Treaties of Rome (1941)

The Treaties of Rome were a series of treaties concluded by the Fascist Italy and the World War II collaborationist Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) on 18 May 1941 following the Axis Invasion of Yugoslavia. The treaties determined the borders between the NDH and Italy–effectively ceding territory largely organised as the Governorate of Dalmatia to the latter. The treaties also prohibited NDH from deploying naval forces to the Adriatic Sea and restricted movement of its troops in the Italian-controlled part of the NDH.

Treaties of Rome
TypeTreaties on borders, military, foreign policy and economic cooperation
ContextPartition of territory following Axis Invasion of Yugoslavia and establishment of the Independent State of Croatia
Signed18 May 1941 (1941-05-18)
LocationRome, Italy
Expiry10 September 1943 (1943-09-10)
Negotiators
Signatories
Parties

Other provisions of the treaties largely subordinated the NDH to Italian interests and effectively placed the NDH in matters of defence, foreign policy, and economy in position of a quasi-protectorate obliging the NDH to conclude further treaties required by Italy. Finally, the treaties established that the NDH's Ustaše regime led by Ante Pavelić will offer the position of the king of Croatia to a member of the House of Savoy, as appointed by Victor Emmanuel III. The treaties were repealed by Pavelić in 1943 following surrender of Italy.

The treaties and further agreements concluded based on those treaties created resentment by the Croats–regardless of position towards the regime–and contributed to increasingly successful uprising against Axis occupation led by the Yugoslav Partisans. The security arrangements in the Italian zones of occupation within the NDH required the Italians to use Chetniks as auxiliaries in the anti-guerrilla warfare as they left large areas of land without permanent garrisons. This policy facilitated Partisans' withdrawal after defeats in Montenegro and eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishment of the Bihać Republic in November 1942.

Background

Plans to break up Yugoslavia

Partition of Yugoslavia following Axis Invasion in April 1941.

Seeking to politically destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in retribution for backing out of the Tripartite Pact following the Yugoslav coup d'état of March 1941, Adolf Hitler devised a plan to dismember the country.[1] The move was supported by Italian leader Benito Mussolini who thought that such fragmentation would make it easier for Fascist Italy to expand territorially by absorbing former Yugoslav territories.[2] The territories sought by Mussolini were the southwest parts of the Slovene Lands and unspecified areas of Dalmatia and elsewhere along the eastern Adriatic coast.[3]

German plans for breakup of Yugoslavia within the Operation 25 involved territorial expansion of the Nazi Germany, rewarding their allies–Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria–and political promises to Croats designed to exploit their dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav regime. Initially, the plans called for special political treatment and subsequent autonomy.[1] Hitler offered Hungary to absorb Croatia on 25 March, apparently referring to territories largely corresponding with former Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Montenegro were to be left to Italian control. However, on 27 March, Regent Miklós Horthy declined the offer, and Germans turned to idea of establishment of a Croatian state.[1]

Setting up a Croatian state

Filippo Anfuso intercepted Ante Pavelić in Karlovac to extract written support for Italian claims.

Germans turned to the Croatian Peasant Party, the most popular political party in Croatia at the time, offering its leader Vladko Maček to govern such a state, but Maček declined.[4] In response, the position was offered to Ante Pavelić-led Ustaše who were largely based in Italy at the time.[5] However, the Germans did so reluctantly as they feared that Pavelić was an Italian agent.[4] On the other hand, Mussolini sought to capitalise on the promises made in a 1927 memorandum submitted by Pavelić and Ivo Frank,[3] promising Italian political, economic, and military dominance in the Adriatic region and promising to cede to Italy the Bay of Kotor and parts of Dalmatia of strategic importance to Italy–all in return for Italian support to Croatian struggle against Yugoslavia.[6] Nonetheless, Mussolini felt Italian interests were in jeopardy. Namely, Pavelić only privately told Mussolini that Italian claims against the eastern Adriatic coast would be supported by Ustaše-led regime. Pavelić was avoiding any written commitments to that effect fearing he would look like a traitor,[7] and the Italians deemed the 1927 memorandum insufficiently formal.[8]

Yugoslavia was invaded by the Axis forces on 6 April 1941 and, as Maček rebuffed a renewed push by Germans to rule a Croatian satellite state, the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was declared on 10 April as the Wehrmacht was approaching Croatian capital Zagreb. The declaration was made by Slavko Kvaternik on urging of and with support of SS Colonel Edmund Veesenmayer attached to the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.[5]

