CIA activities in Indonesia

Effective October 1, 1945, President Truman signed an executive order that would dismantle the OSS. The responsibilities of the Intelligence Agency were transferred to the war department and was renamed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The OSS Research and Analysis branch was taken over by the State Department and renamed the Interim Research Intelligence Service (IRIS).[3] Truman wanted James F. Byrnes (Secretary of State) "to take lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program." This idea was resisted by State Department officials because they were against a centralized organization.[3]

Although there was a transfer in Washington happening, the change had little effect on the efforts in Batavia. The OSS was simply replaced with SSU, and the growth of operation continued. Robert A. Koke was the most important SSU intelligence officer operating within Indonesia and was conducting clandestine missions in Southeast Asia longer than any American Intelligence officer.[3] His responsibilities included training OSS agents and accompanying them on submarine missions. While he was not a full-time member of the ICEBERG mission his contributions made him an invaluable member of operation RIPLEY I.[3]

One of the objectives for operation ICEBERG was to discover the fate of J.F. Mailuku, an OSS wartime agent, who had been codenamed HUMPY. Mailuku studied engineering and eventually became an air force cadet in the colonial armed forces. Before the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese in 1942, Mailuku was evacuated to Australia, and from there he traveled to the United States. He was recruited and trained by the OSS and on June 23, 1944, he infiltrated Java via submarine for operation RIPLEY I.

Due to being detained temporarily by Japanese paramilitary forces, Mailuku was unable to attend a rendezvous with the OSS and therefore did not have contact with Americans during the war. Upon the arrival of the Cumberland, Mailuku was introduced to Crockett who was able to receive his reports. "An OSS summary of HUMPY's intelligence activities characterized his detailed reports as 'information of inestimable value.'"[6]

Mailuku had substantiated other OSS reports of anti-Dutch sentiment, with Mailuku characterizing the sentiment as "violent."[7] Dutch officials immediately continued to vehemently reject this notion. Mailuku also reported on the Indonesian people's collective desire for independence. Mailuku was last seen with an acquaintance who was supposedly working for Dutch intelligence before he disappeared. They had been scheduled to attend a meeting with Indonesian nationalists and never returned. It is widely believed that Mailuku was executed for his association with a Dutch agent, especially due to the lack of communication from Mailuku or any form of ransom demand.[7]

By 1949, the Dutch launched a campaign to occupy its colonies once again, despite Sukarno’s warnings. They used police in the region to assert control over the independent Indonesian government. The CIA released a report expressing concern with the actions of the Dutch police. It further conveyed the worry concerning how the circumstances might jeopardize economic activity and the reputation of the United Nations. The CIA feared how it might be used as an opportunity to unite the Asian countries against the United States or to be used by the Soviet Union as a propaganda tool. They also feared that the Dutch would set an example to countries such as Israel that they are capable of going against the security council. It was a moment where the colonial question came to the center of discussion at the international level. [8]

The Indonesian government of Sukarno was faced with a major threat to its legitimacy beginning in 1956, when several regional commanders began to demand autonomy from Jakarta. After mediation failed, Sukarno took action to remove the dissident commanders.

In 1958, elements of the Indonesian military, with the support of the CIA, rebelled against the rule of President Sukarno. This attempted coup ended in failure.[10] In February 1958, dissident military commanders in Central Sumatera (Colonel Ahmad Hussein) and North Sulawesi (Colonel Ventje Sumual) declared the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Permesta Movement aimed at overthrowing the Sukarno regime. They were joined by many civilian politicians from the Masyumi Party, such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who were opposed to the growing influence of the communist party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI.[11] President Sukarno, in an address to the UN after the failed coup, denounced imperialism and vowed he was determined not to let a small corner of the world to make a play thing of Indonesia.[9]

Following President Eisenhower's September 25, 1957 order to the CIA to overthrow the Sukarno government, Soviet intelligence learned of the plans almost instantly, publicizing the "American Plot to Overthrow Sukarno" three days later in an Indian newspaper, Blitz, which Soviet intelligence controlled. Despite Soviet awareness, the CIA began planning the coup, and set up operational bases primarily in the Philippines. The CIA then employed veteran Filipino CIA paramilitary officers to make contact with Indonesian military forces on Sumatra and Sulawesi. Working in tandem with the Pentagon, deliveries of weapons packages were prepared for distribution to rebel military forces in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The CIA also financed rebel forces with radio stations that issued anti-Sukarno broadcasts in an act of psychological warfare.[10] The American involvement, which was meant to remain a secret, was discovered when a United States air man was shot down. After the pilot was shut down, communist activists used Western intervention as a main point in his speech for communism rule.[12] The next political campaigns to occur would incite a great propaganda war to gain citizen support.

