Guy Simonds

On April 20, 1943 (three days before his fortieth birthday) Simonds was promoted to major-general and appointed General Officer Commanding (GOC) 2nd Canadian Infantry Division,[16] having risen from major to major-general in three-and-a-half years–faster than any other officer in the Canadian Army.[17] Just nine days later he was transferred to command the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, replacing Major-General Harry Salmon who had died in a plane crash while planning for Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily.[16][17]

Major-General G. G. Simonds, commanding the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, coming ashore on Sicily, July 1943

In this last post he led the 1st Canadian Division through the invasion of Sicily.[6] The division was placed under the command of British XXX Corps, serving alongside the veteran 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese. XXX Corps was part of the British Eighth Army, under the command of General Sir Bernard Montgomery. Aged just 40, he was the youngest Canadian officer to lead a division in action.[17] He came under fire for the first time on July 16, 1943 after nearly 17 years of service in the Canadian Army.[18] Montgomery was impressed with the way that Simonds had commanded 1st Division in Sicily, marking him out as a man destined for higher command.[19] The Canadian historian Desmond Morton wrote Simonds had proven himself to Montgomery in Sicily as "...an able field commander No other Canadian would ever quite meet Monty's standards". At Agira and Regalbuto, Simonds won "costly, difficult battles" over the Wehrmacht who used the mountainous terrain of Sicily to their advantage.[20] The victories were not cheap, as the 1st Division had taken 2, 310 casualties in Sicily, losing 562 men killed with the rest being wounded or taken prisoner.[21]

The campaign in Sicily was over by mid-August and, after a brief rest, on September 3, 1943 Simonds and the 1st Canadian Division, now serving alongside the British 5th Infantry Division as part of British XIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey (whom Simonds was to form a high opinion of), landed on the mainland of Italy in Operation Baytown, part of the Allied invasion of Italy. Meeting light resistance, the division suffered only nine casualties on the first day.[22]

Falling ill on September 22, he was replaced as commander of the 1st Canadian Division by Brigadier Christopher Vokes, the former commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.[23] Subsequently, he was appointed the GOC of the recently arrived 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division when it arrived on the Italian Front in November 1943. Simonds viewed this, along with the arrival of Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar and I Canadian Corps, as something of a comedown, although this was not the intent of CMHQ.[17] Montgomery had wanted Simonds to command an armoured division to give him experience with commanding tanks, through the mountainous terrain of Italy was hardly the best place.[24] His initial meeting with Crerar went poorly (possibly strained by Simonds' illness), and relations further deteriorated when Simonds ejected an officer sent by Crerar to measure his headquarters caravan at Cassoria. Crerar was fascinated by Simonds's caravan, which he called a "home from home", and sent another officer to take its measurements without informing Simonds, who expelled the officer when he discovered him wandering around his caravan taking the measurements.[25] Crerar had become jealous of Simonds, who had enjoyed more battlefield success and media attention as the general officer commanding (GOC) of 1st Infantry Division and then as 5th Armored Division in Italy than he had.[25]

Crerar attempted to sack Simonds because of this incident, writing to Simonds that he felt his "nerves were over-stretched" and complained about the "personal discourtesy" in expelling the captain from his caravan.[26] Crerar took the matter to General Montgomery, the Eighth Army commander, but found little support. On 11 December 1943 Crerar sent a memo to Montgomery declaring he had "serious cause to doubt...the suitability of Simonds for higher command", going on to write that he believed that Simonds was mentally ill, saying that Simonds had "always been high strung...with a tendency to be introspective rather than objective, when faced with acute problems". Montgomery wrote back that he had the "highest opinion of Simonds" and rejected Crerar's claims that he was mentally ill.[27] However, Crerar discussed the event with army psychiatrists, the Canadian First Army commander, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, and post-war pushed for Charles Foulkes to be selected as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) over Simonds.[28]

Simonds's only battle in command of 5th Division was the so-called "Arielli Show", an offensive launched on 17 January 1944 against the German 1st Parachute Division's strong-points southeast of the Arielli River in central Italy.[24] After being defeated by the 1st Canadian Division in the Battle of Ortona in December 1943, the 1st Parachute Division had retreated back to the Riccio River north of Ortona. The Canadians brought down heavy artillery fire first on the left flank of the 1st Parachute Division to allow the Perth Regiment to advance and then on the right flank to allow the Cape Breton Highlanders to advance. As the 1st Parachute Division was well dug in, the heavy Canadian artillery fire did not have the desired results and the assaults by the Perth Regiment and the Cape Breton Highlanders reached about 200 yards of their objectives before being stopped.[29]

Simonds was furious when he learned that, to save shipping, his new division would have to take old equipment from the veteran British 7th Armoured Division (famous in the Western Desert as the Desert Rats), then in Italy but soon to return to the United Kingdom to participate in Operation Overlord. Crerar nixed an idea to use 3,350 brand-new I Corps headquarters vehicles to equip the 5th Canadian Armoured Division.[30] The division would not be fully equipped until the end of January 1944.

