78th Guards Rifle Division

At 1420 hours 38 tanks and up to a company of German infantry neared the outskirts of Krutoi Log. In the course of an hour-long combat the 25th Panzer Regiment, having lost several vehicles, bypassed the position of the 7th Company of the 225th Guards and the 2nd Battalion of the same Regiment at the Razumnoye railyard and slowly moved on toward Hill 160.8, leaving the railyard garrison encircled. This garrison soon began evacuating to reserve positions while 30 panzers and a company of motorcyclists, after crossing the Krutoi Log - Razumnoye road, came under intense fire from the 158th Guards Artillery, bringing the advance to a halt. By this time the 225th Guards Regiment was largely defending on a line from Hill 160.8 to the northwestern outskirts of Krutoi Log. As this situation was developing the Corps commander, General Safiulin had sent out orders to his reserves:

The 73rd Guards Rifle Division with the 167th Separate Tank Regiment, the 1438th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (SU-122s[13]) and the 30th Separate Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Brigade are to assemble... in readiness to launch a counterattack in the direction of Krutoi Log and the Razumnoye railyard, further according to the situation, in order to restore the positions of the 78th Guards Rifle Division.

However the assembly of this group of forces went slowly, including the mobile units. At 1500 hours the columns of the 73rd Guards were only nearing the "Batratskaya Dacha" State Farm and still had more than 5km to cover on foot. Even as these were moving up the 7th Panzer Division kept advancing and after 1500 combat was already going on in the depth of the 78th Guards' defenses. By 1700 Nizhnii Olshanets was completely isolated and the lead panzers were closing on Krutoi Log. However, heavy artillery fire was slowing their progress.[14]

On the right flank of the 78th Guards its 228th Regiment had been facing attacks by the 19th Panzer Division. It put up a determined defense, aided by artillery that had been assigned to support the 81st Guards on its right; staff officers of the panzer division stated: "It might be hardest of all to picture the stubbornness of the Russians, with which they defended each foxhole and trench. An enemy group in strength of up to one regiment, reinforced by a mortar battalion, in elaborately fortified woods, offered the fiercest resistance." However, by now its 1st Battalion had been driven from Hill 126.3 which led to the collapse of the defense on this flank. By 1400 hours the 19th and 7th Panzers joined forces and were breaking into Razumnoye, which was held by the 228th's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. After street fighting began the Regiment's command and control was disrupted when a group of German halftracks reached its command post. The Regiment's chief of staff, Maj. V. S. Solianko, directed the all-round defense of the headquarters guard, armed largely with grenades and antitank rifles. After this officer was severely wounded by a shell explosion Sgt. I. P. Savchenko took over as leader and destroyed a halftrack with grenades before being killed by machine gun fire. Overall, despite 7th Panzer having driven a corridor about 4km deep by 1600 hours, the defenses of the 78th and 81st Guards had completely disrupted the plans of the III Panzer Corps.[15]

By 1800 hours the situation on the division's extreme right flank had substantially deteriorated. The 7th and 19th Panzers had penetrated much of the 228th Guards positions and were now striking the flank of the 223rd Guards. An Abwehr commando group attempted to infiltrate and overrun the headquarters of the 1st Battalion/228th Regiment but was discovered and fought off; Guardsman N. K. Rybalkin accounted for about a dozen of the attackers with his sub-machine gun then killed another four using his puukko in hand-to-hand combat before himself being killed. He was recognized posthumously with the award of the Order of the Red Banner. By 1900 the 19th Panzer had been stopped by tank and antitank fire from the "Day of Harvest" collective farm and Generalovka and had lost 32 tanks destroyed or disabled, including nearly all the Tigers of its attached company.[16]

