Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb

During Operation Barbarossa—the planned invasion of the Soviet Union—Leeb was given command of Army Group North to invade the Baltic states and to capture Leningrad. Leeb was one of more than 200 senior officers who on 30 March 1941 attended a speech in which Hitler laid out his plans for an ideological war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg) against the Soviet Union.[6]

In June 1941, Army Group North, composed of the Panzer Group 4, the 16th Army and the 18th Army, overwhelmed Soviet border defences and rapidly advanced through the Baltic states, capturing Kaunas and Riga by 1 July that year.[7] As commander of the army group, Leeb had jurisdiction over the area of military operations and over the Army Group North Rear Area.[8] In late June and early July 1941, Franz von Roques, the Rear Area commander, informed Leeb of the massacres of Jews by Einsatzgruppe A, Lithuanian auxiliaries and the men of the 16th Army outside of Kaunas. Leeb noted in his diary afterwards that all he could do was to "keep one’s distance" and that the two men agreed it might be "more humane" to sterilize the Jewish men.[8] Leeb approved of the killing of Jewish men, claiming their supposed crimes during the Soviet occupation of Lithuania justified this, but that the killing of women and children might have been excessive.[9]

In early July, General Rudolf Schmundt, Hitler's aide responsible for the disbursing secret, extra-legal payments from the Konto 5 fund, visited the headquarters of Army Group North. He told Leeb's staff the pogroms and the murder of the Jews by the Einsatzgruppe A were a "necessary cleaning up operation" and that "soldiers should not concern themselves with political matters".[8] Leeb received 250,000 Reichsmark from the fund in September 1941 for his birthday.[10] In the same month, Franz Walter Stahlecker, the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, in a report to Berlin praised Army Group North for its exemplary co-operation with his men in murdering Jews in the Baltic states.[11]

Leeb with Erich Hoepner in September 1941

Soviet resistance stiffened significantly as the army group crossed the Latvia–Russia border in early July 1941. At the same time, Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, German Army High Command) ordered that Panzer Group 3 was no longer to support Army Group North and was to focus solely on Army Group Centre, leaving Leeb to pursue his objectives—Novgorod, Pskov and Luga, as well as Estonia—without the support of an additional Panzer group. Leeb did not protest, presumably because he believed in the superiority of the German forces and that resistance by the Red Army would not affect his operations. In contrast to these expectations, marshy terrain around Lake Ilmen and fierce Red Army counter-attacks prevented a quick advance.[12]

By early August, Army Group North was seriously over-extended, having advanced on a widening front and dispersed its forces on several axes of advance. Leeb estimated he needed 35 divisions for all of his tasks, while he only had 26.[13] The attack resumed on 10 August but immediately encountered strong opposition around Luga. Elsewhere, Leeb's forces were able to take Kingisepp and Narva on 17 August. The army group reached Chudovo on 20 August, severing the rail link between Leningrad and Moscow. Tallinn fell on 28 August.[14]

Units under Leeb's command engaged in widespread plunder of foodstuffs as they advanced. Excessive looting prompted Leeb to issue orders in an attempt to limit looting and destruction of property because they would impede the exploitation of the conquered lands. Leeb's order of 16 August 1941 stated, "the start-up work of the economic authorities is being rendered impossible by the senseless 'organisations' of the troops".[15]

Leeb and Georg von Küchler at an observation post, 11 October 1941

The last rail connection to Leningrad was cut on 30 August, when the German forces reached the River Neva. In early September, Leeb was confident Leningrad was about to fall. Having received reports on the evacuation of civilians and industrial goods, Leeb and the OKH believed the Red Army was preparing to abandon the city. Consequently, on 5 September, he received new orders, including the destruction of the Red Army forces around the city. By 15 September, Panzer Group 4 was to be transferred to Army Group Centre so it could participate in a renewed offensive towards Moscow. The expected surrender did not materialise although the renewed German offensive cut off the city by 8 September.[16] Lacking sufficient strength for major operations, Leeb had to accept the army group might not be able to take the city, although hard fighting continued along his front throughout October and November.[17]

Since September, the headquarters of the army group and OKH had pondered the fate of the city and what to do with the starving Russian population. Leeb ordered the artillery to fire at any civilians trying to escape from the encircled city so they would be killed out of view of the frontline infantry.[18] In mid-November, the army group's war diary noted the artillery was preventing civilians from approaching the German lines. These operations led the command to ponder whether the shooting of unarmed civilians would lead to the "loss of inner balance". Senior officers were also concerned about "false" compassion that might affect the fighting qualities of their men.[19] Forces under Leeb's command killed Romani people, handed others over to the units of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and participated in the killing of mentally disabled people. In December 1941, with the express consent of 18th Army commander Georg von Küchler, SD personnel shot 240 patients in a psychiatric facility.[20]

On 15 December 1941, in the midst of the crisis of the Battle of Moscow, Leeb pulled back his forces on the northern wing to a line behind the Volkhov River without prior authorisation from OKH. Leeb gained approval for the measure the following day in a personal meeting with Hitler in the Wolfsschanze.[21]

On 15 January 1942, Leeb asked Hitler to give him freedom of action or relieve him of his command; Hitler chose the latter and Küchler assumed command of Army Group North.[22] Hitler never employed Leeb again, although his gratitude lasted until Hitler died in April 1945. After Leeb joined the Führerreserve in 1942, he turned to Hans Heinrich Lammers, indicating that in addition to his estate at Solln on the outskirts of Munich, he wanted an estate in the countryside. Hitler promptly presented him with one at Seestetten near Passau; according to Gauleiter (regional Nazi Party leader) Paul Giesler, it was worth an estimated minimum of 660,000 Reichsmarks.[23]