Battle of Kalavryta

During the Axis occupation of Greece, the EAM-ELAS resistance movement, led by the Communist Party of Greece, emerged as the dominant movement of the Greek Resistance. At the time of Greece's liberation in October 1944, EAM-ELAS dominated the country except for the major cities, especially Athens, where British forces supported the returned Greek government in exile. The rivalry between the British-backed government and EAM-ELAS resulted in the Dekemvriana clashes in Athens (December 1944 – January 1945). EAM-ELAS was defeated and had to accept its disarmament in the Treaty of Varkiza (February 1945).[1]

With EAM-ELAS neutralized, its members became easy prey for persecution by various right-wing groups in retaliation for the preceding "Red Terror".[2] Former ELAS partisans and leftist sympathizers reacted by establishing self-defense militias, known as Groups of Democratic Armed Persecuted Fighters (ODEKA).[3] The Communist Party of Greece began preparations for an armed confrontation with the Greek government in April 1946. By the end of the year, the communist party had established a rival government known as the Provisional Democratic Government, with the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) acting as its army; while the conflict had escalated into a large-scale insurgency.[4]

At the beginning of 1948,DSE controlled all of Peloponnese's main mountain ranges including Taygetus, Parnon and Mainalo. While DSE held most of the mountainous Kalavryta province, its capital of the same name remained in government hands. DSE saw Kalavryta as an important target due to its relative isolation from other state garrisons, the abundance of food, clothing and military equipment held in its warehouses as well as the potential of openly recruiting the residents of numerous left leaning villages surrounding it.[5]

The chief of staff of the DSE of Peloponnese Kostas Kanellopoulos and the head of DSE's Argolidocorinthia Command Manolis Stathakis began planning the assault on Kalavryta on 25 March. DSE's Achaea Command head Kostas Basakidis was not involved in the planning and transferred most of his forces to the border with Ileia in a deliberate maneuver designed to confuse the government.[6] DSE possessed excellent intelligence on the Kalavryta region's geological features as well as the strength and disposition of government troops. Information was drawn from personnel native to the area and underground communist party cells in the city.[7]

The city's garrison consisted of approximately 700 personnel belonging the 21st National Guard Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Nikolaos Arvanitakis, an 80-man Hellenic Gendarmerie unit and 100 MAY militiamen. The 1st, 3rd and the Command National Guard Companies as well as 20 gendarmes had occupied various houses in the center of the city. The 4th National Guard Company, 60 gendarmes and 100 MAY militia defended the village of Kertezi south–west of the city. The 2nd National Guard Company entrenched itself at the Mega Spilaio monastery which overlooked the road to Aigio north–east of the city. The perimeter of the city was protected by five fortified positions: Kastro, Ilektriki Etairia, Agia Aikaterini, Sidirodromikos Stathmos and Oikia Katsini. The garrison's headquarters were located in the gendarmerie building positioned in the center of the defensive line, some 300–500 metres (980–1,640 ft) from the closest fortified position. The highest buildings in the vicinity such as the Agricultural Bank were manned by small sniper teams.[8][9] DSE's force numbered some 1,000 to 1,100 fighters headed by DSE of Peloponnese commander in chief Stephanos Giouzelis.[10][11] The force consisted of 300 men from Aristos Kamarinos' 2nd Taygetus Battalion, 180 from Dimitris Giannakouras' 1st Mainalos Battalion, two companies from Helmos-Corinthia under Manolis Stathakis, one company from Erymanthos and the Peloponnese Headquarters Company.[7]

On 8 April, the bulk of DSE's forces set off from Mainalos towards Kalavryta, reaching Helmos on the dawn of the following day. The communists took quarters in the villages of Platyntero, Mazi and Haliki, while awaiting the rest of the troops to congregate in the area. The final plan of the assault was laid out by Stephanos Giouzelis on the night of 10 April.[12] According to the plan the 1st Mainalos Battalion was to strike Kastro, Ilektriki Etairia, Agia Aikaterini. The attack would draw reinforcements from Sidirodromikos Stathmos and Oikia Katsini, which would make them vulnerable, allowing the Democratic Army to penetrate into the city center from those two directions. The 2nd Taygetus Battalion would blockade Kertezi, while Mega Spilaio would be targeted by the Corinthian units. The bridge across River Ladon and the bridges forming part of the Diakopto–Kalavryta railway were mined, to prevent government reinforcements from Aigio. An ambush was set at Vlacherna in order to delay the advance of the Hellenic Army's 72nd Brigade based in Tripoli should it attempt to assist the defenders. Telephone lines were to be cut shortly before the offensive.[13] [14]

