Uroš Drenović

Uroš Drenović (Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic: Урош Дреновић; 1911 – 29 May 1944) was a Bosnian Serb military commander in the central Bosnia region of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the fascist Ustaše-led puppet state, during World War II. Following the German-led Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Ustaše implemented genocidal policies against Serbs, Jews and Romanis in the puppet state. Drenović joined the Yugoslav Partisans, and distinguished himself during the initial uprising against the NDH authorities by capturing the town of Mrkonjić Grad in August 1941. He was appointed to command the 3rd "Petar Kočić" Battalion, a Partisan unit operating in central Bosnia, and was appointed the deputy commander of the 3rd Krajina Detachment.

Uroš Drenović
Drenović (right), alongside a German officer
Native name
Урош Дреновић
Born1911
Sitnica, Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary
Died29 May 1944 (aged 33)
Banja Luka, Independent State of Croatia
Place of burial
Klisina, Stričići
Allegiance
Commands held
  • 3rd "Petar Kočić" Battalion
  • "Petar Kočić" Chetnik Detachment
Battles/warsWorld War II in Yugoslavia
Awards Order of Karađorđe's Star

Drenović subsequently led Serb-chauvinist agitation within the 3rd Krajina Detachment and resisted control of its units by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ). He was the leading exponent of Chetnik ideology in central Bosnia and despised Muslims and Croats. After some vacillation, he eventually betrayed the Partisans during an operation against the Italian occupiers; siding with the royalist and Serb-chauvinist Chetniks while commanding his own Chetnik unit. In April 1942, the Partisans defeated Drenović and other Chetnik defectors from the Partisans, and he fled to Banja Luka where he concluded an alliance with the NDH to fight the Partisans. This agreement was reached out of military and political necessity, because both sides needed assistance to oppose the Partisans, rather than any other common interests. Drenović continued to oppose the Partisans, and his collaboration encompassed the Italians then the Germans until his death during an Allied bombing raid on Banja Luka in May 1944. Despite his extensive collaboration with the Axis Powers during the war, a street in Banja Luka is named after him, and within the Serb entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, the actions of his Chetniks are celebrated and equated with those of the Partisans.

Early life

Uroš Drenović was born in 1911 in Sitnica, Ribnik, near Mount Manjača in the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary.[1] He attended school in the town of Mrkonjić Grad,[2] and finished teachers' college in Sarajevo.[1][2] After graduation he became a schoolmaster at Baraći, near Banja Luka, in the Bosanska Krajina region of Bosnia in what was now the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[2][3][4] Prior to the outbreak of World War II, he attended the Royal Yugoslav Army (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije, VKJ) reserve officer training school at Bileća, and was serving in the VKJ reserve.[2][5]

World War II

Bosanska Krajina uprising

Soon after the German-led invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, largely spontaneous uprisings began to occur throughout the newly created Axis puppet state, the Independent State of Croatia (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH),[6] which was governed by the fascist Ustaše. These uprisings were caused by the genocidal policies implemented by the Ustaše against Serbs, Jews and Romanis.[7] On 4 July, in the wake of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ) decided to launch a general uprising against the occupying forces across Yugoslavia, in solidarity with the Soviets, and a full-scale rebellion broke out in Bosnia on 27 July.[8] This included local uprisings in the Bosanska Krajina, which spread across the NDH, but the KPJ organisation was initially swept along in the popular uprisings rather than leading the rebellion.[6]

On 29 August, Drenović distinguished himself by planning and leading the capture of Mrkonjić Grad by the rebels, but when the town was recaptured by NDH forces four days later, the KPJ blamed him and his troops, citing their poor discipline and anti-Muslim chauvinism.[9] In September, four battalions of fighters were formed in the Ribnik, Janj and Pliva region. One of these, the 3rd "Petar Kočić" Battalion, was commanded by Drenović, who unlike the other battalion commanders in the region, did not allow the KPJ to appoint political commissars to his companies.[10] In an area where the KPJ did not have a strong presence, but which was under the sway of the sectarian Serb elite of Mrkonjić Grad, Drenović arrested Muslim communists, even confronting senior members of the Partisan leadership in the Bosanska Krajina.[4]