In an effort to try to justify the interference by the United States, the CIA stated that in the time leading up to the coup, Indonesian economic development was severely impacted by the government's failure to unify the country. As a result, the outlying island population, which was responsible for most of the country's exports and tax revenues, became discontent with receiving little in return for their large contributions. In addition, the government began to nationalize foreign-owned plantations and mines, investing in the industries of rubber, copra, and tin, however the facilities were noted to be ill-maintained, which ultimately harmed Indonesia's economy under Sukarno. The islands began to set up semi-autonomous governments until a rebellion finally broke out a year later, staggering production and devastating government revenues due to the loss of exports. Progress was set forth and it was expected that the population would not have famine issues. These economic sanctions eventually became a strategy for throughout their campaign for a free government, albeit these measures proved to be costly in the end.[13]

Back in the United States, at an OCB (Operations Coordination Board) Luncheon on January 8, 1958, the memorandum for the record states: "Mr. Dulles gave a brief report on the latest developments in Indonesia. He referred particularly to indications that the Bandung Council proposes to establish a Free Government of Indonesia, and said that while he believes a move of this sort would be premature, there is little we can or should do to try and stop it. It was agreed it would be unwise to supply arms so long as the possibility exists that the government might become communist dominated."[14]

Nevertheless, the dissidents of Sumatra were anticipated to issue a demand for the establishment of an anti-communist government on February 7, 1958, threatening that any denial of this demand would lead to a rival regime. Noting the dissidents deep distrust of Sukarno, prior proposals for compromise coming from the Djuanda Cabinet were rejected outright. Dissidents supported the Indonesian diplomatic missions in various countries including Singapore, South Vietnam, Malaya, and Italy. Given their resistance to prior proposals, an intelligence memo indicated that the rival regime was poised to proceed regardless of Sukarno's response. As such, these negotiations were viewed as Sukarno's stalling tactic in order to avoid the formation of the rival regime.[15]

While the dissidents were poised to take action regardless of Sukarno's response to their demand, they still feared military attacks from Djakarta in the form of airstrikes. In addition, Djakarta was allegedly maneuvering to split the dissidents, specifically the group under South Sumatran commander Barlian. Propaganda to dispel the dissident movement was also alleged to have been in existence in an intelligence memo, as both Indonesia and the Soviet Union were branding the dissidents' movement as a U.S. plot to fragment and enslave the nation.[16]

On February 21, 1958, the Indonesian military obliterated the radio stations in Sumatra via bombings and established a naval blockade along the coast. Not only did the CIA underestimate the Indonesian Army, but the agency apparently failed to realize that many of the top commanders within the Indonesian Army were fiercely anti-communist, having been trained in the United States, even calling themselves "the sons of Eisenhower." This misstep led to American-aligned Indonesian military forces fighting American-aligned rebel forces. Finally, in a desperate last ditch, CIA pilots began bombing Indonesia's outer islands on April 19, 1958, targeting civilians and fomenting much anger among the Indonesian populace. Eisenhower had ordered that no Americans be involved in such missions, yet CIA Director Dulles ignored this order from the president. On May 18, 1958, Al Pope, an American citizen and CIA bomber, was downed over eastern Indonesia, revealing U.S. involvement. The 1958 CIA covert coup thus ended as a complete and transparent failure.[17] The failed coup would become one of the biggest failures in the history of the CIA; the CIA's inability to compete with Soviet covert-intelligence proved costly in this instance, and would prove costly in many other CIA operations against the Soviets.

