Balingiin Tserendorj

Prime Minister Tserendorj

As under previous governments, Tserendorj's primary goal was to secure broader international recognition of Mongolia's independence. In October 1912, Tserendorj was one of three men appointed to write a final draft for a Russo-Mongolian Friendship Agreement, signed in Urga on October 21, 1912. In exchange for Russia helping Mongolia maintain its independence, Mongolia agreed to give special privileges to Russian civilians and trade, and to consult Russia before concluding agreements with other countries.[4]

In January 1913, Tserendorj was part of the "Mongolian Embassy" delegation (consisting of Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Khanddorj, the Deputy Prime Minister Beis Shirnendamdin, Deputy Minister Tserendorj, and Secretary Bavuudorj from the Foreign Ministry) sent to Russia by the Bogd Khaganate to negotiate the establishment of a Mongolian embassy in St. Petersburg (which Russia refused), the purchase of weapons and military training, and the issuing of a reproval by Russia to the Chinese government to end hostilities towards Mongolia. On January 24, 1913, Tsar Nicholas II received the delegation at Tsarskoye Selo Palace, with the Imperial Russian government awarding honors to the delegates. Tserendorj was awarded the Order of Saint Stanislaus (2nd class).[5]

From 1914 to 1915, Tserendorj accompanied Prime Minister Tögs-Ochiryn Namnansüren as part of the Mongolian delegation to the 8-month long Kyakhta treaty conference between Czarist Russia and the Republic of China that sought to clarify, among other things, the Russian-Chinese border in East Asia and Mongolia's geopolitical status. Ultimately, Mongolian hopes for international recognition of its independence were dashed when Russia and China agreed that Mongolia was an autonomous region within China.[6] Although the agreement failed to secure Moscow's firm recognition of Mongolia's independence from Chinese rule, Moscow did, however, recognize the Mongolian People's government as "the sole legitimate government" of the Mongolian people.

Tserendorj maintained his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs after the occupation of Niislel Khüree (present day Ulaanbaatar) by troops under the Chinese warlord Xu Shuzheng in late 1919.[7] Xu installed a dictatorial regime, imprisoned leaders of Mongolia's independence movement such as Khatanbaatar Magsarjav and Manlaibaatar Damdinsüren, and placed the Bogd Khan under house arrest. In the face of Chinese threats to exile the Bogd Khan, Tserendorj, Prime Minister Gonchigjalzangiin Badamdorj and the Bogd Khan acquiesced and signed a document "voluntarily" abdicating Mongolia's autonomy to Chinese rule. Although Badamdorj's career and reputation suffered irreparable damage as a result of his caving to Chinese pressure, Tserendorj escaped blame despite reports from the first American Consul in Kalgan, Samuel Sokobin, that Tserendorj had opted for reconciliation with the Chinese if negotiations could not produce independence.[8]

Tserendorj continued to work within the government even after forces commanded by "The Mad Baron" Roman Ungern von Sternberg ejected a Chinese occupation in February 1921.[9] Ungern, an anti-Bolshevik warlord whose forces invaded Mongolia during the Russian Civil War, entered Mongolia in late 1920 with the intent of freeing the Bogd Khan from Chinese domination and establishing a new Mongolian Empire.[10] Tserendorj made up part of his short-lived puppet government that lasted until July 11, 1921 when Mongolian partisans (commanded by Damdin Sükhbaatar) and Red Army units defeated Ungern's forces and recaptured the Mongolian capital.[11] Tserendorj was named Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the newly proclaimed revolutionary government headed by Prime Minister Dogsomyn Bodoo.[12]

Tserendorj Signs Pact 1921

Following the Russian October Revolution of 1917, and the declaration of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1921, the Kyakhta Treaty became moot. In 1921, a group of high-ranking Mongolians that included Damdin Sükhbaatar and Tserendorj traveled to the Soviet Union to initiate Soviet-Mongolia friendship talks. There they both allegedly met with Vladimir Lenin.[13] The resulting Friendship Treaty (signed November 5, 1921) formally established relations between the two countries and the exchange of Ambassadors.[14] News articles from 1921 show Tserendorj "photographed in Moscow while signing a pact with the Russian Soviet Government opening diplomatic relations between the new revolutionary republic of Mongolia and Russia, Tsiben Dargi headed the Mongolian delegation.";[15][16]

Tserendorj's monument in Ulan Bator

Following the 1921 Revolution and the subsequent friendship agreement with the Soviet Union, soviet troops were stationed in Mongolia exercising significant influence on the new government's political and ideological development. From 1926 to 1928, as Moscow tightened its control over the Mongolian political process, Tserendorj was pressured to include Russians in high-ranking positions within his government. The minister of finance, chairman of the economic council, head of Mongolian construction, head of the domestic trading organization, chairman of the military council, and minister of war were all Russian nationals. A Russian also headed the secret police along with six Russian advisers.

To offset the growing influence of the Soviets in internal affairs, Tserendorj pursued international recognition of Mongolian independence, not only from Russia but from other nations as well. He also hoped to see Mongolia become a neutral state, akin to an Asian Switzerland. Outreach efforts to Europe, Japan, and the United States were eventually stifled by Moscow and Comintern agents within the Mongolian government. Later, Tserendorj and his allies came under heavy criticism from pro-Soviet members of the MPRP who felt such efforts were counterrevolutionary and a betrayal of the special relationship that had developed between Mongolia and its chief benefactor.

Tserendorj rejected such criticism while also resisting what he saw as heavy-handed Soviet pressure to rapidly abolish private property in Mongolia, implement cooperatives and state industries, and persecute the Buddhist Church. He believed these policies conflicted with the country's nomadic culture and Buddhist traditions. He also became increasing uncomfortable with Comintern efforts to "divide and control" the MPRP by supporting the radicalized Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League and promoting younger, more hard-line party members, particularly from rural areas, to challenge the authority of the "old guard" leadership whom the Soviets suspected were overly conservative.