Mathematical theory of democracy

The mathematical theory of democracy is an interdisciplinary branch of the public choice and social choice theories. It operationalizes the fundamental idea to modern democracies — that of political representation, in particular focusing on policy representation - how well the electorate's policy preferences are represented by the party system and the government. The representative capability is measured by means of dedicated indices that are used both for analytical purposes and practical applications.

The mathematical approach to politics goes back to Aristotle, who explained the difference between democracy, oligarchy and mixed constitution in terms of vote weighting.[1] The historical mathematization of social choice principles is reviewed by Iain McLean and Arnold Urken.[2] Modern mathematical studies in democracy are due to the game, public choice and social choice theories, which emerged after the World War II; for reviews see.[3][4]

In 1960s, the notion of policy representation has been introduced.[5] It deals with how well the party system and the government represent the electorate's policy preferences on numerous policy issues. Policy representation is currently intensively studied[6] and monitored through the MANIFESTO data base that quantitatively characterizes parties' election programs in about 50 democratic states since 1945.[7] In 1989, it was operationalized in the Dutch voting advice application (VAA) StemWijzer (= ‘VoteMatch’), which helps to find the party that best represents the user's policy preferences. Since then it has been launched on the internet and adapted by about 20 countries as well as by the European Union.[8]

The theoretical aspects of how to best satisfy a society with a composite program first considered by Steven Brams with coauthors[9] is now studied within the relatively new discipline of judgment aggregation.[10][11][12][13] The mathematical theory of democracy focuses, in particular, on the practical aspects of the same topic.For this purpose, the quality of policy representation is measured by special indices. These indices are based on the same data structures as VAAs and they are used for a wide range of problems:

The name mathematical theory of democracy is due to the game theorist Nikolai Vorobyov who commented on the first findings of this kind in the late 1980s.[14] A comprehensive presentation of the theory is provided by Andranik Tangian.[29]

References

  1. Aristotle (340 BC). Politics, Book 3. Cambridge MA: Harward University Press; 1944. pp. 1280a.7–25.
  2. McLean, Iain; Urken, Arnold Bernard, eds. (1995). Classics of social choice. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
  3. Simeone, Bruno; Pukelsheim, Friedrich, eds. (2006). Mathematics and Democracy. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer.
  4. Brams, Steven (2008). Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  5. Miller, Warren Edward; Stokes, Donald Elkinton (1963). "Constituency influence in Congress". American Political Science Review. 57 (1): 45–56. doi:10.2307/1952717. JSTOR 1952717.
  6. Budge, Ian; McDonald, Michael D (2007). "Election and party system effects on policy representation: Bringing time into a comparative perspective". Electoral Studies. 26 (1): 168–179. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.02.001.
  7. Volkens, Andrea; Bara, Judith; Budge, Ian; McDonald, Michael D; Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, eds. (2013). Mapping policy preferences from texts: Statistical solutions for manifesto analysts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  8. Garzia, Diego; Marschall, Stefan (eds.) (2014). Matching voters with parties and candidates: voting advice applications in a comparative perspective. Colchester UK: ECPR Press.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
  9. Brams, Steven J; Kilgour, D Marc; Zwicker, William S (1998). "The paradox of multiple elections". Social Choice and Welfare. 15 (2): 211–236. doi:10.1007/s003550050101. S2CID 154193592.
  10. List, Christian; Puppe, Clemens (2009). "Judgment aggregation: a survey". In Anand, Paul; Puppe, Clemens; Pattranaik, Prasanta (eds.). Oxford handbook of rational and social choice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 457–482.
  11. List, Christian (2012). "The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review" (PDF). Synthese. 187 (1): 179–207. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3. S2CID 6430197.
  12. Grossi, Davide; Pigozzi, Gabriella (2014). Judgment aggregation: a primer. San Rafael CA: Morgan and Claypool Publishers.
  13. Lang, Jérôme; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Slavkovik, Marija; van der Torre, Leendert (Leon); Vesic, Srdjan S (2017). "A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties". Social Choice and Welfare. 48 (2): 327–356. arXiv:1502.05888. doi:10.1007/s00355-016-1006-8. S2CID 12154890.
  14. Tangian, Andranik (2014). Mathematical theory of democracy. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38724-1. ISBN 978-3-642-38723-4.
  15. Tanguiane (Tangian), Andranick (1993). "Inefficiency of democratic decision making in an unstable society". Social Choice and Welfare. 10 (3): 249–300. doi:10.1007/BF00182508. S2CID 154339432.
  16. Tanguiane (Tangian), Andranick (1994). "Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy". Social Choice and Welfare. 11 (1): 1–82. doi:10.1007/BF00182898. S2CID 154076212.
  17. Tangian, Andranik (2010). "Application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (How dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?)". Social Choice and Welfare. 35 (1): 135–167. doi:10.1007/s00355-009-0433-1. S2CID 206958453.
  18. Tangian, Andranik (2008). "A mathematical model of Athenian democracy". Social Choice and Welfare. 31 (4): 537–572. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0295-y. S2CID 7112590.
  19. Tangian, Andranik (2010). "German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy". Social Choice and Welfare. 40 (3): 833–869. doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0646-y. S2CID 39079121.
  20. Tangian, Andranik (2017). "Policy representation of a parliament: the case of the German Bundestag 2013 election". Group Decision and Negotiation. 26 (1): 151–179. doi:10.1007/S10726-016-9507-5. S2CID 157256280.
  21. Tangian, Andranik (2019). "Visualizing the political spectrum of Germany by contiguously ordering the party policy profiles". In Skiadis, Christos H.; Bozeman, James R. (eds.). Data Analysis and Applications 2. London: ISTE-Wiley. pp. 193–208. doi:10.1002/9781119579465.ch14.
  22. Tangian, Andranik (2008). "Predicting DAX trends from Dow Jones data by methods of the mathematical theory of democracy". European Journal of Operational Research. 185 (3): 1632–1662. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.08.011.
  23. Tangian, Andranik (2007). "Selecting predictors for traffic control by methods of the mathematical theory of democracy". European Journal of Operational Research. 181 (2): 986–1003. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.06.036. S2CID 46111084.
  24. Tangian, Andranik (2017). "An election method to improve policy representation of a parliament". Group Decision and Negotiation. 26 (1): 181–196. doi:10.1007/S10726-016-9508-4. S2CID 157553362.
  25. Tangian, Andranik (2017). "The Third Vote experiment: Enhancing policy representation of a student parliament". Group Decision and Negotiation. 26 (4): 1091–1124. doi:10.1007/S10726-017-9540-Z. S2CID 158833198.
  26. Amrhein, Marius; Diemer, Antonia; Eßwein, Bastian; Waldeck, Maximilian; Schäfer, Sebastian. "The Third Vote (web page)". Karlsruhe: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute ECON. Retrieved 30 December 2019.
  27. "Turning a political education instrument (voting advice application) in a new election method", World Forum for Democracy 2016, Lab 7: Reloading Elections, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 7–9 November 2016, retrieved December 30, 2019
  28. "Well Informed Vote", World Forum for Democracy 2019, Lab 5: Voting under the Influence, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 6–8 November 2019, retrieved December 30, 2019
  29. Tangian, Andranik (2020). Analytical theory of democracy. Vols. 1 and 2. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-39691-6. ISBN 978-3-030-39690-9.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.