On February 9, 1958, rebel Colonel Maludin Simbolon issued an ultimatum in the name of a provincial government, the Dewan Banteng or Central Sumatran Revolutionary Council, calling for the formation of a new central government. On February 15 Dewan Banteng became part of a wider Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI or "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia") that included rebels led by other dissident colonels in East and South Sumatra and in North Sulawesi.[18]

Sukarno aggressively opposed the rebels; he called upon his loyal army commander, General Abdul Haris Nasution, to destroy the rebel forces. By February 21 forces loyal to Sukarno had been airlifted to Sumatra and began the attack. The rebel headquarters was in the southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia.[18]

In April and May 1958 CIA proprietary Civil Air Transport (CAT) operated B-26 aircraft from Manado, North Sulawesi to support Permesta rebels.

Military loyal to the central government of Sukarno launched airborne and seaborne invasions of the rebel strongholds Padang and Manado. By the end of 1958, the rebels were militarily defeated. The last remaining rebel guerilla bands surrendered by August 1961.[11]

In a memorandum dated May 2, 1958, the board of national estimates outlined the position of the Indonesian Communist Party, (PKI). Due to PKI support of Sukarno, the influence of Sukarno's government was significantly influential and powerful. The PKI controlled several pro-government groups, expanded influence in rural areas, and possessed significant military strength. The opposition movement provided a reason for the PKI to strengthen ties and gain influence over Sukarno, thereby bolstering Sukarno's efforts against the opposition, and increasing the schism between Sukarno and western interests.[19]

Fragmentation of non-communist groups also played a role in strengthening Sukarno. Indonesian political groups were very diverse. The non-communist Indonesian political groups were organized according to faith, gender, education, culture, and occupation.[20]

The memorandum from May 2, 1958 points to the weakening of the Masjumi, a non-communist political party, which served as a powerful force to prevent Sukarno from connecting with the PKI. Due to the Masjumi's fragmentation, notes the memo, its former strength or unity was not anticipated to return post-revolution.[18]

Lastly, the May 2, 1958 memorandum points to the failure of Western support and inability to compromise on the West Irian issue. The lack of western compromise, the memo alleges, allowed exploitation of this issue for the benefit of the PKI. Further, the memorandum stated that following a revolution, Indonesia would view US support and motives with great suspicion, creating greater opportunities for the PKI and global communist interests.[18]

The failed coup emboldened Sukarno, however the United Nations backed the formation of Malaysia in Indonesia's northernmost territory. By 1965, Sukarno was seen to be decisively siding with communist interests.[10]

General Suharto was directly appointed by President Sukarno to lead the Indonesian army. From the very beginning of his rule he planned to destroy and disrupt the Communist party in Indonesia. Even Communist sympathizers were not safe, he planned to make examples out of them as well. He felt so strongly about this that he had given orders to wipe out every Communist in Indonesia. Every commander in the military was ordered to "clean up everything; "I ordered all of my people to send patrols out and capture everybody in the PKI post."" Those that were captured were then given options to "surrender, support the government, or die."

The oppression was not just physical. Propaganda campaigns were conducted against the PKI while they were being simultaneously exterminated. After the 30 September movement coup failed, the army set up a new tabloid to spread rumors of the bestiality of the PKI. They emphasized that women would sink to new depths of depravity under the influence of the godless communists.[9]

One of the first regions to feel the wrath of General Suharto's campaign against Communism was the district of Prambanan. In this area, Suharto's soldiers wet on hunts for suspected Communists. They would ask peasants if they were members of the PKI and the slightest suspicion led to death or capture. One example of this details an account when a peasant bought cheaper seed from a PKI member. In return, the member mislead the peasant and signed him up for the PKI, causing him to get killed. The peasant knew nothing about the PKI or Communist party, he was just taking advantage of a good deal. Thousands of people were rounded up held until a decision was made about their fate. In the harshest case, prisoners were interrogated about Communism. If they were to believed to be Communists then they were taken to a killing location, shot in the back of the head, tossed into a prepared hole that was dug, and then left to rot.

