First-move advantage in chess

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
8									8
7									7
6									6
5									5
4									4
3									3
2									2
1									1
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h

After 1.e4, "White ought to win", according to Adams.

Weaver Adams, then one of the leading American masters,[69] was the best-known proponent of this view, which he introduced in his 1939 book White to Play and Win,[70] and continued to expound in later books and articles until shortly before his death in 1963.[71] Adams opined that 1.e4 was White's strongest move,[72] and that if both sides played the best moves thereafter, "White ought to win."[73] Adams' claim was widely ridiculed,[74][75][76] and he did not succeed in demonstrating the validity of his theory in tournament and match practice. The year after his book was published, at the finals of the 1940 U.S. Open tournament, he scored only one draw in his four games as White, but won all four of his games as Black.[77] Adams also lost a match to IM I.A. Horowitz, who took the black pieces in every game.[78]

According to Sveshnikov, Vsevolod Rauzer, a leading Soviet player and theoretician during the 1930s,[79] likewise "claimed in the [1930s]: '1.e4—and White wins!' and he managed to prove it quite often".[12]

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
8									8
7									7
6									6
5									5
4									4
3									3
2									2
1									1
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h

After 1.d4, Berliner claimed that White may have a winning advantage.

More recently, IM Hans Berliner, a former World Champion of Correspondence Chess, claimed in his 1999 book The System that 1.d4 gives White a large, and possibly decisive, advantage. Berliner asserted that with best play White wins against the Grünfeld Defense, the Modern Benoni, the Benko Gambit and other (unnamed) "major defences", and achieves at least a large advantage in many lines of the Queen's Gambit Declined.[80] He allowed, however, that "It is possible that the rules of chess are such that only some number of plausible-appearing defences to 1.d4 can be refuted."[81] Berliner wrote that Adams' "theories, though looked upon with scorn by most top chess players, made an immediate and lasting impression on me. Weaver W. Adams was the first person I met who actually had theories about how chess should be played."[74]

Berliner's thesis, like Adams', has been sharply criticized.[82][83][84]

In 2004, GM Larry Kaufman expressed a more nuanced view than Adams and Berliner, arguing that the initiative stemming from the first move can always be transformed into some sort of enduring advantage, albeit not necessarily a decisive one. Kaufman writes, "I don't believe that White has a forced win in Chess. I do however believe that with either 1.e4 or 1.d4, White should be able to obtain some sort of advantage that persists into the endgame. If chess were scored like boxing, with drawn games awarded by some point system to the player (if any) who came 'closer' to winning, then I believe White would indeed have a forced win in theory."[85]

Starting in 1988, Adorján has argued in a series of books and magazine articles that "Black is OK!"[86][87] Alone amongst modern writers, Adorján claims that White starts the game with essentially no advantage. He writes, "In my opinion, the only obvious advantage for White is that if he or she plays for a draw, and does so well, then Black can hardly avoid this without taking obvious risks."[88] Adorján goes so far as to claim that, "The tale of White's advantage is a delusion; belief in it is based on mass psychosis."[89] Rowson writes that Adorján's "contention is one of the most important chess ideas of the last two decades ... because it has shaken our assumption that White begins the game with some advantage, and revealed its ideological nature".[90] However, Rowson rejects Adorján's claim that White has essentially no advantage, reasoning that "'White is better' and 'Black is OK' need not be mutually exclusive claims".[91]

In one of Adorján's books, GM Lajos Portisch opined that "at least two-thirds of all 'tested' openings give White an apparent advantage." According to Portisch, for Black, "The root of the problem is that very few people know which are the openings where Black is really OK. Those who find these lines have nothing to fear, as Black is indeed OK, but only in those variations!"[92] Rowson considers this an important point,[91] noting that "1.d4 players struggle to get anywhere against main-line Slavs and 1.e4 players find the Najdorf and Sveshnikov Sicilians particularly tough."[93]

Modern writers often think of Black's role in more dynamic terms than merely trying to equalize. Rowson writes that "the idea of Black trying to 'equalize' is questionable. I think it has limited application to a few openings, rather than being an opening prescription for Black in general."[91] Evans wrote that after one of his games against Fischer, "Fischer confided his 'secret' to me: unlike other masters, he sought to win with the Black pieces from the start. The revelation that Black has dynamic chances and need not be satisfied with mere equality was the turning point in his career, he said."[94] Likewise, Watson surmised that Kasparov, when playing Black, bypasses the question of whether White has an opening advantage "by thinking in terms of the concrete nature of the dynamic imbalance on the board, and seeking to seize the initiative whenever possible".[6] Watson observes that "energetic opening play by Black may ... lead to a position so complex and unclear that to speak of equality is meaningless. Sometimes we say 'dynamically balanced' instead of 'equal' to express the view that either player is as likely as the other to emerge from complications with an advantage. This style of opening play has become prevalent in modern chess, with World Champions Fischer and Kasparov as its most visible practitioners."[95]

