Ralph Austin Bard

Ralph Austin Bard visits a wounded U.S. Marine in San Diego in 1944.

When Bard became Assistant Secretary, Navy policy was to prohibit African Americans from enlisting for "general duty" (combat) roles, restricting them to service as "messmen." Although Bard's duties as Assistant Secretary did not extend to uniformed personnel, his office often dealt with racial discrimination and its consequences. As a member of a committee appointed to investigate the Navy's racial policies, Bard's special assistant Addison Walker argued for allowing enlistment of a small number of African Americans for general duty on an experimental basis; and Bard himself promised Mark Abridge, who chaired President Roosevelt's Fair Employment Practices Committee, that enlistment of African Americans would be given consideration. Under pressure from President Roosevelt, the Navy announced in 1942 a new policy of accepting African American volunteers (but not draftees) for general duty positions in segregated units, a practice that continued until 1948 when President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 racially integrating the United States Armed Services. In 1944, the Navy began the training of African Americans as commissioned officers.[11]

In 1945, Bard became one of eight members of the Interim Committee appointed to advise President Harry S. Truman on the use of the atomic bomb.[12] Although Bard joined in the committee's unanimous recommendation that the bomb should be used in combat as soon as possible and without warning,[13] he developed second thoughts. In a memorandum dated June 27, 1945, to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,[14] Bard argued that Japan should receive two or three days' "preliminary warning" before the bomb was used. "The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling," Bard wrote, adding that he felt "that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender." The memorandum also suggested that Japan be informed of "Russia's position," i.e., the likely entry of the Soviet Union into the war, and that "assurances" be given "with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender."[15] However, the extensive incendiary raids on Japanese cities under General Curtis LeMay that killed at least 350,000 civilians desensitized U.S. authorities,[16] and the Japanese government did not respond to the Potsdam Declaration in late July 1945 outlining the conditions for unconditional surrender.

On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima without the warning that Bard recommended, inflicting approximately 70,000 deaths, including 20,000 Japanese combatants and 20,000 Korean slave laborers. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and launched the invasion of Manchuria which decimated the already-weakening Manchukuo Imperial Army. On August 9, a second bomb was used on the Japanese city of Nagasaki, killing approximately 35,000 people, including 27,778 Japanese munitions employees, 2,000 Korean slave laborers, and 150 Japanese combatants. On August 15, the Emperor announced the surrender of Japan.[17]

Wikisource has original text related to this article: Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb

Wikisource has original text related to this article: We Are Still Losing This War

Bard submitted his resignation as Under Secretary at about the time the Interim Committee made its recommendation to Truman on the use of the bomb. He left his post a month later. There is no evidence that he resigned in disagreement with the recommendation or because his own recommendations to Stimson were not followed.[18]