The Indonesian military was slaughtering communists, but it was presented in the western press as a civil war so as not to elicit sympathy for the communists.[9]

According to documentation declassified in the late 90s and released in 2001 pertaining to the Indonesian Army's fight against the Indonesian Communist Party, the U.S. Embassy originally stated that 50-100 PKI members were being killed nightly. In an air-gram to Washington in April 1966, the estimated fatalities had reached between 100,000 and 1,000,000.

The fight against the Indonesian Communist Party eventually led to President Suharto's heightening of power and ultimately led to a brutal dictatorship from 1967-1998, marking 31 years of brutality.

The United States involvement in these situations is marked with controversy in and of itself - according to an August 1966 airgram from Marshall Green stated that the U.S. Embassy prepared a list of Communist leaders with attribution to the Embassy removed, and that list was being used by Indonesian security officials that lacked an extreme amount of overt knowledge on Communist officials.[43]

The United States continued to view the military as an opportunity. They understood that it had a strongly anti-Communist stance. In one 12-page report, an analyst noted that the military loathed the PKI and regarded "Communism as an ideology which is essentially evil, totalitarian, and alien to the 'Indonesian way of life."[44]

"USG" stands for the United States Government. In 1965, after the "30th of September Slaughter," the US and Britain were more passionate to have another joint operation. On October 5, 1965, Sir Andrew Gilchrist stated, "I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change".[45] This was used as an incentive to provoke quick action against the PKI. The United States backed up this statement by stating, "We are, as always, sympathetic to army's desires to eliminate communist influence".[45] With the Western world backing up anti-PKI military generals, mass killings of PKI supporters and members began. By beginning of November, several hundred were executed. On November 25, 1965 British Intelligence reported stating, "PKI men and women are being executed in very large numbers. Some victims are given a knife and invited to kill themselves. Most refuse and are told to turn around and are shot in the back".[45] Propaganda supported by American and British officials made an influence of barbaric attitudes towards Indonesian people. Some British soldiers were quoted referring to the Indonesian communist supporters as "less than animals," as quoted by Curtis.

An action proposal was approved in March of that year, with an intermediate intelligence memorandum in July, and a SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate), on the situation regarding Indonesia and Malaysia, in September. According to H. W. Brands, American officials were so unprepared for the crisis that at first they misidentified the anti-communist leader, General Suharto.[46]

The United States along with Britain and Australia wanted to overthrow the Sukarno administration, who had become Indonesia's first president in 1949. Sukarno's vision was to unify the different cultures, languages, religions and political ideologies that existed within Indonesia under one common government and culture. Three months after Sukarno visited the United States, he visited China and the Soviet Union. Since Sukarno welcomed the ideology of communism (though he himself was a nationalist) and the success of PKI in 1965, his recent visit to these communist nations forced the U.S. to question Sukarno's objectives concerning communism.

On October 1, 1965 (late night of September 30), early in the morning, six senior Indonesian army generals were kidnapped and executed by a group who called themselves the "30 September Movement."[47] The so-called "movement" was headed by Lt. Colonel Untung, an officer in the President's bodyguard. According to a declassified CIA memo from October 6, 1965, the movement also included parts of the Indonesian army and air force, as well as members of several Communist organizations.[47] On the same morning in October, a radio message was transmitted claiming that operation was "supported by troops of other branches of the armed forces" and that Utung acted to prevent a supposed 'generals' coup. These radio messages also insisted that the attempted coup was "American-inspired," while ensuring that the President and any other possible targets were now "under the protection of the movement." They proceeded to establish a left-wing "Revolutionary Council" which was composed of government officials who were not opposed to Communism, as well as members of various Communist parties.[47] The self-appointed government did not muster support, and a few days later Sukarno regained control, but insisted that this was a political issue and refused to impose harsh penalties on those involved in the "30 September Movement."[47] The memo notes the involvement of the PKI in the movement, and their subsequent disappearance from the public eye. It also speculates on the possible involvement of Sukarno in operation. This document illustrates the agency's ability to see past what appears to be happening, and instead looks at the primary consequences and who benefited from what transpired. The CIA believed that the movement was a type of false flag operation that attempted to garner support for Sukarno, pro-Communist sentiment, and anti-American sentiment. Sukarno, with the apparent support of the army, began to align himself with Communist policies.[47] The memo advises that the army does not support the Communist policies. However, Sukarno's declaration that the problem is political, and therefore requires a political solution, has stalled any possibility of the army taking action against the PKI. It predicts Sukarno's goals of returning the Communist Party to the "favorable political position it enjoyed prior to the events of October 1."[47] Some people believed that Sukarno was speaking under duress and that he might have been forced to make these statements, which would indicate that he did not actually believe that the PKI should be handled politically. The CIA then started to question whether or not Suharto would listen to Sukarno's statements and leave them alone or not.[48]