Modern writers also question the idea that White has an enduring advantage. Suba, in his influential 1991 book Dynamic Chess Strategy,[96] rejects the notion that the initiative can always be transformed into an enduring advantage. He contends that sometimes the player with the initiative loses it with no logical explanation, and that, "Sometimes you must lose it, just like that. If you try to cling to it, by forcing the issue, your dynamic potential will become exhausted and you won't be able to face a vigorous counter-attack."[97] Rowson and Watson concur.[98][99] Watson also observes, "Because of the presumption of White being better, the juncture of the game at which Black frees his game or neutralizes White's plans has often been automatically assumed to give him equality, even though in dynamic openings, the exhaustion of White's initiative very often means that Black has seized it with advantage."[100]

Rowson argues that both White and Black have certain advantages:[101]

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
8									8
7									7
6									6
5									5
4									4
3									3
2									2
1									1
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h

Position after 12.Nf3: Black must either continue with the Zaitsev Variation (12...Re8), allowing White an immediate draw, or choose a different variation.

According to Rowson, White's first advantage is that, "The advantage of the first move has some similarities with the serve in tennis in that White can score an 'ace' (for instance with a powerful opening novelty), he has more control over the pace and direction of the game, and he has a 'second serve' in that when things go wrong his position is not usually losing." Second, White begins the game with some initiative, although Rowson regards this as a psychological rather than a positional advantage, "and whether it leads to a positional advantage depends on the relative skill of the players."[102] Third, some players are able to use the initiative to "play a kind of powerful 'serve and volley' chess in which Black is flattened with a mixture of deep preparation and attacking prowess." Fourth, "If White wants to draw, it is often not so easy for Black to prevent this. This advantage is particularly acute in cases where there is a possible threefold repetition, because White can begin the repetition without committing to a draw and Black has to decide whether to deviate before he knows whether White is bluffing."[103]

Rowson cites as an example of the last phenomenon the well-regarded Zaitsev Variation of the Ruy Lopez. After 1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.Bb5 a6 4.Ba4 Nf6 5.0-0 Be7 6.Re1 b5 7.Bb3 0-0 8.c3 d6 9.h3 Bb7 10.d4 Re8 (initiating the Zaitsev Variation), White can repeat moves once with 11.Ng5 Rf8 12.Nf3. This puts Black in an awkward situation, since he must either (a) insist on the Zaitsev with 12...Re8, which allows White to choose whether to draw by threefold repetition with 13.Ng5 Rf8 14.Nf3, or play on with a different move, or (b) play a different (and possibly inferior) variation by playing something other than 12...Re8.[103][104]

Rowson argues that Black also has several advantages. First, "White's alleged advantage is also a kind of obligation to play for a win, and Black can often use this to his advantage." Second, "White's 'extra move' can be a burden, and sometimes White finds himself in a mild form of zugzwang ('Zugzwang Lite')." Third, although White begins the game with the initiative, if "Black retains a flexible position with good reactive possibilities, this initiative can be absorbed and often passes over to Black." Fourth, "The fact that White moves before Black often gives Black useful information".[105] Suba likewise argues that White's advantage is actually less than a move, since White must tip his hand first, allowing Black to react to White's plans. Suba writes, "In terms of the mathematical games theory, chess is a game of complete information, and Black's information is always greater—by one move!"[106]

Rowson also notes that Black's chances increase markedly by playing good openings, which tend to be those with flexibility and latent potential, "rather than those that give White fixed targets or that try to take the initiative prematurely." He also emphasizes that "White has 'the initiative', not 'the advantage'. Success with Black depends on seeing beyond the initiative and thinking of positions in terms of 'potential'."[105] These ideas are exemplified by the Hedgehog, a dynamic modern system against the English Opening that can arise from various move orders. A typical position arises after 1.c4 c5 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.g3 b6 4.Bg2 Bb7 5.0-0 e6 6.Nc3 Be7 7.d4 cxd4 8.Qxd4 d6 9.e4 a6.[107] White has a spatial advantage, while Black often maneuvers his pieces on the last two ranks of the board, but White "has to keep a constant eye on the possible liberating pawn thrusts ...b5 and ...d5."[108] Watson remarks, "Black's goal is to remain elastic and flexible, with many options for his pieces, whereas White can become paralyzed at some point by the need to protect against various dynamic pawn breaks."[109] He also observes that, "White tends to be as much tied up by Black's latent activity as Black himself is tied up by White's space advantage."[107] Moreover, attempts by White to overrun Black's position often rebound disastrously.[110] An example of this is the following grandmaster game:

