Force multiplication

Some common force multipliers are:

• Morale
• Mobility
• Fearsome reputation
• Technology
• Geographical features
• Weather
• Recruitment through diplomacy
• Training and experience
• Military strategy, such as the Fabian strategy
• Military tactics, such as force concentration
• Intelligence
• Deception

Some factors may influence one another, e.g. enhanced technology improving morale or geographical features allowing deception.

Notable historical examples of force multiplication include:

• Fortifications: e.g. the Theodosian Wall of Constantinople[1]
• Reliance on air force by the Coalition in the Gulf War[2] and the 2003 invasion of Iraq[3]

In the First World War, the Germans experimented with what were called "storm tactics", where a small group of highly trained soldiers (stormtroopers) would open a salient through which much larger forces could penetrate. This met with only limited success, breaking through the first lines of defence but lacking the staying power to break the opposing forces entirely while the 1939 Blitzkrieg, which broke through with coordinated mechanized ground forces with aircraft in close support, was vastly more effective.

Towards the end of World War II, the German army introduced kampfgruppe combat formations that were composed of whatever units happened to be available. Though poor quality ones generally constituted the major part of them, they often performed successfully because of their high degree of flexibility and adaptability. Mission-type tactics, as opposed to extremely specific directives that give no discretion to the junior commander, are widely used by modern militaries now due to their force multiplication. Originating from German concepts of Auftragstaktik, these tactics may be developing even more rapidly in the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) where subordinate commanders receive information not only from their own commanders, but from adjacent units.

A different paradigm was one of the results of the theories of John Boyd, the "high-low mix" in which a large number of less expensive aircraft, coupled with a small number of extremely capable "silver bullet" aircraft, had the effect of a much larger force. Boyd's concept of quick action is based on the repeated application of the "Boyd loop", consisting of the steps

• Observe: make use of the best sensors and other intelligence available
• Orient: put the new observations into a context with the old
• Decide: select the next action based on the combined observation and local knowledge
• Act: carry out the selected action, ideally while the opponent is still observing your last action.

Boyd's concept is also known as the OODA Loop, and is a description of the decision-making process that Boyd contended applies to business, sports, law enforcement and military operations. Boyd's doctrine is widely taught in the American military, and one of the aims of network centric warfare is to "get inside his OODA loop"—that is, to go from observation to action before the enemy can get past orientation, preventing him from ever being able to make an effective decision or put it into action. Small unit leadership is critical to this, and NCW's ability to disseminate information to small unit leaders enables such tactics.

Network-centric warfare can provide additional information and can help prevent friendly fire, but also allows "swarm tactics"[4] and the seizing of opportunities by subordinate forces. These are a realization of Boyd's theories. (Rand-Edwards-2000 & pg. 2) harv error: no target: CITEREFRand-Edwards-2000pg._2 (help) defines " "a swarming case is any historical example in which the scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some particular place. "Convergent" implies an attack from most of the points on the compass."

Another version of "swarming" is evident in air-to-ground attack formations in which the attack aircraft do not approach from one direction, at one time, or at the same altitude, but schedule the attacks so each one requires a Boyd-style OODA iteration to deal with a new threat.[5] Replacement training units (RTU) were "finishing schools" for pilots that needed to know not just the school solution, but the actual tactics being used in Vietnam. Referring to close air support, "In the RTU, new pilots learned the rules of the road for working with a Forward air controller (FAC). The hardest part was finding the small aircraft as it circled over the target area. The fast-moving fighters used directional finding/steering equipment to get close enough to the slow, low FAC until someone in the flight could get an eyeball on him—a tally-ho. Once the FAC was in sight, he would give the fighters a target briefing—type of target, elevation, attack heading, location of friendlies, enemy defensive fire, best egress heading if hit by enemy fire, and other pertinent data. Usually the fighters would set up a circle, called a wheel or "wagon wheel", over the FAC, and wait for him to mark the target. Once the target was marked, the flight leader would attack first.

Napoleon is well known for his comment "The moral is to the physical as three to one."[6] Former United States Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell has said: "Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier."[7] Morale, training, and ethos have long been known to result in disproportionate effects on the battlefield.

Psychological warfare can target the morale, politics, and values of enemy soldiers and their supporters to effectively neutralize them in a conflict.

Torture of select individuals in enemy populations can turn them into social disease vectors; effectively weaponizing 'shell-shock' which may create long-lasting effects in the target population that outlast physical injuries.

Ranged weapons that hit their target can be far more effective than those that miss. That is why rifled muskets for infantry and rangefinders for artillery became commonplace in the 19th century.

Two new weapons of World War I, barbed wire and the machine gun, multiplied defensive forces, leading to the stalemate of trench warfare.

The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100-200 men) of local guerrillas.

Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation Bodyguard[9] successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. As a result of the successful deception, the Normandy force penetrated deeply, in part, because the Germans held back strategic reserves that they thought would be needed at the Pas de Calais, against what was a nonexistent force. FUSAG's existence was suggested by the use of decoy vehicles that the Allies allowed to be photographed, fictitious radio traffic generated by a small number of specialists, and the Double Cross System.[10] Double Cross referred to turning all surviving German spies in the UK into double agents, who sent back convincing reports that were consistent with the deception programs being conducted by the London Controlling Section.

• Network-centric warfare
• Asymmetric warfare
• C4ISTAR
• Lanchester's laws