On 26 September 1941 at the Partisan conference in Stolice in the German-occupied territory of Serbia, the leadership decided to standardise its military organisation across occupied Yugoslavia. During October and November, three detachments were formed in the Bosanska Krajina from existing units such as the 3rd "Petar Kočić" Battalion, and Drenović was appointed as deputy commander of the 3rd Krajina Detachment responsible for operations in the territory of central Bosnia. The Serbs of this region had strong pro-Chetnik/Serb-chauvinist sympathies.[11] The Chetniks were a loosely-organised Serb-chauvinist guerilla movement putatively led by Draža Mihailović.[12] Of the 34 companies in the detachment, only 13 had KPJ organisations, only 11 had commanders who were members of the KPJ, and only 18 had a political commissar. Many KPJ activists in the region were Muslims or Croats, not easily accepted by the mass of the rank-and-file who were largely Serb-chauvinist peasants. Drenović himself was the leading exponent of Chetnik ideology in central Bosnia.[11] This narrow ideology involved extreme Serbian nationalism,[13][14] and irredentism focussed on the creation of a Greater Serbia,[15] and was anti-Croat,[15][16] anti-Muslim,[15][16] monarchist,[17] and anti-communist.[18] Drenović himself despised Muslims and Croats but, according to the historian Marko Attila Hoare, was "diplomatic enough to keep his feelings in check when necessary".[19] In October, the leadership of the 3rd Krajina Detachment attempted to win over the Muslim village of Crljeni by gaining the agreement of the headman to contribute five armed men to the detachment. When the headman reneged on the deal, the bulk of the detachment attacked the village, and the remainder of the detachment had to prevent Drenović's men from burning and looting it.[20]

On 26 November 1941, at a meeting of the leadership of the 3rd Krajina Detachment, Drenović advocated collaboration with the Italian occupation forces on the basis that the Italians were protecting Serbs from the Ustaše. This was rejected by the senior KPJ members of the detachment, but they were not in a position to force him to abandon the idea. At the same meeting, Drenović refused to commit the 3rd "Petar Kočić" Battalion to fight the Italians. Under pressure, he agreed to advise neighbouring battalions if the Italians moved through his territory. In return, the leadership of the 3rd Krajina Detachment agreed that Drenović could refer to his force as a "Military-Chetnik Detachment".[9] On 10 December, the senior KPJ members of the 3rd Krajina Detachment concluded that 50 percent of their command staff did not support the leading role of the KPJ in the uprising. The Partisan leadership for Bosanska Krajina later observed that the leaders of the 3rd Krajina Detachment had made no effort to remove Chetnik elements from its ranks or stop their Serb-chauvinist agitation.[9] In early February 1942, Drenović took a leading role in a conference intended to bring the 7th Glamoč Battalion, which had declared itself as "Chetnik", back into the Partisan structure. Drenović argued for the Chetnik side, and was expelled from the meeting along with his supporters, and the 7th Glamoč Battalion returned to the Partisan fold.[21] On 6 February, a meeting of the leaders of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battalions of the 3rd Krajina Detachment met and decided to bring Drenović back into the Partisan movement by organising an attack on the Italian and Ustaše garrison of Mrkonjić Grad. Under pressure from his own rank-and-file, Drenović formally participated in the attack, but he was able to prevent its success through allowing the Italians to move past his battalion and attack the Partisan rear. According to Partisan sources, he forewarned the Italians and Ustaše forces, and divulged the Partisan plan to them.[22]

