Naval Aid Bill

The 1911 federal election, in which the Conservatives defeated the Liberal government, was fought largely on the question of what role Canada should play in the common defence of the British Empire. At the time, Britain was engaged in a naval arms race with the German Empire. While the Liberals and Conservatives both agreed that the best long-term maritime defence policy would be for Canada to acquire its own navy, the Conservatives vehemently objected to Liberal Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier’s Naval Service Act, which called for construction of that fleet to begin immediately. As Opposition Leader, Borden argued that Laurier’s plan to operate an autonomous fleet of five cruisers and six destroyers was a wholly inadequate response to the Empire's apparently pressing need.

What was not yet well known within Britain or Canada was that by 1912 the German government had quietly scaled back its naval ambitions in favour of strengthening its army. The Germans had made this policy change in secret, and in any event the Admiralty strenuously downplayed reports that the Germans might have been giving up on their attempt to surpass the Royal Navy. As the new Prime Minister of Canada, Borden visited the United Kingdom in 1912 to accept the knighthood that was customarily granted at the time to Dominion Prime Ministers. While in the U.K., at the urging of the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, Prime Minister Borden agreed to finance the construction of three dreadnoughts for $35 million.[1]

The Conservative plan was at least three times more costly than the Liberal plan to construct a Canadian-operated fleet, and would reap no benefits to Canadian industries whatsoever. On December 5, 1912, Borden introduced the Naval Aid Bill as a one-time contribution to Britain's navy. After a bitter debate and a long filibuster by the opposition Liberals, the Borden government invoked closure on the debate, for the first time ever in Canadian Parliament, on May 15, 1913. The Act was soundly defeated by the Liberal-majority Senate two weeks later.

2nd Session, 12 Parliament, 3 George V., 1912-13

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, CANADA

Bill 21

An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.

HIS MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:-

1. This Act may be cited as The Naval Aid Act.

2. From and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.

3. That said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.

4. The said ships when constructed and equipped shall be placed by the Governor in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire.

5. The said sum shall be paid, used and applied and the said ships shall be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the Governor in Council and His Majesty's Government.[2]

Had the bill passed the Senate and received Royal Assent, it is likely the funds would have been used to construct three Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, potentially named as Acadia, Quebec and Ontario,[3] The bill's failure ultimately made little impact on the naval arms race. The First World War commenced about fourteen months after the bill's defeat. At the time, none of the five Queen Elizabeth class battleships that were ultimately built for the Royal Navy had yet been commissioned.

At the start of the war, Britain had 22 dreadnoughts in service compared to Germany's 15, but Britain also had 13 dreadnoughts under construction even without a Canadian contribution, and by then, the Germans were building only five additional dreadnoughts. With the additional naval strength of France in the Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific, later bolstered by the entry of Italy and eventually the United States, Allied control of the high seas was never seriously threatened and Germany was compelled to seek less costly alternatives (submarines in particular) to project a measure of power in the Atlantic sea lanes.

• German, Tony (1990). The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. ISBN 0-7710-3268-4.