The 167th Tank Regiment was under the operational control of the commander of the 73rd Guards, Col. S. A. Kozak. As his division came up Kozak moved to Skvortsov's forward observation post on Hill 209.6 from where he gained an impression that the position of the 78th Guards was more desperate than it actually was. At about 1630 hours he ordered the tank regiment into an unsupported attack to restore the situation; in the course of two-and-a-half hours of combat the 167th lost 75 percent of its 27 T-34s and five T-70s, although this sacrifice provided cover for the retreating elements of the division, primarily the 225th Regiment, to rally and organize a mobile defense. Active combat operations mostly ended by about 2300 hours on this sector although fighting continued almost all night in Razumnoye and at Krutoi Log. The situation on the division's front was prompting the greatest concern within the 7th Guards Army command. The attackers now had two strong panzer groups across the Donets and had split the 78th Guards' defense almost to its entire depth, threatening the left flank and rear of the 81st Guards, which was still holding its initial positions. The division reported 383 killed and 53 missing-in-action during the day; the 225th Regiment alone counted 271 dead and 1,006 wounded.[17]

In the German planning for July 6 the 6th and 19th Panzers would attack side by side along the Razumnaia River and smash through the boundary of the 81st Guards and the 78th and 73rd Guards up to the 7th Guards Army's second belt of defenses while also taking Razumnoye. At dawn a reconnaissance-in-force was launched in the direction of the "New World" collective farm in the valley of the Razumnaia which was defended by elements of the 2nd Battalion/228th Guards. Among the most important objectives for Army Detachment Kempf at this point were Razumnoye and Krutoi Log which were splitting its advancing corps and hampering the advance of the 7th and 19th Panzers with flanking fire. The latter village was in the sector of the 106th Infantry. That division's Infantry Regiment 240 was ordered to take it from units of the 78th Guards that had fallen back to it the previous day while a detachment of 7th Panzer's Panzer Regiment 25 was to attack positions of the 73rd Guards in the direction of Hill 191.2.[18]

A critical situation soon took shape in the area of Hill 187.4 as 28 German armored vehicles broke through to its foot. The commander of the 73rd Guards' 214th Guards Regiment ordered up the 1438th SU Regiment which went into action at 1000 hours, trading losses with the German grouping until it fell back. Meanwhile, elements of Infantry Regiment 240 broke into Krutoi Log from several directions. The defending 225th Regiment reported that the German infantry were "totally numb to everything and were advancing literally head-on with no regard for losses." Prisoners were taken following hand-to-hand combat on some sectors, many of whom proved to be drunk on alcohol. Although accounts differ, it appears that the Regiment had been encircled by 1100 hours and soon received contradictory orders. According to the division's chief political officer, Col. B. I. Mutovin:

I was at the division headquarters when... Khorolenko reported to General Skvortsov that the fascist tanks had been stopped by the fire of the 158th Artillery Regiment and the corps and army anti-tank forces, and the infantry had been separated from the tanks. The Major requested aid in throwing back the enemy, in order to come out of the encirclement. A. V. Skvortsov was plainly upset. "Of course things are hard for Khorolenko, and he needs help, but how? All of the regiments are tied up in fighting in their own sectors of defense," he said, addressing me. "He must hold out. The village of Krutoi Log must be held whatever happens." ... I offered a suggestion: "Perhaps it is possible to support the regiment with the fire from the division's artillery group and the corps' anti-tank guns?" Skvortsov thought for a moment. "I think that's what we'll do," he agreed. "Pass this along to the corps commander." General Safiulin, having heard my report, kept silent for a long time, before ordering: "Tell Khorolenko that he should abandon Krutoi Log under the supporting artillery fire and come out of the pocket. Otherwise, the entire regiment will perish..."