Simonds inspecting II Canadian Corps in Meppen, Germany, May 31, 1945.

In January 1944 he was recalled to the United Kingdom and made General Officer Commanding II Canadian Corps,[6] which went on to take part in the Normandy landings and advance through France. At age forty-one, Simonds was purported to be the youngest corps commander in the British Empire.[31] Simonds made numerous personnel changes: The Chief Engineer, Chief Medical Officer and the Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) were sacked, and F. F. Worthington was replaced as commander of 4th Canadian Armoured Division.[31] Talented officers such as George Kitching, Bruce Matthews and Geoffrey Walsh were brought by Simonds from Italy to II Corps.[32] In his instructions to his officers in February 1944, Simonds noted that the Wehrmacht always fought its defensive battles the same way; namely a thinly manned series of outposts, behind which were a series of strongly held dug-in positions that could bring down interlocking machine gun and mortar fire.[33] Simonds further noted the Wehrmacht would always launch aggressive counter-attacks in face of an Allied attack, stating:

"...success of the offensive battle hinges on the defeat of the German counter-attacks, with sufficient of our own reserves in hand to launch a new phase as soon as the enemy strength has spent itself. The defeat of these counter-attacks must form part of the original plan of attack which must include arrangements for artillery support and forward moves of infantry-supporting weapons-including tanks-on the objective".[33]

As Simonds had been trained as a "gunner", as artillerymen were known in the Canadian Army, artillery played a significant role in his planning for offensives with the divisions attacking along narrow points as divisional artillery was only capable of supporting one brigade at a time.[33]

Simonds, by his own admission, was bad-tempered, unable to tolerate those he regarded as fools, and had a headstrong streak, which he attempted to check by maintaining a cold "glacial" composure.[26] Simonds always spoke with a strong English accent, and his personality never inspired any affection from the men under his command who regarded him as a "cold Englishmen".[26] One Canadian brigadier wrote that Simonds "was not a man one could love. In my heart I knew, however, that I would rather serve under his type than under a kindly, but less driving commander; the former is much more likely to win battles".[33] Simonds had a long-standing feud with his fellow British immigrant Charles Foulkes, going back to their days as students at the Staff College where Simonds had received greater recognition than Foulkes. Both Foulkes and Simonds were ambitious men with strong ruthless streaks, and together with General Harry Crerar, who had "a nasty streak of his own", the three officers were the ones most responsible for the command decisions of the Canadians in the Normandy campaign.[26] Relations between Simonds and his commanding officer, Crerar, were very poor as Crerar had attempted to sack Simonds as commander of the 5th Canadian Division in December 1943.[34] However, Simonds was a favorite of Bernard Law Montgomery, who viewed Simonds as the most talented Canadian general in the entire war, and Montgomery blocked Crerar's attempts to send Simonds back to Canada.[35]

Once II Corps was activated, Simonds would direct four major attacks during the Battle of Normandy in five weeks: Operations Atlantic (the Canadian part of Operation Goodwood), Spring, Totalize and Tractable. After Operation Spring, Simonds tried to sack Foulkes as commander of 2nd Canadian Division, writing that Foulkes "did not the right qualities to command 2nd Division", but was blocked by Crerar, who kept Foulkes on to nettle Simonds.[36] Simonds has often been criticized for his reliance on heavy bombers to "blast" open a way for Operation Totalize, but the Canadian historian Jody Perrun argued that the marked inferiority of the Sherman tanks to the Panther and Tiger tanks of the Germans meant that Simonds had no other choice, but to use air power to even the odds given that both the Panthers and Tigers had more powerful guns and heavier armor than the Shermans.[37] Perrun has charged too many historians have taken at face value the disparaging remarks about Simonds's command by SS-Brigadeführer Kurt "Panzer" Meyer, the commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, who spoke as if the Sherman tanks were the equal of the Tiger and Panther tanks, and charged that the Canadians were insufficiently aggressive in armored operations and too reliant upon air support.[38] A principle problem for Simonds was that his tank crews were loath to face the Panthers and Tigers on open ground given their guns could not knock either type of tank except at very close range while the guns of the Panthers and Tigers could knock a Sherman at long range.[39] The Germans called the Shermans "Ronsons" (a type of cigarette lighter popular in Germany) as the lightly armored Shermans would explode into fireballs with one hit; the crews of the Shermans who would be incinerated if their tank was hit were understandably cautious when facing the Tigers and Panthers.[40] Perrun argued that Meyer's claims that Simonds lacked aggression failed to take into account the weaknesses of the Sherman tanks, and Simonds designed his operations with the aim of counter-acting the flaws of the Shermans by providing for air and artillery support to even the odds.[41]