Alliance with the NDH

Drenović (far left) drinking with Croatian Home Guard and Ustaše troops

In response to highly effective pro-Chetnik agitation from within, many Partisan units defected to the Chetniks.[23] In the second half of April 1942, the Partisans responded with aggressive military action against the defectors. The unit that led this offensive was the Grmeč Shock Anti-Chetnik Battalion, formed earlier that month from wholly loyal and reliable troops. This offensive spelt the end of Drenović's "Petar Kočić" Chetnik Detachment, and Drenović took refuge with the Ustaše in Mrkonjić Grad.[24] On 27 April, he and other defeated Chetnik commanders signed an agreement with the NDH. The agreement had eight points, which included requiring that hostilities between the Ustaše and Drenović's Chetniks come to an end, that the NDH forces protect Serb villages from the Partisans, and that the Ustaše units assist the Chetniks in fighting the Partisans.[25][26] The agreement also required the Ustaše to restore religious and civil rights to Serbs of the Krajina. In turn, Drenović issued a declaration in which he recognised the sovereignty of the NDH.[27] The historian Enver Redžić argues that the agreement was reached out of military and political necessity.[28] He writes:[29]

The Ustaše–Chetnik accords were driven neither by a confluence of Serbian and Croatian national interests nor by mutual desire for acceptance and respect, but rather because each side needed to obstruct Partisan advances. The Ustaše and Chetniks, two long-time foes, sought help from one another at a time when the Ustaše were facing national political disgrace among the Croats and the Chetniks were losing the support of the Serbs.

Drenović's grave at the Klisina church in Stričići

The NDH authorities considered that the alliance would also mean that the Chetniks could continue to subvert Partisan units. On 30 April, the NDH authorities recognised the rights of Drenović and his troops to remain armed in order to fight the Partisans.[24] The agreement between the NDH and Drenović's Chetniks was soon made public by the Ustaše press;[30] Serb public opinion remained divided.[31] By May, Drenović had a force of about 350 Chetniks.[32] Around mid-month, he signed an agreement with a Croatian general staff officer in Banja Luka agreeing to cooperate with the NDH in fighting the Partisans.[27] Drenović soon emerged as one of the most important Chetnik leaders in western Bosnia.[33] That summer, when order had been established in significant parts of the Italian occupation zone, Drenović and other Chetnik detachment leaders and their principal political spokesmen with Italian Second Army headquarters were recognised by the Italians as auxiliaries. Early in the summer the Second Army commander, Generale designato d’armata (acting General) Mario Roatta, allowed for the delivery of arms, munitions, and supplies to the Chetniks.[33] Other Chetnik leaders in Bosnia who had concluded alliances with the NDH by June 1942 included Mane Rokvić, Branko Bogunović, Stevo Rađenović and Momčilo Đujić. The political scientist Sabrina P. Ramet observes that the co-operation with the NDH must be seen as a function of their mutual fear of the Partisans, and emphasises the uncertainty and distrust that accompanied it.[34] By June, Drenović's Chetniks numbered about 600 men.[32]

In 1943, Drenović was awarded the Order of Karađorđe's Star by the exiled King Peter, based on a recommendation by Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović.[30] Following the Italian capitulation in September 1943, Drenović agreed to the close cooperation of his Chetniks with local German units, and was informed at the end of the year that Ustaše units would again be stationed in Serb-inhabited areas.[35] In October 1943, a team from the German Brandenburg Division under Oberleutnant Hermann Kirchner began working alongside Drenović's Chetniks in northwest Bosnia, operating forward reconnaissance groups and developing contact with anti-communist farmers to keep an eye on Partisan troop movements.[36] There were about 950 Chetniks serving under Drenović that year, positioned around Manjača and Glamoč.[37] Drenović had about 400 Chetniks under his command by the following year. His was the only Chetnik band that the Ustaše trusted fully during the war.[38] According to the Serbian-language television station BN Televizija, Drenović is considered a Chetnik vojvoda (warlord).[39]

Death and legacy

On 29 May 1944, Drenović was killed in an Allied bombing raid on Banja Luka,[40] and his grave is at the Serbian Orthodox Church of Klisina in Stričići outside Banja Luka.[1] The Ravna Gora Movement, which is a modern-day Serbian nationalist Chetnik organisation,[41] and the Klisina church organise a ceremony each year to commemorate Drenović's actions in 1941. In recent years, the ceremony was not attended by any officials of the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[39][42] As of 2019 a street in Banja Luka was named after Drenović, and his actions and those of his Chetniks are celebrated in the official history of World War II used within Republika Srpska. Schools in Republika Srpska teach that the Chetniks were on the same anti-fascist footing as the Partisans, despite the Chetniks' extensive collaboration with the Axis during World War II.[43]