The 225th Guards began to break out around noon although due to disrupted communications not all companies received the orders. These difficulties were made worse by attacks from Il-2 aircraft ordered by Colonel Kozak, who was unaware of the true situation in the village. Some remnants managed to fight their way out to friendly lines by 1500; the 2nd Battalion, which provided the covering force, was hit particularly hard and lost its commander, Cpt. I. A. Matsokin, among those killed.[19]

Meanwhile, along the Razumnaia the rest of the 78th Guards was under attack from the 19th Panzers. The 1st and 2nd Battalions/223rd Regiment were in first echelon along a line from 1,000m south of Generalovka to Hill 164.7 to the northeast outskirts of Krutoi Log and were backed by a battalion of the 73rd Guards' 209th Regiment. By noon the entire 228th Guards Regiment had been forced to fall back to the right bank of the river from Razumnoye to Generalovka, leaving behind rearguards and scattered mines. This redeployment prevented the 6th and 19th Panzers from linking their adjacent flanks, even after seizing Razumnoye. By mid-afternoon the 2nd Battalion/223rd Guards in Generalovka, supported by the remnants of the 167th Tanks, came under heavy artillery and tank fire and after losing more than half of its men began to retreat toward the "Day of Harvest" collective farm in disorganized groups leaving its own artillery without cover. 19th Panzer reached to within 600m of this farm at 1530 hours but there encountered deep minefields through which a narrow passage was cleared only by 1910. It was clear to General Shumilov that the 223rd and 209th Regiments were no longer combat effective and he requested assistance by reserves from Voronezh Front.[20]

Overnight on July 6/7 Army Detachment Kempf prepared to finally break through the second line of defense of 7th Guards Army and reach the right flank of 4th Panzer Army. This would involve driving the 73rd Guards and elements of the 78th and 72nd Guards and the 213th Rifle Divisions across the Koren River to secure the right flank of III Panzer Corps. At the same time the left-flank regiment of the 94th Guards Rifle Division was moved into the second echelon behind the positions of the 73rd Guards. Safiulin's orders from General Vatutin for July 7 were to hold his Corps' line. Before dawn the 106th Infantry went on the attack with up to a regiment, supported by 13 tanks towards the Koren in the sector held by the 73rd Guards' 211th Regiment, backed by the 223rd and 225th Guards Regiments from south of the "Batratskaia Dacha" State Farm and the "Poliana" State Farm, reinforced by the 201st Separate Tank Brigade (British Matilda and Valentine tanks). By 0500 hours this attack had been driven back with the loss of four German tanks knocked out. A further attack began at 0700 by was focused on the 78th Guards and captured the "Poliana" State Farm at the boundary of the 24th and 25th Guards Corps. The decimated rifle companies of the 223rd and 225th were becoming unable to withstand the attacks of German tanks and there were also signs of panic on certain sectors. At one critical moment General Skvortsov didn't trust a report from Major Arshinov that his 223rd Regiment was holding Gremiachii and demanded written proof from his neighboring units. In fact the 223rd continued to hold until dark. Major Khorolenko twice personally led his men in counterattacks toward the village during the day's fighting.[21]

At 1300 hours a further strong attack by the 106th Infantry toward the "Poliana" State Farm began, involving up to a regiment of infantry and 17 tanks. One battalion of the 73rd Guards' 211th Guards Regiment, suffering significant losses and unable to withstand the attack of superior forces, began retreating in the direction of Churayevo, 4km to the southeast and exposing the flank of the 225th Regiment. In order to restore the position General Safiulin personally assembled the other two battalions of the 211th Guards, the 225th Guards Regiment and 1st Battalion/793rd Rifle Regiment of the 213th Rifle Division (which was made operationally subordinate to Major Khorolenko) and launched a counterattack at about 1600 hours toward Gremiachii and the Machine Tractor Station, with fire support from the 201st Tanks and the 1529th Heavy Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (SU-152s[22]). After a 10-minute artillery preparation and an hour of close-in combat this grouping retook what remained of the hamlet. Having brought up reserves the 106th Infantry returned to the attack but failed to recapture this position.[23]

During most of the day the 228th Guards Regiment, having been split from the rest of the division by the German penetration, fought alongside the 81st Guards. The Corps diary reported:

At 1130 the enemy in strength of up to five battalions of infantry with the support of 150 tanks and aircraft broke through the forward edge of defense of the 233rd Guards Rifle Regiment and reached the line: eastern outskirts of Sevriukovo, Point 215.5, Point +1.0, Hill 212.1, northern outskirts of Blizhniaia Igumenka... 228th Guards Rifle Regiment, which was operating in the 81st Guards Rifle Division's sector, after the breakthrough of the 81st Guards Rifle Division's left flank, was withdrawn into the second echelon and took up a defense on the western outskirts of Nikolskoe.