Polugaevsky vs. Ftáčnik, 1982

a b c d e f g h 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 a b c d e f g h Position after 19.Nf3	a b c d e f g h 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 a b c d e f g h Position after 28.Rf1

Lev Polugaevsky–Ľubomír Ftáčnik, Lucerne Olympiad 1982: 1. Nf3 Nf6 2. c4 c5 3. Nc3 e6 4. g3 b6 5. Bg2 Bb7 6. 0-0 Be7 7. d4 cxd4 8. Qxd4 d6 9. Rd1 a6 10. b3 Nbd7 11. e4 Qb8 12. Bb2 0-0 Suba wrote of a similar Hedgehog position, "White's position looks ideal. That's the naked truth about it, but the 'ideal' has by definition one drawback—it cannot be improved."[111] 13. Nd2 Rd8 14. a4 Qc7 15. Qe3 Rac8 16. Qe2 Ne5 17. h3? According to Ftáčnik, 17.f4 Neg4 18.Rf1 is better. h5! 18. f4 Ng6 19. Nf3 Now Black breaks open the position in typical Hedgehog fashion. d5! 20. cxd5?! Ftáčnik considers 20.e5 or 20.exd5 preferable. h4! 21. Nxh4 Nxh4 22. gxh4 Qxf4 23. dxe6 fxe6 24. e5? Ftáčnik recommends instead 24.Rxd8 Rxd8 25.Rd1. Bc5+ 25. Kh1 Nh5! 26. Qxh5 Qg3 27. Nd5 Other moves get mated immediately: 27.Bxb7 Qh3#; 27.Qe2 Qxh3#; 27.Qg4 Bxg2#. Rxd5 28. Rf1 Qxg2+! 29. Kxg2 Rd2+ 0–1[112] White resigned. If 30.Kg3 (the only legal response to the double check), 30...Rg2+ 31.Kf4 Rf8+ forces mate.[113]

An examination of reversed and symmetrical openings illustrates White's and Black's respective advantages:

In a "reversed opening", White plays an opening typically played by Black, but with colors reversed and thus an extra tempo.[114][115] Evans writes of such openings, "If a defense is considered good for Black, it must be even better for White with a move in hand."[116] Former World Champion Mikhail Botvinnik reportedly expressed the same view.[117][118] Watson questions this idea, citing Suba's thesis that Black, by moving second, has more complete information than White.[6] He writes, "everyone has such difficulties playing as White against a Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5), but ... leading masters have no qualms about answering 1.c4 with 1...e5."[119] To explain this paradox, Watson discusses several different reversed Sicilian lines, showing how Black can exploit the disadvantages of various "extra" moves for White.[120] He concludes,

The point is, Black's set-up in the Sicilian is fine as a reactive system, but not worth much when trying to claim the initiative as White. This is true because Black is able to react to the specific plan White chooses; in Suba's terms, his information is indeed a move greater! Furthermore, he is able to take advantage of dead equal positions which White (hoping to retain the advantage of the first move) would normally avoid.[121]

"That extra move's gonna hurt me." — Vladimir Malaniuk

Watson also observes, "Similarly, the Dutch Defence looks particularly sterile when White achieves the reversed positions a tempo up (it turns out that he has nothing useful to do!); and indeed, many standard Black openings are not very inspiring when one gets them as White, tempo in hand."[119] GM Alex Yermolinsky likewise notes that GM Vladimir Malaniuk, a successful exponent of the Leningrad Dutch (1.d4 f5 2.g3 g6) at the highest levels,[122][123] "once made a deep impression on me by casually dismissing someone's suggestion that he should try 1.f4 as White. He smiled and said, 'That extra move's gonna hurt me.'"[124]

Yermolinsky also agrees with Alekhine's criticism of 1.g3 e5 2.Nf3,[125] a reversed Alekhine's Defense, in Réti–Alekhine, Baden-Baden 1925,[126] writing that Alekhine "understood the difference in opening philosophies for White and Black, and realized they just can't be the same! White is supposed to try for more than just obtaining a comfortable game in reversed colour opening set-ups, and, as the statistics show—surprisingly for a lot of people, but not for me—White doesn't even score as well as Black does in the same positions with his extra tempo and all."[127] Howard Staunton, generally considered to have been the strongest player in the world from 1843 to 1851,[128][129][130] made a similar point over 160 years ago, writing that Owen's Defense (1.e4 b6) is playable for Black, but that 1.b3 is inferior to "the more customary [first] moves, from its being essentially defensive".[131] The current view is that Owen's Defense is slightly better for White, while 1.b3 is playable but less likely to yield an opening advantage than 1.e4 or 1.d4.[132]

