The Great Rapprochement

Adam Smith predicted in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that if given representation in Parliament, in a century the Thirteen Colonies would become the center of the British Empire, but the American Revolution that began at that time disrupted the empire's relationship with the new United States.[1] The War of 1812 and disputes along the Canada–US border continued to cause suspicion between the two countries. The US was seen as a potential threat by the British Empire, which was seen, in turn, as the antique and aristocratic empire which had once ruled America.

Americans for their part remained guarded in their assessment of British aims and motives after 1815, in no small part by the status of "belligerent" conferred by the British government upon the Confederate States during the American Civil War (1861-1865). Particularly galling to the United States government was the building of the CSS Alabama from Liverpool in 1862. The Alabama had a relatively successful career disrupting Union shipping in the Atlantic until it was sunk in the Battle of Cherbourg in 1864. The Alabama Claims were settled between the two Atlantic powers by arbitration several years after the war, which formed a useful model for resolving other disputes arising between the two nations into the early 20th century.

Britain itself remained at all times a model of civilization for Anglo-Americans, a still overwhelming proportion of the upper echelons of American society well into the 20th century. Cultural and economic ties served to keep the two nations at something less than arm's length during even the very worst of times. For example, there was ambivalence and even open opposition to the War of 1812 in the United States, especially in New England, which was quick to let bygones be bygones almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities in 1815.

Even before the American Revolution, Americans were well aware of how much they owed to their British background, and the British institutions had always contrasted favorably against their European counterparts. As early as 1823, Britain backed up the American Monroe Doctrine, and both countries co-operated in naval West Africa Squadron missions against the slave trade.

In addition, the differences that had separated an agrarian and isolationist United States from the industrialized imperial power of Britain rapidly diminished after 1865. The United States emerged from the Civil War as a major industrial power with a renewed commitment to a stronger federal government as opposed to one ruled by individual states. The Reconstruction period generated Anglo-American geopolitical and commercial networks in North America.[2]

The Atlantic Maritimes played an important role in furthering reconciliation on the eve of the Great Rapprochement. The 1890-93 appointment of Massachusetts Republican and fishing magnate Isaac C. Hall, a key figure in developing conceptions of "provincial reciprocity," as U.S. Consul to Prince Edward Island spurred Conservative calls for "Dominion reciprocity." The revived idea of "provincial reciprocity," distinguished from "Dominion reciprocity" by Harrison Administration construction of Article 33 in the 1871 Treaty of Washington, contributed to debates in the 31st General Assembly of Prince Edward Island.[3] These conflicts began with U.S. Senate Republicans' 1885 abrogation of fishery articles in the Treaty of Washington, U.S. Senate Republicans' rejection of the 1888 Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty (after passage of the Retaliation Act), and the 1888 U.S. Presidential Election.[4] Neil McLeod, Leader of the Opposition, held that any proposal for "provincial reciprocity" would pressure the "Dominion Government to go on their marrow bones to the American Republic and ask them for better trade relations...it would show the Americans that we were in some dire distress, and without some assistance from them in the shape of trade relations, we were at their mercy. I think that when an important case, such as the question of trade relations with the United States is pending, the local Legislature should remain quiet, and let the Dominion Government carry the burden."[5] McLeod also presaged his own proposed amendments to Liberal "reciprocity" trade resolutions--"we hope the negotiations will result in establishing the freest trade relations between the countries, consistent with the exigencies of the Dominion and our relations with Great Britain"—with his interpretations of lulls in "amalgamation" deliberations: "formerly our Liberal friends advocated doing away with the Legislative Council, but they do not advocate that now in this House. It would not be pleasing to some of their friends in the other branch of the Legislature."[6] Alterations to Liberal "reciprocity" resolutions proved more divisive within Conservative ranks than narratives of the origins of "amalgamation." Although nine Conservative delegates (in addition to McLeod) voted for his amendments, three joined the Liberal bloc in defeating the proposed revisions.[7]