Later in the day units of the 94th Guards Division began to arrive from the march, as did the 148th Separate Tank Regiment and the 31st Antitank Artillery Brigade; despite this the 81st Guards and the 228th Guards Regiment wound up in semi-encirclement by the end of the day.[24]

At the start of the following day the 223rd and 225th Guards Regiments were intermingled with the 73rd Guards along the line from the "Solovev" State Farm - 1.5km to 2km east of "Batratskaia Dacha" State Farm - Hill 209.7 - "Poliana" State Farm. Overnight orders had been drawn up for an ambitious counterattack by most of 7th Guards Army that would have involved the division attacking between "Batratskaia Dacha" and Gremiachii toward Krutoi Log before being relieved by the 270th and 111th Rifle Divisions attached to 24th Guards Rifle Corps, to reorganize. While this counterattack regained little ground through the day it effectively tied down the 7th Panzer and 106th Infantry. On the other hand the division's morale was being impacted by the continuous combat; over July 7 and 8 the blocking detachments of the 92nd NKVD Rifle Regiment reported having detained 339 men of the division. As of July 9 it recorded a personnel strength of 4,981 men; remaining equipment included just 3 heavy and 19 medium mortars (plus 13 of 50mm calibre), 6 45mm antitank guns, 18 76mm and 3 122mm guns.[25]

A battery of M-13 Katyusha launchers firing at enemy targets, 1943

By the morning of July 10 the division, which had not been relieved, had its 228th Regiment at Nikolskoe with the 223rd and 225th, still mixed with the 73rd Guards, on a line from Hill 209.6 to Korenskaia Dacha to 500m south of Gremiachii. At this point in the battle the III Panzer Corps was pressing north between the Donets and the Razumnaia rivers and the division's sector was no longer under heavy attack. The 228th was ordered to move up and attack toward "Batratskaia Dacha" Farm at 1000 hours but soon came under heavy fire from Nebelwerfers and became pinned down in an orchard. The commander of the 15th Guards Rifle Division's 44th Guards Regiment was ordered to attack towards the farm with two of his battalions. Lt. Col. Usikov now deployed his fire support effectively and the attack began well, catching units of the 7th Panzer during a redeployment. During the afternoon the 15th Guards, reinforced with a regiment of 73rd Guards, forced the panzergrenadiers back while General Safiulin ordered the 97th Guards Mortar Regiment to support the attack with rocket fire. At 1855 hours five launchers fired a salvo of 78 M-13 (4.9 kg of high explosive each) at a concentration of German infantry and armor in the area of the woods 1,000m west of "Batratskaia Dacha" Farm which "blanketed" the target. The 228th Guards then joined the attack to mop up the farm area, but this was unable to make headway.[26]

Late on July 11 Shumilov ordered the 78th Guards to be withdrawn into reserve. The 223rd and 225th Regiments took up a line in Corps' second echelon from Nekliudovo to Pentsevo to Churaevo while the 228th Regiment and a battery of the 158th Artillery Regiment were to continue to hold positions along the eastern outskirts of "Batratskaia Dacha" Farm covering the boundary between the 15th and 73rd Guards Divisions. It therefore missed action in the counterattack launched by 7th Guards Army on July 12, the same day that Hitler decided to suspend the offensive. From July 5-10 the division had lost 3,656 men, of which 1,005 were killed and 1,445 missing-in-action, the highest losses among the divisions of the Army.[27] As an indication of the impact of these losses and their replacements, later in the month it was noted that the division's personnel were now 60 percent Russian and 40 percent of several Asian nationalities.[28] These sacrifices did not go unrewarded. On July 19 the 225th and 228th Guards Rifle Regiments were each awarded the Order of the Red Banner.[29]