Watson concludes that

1. "most moves have disadvantages as well as advantages, so an extra move is not always an unqualified blessing";
2. "with his extra information about what White is doing, Black can better react to the new situation"; and
3. because a draw is likely to be more acceptable to Black than to White, White is apt to avoid lines that allow drawish simplifications, while Black may not object to such lines.[119]

Rowson writes that "in general one would assume that whatever advantage White has would be revealed most clearly in symmetrical positions."[133] Accordingly, Watson, Suba, Evans, and the eminent player and theorist Aron Nimzowitsch (1886–1935) have all argued that it is in Black's interest to avoid symmetry.[134][135][136][137] Nonetheless, even symmetrical opening lines sometimes illustrate the tenuous nature of White's advantage, in several respects.

It is often difficult for White to prove an advantage in symmetrical opening lines. As GM Bent Larsen wrote, annotating a game that began 1.c4 c5 2.b3 b6,[138] "In symmetrical openings, White has a theoretical advantage, but in many of them it is only theoretical."[139] GM Andrew Soltis wrote in 2008 that he hates playing against the symmetrical Petroff's Defense (1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6), and accordingly varies with 2.Nc3, the Vienna Game.[140] However, there too he has been unable to find a way to an advantage after the symmetrical 2...Nc6 3.g3[141] g6 4.Bg2 Bg7, or after 3.Nf3 Nf6 (transposing to the Four Knights Game) 4.Bb5 Bb4[142] 5.0-0 0-0 6.d3 d6[143] 7.Bg5 Bg4 8.Nd5[144] Nd4 9.Nxb4[145] Nxb5, or 7.Ne2 Ne7 8.c3 Ba5 9.Ng3 c6 10.Ba4 Ng6 11.d4 d5, when 12.exd5?! e4! may even favor Black.[140]

Moreover, symmetrical positions may be disadvantageous to White in that he has to commit himself first.[146][147] Watson notes that it is even difficult for White to play noncommittally in a symmetrical position, since almost every move has certain drawbacks.[148] Fischer once went so far as to claim that after 1.Nf3 Nf6 2.g3 g6 3.Bg2 Bg7 4.0-0 0-0 5.d3 d6 (Reinhard–Fischer, Western Open 1963),[149] "'Believe it or not,' Black stands better! Now, whatever White does, Black will vary it and get an asymmetrical position and have the superior position due to his better pawn structure!"[150] However, GM Paul Keres responded in CHESS magazine, "We just don't believe it!"[151] In symmetrical positions, as the Hodgson–Arkell and Portisch–Tal games discussed below illustrate, Black can continue to imitate White as long as he finds it feasible and desirable to do so, and deviate when that ceases to be the case.

Further, a particular extra move is sometimes more of a liability than an asset. For example, Soltis notes that the Exchange French position arising after 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.exd5 exd5 4.Nf3 Nf6 "is pretty equal". The same position, but with Black's knight moved to e4, arises in Petroff's Defense after 1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.Nxe5 d6 4.Nf3 Nxe4 5.d4 d5. That position offers White better chances precisely because Black's extra move (...Ne4) allows the advanced knight to become a target for attack.[152][153]

Finally, symmetrical positions may be difficult for the white player for psychological reasons. Watson writes that anyone who tries the Exchange French, "even if he thinks he is playing for a win, assume[s] a psychological burden. White has already ceded the advantage of the first move, and knows it, whereas Black is challenged to find ways to seize the initiative."[154] Two famous examples of White losses in the Exchange French are M. Gurevich–Short and Tatai–Korchnoi. In M. Gurevich–Short,[155] a game between two of the world's leading players,[156] White needed only a draw to qualify for the Candidates Matches, while Black needed to win.[157] Gurevich played passively and was outplayed by Short, who achieved the necessary win.[nb 3] In Tatai–Korchnoi,[159] the Italian IM fell victim to Korchnoi's whirlwind mating attack, losing in just 14 moves.

