List of United States Supreme Court decisions on capital punishment
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued numerous rulings on the use of capital punishment (the death penalty). While some rulings applied very narrowly, perhaps to only one individual, other cases have had great influence over wide areas of procedure, eligible crimes, acceptable evidence and method of execution.
Year | Case | Ruling | Vote |
---|---|---|---|
1879 | Wilkerson v. Utah | Firing squad is constitutional. | 9-0 |
1890 | In re Kemmler | Electrocution is constitutional. | 9-0 |
1905 | Rooney v. North Dakota | Adoption of private execution versus public execution after sentence does not violate the Ex post facto clause. | 9-0 |
1915 | Malloy v. South Carolina | Retroactively changing the execution method does not violate the Ex post facto clause. | 9-0 |
1932 | Powell v. Alabama | Courts are required to ensure that, in capital cases, indigent defendants who do not represent themselves must be appointed counsel. | 7-2 |
1947 | Francis v. Resweber | Re-execution after a failed attempt does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment nor double jeopardy. | 5-4 |
1968 | Witherspoon v. Illinois | A state may not have unlimited challenge for cause of jurors who might have any objection to the death penalty. (See also Morgan v. Illinois (1992)) | 6-3 |
1971 | McGautha v. California | The death penalty can be imposed by a jury without standards to govern its imposition, and a unitary guilt and punishment trial is constitutional. (Overruled in Furman v. Georgia, 1972, and Gregg v. Georgia, 1976) | 6-3 |
1972 | Furman v. Georgia | The death penalty must not be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. The ruling caused all death sentences pending at the time to be reduced to life imprisonment and made all previous capital punishment statutes void. | 5-4 |
1976 | Gregg v. Georgia | Post-Furman death penalty statutes providing a bifurcated trial in capital cases to decide guilt and punishment are constitutional. | 7-2 |
1976 | Woodson v. North Carolina | Statutes providing mandatory imposition of the death penalty are unconstitutional. | 5-4 |
1977 | Coker v. Georgia | The death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for rape of an adult woman when the victim is not killed. | 6-3 |
1978 | Lockett v. Ohio | Sentencing authorities must have the discretion to consider every possible mitigating factor, rather than being limited to a specific list of factors. | 6-2 |
1980 | Beck v. Alabama | Jury must be allowed to consider lesser included offense, not just capital offense or acquittal. | 7-2 |
1980 | Godfrey v. Georgia | Murder must involve a narrow and precise aggravating factor to be punishable by death. | 6-3 |
1982 | Enmund v. Florida | Death penalty is unconstitutional for a person who is a minor participant in a felony and does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. | 5-4 |
1984 | Pulley v. Harris | There is no constitutional requirement for a proportionality review of sentences in comparable cases throughout a state. | 7-2 |
1984 | Spaziano v. Florida | It is constitutional for a judge rather than jury to decide aggravating factors. (Overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 2002). | 6-3 |
1986 | Ford v. Wainwright | Execution of an insane convict is unconstitutional. | 5-4 |
1987 | Tison v. Arizona | Death penalty may be imposed on a felony-murder defendant who was a major participant in the underlying felony and exhibits extreme indifference to human life. | 5-4 |
1987 | McCleskey v. Kemp | Racial disparities not recognized as a constitutional violation of "equal protection of the law" unless intentional racial discrimination against the defendant can be shown. | 5-4 |
1987 | Sumner v. Shuman | A death sentence cannot be mandatory, even for a murder committed by a prisoner already serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. | 6-3 |
1988 | Lowenfield v. Phelps | The aggravating factor making the crime punishable by death may be found in the definition of the crime itself as long it is enough narrow and precise. | 7-2 |
1988 | Thompson v. Oklahoma | Capital punishment for crimes committed at 15 or less is unconstitutional. | 5-3 |
1989 | South Carolina v. Gathers | Admission of a victim impact statement at the sentencing phase of a death penalty-trial is unconstitutional. (Overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, 1991) | 5-4 |
1989 | Stanford v. Kentucky | The death penalty for crimes committed at age 16 or 17 is constitutional. (Overruled in Roper v. Simmons, 2005) | 5-4 |