The immediate aftermath of this event brought swift changes. The army couldn't simply take control of the government because they needed Sukarno's name attached to them in order to gain legitimacy. Sukarno, on the other hand, needed to strengthen the PKI after this massacre because they formed a strong base of support. Despite this, both the army and Sukarno were essentially two distinct governments within Indonesia. Sukarno did, however, appoint General Suharto as the head of the military at the behest of other military leaders. Sukarno wanted someone who would be softer on the PKI, but still chose Suharto nonetheless due to strong army pressure. Within a month of the September 30th massacre, the army had arrested as many as 2,000 PKI party members or suspected members. A further 74 had been executed.[49] The CIA by this point knew that both the military and Sukarno were going different directions. Sukarno wanted to revive the PKI, while the military was trying to eliminate any communist support. Many anti-PKI groups began demonstrating trying to remove the party from any politics. Sukarno attempted to reel in the army, but they continued to pursue their own goals in eliminating the PKI, believing that Sukarno himself may have played a role in the attempted coup. Because of this, the CIA concluded that communism in Indonesia would be on the defense and that Sukarno's power was weakening.[50] A situations report from November 1965 also showed increasingly anti-Chinese sentiment in the region, stating that Chinese nationals were being victimized in the country, including a Chinese embassy office in Djakarta being entered by armed troops.[50][51] The report also indicates that there was anti-Communist and PKI sentiment throughout the general population during the time period, mentioning one of many protests that took place calling for the banning of the PKI in the country.[52]

The CIA closely monitored Suharto's relationship with the PKI. They kept especially close tabs on meetings he held with other members of the government. One report notes "a possible decision to ban the PKI". Something that the CIA expressed interest about in all of its reports.[53] However, although Sukarno stated that he would consider banning the PKI, he would not stop there. A report which outlines a speech Sukarno gave on November 6 states that Sukarno said, "I am urged to ban the PKI. I am considering this. But I will ban the PNI, Partindo, PSII, NU and any other party which does not help to create a calm atmosphere. I will ban all parties, not just the PKI."[54]

However, Suharto had his own agenda in mind when he took over his new position as the head of the Indonesian army. His agenda was to prosecute and kill PKI members and supporters; his motto "surrender, support the government or die." Shortly after being appointed as head of the army, Suharto placed in motion a plan for a complete takeover of the government. Eventually, with the help of the U.S government [source?] and the army, Suharto defeated Sukarno and took over the government. A briefing meant for the DCI dated in October 1965 states quite contrarily to what was proven that during the aftermath of the 1965 coup, both governments declared in the region were interdependent on each other; this obviously was proved untrue.[55] The U.S. ambassador to Indonesia publicly denied any CIA involvement, saying that no agency had ever attempted to overthrow Sukarno.[33]

Bradley Simpson, Director of the Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project at the National Security Archive,[56] contends that declassified documents[57] indicate that the United States "provided economic, technical and military aid to the army soon after the killings started. It continued to do so long after it was clear a 'widespread slaughter' was taking place in Northern Sumatra and other places, and in the expectation that US assistance would contribute to this end."[28][58][59][60] Further evidence for this funding has been substantiated by a cable that was sent from Ambassador Marshall Green, after meeting with CIA's Hugh Tovar,[61] to the assistant secretary of state Bill Bundy, one advocating for payments to be sent to anti-communist fighter Adam Malik:

This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik with fifty million rupiah [about $10,000] for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement. The army-inspired but civilian-staffed group is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts...Our willingness to assist him in this manner will, I think, represent in Malik's mind our endorsement of his present role in the army's anti-PKI efforts, and will promote good cooperating relations between him and the army. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black flag operation can be.[62]

