Hegemonic stability theory

According to Thomas J. McCormick, scholars and other experts on the systemic school define hegemony "as a single power's possession of 'simultaneous superior economic efficiency in production, trade and finance.'" Furthermore, a hegemon's superior position is considered the logical consequence of superior geography, technological innovation, ideology, superior resources, and other factors.[11]

George Modelski, who presented his ideas in the book, Long Cycles in World Politics (1987), is the chief architect of long cycle theory. In a nutshell, long cycle theory describes the connection between war cycles, economic supremacy, and the political aspects of world leadership.

Long cycles, or long waves, offer interesting perspectives on global politics by permitting "the careful exploration of the ways in which world wars have recurred, and lead states such as Britain and the United States have succeeded each other in an orderly manner." Not to be confused with Simon Kuznets' idea of long-cycles, or long-swings, long cycles of global politics are patterns of past world politics.[12]

The long cycle, according to Dr. Dan Cox, is a period of time lasting approximately 70 to 100 years. At the end of that period, "the title of most powerful nation in the world switches hands.".[13] Modelski divides the long cycle into four phases. When periods of global war, which could last as much as one-fourth of the total long cycle, are factored in, the cycle can last from 87 to 122 years.[14]

Many traditional theories of international relations, including the other approaches to hegemony, believe that the baseline nature of the international system is anarchy.[15] Modelski's long cycle theory, however, states that war and other destabilizing events are a natural product of the long cycle and larger global system cycle. They are part of the living processes of the global polity and social order. Wars are "systemic decisions" that "punctuate the movement of the system at regular intervals." Because "world politics is not a random process of hit or miss, win or lose, depending on the luck of the draw or the brute strength of the contestants," anarchy simply doesn't play a role. After all, long cycles have provided, for the last five centuries, a means for the successive selection and operation of numerous world leaders.[16]

Modeslki used to believe that long cycles were a product of the modern period. He suggests that the five long cycles, which have taken place since about 1500, are each a part of a larger global system cycle, or the modern world system.

Under the terms of long cycle theory, five hegemonic long cycles have taken place, each strongly correlating to economic Kondratieff Waves (or K-Waves). The first hegemon would have been Portugal during the 16th century, then the Netherlands during the 17th century. Next, Great Britain served twice, first during the 18th century, then during the 19th century. The United States has been serving as hegemon since the end of World War II.

The traditional view of long cycle theory has evolved somewhat, as Modelski now suggests that Northern and Southern Sung China, Venice and Genoa were each the dominant economic powers during medieval long cycles. However, he does not classify any of these states as world powers. Only when Portugal gained hegemony after 1500 is that distinction made.[17]

Neorealists have been focusing on this theory recently, the main proponent of it being John J. Mearsheimer who is trying to incorporate it into 'offensive realism'.[18] In his book 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics' Mearsheimer outlines how the anarchic system that neorealists subscribe to (see Kenneth Waltz for original theory) creates power hungry states who will each attempt to install themselves as regional and global hegemons.[19] His theory is not widely embraced by fellow realists who argue that the hegemon supports the system so long as it is in their interests. The system is created, shaped and maintained by coercion. The hegemon would begin to undermine the institution when it is not in their interests. With the decline of a hegemon, the system descends into instability. Other realists argue that the anarchic system does not actually give causal motivation to aid the creation of hegemons.

Neoliberals argue that the hegemon wishes to maintain its dominant position without paying enforcement costs, so it creates a system in which it can credibly limit the returns to power (loser doesn't lose all) and credibly commit to neither dominate nor abandon them. This is done through institutions, which are sticky, (hard to change, more convenient to continue using than to revamp.) These institutions favor the hegemon, but provide protection and a stable world order for the rest of the world. The more open this world-order, the less likely that there will be a challenger.[20] With the decline of the hegemon, institutions don't automatically die, because they were constructed in a way that benefited all stakeholders; instead, they take on a life of their own (see regime theory).[21][22]

It is motivated by 'enlightened self-interest'; the hegemon takes on the costs because it is good for all actors, thereby creating stability in the system, which is also in the interests of all actors.