The 78th Guards, leading the 69th and 80th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 21st Guards Corps, arrived at the Dniestr River near the villages of Zhura and Mikhailovka, 13 km northeast of Susleni, late on April 2. At dawn the next day the division assaulted across the river, leading to a three-day battle with forward elements of the 3rd Panzer Division defending security outposts in the Bulaeshty region, 6–8 km north of Susleni; the 78th was soon joined by the 69th and 80th Guards in this fighting. It wasn't until midday on April 5 that the Corps' forces were able to drive the panzer troops back to their Susleni strongpoint. Meanwhile the five divisions of the 20th Guards Rifle Corps attacked towards Orhei and Chișinău but gained only 3–5 km against stiffening German resistance from the XXXX and XXXXVII Panzer Corps. The history of 4th Guards Army described the difficulties during its advance:

Overcoming the increasing enemy resistance became more difficult because our forces had inadequate artillery support and ammunition. Of the army's 700 guns no more than 200 of them were in their firing positions. The remainder lagged behind... No less difficult was the process of supplying ammunition to the artillery... We used every conceivable means of transport, including carrying the shells forward by hand.

Despite the many daunting problems caused by the spring rasputitsa, on April 5 the Army commander, Lt. Gen. I. V. Galanin, resumed the offensive. Four divisions of 20th Guards Corps assaulted the defenses of the 13th and 3rd Panzer Divisions west and north of Orhei but made only modest gains in heavy fighting. The next day the 5th Guards Airborne and 41st Guards managed to seize the city but the arrival of the 11th Panzer Division halted any further advance. Marshal I. S. Konev, the Front commander, was determined to take Chișinău and on April 8 Galanin ordered his two Guards corps to assault and crush the positions of 3rd Panzer south of Susleni. Over two days the German defenses were pounded by artillery and mortar fire and repeated ground assaults but XXXX Panzer Corps threw in reserves to stabilise the situation. On April 10 and 11 Galanin reinforced the see-saw battle for the Orhei bridgehead with the 69th and 80th Guards but his move was met by the 14th Panzer Division which joined the German counterattacks. Overnight on April 12/13 most of the Panzer Corps withdrew south of the Reut River where the 69th Guards already held a bridgehead and its Corps-mates soon linked up to expand this lodgement to about 11 km in width and as much as 5 km in depth. But by now the 4th Guards Army was so depleted from months of fighting that it was no longer capable of offensive operations; the 78th Guards, like the Army's other divisions, was down to roughly 5,000 personnel. On April 18 Konev authorized Galanin to go over to the defense.[38] During the following week Konev ordered the division to be transferred to the 5th Guards Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. A. S. Zhadov. This Army had made one failed attempt to break out of its bridgehead over the Dniestr at Tașlîc and Konev was determined to make another effort. The divisional history states:

Our division was alerted at midnight on [April 19], and after conducting a night march, it reached the village of Susleny on the morning of 20 April. After crossing the Dnestr, we marched 98 kilometres to the northwest through Gainy [and then southeastward] and concentrated in the region of the village of Tashlyk by 0500 hours on 23 April, where we became subordinate to the 5th Guards Army's 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. At 1100 hours on 23 April, the division crossed the Dnestr into the bridgehead... and entered combat on the heights southwest of Pugacheny from the march... Dense and acrid smoke swirled in the skies, and under its cover, enemy tanks and infantry moved toward the guardsmen's positions. However, together with the units of the 5th Guards Army, the soldiers of the 78th Guards not only held on to the bridgehead but also considerably expanded it in width and depth.[39]

