Nur ul-Haq Ulumi

Ulumi saw action at the Battle of Jalalabad, where he played an important role in defeating the mujihadeen offensive. Following his success at Jalalabad he was given a new position as Governor of Kandahar.[2] This is according to Peter Tomsen, but Tomsen is characteristically inaccurate. Ulumi was promoted to Kandahar governor in 1988 (see Mark Urban's "War in Afghanistan", written - unlike Tomsen's book - without political retrospective) and was still in Kandahar during the 1989 Jalalabad battle. The Jalalabad battle was actually led by Manokai Mangal and Asif Dilawar; Ulumi played no part though another Parchami interior minister, Hanif Atmar, was involved as an officer.

In his new role as governor, Ulumi enacted a number of major changes to regional government policy in order to help implement the Afghan Government's National Reconciliation. Firstly, he persuaded President Najibullah to withdraw Abdul Rashid Dostum's hated Jouzjani militia from Kandahar, he stopped forced conscription into the Army, he encouraged local unemployed youth to join his local paid militia to help defend Kandahar, he complied with prisoner release requests from moderate mujihadeen commanders, and he didn't interfere with the mujihadeen-run narcotics smuggling trade.[2]

Ulumi co-opted local mujahideen forces by providing them with incentives, such as money or permission to visit their families within Kandahar, in exchange for the mujahideen scaling down attacks on local government forces.[1]

In the case of Ahmed Gailani, Ulumi was related to the wife of Ahmed Gailani, due to her being a member of the Mohammadzai clan. As such he was able to reach out to and ease relations with Gailani's National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, inviting Gailani's son Hasan to Kandahar for negotiations.[2]

Ulumi was also able to reach out to Gul Agha Sherzai by emphasising their common Barakzai heritage as well as by offering financial incentives. Under a jointly agreed plan, Gul Agha would launch attacks on Kandahar Airport that had been pre-planned with Ulumi. Gul Agha's forces would fire off rockets and weapons at the airport, whilst forces under Ulumi would light fires and make loud noises. ISI forces observing the operation would then believe Gul Agha to be fighting the government, and would then supply him with weapons and food, which Ulumi allowed Gul Agha to sell within Kandahar.[2]

This made coordination of attacks between various mujahideen groups increasing difficult, although some groups such as Hezbi Islami refused any compromise with the Afghan government. Their refusal to compromise was in turn rewarded by funding from Pakistan, who made several failed attempts to unite the mujihadeen.[1]

During the Civil War, Ulumi also commanded the Afghan Army's Kandahar Corps.[5]

Ulumi, as commander of Afghan government forces in Kabul, surrendered Kabul in April 1992 to advancing mujahideen forces.[5] After the conflict had ended Ulumi moved to the Netherlands, where lived in Landgraaf. He returned to Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.[6]

Ulumi maintains that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was only done at Afghanistan's behest, and that Soviet actions in the conflict were done in support of the Afghan government, who retained operational command. Ulumi also argues that during the rule of the PDPA, Afghans could approach the government and seek redress for issues free from corruption or tribalism.[5]

Ulumi has blamed the rise in Taliban activity in southern Afghanistan on the failure of the Afghan government to build a fair government, free from corruption.[5]