Other cables from Green, issued to the State Department, suggested that the United States played a role in developing elements of the anti-communist propaganda following alleged PKI activities. As Green stated in a cable dated from October 5, 1965, "We can help shape developments to our advantage...spread the story of PKIs guilt, treachery, and brutality."[63] He went on to say that it would be a welcome goal to blacken the eye of the PKI in the eyes of the people. This position of ousting the communist PTI was later echoed by the CIAs Hugh Tovar, who recalled with great satisfaction how the PKI were partially defeated due to the use of Soviet-provided weapons.[63]

Despite the Soviet weapons used to killed members of the PKI, the United States was complicit in providing amounts of money and backing to the anti-PKI leaders, General Suharto and Adam Malik. Malik, as reported by CIA's Clyde McAvoy, was trained, housed, and supplied by the CIA. "I recruited and ran Adam Malik," McAvoy said in a 2005 interview. "He was the highest-ranking Indonesian we ever recruited."[64] The conflict in Indonesia ultimately led to upwards of 500,000 people killed, a number confirmed by Ambassador Green in a 1967 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.[65]

In May 1990, the States News Service published a study by journalist Kathy Kadane which highlighted significant U.S. involvement in the killings.[66][67] Kadane quoted Robert J. Martens (who worked for the U.S. embassy) as saying that senior U.S. diplomats and CIA officials provided a list of approximately 5,000 names of Communist operatives to the Indonesian Army while it was hunting down and killing members the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and alleged sympathisers.[66] Martens told Kadane that "It really was a big help to the army. They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."[66][68] Kadane wrote that approval for the release of names put on the lists came from top U.S. embassy officials; Ambassador Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters.[66] The accuracy of Kadane's report was challenged by those officials in a July 1990 article in The New York Times.[69] Martens asserted that he alone compiled the list from the Indonesian communist press, that the names were "available to everyone," and that "no one, absolutely no one, helped me compile the lists in question." He admitted to providing the list of "a few thousand" names of PKI leaders and senior cadre (but not the party rank and file) to Indonesian "non-Communist forces" during the "six months of chaos," but denied any CIA or embassy involvement.[69][70]

Green called Kadane's account "garbage," adding that "there are instances in the history of our country....where our hands are not as clean, and where we have been involved....But in this case we certainly were not".[69] Lydman, Masters, and two other CIA officers quoted by Kadane also denied that her account had any validity.[69] Masters stated:

I certainly would not disagree with the fact that we had these lists, that we were using them to check off, O.K., what was happening to the party. But the thing that is giving me trouble, and that is absolutely not correct, is that we gave these lists to the Indonesians and that they went out and picked up and killed them. I don't believe it. And I was in a position to know.[69]

The States News Service issued a memo in July 1990 defending the accuracy of Kadane's work, and in a rebuttal to their statements to The New York Times, published excerpts from the interviews that Kadane had made with Green, Lydman and Masters.[71][72][73] In 2001, the National Security Archive reported that Ambassador Marshall Green admitted in an August 1966 airgram to Washington, which was drafted by Martens and approved by Masters, that the lists were "apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership."[70][74] In an October 1965 telegram, Green endorsed the Indonesian military "destroying PKI" through executions.[31][75] In February 1966, he further expressed approval that "the Communists . . . have been decimated by wholesale massacre."[31][76] Historian Geoffrey B. Robinson asserts that such U.S. government officials "published memoirs and articles that sought to divert attention from any possible US role, while questioning the integrity and political loyalties of scholars who disagreed with them."[77] Robinson also posits that the mass killings would not have happened absent the support of the U.S. and other powerful Western governments.[78]

Scholars, including documentary filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer, the director of The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence, have since then corroborated Kadane's account of U.S. involvement in the killings.[29][30][31][79][80] In a January 2014 interview with The Diplomat, Oppenheimer stated:

The details of what individual Western governments did are somewhat obscure, but for example the United States provided cash for the death squad and the army, weapons, radios so the army could coordinate the killing campaigns across the 17,000-island archipelago, and death lists. I interviewed two retired CIA agents and a retired state department official whose job was to compile lists generally of public figures known publicly to the army, compiled lists of thousands of names of people the U.S. wanted killed, and hand these names over to the army and then check off which ones had been killed. They would get the list back with the names ticked off [designating] who had been captured and killed.[81]