By the beginning of May the division had been transferred to the 75th Rifle Corps, still in 5th Guards Army, but later that month it returned to 33rd Guards Corps. In June it was removed to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command for rebuilding, along with the rest of 5th Guards Army, before being reassigned to the 1st Ukrainian Front in July.[40] The division would remain under these commands for the duration of the war.[41]

The Front launched this offensive on July 13 but the Army did not enter the operation until early August. By the end of August 3 it had concentrated in the Kolbuszowa region and was ordered to exploit the 3rd Guards Tank and 13th Armies' crossings over the Vistula in the Baranów Sandomierski area. 5th Guards Army was to develop the offensive along the Busko-Zdrój axis and General Zhadov directed the 33rd Guards Corps to make its attack toward Mielec, which began at 1500 hours on August 4. During intense fighting the Corps defeated the German Mielec grouping, forced a crossing of the Wisłoka River, and reached a line to the west of the city by the end of August 6. While the 32nd and 34th Guards Rifle Corps entered the existing bridgehead the 33rd forced a new crossing to the south,[42] in recognition of which the 78th Guards was awarded the honorific "Vistula".

During this crossing operation and the fighting that followed Maj. Ivan Antonovich Ternavskii distinguished himself and became a Hero of the Soviet Union. A prewar junior officer of artillery he had fought from the start of the German invasion, primarily in the 500th Artillery Regiment of the 199th Rifle Division, before joining the 158th Guards Artillery prior to Kursk. Commanding one of its three battalions he skilfully controlled its fire during the landings and during the battles up to August 22 was responsible for the destruction of three mortar batteries, 23 machine gun posts, five observation posts and two antitank guns, while his gunners also suppressed or damaged many other targets. He would be awarded his Gold Star on September 23. In February 1945, as a result of his leadership in fighting at Brzeg, he would be nominated for a second Gold Star, but was awarded a second Order of the Red Banner instead. Ternavskii continued to serve in the Red (later Soviet) Army until 1956, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel, and died on January 19, 1995.[43]

Near the end of this fighting two regiments of the division were awarded honorifics:

DEMBITSA... 225th Guards Rifle Regiment (Lt. Colonel Orlyanskii, Dmitrii Konstantinovich)... 158th Guards Artillery Regiment (Major Demchenko, Viktor Vasilevich)... The troops who participated in the liberation of Dembitsa, by the order of the Supreme High Command of 23 August 1944, and a commendation in Moscow, are given a salute of 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns.[44]

In addition, on September 7 the 81st Guards Antitank Battalion would be awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, 3rd Degree, for its role in the battle for this town.[45]

In the first days of February the 78th Guards again forced the Oder and took part in the capture of Brzeg. Overnight on February 5/6 a German force numbering about 2,500 infantry, supported by six tanks and four armored cars, surrounded the town while attempting to break out to the west. This grouping was largely destroyed or driven off by the 158th Guards Artillery with the loss of three 105mm guns, 21 motor vehicles, 20 loaded carts, 47 horses and 210 soldiers and officers, while a further 200 were taken prisoner.[47]

Beginning on February 8 the 5th Guards Army took part in the Front's Lower Silesian Offensive with its main objective of encircling the German garrison of Breslau. On its sector the offensive was based on the bridgehead seized by 14th Guards Rifle Division in January. The German defense was based on the 269th Infantry Division with several battlegroups, five independent battalions, two panzer battalions and an NCO school. The Army's attack was led by 32nd Guards Rifle Corps and developed slowly over the first three days in large part due to the large number of fortified villages to be overcome and the ammunition shortage faced by all Soviet forces after the breakneck advance through Poland. On February 11 Marshal Konev shifted the 31st Tank Corps from 21st Army and committed it on the sector of 33rd Guards Corps the next day with the immediate objective of capturing the Bogenau area.[48]