On the following day, Pavelić and Italy-based Ustaše were gathered in Pistoia. Before departing by train to Trieste and then by road towards Zagreb, they were issued Italian uniforms, buses, few cars, and light arms. However, when they reached Karlovac on 14 April, Mussolini dispatched Filippo Anfuso by plane intercept Pavelić and obtain a written public confirmation that Pavelić would recognise Italian claims in Dalmatia. Pavelić complied and Anfuso left him to proceed,[7] and reach Zagreb in early morning of 15 April with 195 Ustašas.[9] Yugoslavia surrendered on 17 April.[10]

Italian and German control

At the outset, Pavelić assumed that the NDH would be within the Italian sphere of influence,[11] and Italians saw the NDH as dependent on Italy.[12] By 22 April, Germany posted Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as its plenipotentiary general in the NDH and Siegfried Kasche as its envoy, while Italy dispatched Raffaele Casertano as its special representative to Zagreb. The German Foreign Ministry told Kasche to expect Italians and the NDH authorities to clash over a variety of issues, and instructed to take a hands-off approach when possible and to support Italians at all times.[13]

Hitler reversed his initial decision to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina to Italians and foreign ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop and Galeazzo Ciano met in Vienna on 21–22 April to establish a demarcation line dividing the NDH approximately down the middle from northwest to southeast. Thus established Vienna Line separated the German occupation zone north of the line from the Italian to the south.[14] The line was effectively set by the Germans aiming to secure their control over sources of raw materials and lines of communication between Austria and Greece.[15] The decision was a reversal of the decision to have German troops leave the NDH as soon as possible.[16]

Provisions

Negotiations

Ante Pavelić and Galeazzo Ciano led the first round of negotiations on the 1941 treaties concluded by the NDH and Italy.

Pavelić and Ciano held the first round of negotiations to determine borders between the NDH and Italy in Ljubljana on 25 April. Ciano initially claimed a strip of land along the entire Adriatic coast linking the Slovene Lands and Montenegro. When Pavelić complained that this would cost him his position, Ciano put forward another proposal largely constrained to the former Kingdom of Dalmatia accompanied by a treaty legally attaching the NDH to Italy militarily, politically and economically.[3] Pavelić asked Ciano to leave Split, Dubrovnik and several islands to the NDH and to avoid establishment of a customs union. On the following day, Mussolini agreed with Pavelić’s request, except in relation to Split. Ciano concurred considering it more useful to tie the NDH closely to Italy than to annex outright a large territory containing hostile population.[17]

The second round of negotiations took place in Zagreb between Pavelić and Casertano–producing an agreement on 29 April to appoint a prince of the House of Savoy as the king of Croatia.[18] Casertano was instructed to insist on Italian possession of Split, but not if that endangered the successful conclusion of the treaties. However, Pavelić only requested certain guarantees regarding city administration and did not insist on keeping the city within the NDH. Pavelić met Mussolini and Ciano on 7 May in Monfalcone where Ciano insisted on adding Bakar to Italy as his father’s birthplace and on acquisition of the island of Korčula.[19] It was specifically provided that the NDH authorities would facilitate opening of schools and use of Italian language in coastal areas under NDH control, while Italy promised to enter into further agreements with the NDH on administration of the city of Split and the island of Korčula. However, the latter was never pursued further.[20] Otherwise, earlier arrangements were confirmed and it was determined that signing of the treaties would take place in Rome on 18 May.[18] No ratification process was foreseen.[20]

Italian–Croatian Treaty on Frontiers

Bulk of the land ceded to Italy became the Governorate of Dalmatia.

The Italian–Croatian Treaty on Frontiers defined the bulk of the border between the NDH and Italy. It provided for Italian annexation of 5,380 square kilometres (2,080 sq mi) of territory which was home to 380,000 people. It included Dalmatian hinterland of the city of Zadar, as well as the cities of Split and Šibenik, most Adriatic islands and a strip of land in the northwest of Croatia. These lands were referred to as the "Zone I" and largely organised as the Governorate of Dalmatia.[21]

In the North, the border was drawn to give Italy Kastav, Sušak, Fužine, Čabar, Bakar and a part of the Delnice district. In the central part of the eastern Adriatic coast, Italy received the land between the Zrmanja River and a point south of Split, as well as the Bay of Kotor in the South. Italy also gained all Adriatic islands except Pag, Brač and Hvar.[22] The treaty was signed on 18 May in Rome by Mussolini and Pavelić. The territories annexed under the treaty were incorporated into Italian legal system by the Royal Decree Law 452 issued on the day of signing of the treaty.[23]

