, improves himself through study [...] be resolute, brave, and undiscouraged in the face of difficulties."[61]

Laos
This article is part of a series on the politics and government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic
Ideology Collective leadership Marxism–Leninism Kaysone Phomvihane Thought
Constitution
People's Revolutionary Party Congress (11th) Central Committee (11th) Gen. Secretary: Thongloun Sisoulith Politburo (11th) Secretariat (11th) Standing Member: Bounthong Chitmany Commission for Inspection Chairman: Khamphanh Phommathat
Legislature National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman: Pany Yathotou
Executive President Bounnhang Vorachith Vice President Phankham Viphavanh Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith Government (8th—list) Deputy Prime Ministers Bounthong Chitmany Sonexay Siphandone Somdy Duangdy
Mass organizations Front for National Construction Standing Committee Chairman: X. Phomvihane Youth Union Central Committee Gen. Secretary: A. Sounnalath
Military Defense Lao People's Army Head: B. Vorachith Ministry of Defense Minister: C. Chanyalath
Foreign relations Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minister: Saleumxay Kommasith Diplomatic missions of / in Laos Passport Visa requirements Visa policy
Judiciary Supreme People's Court Supreme Public Procuracy
Related topics Elections Administrative divisions (provinces districts) Human rights LGBT rights Committee for Independence and Democracy (CIDL) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Laos portal Other countries

The National Congress is the party's highest body, and convenes every fifth year.[62][48] According to the party statute, the Central Committee convenes the national congress. The party statute gives the Congress the following responsibilities:[63]

1. Hearing the Political Report of the outgoing Central Committee
2. Examining the Political Report of the outgoing Central Committee
3. Adopting a Five-Year Plan of Socio-Economic Development
4. Electing a Central Committee
5. Discussing and enacting party policies
6. Revising the party statute

In between LPRP convocations of the national congress, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution.[63] The Central Committee elects the composition of several bodies to carry out its work.[48] The 1st Plenary Session of a newly elected central committee elects the party's General Secretary,[48] Defence and Public Security Commission (DPSC),[52] the Secretariat,[63] the Politburo,[48] and the Inspection Commission. The Politburo exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when it is not in session.[63] The DPSC is the highest decision-making institution on military and security affairs within the party, and controls the operations of the Lao People's Armed Forces.[52] The LPRP General Secretary is by right of office the DPSC chairman.[52] Meanwhile, the Secretariat is the top implementation body and is headed by the LPRP General Secretary as the 1st-ranked member, the Inspection Commission chairman as the 2nd-ranking member and the 3rd-ranking member serving as Standing Member.[64][65] LPRP secretaries normally head or work in Central Committee commissions, the Pasaxon and Alun Mai publications,[66] and so on.[37] The Inspection Commission resolves disciplinary issues involving party members. Investigative subjects range from graft to anti-party and counter-revolutionary activities, generally encompassing all party rules violations.[67]

The Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union (LPRYU) is the LPRP's youth league.[37] It was established in 1983, and is modelled organisationally on the LPRP; it has its own General Secretary, Politburo, Secretariat and Central Committee.[37] It convenes a national congress, its highest decision-making body, ever five years.[37] It publishes its own newspaper, the Num Lao.[37]

Books:

• Wescott, Clay (2003). "Combating Corruption in Southeast Asia". In Frank-jurgen Richter & John Kidd (ed.). Fighting Corruption In Asia: Causes, Effects And Remedies. World Scientific. ISBN 978-9814486934.
• Son, Bui Ngoc (2020). Constitutional Change in the Contemporary Socialist World. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198851349.
• Stuart-Fox, Martin (2002). Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos (2nd ed.). University of Michigan. ISBN 978-9748496481.
• Stuart-Fox, Martin (2008a). A History of Laos (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521597463.
• Stuart-Fox, Martin (2008b). Historical Dictionary of Laos. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0-81086-411-5.

Dissertation:

• Punya, Supitcha (January 2019). Restructuring Domestic Institutions: Democratization and Development in Laos (PDF) (Thesis). Humboldt University of Berlin.
• Soukamneuth, Bounlonh J. (August 2006). The Political Economy of Transition in Laos: From Peripheral Socialism to the Margins of Global Capital (PDF) (Thesis). Cornell University.

Journal articles:

• Creak, S.; Sayalath, S. (2017). "Regime Renewal in Laos: The Tenth Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party" (PDF). Southeast Asian Affairs: 177–200. doi:10.1355/9789814762878-014.
• Creak, Simon; Barney, Keith (2018). "Conceptualising Party-State Governance and Rule in Laos". Journal of Contemporary Asia. 48 (5): 693–716. doi:10.1080/00472336.2018.1494849. S2CID 158403649.
• Gunn, Geoffrey (2007). "Laos in 2006: Changing of the Guard". Asian Survey. University of California Press. 47 (1): 183–188. doi:10.1525/as.2007.47.1.183. JSTOR 10.1525/as.2007.47.1.183.
• Gunn, Geoffrey (2017). "Laos in 2016: Difficult History, Uncertain Future". Asian Survey. University of California Press. 57 (1): 206–210. doi:10.1525/as.2017.57.1.206. JSTOR 26367743.
• High, Holly (2013). "LAOS IN 2012: In the Name of Democracy". Southeast Asian Affairs. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute: 137–152. JSTOR 23471141.
• Meng, Ng Shui (1993). "LAOS 1992: At the Crossroads". Southeast Asian Affairs. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. 1993: 185–200. doi:10.1355/SEAA93J. JSTOR 27912075.
• Stuart-Fox, Martin (Autumn 1983). "Marxism and Theravada Buddhism: The Legitimation of Political Authority in Laos". Pacific Affairs. University of British Columbia. 56 (3): 428–454. doi:10.2307/2758191. JSTOR 2758191.
• Stuart-Fox, Martin (2007). "LAOS: Politics in a Single-party State". Southeast Asian Affairs. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. 2007: 161–180. doi:10.1355/SEAA07H. JSTOR 27913331.
• Yamada, Norihiko (2018). "Legitimation of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party: Socialism, Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking) and Reform". Journal of Contemporary Asia. 58 (5): 717–738. doi:10.1080/00472336.2018.1439081. S2CID 158837854.
• Brown, MacAlister; Zasloff, Joseph J. (1976). "Laos in 1975: People's Democratic Revolution — Lao Style". Asian Survey. University of California Press. 16 (2): 193–199. doi:10.2307/2643148. JSTOR 2643148.

Reports:

• Zasloff, Joseph J. (Autumn 1973). "THE PATHET LAO: Leadership and Organization" (PDF). Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)