On February 13 the Army's offensive developed more successfully than in the preceding days. German resistance did not abate and if anything increased as further forces entered the Breslau area but despite this the 4th Guards and 31st Tank Corps linked up with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of 6th Army to complete the encirclement. Konev chose to leave 6th Army to maintain the siege while the 32nd and 33rd Guards Corps were ordered to make a decisive attack from the Magnitz area toward Koberwitz and then to the southwest. During the fighting on February 15 the width of the cordon between Breslau and the main German forces was increased to up to 13km. By the end of February 17 elements of the Army had arrived in the Liegnitz area, relieving the 3rd Guards Tank Army's 9th Mechanized Corps which then undertook a forced night march which brought it to Bober River in the Lewenberg area.[49] On March 13 General Motov handed his command to Maj. Gen. Zakhar Trofimovich Trofimov. On April 5 the 225th Guards Rifle Regiment received the Order of Aleksandr Nevsky for its part in the battles for the Oder and Breslau.[50]

By the start of the final offensive against the German capital the 33rd Guards Corps consisted of the 78th Guards, the 9th Guards Airborne Division and the 118th Rifle Division. 5th Guards Army was deployed along the east bank of the Neisse River on a 13km front and planned to launch its main attack with its right wing on the 8km sector from Gross Saerchen to Muskau. The 32nd and 34th Guards Corps were deployed in the first echelon while the 33rd Guards Corps was in second echelon, along with the 4th Guards Tank Corps. At this time the division, in common with most of those in the Army, had a personnel strength of roughly 5,200 men.[51]

When the offensive began on April 16 the Army's main forces crossed the Neisse under the cover of massed artillery fire. By the end of the day the 33rd Guards Corps had concentrated in the area from Klein Zerchen to Kwolsdorf to Toepferstedt on the river's east bank. As the offensive continued the Army's right flank reached the Spree River by the end of April 18 but the Corps remained in its second echelon, now in the area of Jamlitz. The next day the Corps was committed along the Spremberg axis in the 32nd Guards Corps' sector and by evening all three divisions were fighting along the line from Graustein to Slamen in an effort to eliminate the German bridgehead east of this important resistance center. At 1100 hours on April 20, following a pair of 5-minute artillery preparations, the 78th Guards and its corps-mates began the storm of Spremberg which concluded with an advance of 5-6km by the end of the day.[52] During this fighting Major Ternavskii again distinguished himself and would soon be awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st Degree.[53]

On April 21 the Corps linked up with the 13th Army's 24th Rifle Corps in the Neu Welzow area, completing the encirclement of the German Spremberg grouping. About 5,000 men were killed in the pocket including elements of Panzer-Führerbegleitdivision, 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg and 21st Panzer Division, plus 30 tanks and assault guns destroyed. The 78th Guards was soon assigned to secure the 5th Guards Army's nearly 100-km long left flank along a line from Weisswasser to Keula with its front facing south. Over the next two days a German force based on elements of 17th and 4th Panzer Armies launched a counteroffensive which broke through the 52nd Army's front along its boundary with the 2nd Polish Army and continued north in the general direction of Spremberg. To counter this effort, Konev ordered Zhadov to use the 33rd Guards Corps and the 14th Guards Division to attack towards Losa and Ugist (north of Bautzen) and reestablish contact with the Poles. This effort brought the German attack to a halt by the end of April 24.[54]

During fighting on April 26 the 33rd Guards Corps advanced 3-4km to the south and reached a line from Biela to Schmerlitz to Neschwitz. During April 27-30 the German group of forces in the Görlitz area attempted to renew their counteroffensive but without success and finally went over to the defensive.[55] From May 6-11 the 78th Guards took part, with the rest of 1st Ukrainian Front, in the final offensive on Prague.

• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967a). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть I. 1920 - 1944 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part I. 1920–1944] (PDF) (in Russian). Moscow.
• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967b). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть II. 1945 – 1966 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part II. 1945–1966] (PDF) (in Russian). Moscow.
• Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. p. 190
• Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. pp. 205, 325