This treaty was complemented by two additional treaties on borders. On 15 July, a treaty was concluded to adjust the border between the NDH and the Italian-annexed Slovene Lands. The NDH–Italian-occupied Montenegro border was determined in a treaty concluded on 27 October.[21]

Agreement on Military Matters

Italian zones of occupation in the Independent State of Croatia in 1941–1943

On 18 May the NDH and Italy also concluded the Agreement on Military Matters Pertaining to the Coastal Area. The agreement established further two areas within the Italian zone of occupation in the NDH. The Zone II was a strip of land running along the entire length of the Adriatic coast (or Zone I where present) between Slovenia and Montenegro, and the Zone III extending between the Zone II and the Vienna Line. The Agreement prohibited NDH to deploy troops in the Zone II, allowing it only to establish a civilian administration there.[21] The Agreement also prohibited the Navy of the Independent State of Croatia from deploying to the Adriatic except for policing and customs control, and determined that Italian troops will be allowed to use roads and railroads to transit through the NDH pursuant to future agreements on the topic.[21]

Treaty of Guarantee and Collaboration

Further matters were regulated by the 25-year Treaty of Guarantee and Collaboration. It stated that Italy guaranteed the political independence and inviolability of borders of the NDH which would be determined by mutual agreement. It also prohibited the NDH from concluding international agreements contrary to the spirit of this treaty and required the NDH to rely on Italy for development of its military. Finally, the treaty established a commission to study economic development opportunities to be exploited as circumstances improve. In a separate protocol, the signatories affirmed all treaties concluded between Yugoslavia and Italy.[24]

Appointment of a king

Only hours before signing of the treaties, Pavelić formally requested Victor Emmanuel III to appoint a member of the House of Savoy to become the king of Croatia as previously agreed. Victor Emmanuel III responded by appointing the Prince Aimone, Duke of Spoleto to fill the position. As a result, the Treaties of Rome were signed on behalf of the "Kingdom of Croatia".[25]

Response

Designation of Prince Aimone as the King of Croatia on 18 May 1941.

The treaties made the NDH an Italian quasi-protectorate and confirmed that its independence was only in its name. The treaties represented materialisation of Mussolini's ambition to expand across the Adriatic. The treaties also meant loss of sovereign rights, a large swath of national territory, while inviting a foreign prince to become a sovereign of Croatia. This in turn ensured that the Ustaše regime would not manage to win universal acceptance even among Croats or consolidate its rule across the NDH.[26]

Even though the German representatives in the NDH initially left the internal affairs to Italians to settle, they wondered about justification of Italian territorial claims which had no apparent ethnic background. Ciano explained that the claims were also based on historical and cultural issues as well as Italian need to improve borders and expand living space. Victor Emmanuel III predicted that the size of Italian problems will match the size of annexed territory, but was powerless to intervene.[26]

The treaties were received extremely unfavourably by the Croat population–especially the people living along the Adriatic coast. In February 1942, Glaise-Horstenau remarked that the popular sentiment there is such that the population is eagerly awaiting the British Army to invade and liberate it–and that the local population would rise against the Axis powers. Some Ustaše were shocked to learn of the treaty and believed it would only serve Communist and Yugoslav Partisan propaganda.[27] The treaties created a natural base for Partisan recruitment among the Croats–particularly in Dalmatia.[28]

Reoccupation of Zones II and III

Ante Pavelić and Benito Mussolini in Rome on 18 May 1941

Even though the Italian forces withdrew from Zones II and III after signing of the Treaties of Rome, this was reversed unilaterally on 22 August. The decision was purportedly motivated by the intention to counter Yugoslav Partisan guerillas, but it was also meant to deter German access to the Adriatic.[29]

The reoccupation was formalised on 7 September when Italy took over military and civilian administration of the Zone II, as well as military authority in the Zone III–reducing the NDH authority in the Zone III to civilian administration under Italian supervision. The full takeover of the Zone II gave the Italy control over the territory requested by Ciano during the negotiations in Ljubljana in April 1941. Furthermore, on 27 October 1941, the NDH was pressured to agree to supply food to the Italian troops in Zones II and III and to the civilian population in the Zone I.[30] NDH troops largely moved out of the Italian-occupied zones and few that remained or returned after an agreement of 19 June 1942 were placed under Italian command.[31]

In June 1942, the Italian forces withdrew 70–80 battalions of 200 stationed in the Zones II and III–choosing to garrison large population centres and major routes of transport only. This was motivated by events of the previous winter when the Yugoslav Partisans managed to cut off isolated Italian garrisons.[32] The withdrawal led the Italians to rely on the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia, largely composed of Chetniks, as auxiliary units for anti-guerrilla warfare.[33] The Italian pullout was exploited by the Partisans who were retreating after defeats in the Montenegro offensive and in the Operation Alfa. In November 1942, the Partisans retreated northwest and took the town of Bihać and a large part of Zones II and III surrounding the town.[34] This territory became known as the Bihać Republic. In the town, the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia was established later that month as a Partisan-controlled pan-Yugoslav assembly.[35]

Repeal

German troops removing Yugoslav flag in Split after taking the town from the Yugoslav Partisans who briefly captured it after Italy surrendered.

