Ottoman reconquest of the Morea

The inability of the Venetians to effectively defend the Morea had been apparent already during the latter stages of the Great Turkish War, when the Greek renegade Limberakis Gerakaris had launched dangerous raids into the peninsula.[8] The Republic was well aware of the Ottoman ambitions to recover the Morea, both for reasons of prestige and because of the potential threat to the Ottoman possessions in the rest of Greece posed by Venetian possession of the peninsula: with the Morea as a springboard, the Venetians might seek to reclaim Crete, or foment anti-Ottoman rebellions in the Balkans.[9]

Consequently, from the beginning of its rule, Venice's officials toured the fortresses to ascertain their state and their capacity to resist. However, the Venetians' position was hampered by problems of supplies and morale, as well as the extreme lack of troops available: in 1702, the garrison at the Acrocorinth, which covered the Isthmus of Corinth, the main invasion route from the mainland, numbered only 2,045 infantry and barely a thousand cavalry.[10] The peacetime Venetian military system, which consisted of a small permanent army and spread it among small garrisons (presidi) in the colonies, also proved a problem, as it prohibited a rapid mobilization and concentration of a large force. Furthermore, such a force was essentially an infantry army, short in cavalry and hence forced to avoid pitched battles and concentrate on sieges.[11] The Venetian militia (cernide) system was problematic as well, being plagued by money shortages and the reluctance of the colonial subjects to serve in it. For example, out of 20,120 men deemed fit for duty in 1690, only 662 actually joined the militia in the Morea.[12] The Venetian army in the Morea particularly lacked cavalry. Only three dragoon regiments of five companies each, and the Croat cavalry regiment of Antonio Medin, with eight companies, were stationed in the Morea. The quality of both the men and their horses was judged as extremely poor, and peacetime losses through desertion or disease meant that they were never at full strength.[13][14]

View of the Palamidi fortress today

View of the Acrocorinth fortress today

In light of these facts, the Venetian governors in the Morea quickly concentrated their attention to the fortifications. However, although a detailed survey in 1698 found serious deficiencies in all the fortresses of the Morea, little seems to have been done to address them.[15] In 1711, Daniele Dolfin, charged with inspecting the situation in the peninsula, warned that unless the many deficiencies were addressed soon, it would be lost in a coming war. He also recommended that, given the lack of funds and men, and the inability of either the available army or the navy to stop an Ottoman invasion over land, the defence of the Morea should be limited to a handful of strategically important fortresses: the capital Nauplia, the Acrocorinth, the Castle of the Morea at the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf, and the coastal castles of Modon and Monemvasia. It was hoped that by concentrating the available resources in strengthening these, they could be made impregnable.[16] Almost the only major new fortification undertaken by the Venetians during their rule in the Morea was the new citadel for Nauplia, built in 1711–1714 on the height of Palamidi overlooking the city and the approaches to it.[15][17][18]

The forces available to the Republic in the Morea on the eve of the war were fewer than 5,000 men, and dispersed among the various fortresses.[19] According to a contemporary register preserved in Montreal, the total strength of Venetian regular troops in the Morea was 4,414 men:[20][lower-alpha 1]

• Nauplia: 1,716 men (370 for Palamidi), under the provveditore generale Alessandro Bon
• Acrocorinth (Corinth): 330 men, plus 162 Albanians for covering the Isthmus, under the provveditore straordinario Giacomo Minotto
• Castle of the Morea (Rio): 786 men, under the provveditore straordinario Marco Barbarigo
• Monemvasia: 261 men, under the provveditore straordinario Federgo Badoer
• Kelefa: 45 men, under the provveditore Paulo Donà
• Zarnata: 83 men, under the provveditore Bembo
• Coron: 282 men, under the provveditore Agostin Balbi
• Modon: 691 men, under the provveditore straordinario Vincenzo Pasta
• Aigina: 58 men, under the provveditore Francesco Bembo

Apostolos Vakalopoulos gives similar, but slightly different numbers: 1747 (397 cavalry) at Nauplia, 450 at Corinth, 466 infantry anf 491 at Rio and its region, 279 at Monemvasia, 43 each at Kelefa and Zarnata, 719 (245 cavalry) at Coron and Modon, and 179 infantry and 125 at Navarino, for a total of 4,527 men.[22] The strength of the cernide militias is unknown.[13]