Rowson gives the following example of Black outplaying White from the Symmetrical Variation of the English Opening. He remarks, "there is something compelling about Black's strategy. He seems to be saying: 'I will copy all your good moves, and as soon as you make a bad move, I won't copy you any more!'"[160]

Hodgson vs. Arkell, 2001

a b c d e f g h 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 a b c d e f g h Position after 9...axb5	a b c d e f g h 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 a b c d e f g h Position after 24...d4

Hodgson–Arkell, Newcastle 2001: 1. c4 c5 2. g3 g6 3. Bg2 Bg7 4. Nc3 Nc6 5. a3 a6 6. Rb1 Rb8 7. b4 cxb4 8. axb4 b5 9. cxb5 axb5 (see diagram). Here Rowson remarks, "Both sides want to push their d-pawn and play Bf4/...Bf5, but White has to go first so Black gets to play ...d5 before White can play d4. This doesn't matter much, but it already points to the challenge that White faces here; his most natural continuations allow Black to play the moves he wants to. I would therefore say that White is in 'Zugzwang Lite' and that he remains in this state for several moves." 10. Nf3 d5 10...Nf6 11.0-0 0-0 12.d3 d6 13.Bd2 Bd7 would transpose to the Portisch–Tal game below. 11. d4 Nf6 12. Bf4 Rb6 13. 0-0 Bf5 14. Rb3 0-0 15. Ne5 Ne4 16. h3 h5!? Finally breaking the symmetry. 17. Kh2 The position is still almost symmetrical, and White can find nothing useful to do with his extra move. Rowson whimsically suggests 17.h4!?, forcing Black to be the one to break the symmetry. 17... Re8! Rowson notes that this is a useful waiting move, covering e7, which needs protection in some lines, and possibly supporting an eventual ...e5 (see Black's twenty-second move). White cannot copy it, since after 18.Re1? Nxf2 Black would win a pawn. 18. Be3?! Nxe5! 19. dxe5 Rc6! Rowson notes that with his more active pieces, "It looks like Black has some initiative." If now 20.Nxd5, Bxe5 "is at least equal for Black". 20. Nxb5 Bxe5! 20...Nxf2? 21.Qxd5! wins. 21. Nd4 Bxd4 22. Bxd4 e5 Rowson writes, "Now both sides have their trumps, but I think Black has some advantage, due to his extra central control, imposing knight and prospects for a kingside attack." 23. b5 Rc8 24. Bb2 d4 (diagram). Now White has a difficult game: Rowson analyzes 25.e3?! Nxg3 24.fxg3 Bc2 25.Qf3 Bxb3 26.exd4 Bc4!, winning; 25.g4 hxg4 26.hxg4 Nxf2! 27.Rxf2 Bc2, winning; 25.Qe1!? Rc2! with advantage; and 25.f4 (risky-looking, but perhaps best) Nc3! 26.Bxc3 dxc3 27.Qxd8 Rexd8, and Black is better. 25. b6? Overlooking Black's threat. 25... Nxf2! 26. Qe1 If 26.Rxf2, Bc2 forks White's queen and rook. 26... Ne4 27. b7 Rb8 28. g4 hxg4 29. hxg4 Be6 30. Rb5 Nf6! 31. Rxf6 Qxf6 32. Qg3 Bc4 33. g5 Qh8+ 0–1[160]

The opening of the following game between two world-class players,[161] another Symmetrical English, took a similar course:

Portisch vs. Tal, 1965

	a b c d e f g h 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 a b c d e f g h Position after 13...Bd7; White to play, but Black has the easier game		a b c d e f g h 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 a b c d e f g h Position after 18...Rc8

Lajos Portisch–Mikhail Tal, Candidates Match 1965: 1. Nf3 c5 2. c4 Nc6 3. Nc3 Nf6 4. g3 g6 5. Bg2 Bg7 6. 0-0 0-0 7. d3 a6 8. a3 Rb8 9. Rb1 b5 10. cxb5 axb5 11. b4 cxb4 12. axb4 d6 13. Bd2 Bd7 (see diagram). Once again, White is on move in a symmetrical position, but it is not obvious what he can do with his first-move initiative.[162] Soltis writes, "It's ridiculous to think Black's position is better. But Mikhail Tal said it is easier to play. By moving second he gets to see White's move and then decide whether to match it."[140] 14. Qc1 Here, Soltis writes that Black could maintain equality by keeping the symmetry: 14...Qc8 15.Bh6 Bh3. Instead, he plays to prove that White's queen is misplaced. 14... Rc8! 15. Bh6 Nd4! Threatening 16...Nxe2+. 16. Nxd4 Bxh6 17. Qxh6 Rxc3 18. Qd2 Qc7 19. Rfc1 Rc8 (diagram). Although the pawn structure is still symmetrical, Black's control of the c-file gives him the advantage.[140] Black ultimately reached an endgame two pawns up, but White managed to hold a draw in 83 moves.[163]

Tal himself lost a famous game as White from a symmetrical position in Tal–Beliavsky, USSR Championship 1974.[164][165][166]