Aburi Accord

Aburi Accord was reached in 1967 at a meeting attended by delegates of both the Federal Government of Nigeria (the Supreme Military Council) and the Eastern delegates, led by the Eastern Region's leader Colonel Ojukwu. The meeting was billed to be the last chance of preventing all out war.[1] It was held between 4 and 5 January 1967. The Aburi conference lasted for two days. It seemed as if all the other members of the council from Nigeria had come to meet and reconcile with Ojukwu. Nearly all the proposals put forward by him were adopted unanimously. The council collectively avowed not to use force to settle the Nigerian crisis, they also agreed to a law of collective responsibility which vested all powers of the Federal Military Government (FMG) in the Supreme Military Council, making a unanimous concurrence imperative. It was agreed as well, that the Head of the Federal Military Government should assume the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The atmosphere of the meeting was very cordial saving that Ojukwu did not participate in the humour side of the show. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the resolutions of the meeting should be embodied in a Decree to be issued by Lagos with the concurrence of the military Governors.

Aburi as venue

Aburi, Eastern Region of Ghana was chosen as a venue because the eastern delegates led by the Governor of Eastern State Colonel Ojukwu's safety could not be guaranteed anywhere within the western or northern part of the country.[2]

Agenda of Aburi Meeting

Delegates

The following are the delegates at the Aburi Conference:

Others as follows:

  • N. Akpan Secretary to the Military Governor-East
  • Alhaji Ali Akilu Secretary to the Military Governor-North
  • D. Lawani Under Secretary, Military Governor's Office-Mid-West.
  • P. Odumosu Secretary to the Military Governor-West
  • S. Akenzua (who later became the Oba of Benin - Erediauwa I[4]) Permanent Under-Secretary-Federal Cabinet Office

The Accord

Aburi accord is as follows:

  • "Members agree that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council, to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for determination provided that where it is possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to military governors for their comment and concurrence.
  • Specifically, the council agreed that appointments to senior ranks in the police, diplomatic, and consular services as well as appointment to superscale posts in the federal civil service and the equivalent posts in the statutory corporation must be approved by the Supreme Military Council.
  • The regional members felt that all the decrees passed since January 15, 1966, and which detracted from previous powers and positions of regional governments, should be repealed if mutual confidence is to be restored.[5]

Breakdown

In response to the accord, the federal government promulgated Decree No. 8, which was mainly an embodiment of the accord. The accord finally broke down because of differences of interpretation on both sides. This led to the outbreak of Nigerian Civil War.[6] Before the Decree No.8 could finally be issued on March 17, 1967, it had to be passed by the Supreme Military Council meeting which say in Benin on March 10. But Ojukwu did not attend that meeting because he had earlier rejected a draft of that decree which made mockery of the Aburi resolutions. The really offending clauses of the decree were sections 70 and 71 which empowered the Supreme Military Council to declare a state of emergency in Nigeria, if the Head of Federal Military Government and at least three of the Governors agreed to do so. Section 71 also empowered the Head of the Federal Military Government in agreement with at least three Governors to legislate for any particular region whenever they deemed it fit during a state of emergency, with or without the consent of the Governor of that particular Region. In effect, Gowon had thus taken power unto himself to deal with Ojukwu whenever he pleased, how he pleased and as long as he pleased.

References
  1. / Biafra Story, Frederick Forsyth ,Leo Cooper, 2001 ISBN 0-85052-854-2
  2. Ethnic politics in Kenya and Nigeria By Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nova Publishers, 2001.ISBN 1-56072-967-8
  3. http://www.dawodu.com/aburi1.htm
  4. Erediauwa I
  5. Biafra: Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts by C. Odumegwu Ojukwu published by Harper & Row 1969."
  6. Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War by Raph Uwechue, Trafford Publishing, 2004.ISBN 1-4120-2806-X
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