In Prince Edward Island, Conservative challenges against "provincial reciprocity" did not preclude Conservative advocacy for U.S. trade treaties by "Dominion reciprocity" with "provincial" support. For example, when a Liberal delegate accused Conservatives of attempting to "press upon the Dominion Government to get a treaty with the United States," Neil McLeod countered that "when the Dominion Government want[s] to undertake some great measure, such as a treaty with the United States, he [the Liberal delegate] knows that instead of being weakened by the assistance of Local Parliaments, they will be strengthened by that assistance. I do not mean to say that we ought to raise any factious difficulties or anything of that kind, but we should in any and every way show the Dominion Government that when they have a really bona-fide measure to propose, we are in unison with them."[8] Conservative appraisals of "provincial reciprocity" as a question of legislative sovereignty, rather than solely international commerce and political economy, became crucial for fictional and nonfictional narratives of Anglo-American reunion as well as burgeoning New England tourism in the Atlantic Maritimes.[9]

The US emerged from the Spanish–American War (1898) as an imperial power with possessions around the globe, and a special interest in the approaches to what in 1914 became the Panama Canal. At the same time, the British Empire was coming under increasing pressure from the growth of the German Empire's economy and navy, and it was cutting back on potential conflicts on its periphery to focus on the rising threat across the North Sea.[10] As part of the process of imperial retrenchment, Britain resolved a border conflict between Canada and Alaska, withdrew its objections to an American-controlled canal in the Hay–Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, and agreed in 1902 to arbitrate a debt collection dispute with Venezuela. Perhaps foreseeing the coming Anglo-German conflict in his old age, Otto von Bismarck remarked in 1898 that the most significant event of the 20th century would be "the fact that the North Americans speak English."[11]

By 1901, many influential Britons advocated for a closer relationship between the two countries. W. T. Stead even proposed that year in The Americanization of the World for both to merge to unify the English-speaking world, as doing so would help Britain "continue for all time to be an integral part of the greatest of all World-Powers, supreme on sea and unassailable on land, permanently delivered from all fear of hostile attack, and capable of wielding irresistible influence in all parts of this planet." The Scottish-born American Andrew Carnegie shared the goal by telling Stead, "We are heading straight to the Re-United States."[1] As US Anglophobia declined, London realized the value of a long-term ally that would prevent an upset in Britain's balance of power, which Germany and Russia appeared to threaten. The US seemed to understand and to some extent agree with British imperial aspirations, if not always with the methods used in their pursuit. Britain's adoption of US Secretary of State John Hay's "Open Door Policy" toward China garnered much goodwill on the western side of the Atlantic and further accelerated the pace of rapprochement after 1900. After a final British flirtation with Germany's anti-American designs during the Venezuelan crisis of 1902–03, Britain and the US embraced unreservedly during the Theodore Roosevelt administration (1901-1909).

American culture and language largely derived from those of Britain. However, Irish Americans were strongly hostile to Britain because they wanted independence for Ireland. They pushed the Democratic Party, which most of them supported, towards hostile measures like the dispute over the Venezuela boundary.[12]

The most notable sign of a warming in Anglo-American relations was Britain's support of the US during the Spanish–American War in 1898. Britain had previously favored Spanish control over Cuba because the possession of Cuba by an unfriendly United States might harm British trade in the Caribbean. However, the warming of Anglo-American relations and a guarantee of Cuban independence by the US in 1898 made Britain abandoned their policy and supported the US position on Cuba and the war although Britain was officially neutral. Also, Washington refused to give support to the Boers during the Second Boer War.[13]

At the start of the Spanish–American War, most Continental European powers remained neutral and cool but warned Spain repeatedly not to provoke a war with the more-powerful United States. Britain also officially remained neutral but openly sided with the US.[14] During the 90-day war, Britain sold coal to the US Navy and allowed the US military to use Britain's submarine communications cables to communicate.[15][16] When Commodore George Dewey's fleet sailed out of Hong Kong's harbor for Manila, the British soldiers and sailors in the harbor openly cheered for the US.[17]

• United Kingdom–United States relations
• Special Relationship
• Samoan crisis
• New Imperialism
• Alaska Boundary Dispute

• Adams, Iestyn. Brothers Across The Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' (2005).
• Anderson, Stuart. Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904 (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981).
• James C. Bennett, "The Anglosphere Challenge" (2004).
• Burton, David H., British-American Diplomacy 1895-1917: Early Years of the Special Relationship (1999).
• Campbell, Charles S. Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957).
• Neale, Robert G. "British‐American relations during the Spanish‐American war: Some problems." Australian Historical Studies 6#21 (1953): 72–89.
• Perkins, Bradford. The great rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (1968).
• Watt, Donald Cameron. Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's place, 1900-1975: a study of the Anglo-American relationship and world politics in the context of British and American foreign-policy-making in the twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, 1984).