Following the 3 September 1943 Armistice of Cassibile ahead of the surrender of Italy, the Italian troops in Yugoslavia were variously instructed to return to Italy, provide weapons and supplies to the Partisans or fight Germans together with the Partisans. Some Italian units were persuaded by Germans to switch allegiance to the Italian Social Republic.[36]

The imminent Italian surrender was universally welcomed among Croatian population. Those supporting the Partisan struggle viewed it as collapse of an enemy power, while the Ustaše regime felt relieved from the Italian domination. In response, on 10 September, Pavelić declared the Treaties of Rome void and proclaimed addition of the Zone I to the NDH.[37] In his declaration, Pavelić announced annexation of areas previously outside Yugoslavia–specifically Zadar, Rijeka and Croatian part of Istria. However, the move was blocked by Hitler who established the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral which included the northernmost part of the former Zone I as well as Rijeka and Istria thus countermanding Pavelić. NDH was also prohibited from annexing Zadar and the island of Lastovo.[38]

As the Italian forces in Zones I, II, and III disintegrated, the Partisans moved to capture as much equipment as possible. The NDH had virtually no troops in the area and the Germans restricted NDH to capturing Italian garrisons in Zagreb and Karlovac, while enlisting Chetniks in the push to secure control over the former Italian zones of occupation.[39] Since the armistice of 1943, Italy has considered the treaties null and void. The 1947 peace treaty with Italy makes no reference to the 1941 Treaties of Rome at all.[38]

Footnotes

  1. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 47–48.
  2. Tomasevich 2001, p. 64.
  3. Tomasevich 2001, p. 235.
  4. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 49–50.
  5. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 51–52.
  6. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 30–31.
  7. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 58–59.
  8. Tomasevich 2001, p. 59, n. 31.
  9. Degan 2008, p. 268.
  10. Calic 2019, p. 125.
  11. Tomasevich 2001, p. 58.
  12. Tomasevich 2001, p. 234.
  13. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 60–61.
  14. Tomasevich 2001, p. 49.
  15. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 233–234.
  16. Tomasevich 2001, p. 242.
  17. Degan 2008, pp. 269–270.
  18. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 235–237.
  19. Degan 2008, p. 270.
  20. Degan 2008, p. 272.
  21. Tomasevich 2001, p. 237.
  22. Degan 2008, pp. 272–273.
  23. Verna 1990, pp. 528–529.
  24. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 237–238.
  25. Tomasevich 2001, p. 238.
  26. Tomasevich 2001, p. 239.
  27. Hoare 2013, p. 28.
  28. Banac 1988, pp. 84–85.
  29. Tomasevich 2001, p. 246.
  30. Tomasevich 2001, p. 248.
  31. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 249–250.
  32. Tomasevich 2001, p. 250.
  33. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 250–251.
  34. Tomasevich 2001, p. 252.
  35. Calic 2019, p. 138.
  36. Tomasevich 2001, p. 298.
  37. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 299–300.
  38. Degan 2008, p. 276.
  39. Tomasevich 2001, pp. 300–301.

References

  • Banac, Ivo (1988). With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-2186-0.
  • Calic, Marie-Janine (2019). A History of Yugoslavia. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press. ISBN 978-1-55753-838-3.
  • Degan, Vladimir-Đuro (2008). "Pravni aspekti i političke posljedice rimskih ugovora od 18. svibnja 1941. godine" [Legal Aspects and Political Effects of the Rome Treaties of 18 May 1941]. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu (in Croatian). Split, Croatia: University of Split. 45 (2): 265–278. ISSN 0584-9063.
  • Hoare, Marko Attila (2013). The Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-70394-9.
  • Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
  • Verna, Frank P. (1990). "Notes on Italian Rule in Dalmatia under Bastianini, 1941-1943". The International History Review. Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Taylor & Francis. 12 (3): 528–547. doi:10.1080/07075332.1990.9640557. ISSN 0707-5332. JSTOR 40106230.
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