Footnotes

  1. 24sata.info 21 July 2009.
  2. Petrić 2004, p. 383.
  3. G-2 (PB) 1944, p. 37.
  4. Hoare 2006, p. 102.
  5. Trikić & Repajić 1982, p. 21, note 15.
  6. Hoare 2006, p. 76.
  7. Hoare 2006, pp. 20–24.
  8. Tomasevich 1975, p. 134.
  9. Hoare 2006, p. 250.
  10. Hoare 2006, pp. 76–78.
  11. Hoare 2006, pp. 248–249.
  12. Tomasevich 1975, pp. 465–471.
  13. Prusin 2017, p. 83.
  14. Hoare 2013, p. 8.
  15. Tomasevich 1975, p. 175.
  16. Sadkovich 1998, p. 148.
  17. Prusin 2017, pp. 82–83.
  18. Redžić 2005, p. 152.
  19. Hoare 2006, p. 249.
  20. Hoare 2006, p. 251.
  21. Hoare 2006, pp. 252–253.
  22. Hoare 2006, p. 254.
  23. Hoare 2006, pp. 258–262.
  24. Hoare 2006, pp. 261–262.
  25. Barić 2011, p. 182.
  26. Christia 2012, p. 206.
  27. Milazzo 1975, pp. 78–79.
  28. Christia 2012, pp. 206–207.
  29. Redžić 2005, p. 88.
  30. Dedijer 1990, p. 17.
  31. Hoare 2013, p. 170.
  32. Milazzo 1975, p. 80.
  33. Milazzo 1975, p. 77.
  34. Ramet 2006, p. 129.
  35. Milazzo 1975, p. 164.
  36. Greentree 2012, p. 17.
  37. Redžić 2005, p. 236.
  38. Tomasevich 1975, p. 354.
  39. BN Televizija 2014.
  40. Hoare 2013, p. 254.
  41. Sorguc 10 December 2020.
  42. Alternativna TV 21 July 2017.
  43. Aljazeera Balkans 2019.

References

Books

  • Barić, Nikica (2011). "Relations between the Chetniks and the Authorities of the Independent State of Croatia, 1942–1945". In Ramet, Sabrina P.; Listhaug, Ola (eds.). Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 175–200. ISBN 978-0-230-27830-1.
  • Christia, Fotini (2012). Alliance Formation in Civil Wars. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-02302-4.
  • Dedijer, Vladimir (1990). The War Diaries of Vladimir Dedijer. 2. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-47210-109-2.
  • Greentree, David (2012). Knight's Move: The Hunt for Marshal Tito, 1944. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-461-4.
  • Hoare, Marko Attila (2006). Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-726380-8.
  • Hoare, Marko Attila (2013). Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-70394-9.
  • Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-1589-8.
  • Petrić, Nevenka (2004). I zvijezde smo dosezali: Revolucionarni omladinski pokret srednje Bosne: 1941 - 1945 [We Also Reached the Stars: The Revolutionary Youth Movement of Central Bosnia: 1941–1945] (in Serbo-Croatian). 2. Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro: Foto Futura. ISBN 978-86-83691-07-4.
  • Prusin, Alexander (2017). Serbia Under the Swastika: A World War II Occupation. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-09961-8.
  • Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
  • Redžić, Enver (2005). Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War. Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-7146-5625-0.
  • Sadkovich, James J. (1998). The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-95046-0.
  • Trikić, Savo; Repajić, Dušan (1982). Proleterski bataljon Bosanske krajine. Belgrade, Yugoslavia: Vojnoizdavački zavod. OCLC 441716267.
  • Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.

Documents

  • G-2 (PB) (1944). "The Četniks: A Survey of Četnik Activity in Yugoslavia, April 1941 – July 1944". Caserta, Italy: Allied Forces Headquarters. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

News

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