Regarding the 5,000 individuals named on the lists, Oppenheimer contends "my understanding is that 100% were killed."[80] Robinson also asserts that "despite Marten's later denials of any such intent, these actions almost certainly aided in the death or detention of many innocent people," and that providing the lists "sent a powerful message that the US government agreed with and supported the army's campaign against the PKI, even as that campaign took its terrible toll in human lives."[82]

On December 10, 2014, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) introduced a "Sense of the Senate Resolution" which condemned the killings and called for the declassification of all documents pertaining to U.S. involvement in the events, noting that "the U.S. provided financial and military assistance during this time and later, according to documents released by the State Department."[79][83][84]

In 2016, Indonesia's human rights commission submitted an official request with the U.S. government to declassify archived files believed to detail the CIA's involvement in the killings.[85] A tribunal on the mass killings held in The Hague concluded the killings constitute crimes against humanity, and that the United States and other Western governments were complicit in the crimes.[86][87]

On October 17, 2017, declassified documents from the US embassy in Jakarta covering 1963-66 revealed that not only did the US government have detailed knowledge of the killings as they happened and welcomed them, but also actively encouraged and facilitated the massacres to further their geopolitical interests in the region.[88] A November 1965 report by the aforementioned political affairs officer, Edward E Masters, examined the spread of large scale executions to multiple provinces and the role of youth groups in helping resolve the "main problem" of housing and feeding PKI prisoners. He stated that "many provinces appear to be successfully meeting this problem by executing their PKI prisoners, or killing them before they are captured, a task in which Moslem youth groups are providing assistance."[89] Historian Bradley R. Simpson says the documents "contain damning details that the US was willfully and gleefully pushing for the mass murder of innocent people."[90] Historian John Roosa contends the documents show "the U.S. was part and parcel of the operation, strategizing with the Indonesian army and encouraging them to go after the PKI."[91]

Among the events being documented by the CIA were reports of President Sukarno's health conditions. In a meeting related to issues of foreign relations in New York in December 1964, the U.S. secretary started the meeting off by inquiring about President Sukarno's health. Deputy PriMin Subandrio responded that "...an X-ray taken in Vienna some months ago had revealed there was a stone in President Sukarno's right kidney. Inasmuch as his other kidney is already affected...the X-ray had given rise to real concern. Subsequent examination, however, had shown that the second kidney stone was not serious."[92]

Although President Sukarno's health condition was not a concern at that meeting, a later report discloses that his health condition had become serious. A report to the U.S. president included the health conditions of President Sukarno: "Sukarno collapsed three days ago and was still in bed yesterday. Despite Sukarno's long-standing kidney ailment, for which he delays proper treatment, he has seemed quite chipper lately...a team of Chinese Communist doctors has been scheduled to visit Djakarta and there is some suspicion that another acupuncture treatment may involved...although Sukarno may only have the flu, background political maneuvering may already have begun against the possibility it is more serious."[93]

Sukarno's declining health emboldened Suharto, who had been residing in the United States, to return to Indonesia. To that point, Suharto was only an obscure military figure in the cloud of information that surrounded Indonesia in the 1960s. Suharto was eventually able to come to power, and was officially named the President of Indonesia on February 22, 1967.[94]

The CIA believed Sukarno to be a popular, capable leader, despite his dismissal and lack of understanding of economic issues in the country, and the CIA believed this to be an area ripe for communist exploitation.[95] That being true, a special report from October 1964 indicates that the CIA believed Sukarno was at the very least indirectly involved with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).[96] This report accused the Indonesian president of leaving the PKI unchallenged in order to protect his own interests and power, referring back to his August 17, 1964 speech for the country's Independence Day, wherein Sukarno made pro-communist statements. The report then states that the PKI quickly aligned itself to the speech, indicating that both the PKI and President Sukarno benefited from the successes of the other. This CIA document expresses concern that Sukarno supports both Communist and anti-American ideals, wishing to remove Western influences from the region. Although this report did not give any recommendation for how the CIA or the US should proceed in their relationship with Sukarno, it did warn that "if he [lived] a few more years, it [was] likely that he [would] eventually preside over a modified Communist regime."