For Totalize (beginning August 7, 1944), which involved a night attack, numerous navigation aids were devised, along with heavy bomber support. Having learned from Operation Spring, Simonds devised the "Kangaroo", an early armoured personnel carrier converted from non-operational armoured vehicles "defrocked Priests".[6][42] Granatstein characterizes the plan as "brilliant if too complicated",[43] in that it did not account for the inexperience of the troops. The two commanders of the armored divisions tasked with leading the assault, George Kitching and Stanisław Maczek both objected to Simonds's plans for a "mailed fist" assault on narrow fronts as allowing the Germans to concentrate their forces for counter-attack, but Simonds argued the planned heavy bombing attack by American bombers would disorganize the Germans enough to allow a breakthrough.[44] As Maczek's English was very poor and Simonds spoke no Polish, the two generals spoke in French, in which Maczek was fluent.[45] Simonds insisted that his French was not that good and so Kitching translated for him.[45] Kitching later accused Simonds of being better at French than what he pretended as the interval for translations gave him more room to develop arguments to dismiss Maczek's concerns.[45]

During Operation Totalize, the American bombers who were supposed to hit the German lines instead carpet-bombed the II Canadian Corps's artillery and assembling areas, badly disorganizing the offensive.[46] While the offensive was derailed by the American "friendly fire", the aggressive Meyer took advantage of the pause to stop the advances of both the 1st Polish Armored Division at St. Aignan and the 4th Canadian Armored Division at Langannerie.[47] Simonds's plan for Totalize had called for Canadian heavy and medium artillery to support the Canadian and Polish tanks as they advanced, but the accidental American bombing of the Canadian artillery had robbed the Allied armor of the expected fire support. Simonds, knowing of the weakness of the Sherman tanks, which were both under-armored and under-gunned, had planned for his artillery to knock out Meyer's Tigers and Panthers, and expected the Germans to counter-attack at once with their armor.[48] The next day, Simonds sent the Worthington Force, comprising a battlegroup of the British Columbia regiment and the Algonquin regiment, which however took a wrong turn, and was annihilated by Meyer who sent his Tiger and Panther tanks against the Shermans.[49]

Tractable, on August 14, used a smoke screen in an attempt to shield armour from German anti-tank weaponry. The Canadian historian Desmond Morton wrote that Operation Tractable should have been a disaster as the Wehrmacht had captured a copy of the Canadian operations plan the night before, but despite this, the assault by the II corps under the cover of smoke ended with the Canadians taking Falaise on 16 August 1944.[50] Afterwards, Simonds had the task of closing the "Falaise Gap" with the 1st Polish Armored Division under General Stanisław Maczek leading the way and engaging in desperate fighting at the Maczuga (Mace) as the Poles called Hill 262 as the German Army Group B sought to escape from Normandy.[50] Through the 1st Polish Division was nearly destroyed several times as the Germans pushed their way out of Normandy, the Poles at the Maczuga and the Canadians at St. Lambert finally closed the "Falaise Gap" on 21 August 1944.[50] Despite its name, the II Canadian Corps had Polish and British divisions operating under Simonds's command.

In September 1944, Simonds temporarily took charge of the First Canadian Army from Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, who was recovering from a bout of dysentery, and led the liberation of the mouth of the Scheldt River.[6] "By most accounts, Simonds’ assumption of command reinvigorated the army HQ; where Crerar managed, Simonds commanded."[51] When Crerar resumed command with the First Army, Simonds resumed his command of II Canadian Corps for the liberation of North-Western Europe.[6]

Seated from left: Stanisław Maczek (Polish Army), Guy Simonds II Canadian Corps, Harry Crerar First Canadian Army, Charles Foulkes I Canadian Corps, Bert Hoffmeister 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division; Standing from left: Ralph Keefler 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Bruce Matthews 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, Harry Foster 1st Canadian Infantry Division, Robert Moncel (for Chris Vokes 4th Canadian Armoured Division, S.B. Rawlins, British 49th Infantry Division.

Major General C Vokes (4th Armoured Division), Lieutenant-General H. D. C. Crerar (Army Commander), Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Lieutenant-General B. G. Horrocks (British 30 Corps, attached First Canadian Army), Lieutenant-General G. C. Simonds (2 Corps), Major-General D. C. Spry (3rd Infantry Division), and Major-General A. B. Mathews (2nd Infantry Division).