These forces were clearly inadequate to confront an Ottoman army of 200,000 men, as the various reports received by the Venetian commanders claimed.[23] The Venetian government also delayed ins ending reinforcements to the Morea: the first convoy, under Lodovico Flangini, arrived in the peninsula in late March, but comprised only two ships carrying ammunition.[24] As a result, in March 1715 the Venetians decided to concentrate their defence on Nauplia, the Acrocorinth, the Castle of the Morea, and Monemvasia. The Venetian commanders hoped to be able to hold Navarino and Coron as well, but already in April, Dolfin judged that these would have to be abandoned as well.[25]

On the outbreak of the war, the Venetians called for aid from the other European states, but due to the Republic's diplomatic isolation and the preoccupation of the European powers with other conflicts, response was slow: apart from the Pope and the Crusading orders of the Knights Hospitaller and the Knights of St. Stephen, who immediately dispatched a few warships, the major European powers offered help only after the loss of the Morea.[26][27] Even after the arrival of these auxiliary squadrons, in July 1715 Dolfin only possessed 22 ships of the line, 33 galleys, 2 galleasses and 10 galliots, and was at a considerable disadvantage against the Ottoman fleet, which forced him to maintain a rather passive stance.[28][29]

Venetian appeals to the local Greek inhabitants were also ineffective, especially in continental Greece: most of the Greeks remained either neutral or actively joined the Ottomans.[30] The Ottomans actively encouraged this with proclamations that life, property, and privileges of ecclesiastical and administrative autonomy would be respected.[30] News that the Patriarch of Constantinople had excommunicated anyone helping the Venetians in whatever manner also influenced the Greek attitudes.[31] This was a severe blow to the Venetians: many leaders of armed bands joined the Ottoman army, bolstering the latter instead of the numerically much inferior Venetian forces, while the Ottomans were able to dominate the countryside, where the Greek peasantry readily provided food and supplies to the Ottoman forces.[30] Even where some Greek leaders, notably in the Mani Peninsula, decided to assist the Venetians, they made this conditional on the Venetian providing arms and supplies. In the event, the rapid Ottoman advance and the absence of an effective Venetian response persuaded them to remain neutral.[30]

Janissaries (left) and sipahis (right), by Richard Knötel

The Ottoman army in 1714 was still organized in the "classical" manner of the previous centuries, with a core of elite kapikulu troops, notably the Janissaries that formed the core of any expeditionary army, augmented by provincial levies and timariot cavalry.[32] Ottoman armies were distinguished by the presence of large numbers of cavalry, which formed about 40% of a field army, but its effectiveness against European regular infantry had diminished much in the previous decades, as shown in the Great Turkish War.[33] Still, it retained its tactical mobility, whereas the Ottoman infantry was a far more static force, capable either of last-stand defence or mass attack, but not much else.[34] The indiscipline of the Janissaries also proved a constant headache for the Ottoman commanders.[34]

During the early months of 1715, the Ottomans assembled their army in Macedonia under the Grand Vizier Silahdar Damat Ali Pasha. On 22 May, Grand Vizier marched south from Thessalonica, arriving at Thebes on 9 June, where he held a review of the troops.[35] Although the accuracy of his figures is open to doubt, Brue reports 14,994 cavalry and 59,200 infantry as present at Thebes on 9 June, with the total number of men involved in the campaign against the Morea placed at 110,364 (22,844 cavalry and 87,520 infantry).[36] The cavalry numbers given by Brue are about half those expected for an Ottoman force of this size, indicating that likely the Ottoman commanders had to begin the campaign before their entire army was assembled.[37] The army's artillery park comprised 111 light field guns, 15 larger siege guns, and 20 mortars.[37]

The army was aided by the Ottoman fleet, which operated in close coordination with it. Like the Venetians, the Ottoman navy was a mixed force of sailing ships of the line and rowed galleys.[38] The Ottomans also secured the assistance of their North African vassals, the regencies of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, and their fleets.[8][39] Commanded by the capable Kapudan Pasha Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha, the fleet that sailed from the Dardanelles in June 1715 numbered 58 ships of the line, 30 galleys, five fireships, and 60 galliots, along with cargo vessels.[8][27][39]

The Ottoman view on the campaign is known mostly through two eyewitness accounts, the diary of the French embassy interpreter Benjamin Brue (published as Journal de la campagne que le Grand Vesir Ali Pacha a faite en 1715 pour la conquête de la Morée, Paris 1870), and that of Constantine the "Dioiketes", a guard officer to the Prince of Wallachia (published by Nicolae Iorga in Chronique de l’expédition des Turcs en Morée 1715 attribuée à Constantin Dioikétès, Bucarest 1913).