Although he had just returned from a diplomatic trip to the United States where he left positive impressions,[97] in May 1965 President Sukarno openly expressed his concerns over the imbalance of power that had developed in Indonesia. To combat the improper balance, Sukarno implemented steps to balance political power in Indonesia more evenly.

1. During the first week of May, Sukarno signed a decree reinstating Murba as a recognized and sanctioned political party within the country.
2. May 5, General Nasution was sent to Moscow to deliver an invitation to Soviet Premier Kosygin to visit Indonesia. It was also Nasution's mission to pacify the Russians by assuring them that Sukarno intended to take certain measures which would alter the current situation.
3. Sukarno called for a major cabinet reshuffle. This move would be made to balance the internal forces of power in his favor.

The United States received a message from the Indonesian government that stated plans to sever diplomatic relations by August 1965. "The Indonesian communist party which was rapidly increasing in strength was pressuring President Sukarno to break away from U.S. relations and support".[98] Confrontation inspired the Indonesian campaign further to completely remove Western influence from Southeast Asia. This pursuit drew Indonesia into an informal alliance with communist China. Military schools were injected with communist doctrine under the control of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

During the meeting with the UN, Sukarno and his ministers explained their concerns about the Dutch "using British Occupation as a cover to achieve a coup d'tat." This was due to Dutch troops that were starting to arrive in Java in incredibly small numbers. Many of these assaults the nationalists said were "made from trucks that had markings 'USA' on them and many of the Dutch soldiers were dressed in U.S. uniforms."

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[99]

Sukarno struck up a revolution with the attempt at a coup supported by the PKI. Blame and reminders were brought out against the CIA by the Indonesian government to remind the people and were marked as a threat to Indonesian sovereignty. The CIA recruited Malik to drive a "political wedge between the left and the right in Indonesia". The CIA worked to build a shadow government to use in a clandestine setting to fight back against Sukarno and the PKI. It was the goal of the CIA to rid the country of communism through a new political movement. Suharto and Kap Gestapu were given American support but in secrecy. $500,000 U.S. dollars was given to support the Indonesian army, Suharto, and Gestapu through the CIA. The CIA had a rumor that their slogan was "Sukarnoism to kill Sukarnoism and Sukarno." The CIA denied involvement with Indonesia. The CIA also denied support of the anti-communist group that was called "Body for the promotion of Sukarnoism."[100] On September 29 of 1965, Sukarno was trying to detonate an atomic bomb on Indonesian territory. He was trying to get Communist China to help him achieve this goal. The detonation was expected to happen in November. According to the International atomic energy association conference Indonesia was trying to come to an agreement with Communist China to research the atomic bomb. Indonesia was expected to build their own reactors by 1970 and the country would gain access to large amounts of uranium and thorium. Peking wasn't expected to agree to help even though they have a mutual interest. Peking did not trust Sukarno. The Chinese were not sure about the success of a Communist takeover following the death of Sukarno so they do not want to give information about nuclear technology to non-communist regime.[101]

President Sukarno had been collaborating during the war. A political stance the republican ministers attributed to be willing to work with any country that would pledge to support the Indonesian independence. Even though the Japanese promises were lies, Sukarno acknowledged the gratitude for the recent occupation. The Japanese unintentionally or intentionally helped to unify the Indonesian people and provided military training for the armed forces. Many of the nationalists believed "capable of resorting to force if necessary in order to preserve their independence.

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[102]

Sukarno was placed under house arrest due to the possible involvement he played in the coup attempt. He died as a broken man in the year of 1970. President Sukarno had at least six assassination attempts on his life in which he blamed the CIA for the majority of these assassination attempts.

Sukarno was a nationalist and was never a communist. Despite this fact, he was forced to be dependent on the communist party because it was able to help him mobilize mass support for his political objectives. The West and many other countries then began to have fears of the danger of communism in Indonesia, which is why the CIA and other Western organizations plotted his overthrow.

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[103]