Duncan Snidal argues that 'the range of the theory is very limited to very special conditions,' and suggests that the decline of a hegemonic power may demonstrate the possibility of a collective power. According to Snidal, the applicability of the theory can be challenged due to limitations and the theory only holds true empirically under special conditions.[23]

Hegemony demands power, which is defined by British scholar Susan Strange as the ability of one party to affect outcomes such that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of other parties. The question of whether the United States is still a hegemon is tied into whether or not it has lost power. Keohane sees power as tied into resources and production. The US GDP is now lower relative to others as there are growing economies with considerable amount of GDP such as BRIC countries. This implies a loss or decreased power of US as a hegemon.

Although resources are an important determinant of power, they are not always determinative. For example, the German troops that conquered western Europe were actually fewer in number than their opponents. Susan Strange uses this logic to argue that the United States is still a hegemon.

The United States unilaterally helped Mexico in the Peso Crisis and unilaterally helped Russia with economic aid. The United States has also been influential in moving many countries towards embracing the free market; through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the United States has pushed Latin American nations to undertake economic programs in accordance with its own foreign policy Interests (see Washington Consensus).

The United States is still considered by most analysts to be at the top of the world, both economically and in terms of military strength.[24][25] With these abundant resources and power in the hands of the United States, they still remain as the leader "in a single superpower world".[26] However, the emergence of new giants threatens U.S. hegemony by creating new power centers all over the world. Of those new giants, the single greatest competitor of United States is China as they are growing rapidly with "no equal in modern history".[27]

Historically, examples of hegemonic decline come in two prime sectors: the leading state's military, and its economy.[28] Thus, it is important to look at China's emergence in both arenas and more to understand the shifting power structure.[29]

With the second highest gross domestic product at purchasing power parity,[30] China poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic primacy especially with the expectation that U.S. national debt could explode to 717% of GDP by 2080 according to Congressional Budget office. Moreover, this debt is financed largely by China through the purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds. On the other hand, China's economic power, not limited to but including industrialization and modernization, is rapidly burgeoning with high consumption and increasing foreign investment.[31] As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to "the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world's wealth" (p. 7).[32]

U.S. military can be characterized by "imperial overstretch" with troops operating abroad in more than fifty-five countries. Through this process, "a military force is extended so much that it nears a breaking point." On the other hand, China is taking advantage by industrializing its army using their wealth. China's military budget is increasing and the troops are expanding.[33] Steven W. Mosher insists that China is building up its armed forces "to break America's back in Asia and thus end America's reign as the sole superpower in the world."[34]

However, many argue that China has a symbiotic relationship with the United States. If the United States declines, it is likely that China also may be in jeopardy. John Gulick points out that China's prosperity is "deeply ensconced in the 'China produces and lends, the US borrows and spends' framework".[35] Economic interdependence of China derives from the fact that they are a producing state rather than a consuming state. China's economy is export heavy as its driving force lies in "export processing measures".[35] The export dependent structure could severely dampen economic growth if demand for Chinese exports is reduced by another economic crisis in the United States. Thus, China's economic woes are one of the barriers to its hegemonic aspirations. However, it is not the only barrier that China must overcome to achieve from hegemony. In fact, HST demonstrates that their needs theoretical requirements for world leadership that China should strive to achieve in order to gain hegemonic status that include whether China has the will to lead and the ability to lead. Also, other factors- for example, domestic political instability, environmental degradation, public health issues, and demographic trends- could possibly hinder China's ascent to great power status.[36]

• Summaries of International Relations Theories
• Assessment of the United States’ Impact on the United Nations While to Maintain Its Hegemonic Stability, KÜRESEL SİYASET MERKEZİ