1989 | Penry v. Lynaugh | Executing persons with mental retardation is constitutional. (Overruled in Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) | 5-4 |
1990 | Walton v. Arizona | Judge-finding of aggravating factors is constitutional. The aggravating factor "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" is not unconstitutionally vague. (First holding overruled in Ring v. Arizona, 2002) | 5-4 |
1991 | Payne v. Tennessee | Victim impact statements are admissible during the penalty phase of a capital case. | 6-3 |
1992 | Morgan v. Illinois | A defendant may challenge for cause a prospective juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty in every capital case. | 6-3 |
1993 | Herrera v. Collins | In the absence of other constitutional grounds, federal courts have no power to rule on innocence claims based on newly discovered evidence. | 6-3 |
1995 | Schlup v. Delo | A condemned man can bypass the procedural bar on successive federal habeas petitions if he show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent". | 5-4 |
1995 | Harris v. Alabama | Allowing the judge to impose a death sentence and making the jury recommendation non-binding even when it calls for life imprisonment is constitutional. | 8-1 |
2002 | Ring v. Arizona | A death sentence where the necessary aggravating factors are determined by a judge violates a defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury, as the jury should determine if there are such factors sufficient to allow the death penalty. | 7-2 |
2002 | Atkins v. Virginia | The execution of mentally retarded offenders is unconstitutional. | 6-3 |
2004 | Schriro v. Summerlin | Ring v. Arizona does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. | 5-4 |
2005 | Roper v. Simmons | The death penalty for those who had committed their crimes under 18 years of age is unconstitutional. | 5-4 |
2006 | Oregon v. Guzek | States may limit the evidence of innocence a defendant may present at his sentencing hearing to evidence already presented at his trial. | 8-0 |
2006 | Hill v. McDonough | Challenging constitutionality of the execution method is a §1983 lawsuit, not a habeas corpus petition, and thus not subject to the procedural bar on successive petitions. | 9-0 |
2006 | Kansas v. Marsh | Imposing the death penalty when mitigating and aggravating factors are in equipoise is constitutional. | 5-4 |
2007 | Panetti v. Quarterman | A person may not be executed if they do not understand the reason for their imminent execution. Once the state has set an execution date death-row inmates may litigate their competency to be executed in habeas corpus proceedings. | 5-4 |
2008 | Baze v. Rees | Kentucky's lethal injection method using sodium thiopental is constitutional. | 7-2 |
2008 | Kennedy v. Louisiana | The death penalty is unconstitutional for child rape and other non-homicidal crimes against the person. | 5-4 |
2009 | Harbison v. Bell | Indigent death row inmates sentenced under state law have a right to federally funded habeas counsel in post-conviction state clemency proceedings, when the state has denied such counsel. | 7-2 |
2011 | Leal Garcia v. Texas | Courts cannot stay an execution on the grounds that Congress might eventually enact a statute to enforce an international law. | 5-4 |
2014 | Hall v. Florida | IQ tests alone can not be used as a rigid limit for determining intellectual disability. | 5-4 |
2015 | Glossip v. Gross | To be unconstitutional, a method of execution must involve any risk of harm which is substantial when compared to a known and available alternative method. The condemned has the burden of proof. | 5-4 |
2016 | Hurst v. Florida | Florida law giving judges the power to decide facts related to sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring, which requires a jury to determine if there are aggravating factors making the crime punishable by death. | 8-1 |
2017 | McWilliams v. Dunn | 5-4 | |
2019 | Madison v. Alabama | Executing a prisoner who cannot remember committing his or her crime may be constitutional, but executing a prisoner who suffers from dementia or another disorder, rather than psychotic delusions, may not be. | 5-3 |
2019 | Bucklew v. Precythe | Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross govern all Eighth Amendment challenges alleging that a method of execution inflicts unconstitutionally cruel pain. "The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual' methods of capital punishment but does not guarantee a prisoner a painless death." | 5-4 |
References
- Capital Punishment: Legal Aspects – Early Constitutional Intervention
- History of the Death Penalty, University of Alaska Anchorage, Justice Center
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