The battle began at 4:30 a.m., on 11 April 1948. A specially trained detachment of DSE snipers and saboteurs had entered the city center undetected, attacking simultaneously with the forces situated outside the city. The defenders of Agia Aikaterini were taken by surprise and the position fell half an hour later. Mega Spilaio was seized at 6:30 a.m., the surviving soldiers of the 2nd National Guard Company fled to Diakopto, where another army company was being held at bay by a DSE ambush. By 8:00 a.m., the communists had taken over Ilektriki Etairia and Oikia Katsini, encircling the Kalavryta garrison's headquarters and the gendarmerie building. At 9:00 a.m., planes belonging to the Hellenic Air Force flew over the city, failing to intervene due to the high risk of friendly fire. The largest fortified positions Sidirodromikos Stathmos and Kastro fell by noon.[11][15] When the units stationed at Kertezi moved towards Kalavryta they were enfiladed by heavy machine gun fire from the Agia Laura height, breaking ranks and fled towards Chalandritsa.[16] By the end of the day, the only buildings still controlled by government forces in the vicinity of Kalavryta were the national guard headquarters and the gendarmerie building where 17 leftists were being imprisoned. Arvanitakis appealed for reinforcements from Mega Spilaio, Kertezi, Tripoli and Patras; yet none arrived.[17]

The gendarmes abandoned the building during the night, managing to evade enemy patrols undetected and reach Diakopto dozens of kilometers from Kalavryta. The prisoners held in the building were left unharmed and were subsequently freed. At noon, on 12 April, Arvanitakis and Kanellopoulos who knew each other from their days at the Hellenic Military Academy negotiated a surrender whereby six officers surrendered to DSE. Arvanitakis then committed suicide.[16][18]

DSE casualties numbered between 10 and 27 killed, and 25 to 40 wounded. Government troops lost 44 to 50 soldiers and officers killed and 160 to 300 soldiers taken prisoner. DSE seized the Kalavryta national guard and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration warehouses. They took four heavy mortars, four Vickers machine guns, 80 submachine guns (MP 40s and Thompsons), 200 rifles, 85,000 rounds of ammunition, 130 mortar shells, mines, radios, military uniforms and other equipment. The communists also confiscated 400 million drachmas, 200 sheep and goats, 10,000 okades of flour and 1,000 okades of sugar. The spoils were loaded onto pack animals and taken to Platyntero where they were split between the units involved in the engagement. On 13 April, government forces entered Kalavryta without encountering any resistance.[19][20]

While the initial plan developed by Kanellopoulos envisioned that DSE's units would retreat to their respective hideouts, Giouzelis insisted on a joint offensive against Goura. Giouzelis argued that government troops would not risk fighting in the woodlands surrounding the village. The Greek Army's 72nd Brigade moved in to encircle Helmos before this maneuver could be executed, forcing DSE to conduct a fighting retreat through Arbouna.[21] Most of the seized weapons and ammunition were hidden in a cache between Mazi and Platyntero which was discovered by the state troops.[22] Seven heavily injured DSE fighters were left in a cave in Helmos; they were likewise discovered by an enemy patrol and summarily executed.[23] On 15 April, authorities executed 25 political prisoners in Sparta as a reprisal for the Kalavryta attack. [24]

The outcome of the operation was discussed at a DSE conference at Agia Varvara on 16 April. The loss of the captured equipment became a point of contention, with Kanellopoulos arguing that it could have been smuggled to Arcadia had Giouzelis followed his plan.[25] DSE's officers were split on the issue. Those siding with Kanellopoulos questioned the Democratic Government's decision to entrust Giouzelis with DSE Peloponnese's leadership. They believed that professional military officers like Kanellopoulos were sidelined in favor of a former political functionary. [26]