Battle of Saseno

The War of Saint Sabas, between the rival Italian maritime republics of Venice and Genoa, broke out in 1256, over access to, and control of, the ports and markets of the Eastern Mediterranean. With its victories in the Battle of Acre in 1258 and in the Battle of Settepozzi in 1263, the Venetian navy had demonstrated its superiority over its Genoese counterpart. Consequently the Genoese avoided direct confrontations with the Venetian battle fleet and engaged in commerce raiding against the Venetian merchant convoys.[1][2]

During the 13th century, the Republic of Venice sent out two trade convoys (muda) to trade in the east each year, one in spring and one in late summer. Normally the convoys split up, one part heading into the Aegean Sea and what the Venetians called "Romania" (the lands of the Byzantine Empire) and the Black Sea, while the other sailed southeast to Alexandria and the port cities of the Levant (Oltremare).[3] The importance of these convoys to the Venetian economy can hardly be overstated:

Bales of costly wares and money were sent in it to the ports of Egypt and Asia; the dates of its departure and return were fixed by stern laws, and equally stern were the regulations as to the number of men on board each vessel; the commanders and captains were appointed by the Great Council; while in case of war the Senate pronounced the "Closing of the Sea" (Chiusura del Mare), a decree which forbade any vessel in the "caravan" from detaching itself from the main body. If at any time there was a suspicion of foes being encountered on the high seas, the "caravan" was escorted by galleys of war, and no precaution was omitted that made for the safety of this all-important and purely commercial expedition.

— Camillo Manfroni,[4] translated by Alethea Wiel[5]

However, since the fall of the Latin Empire in 1261, Constantinople had been in the hands of the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, whose alliance with the Genoese included the obligation of keeping their commercial rivals away from Byzantine-held lands and preventing passage into the Black Sea.[6] As a result, the spring trade convoy to the Levant now represented Venice's "main overseas trading enterprise".[3]

A Genoese nave, by Quinto Cenni

In spring 1264, "in order to crush the Venetian enemies and to ensure the well-being and defend the Genoese sailing in different parts of the world",[7][8] the Genoese prepared a raiding fleet of twenty galleys and two large navi,[lower-alpha 1] crewed by 3,500 men.[8][10][11] The navi in particular were of exceptional size, and had been built by public funds.[12] The fleet was placed under the command of the pro-Ghibelline nobleman Simone Grillo. This led to fears among the rival Guelph party that he might use his new position for a coup that would make him dictator on the model of the only recently deposed "Captain of the People", Guglielmo Boccanegra. The Guelph nobles joined and attacked Grillo's house, and it took three days of negotiations before Grillo was able to secure terms that allowed him to take up his command.[13] Grillo was forced to move to Porto Venere, at the southernmost extremity of Genoese territory, and there wait until the fleet was made ready; and he was also assigned four experienced sailors as councillors, with the added task of keeping an eye on his conduct, among them Ogerio Scoto and Pietro di Camilla.[10][14]

News of the Genoese preparations soon reached Venice, either through Grillo's political enemies or through the boasts of Genoese citizens. These reports greatly exaggerated the Genoese fleet's strength to as many as 90 galleys and six navi. Coupled with news of extensive recruitment of mercenaries in Lombardy, this news worried the Venetian authorities, who delayed the sailing of the spring convoy, and prepared a large fleet of their own to counter the Genoese, with about 50 ships, mostly galleys,[lower-alpha 2] under Andrea Barozzi (or Barocio).[16][3] The naval historian John Dotson considers it possible that the exaggerated reports of the Genoese fleet were leaked deliberately by agents of Grillo, so as to "draw the Venetian fleet out in a predictable fashion".[3]

Grillo set sail in June, and swiftly headed south towards Malta, where he arrived after a few days. On his stops along the way, he took care to announce his intention to sail directly to Acre in the Levant. Instead, however, he remained at Malta much further south than the usual sea lanes, where his Venetian opponents might seek him. When Barozzi, reacting to the news of the Genoese fleet's sailing, arrived at Sicily to intercept it, he only found rumours of its departure. According to some Venetian accounts, Grillo left behind a small vessel whose crew, when captured by the Venetians, informed them that the Genoese fleet had passed that way four days earlier, heading due east for the Levant.[14][17][18]

Acre

Malta

Saseno

Genoa

Venice

Tyre

Sites of the campaign in the Mediterranean Sea

Deceived, Barozzi led his fleet to pursue the Genoese, who were ostensibly heading east. At the same time, in Venice, the authorities, certain of Barozzi's eventual success given the past history of Venetian–Genoese naval encounters, and unwilling to risk losing the profits of the trade convoy, finally decided to allow it to depart on 1 August. It comprised 13 taride,[lower-alpha 3] three navi, including the famously large Roccafortis, a panzone cargo ship,[lower-alpha 4] two light galleys, and a saetta scouting galley. The command of the convoy was entrusted to Michele Duaro or Doro.[21][22][23] Grillo quickly became aware of the Venetian fleet's moves,[lower-alpha 5] and once he was certain that Barozzi was out of the way, he moved his fleet northeast.[25]

At about this point, Grillo decided to detach his two navi and three galleys and send them to trade in Tunisia, possibly after transferring their marines to the rest of his ships.[25] Another galley was sent east; according to the Annali Genovesi on a mission to Palaiologos, but according to Dotson "it seems more likely that it was sent as a scout to keep watch on Barocio's movements".[25] With the remaining 16 galleys, Grillo moved to the Strait of Otranto to await the Venetian trade convoy.[25]

The account of the Annali Genovesi—probably based on Grillo's own report to the Genoese authoritities—justifies Grillo's movements after reaching Malta by claiming that intelligence gathered from a Messinese merchant ship returning from the Levant suggested that the situation there was adverse to Genoese interests, so that nothing could be done that "would redound to the profit and honour of the city of Genoa".[26][27][28] This has led modern historians to suggest that Grillo's original orders had been to sail to the Levant. However, his actions up to that point show that he was already committed to an alternative plan aiming at striking the Venetian convoy, and the story of the Messinese ship may simply have been invented as a justification for deviating from the orders he had pledged to follow.[27][29] As with the Venetian claims of Genoese deception and espionage, Dotson writes, it is impossible to determine the truth from the "many layers of possible deception present in the sources", especially as these are "unclear on the exact timing and even the sequence of events, in an operation in which timing was very important".[25]

The commander of the convoy, Duaro, appears to have sailed slowly, confident of the lack of any threat to his ships.[22] On 14 August, off the island of Saseno (today Sazan Island, Albania), at the narrowest part of the Strait of Otranto, Grillo encountered the Venetian convoy.[25] The Venetians were in a difficult situation: the large taride, loaded with goods, and with at most 40 armed soldiers each, were no match for the swift and agile Genoese galleys, each with a crew of about 150 men (c. 100 rowers and 50 marines).[22][30]

The medieval sources report that Duaro and his crews were initially dismissive of the Genoese: the Venetians threw chickens in front of the Genoese vessels and shouted "fight with them!". The fighting began in the evening and culminated around midnight. The Venetian ships clustered around the Roccafortis, which towered above the other vessels like a castle. As the Genoese pressed their attack on the smaller Venetian vessels, Duaro eventually ordered their crews to abandon them and gather on the Roccafortis, bringing along what valuable goods they could carry. The Venetian sources claim that the departing crews sunk many of their taride, while the Genoese, who approached with caution, wary of a trap, captured the rest. The Annali Genovesi on the other hand report that all lighter ships were captured, apart from a nave, which was sunk, and a tarida which was lost to fire.[31][32][33]

On the other hand, the Roccafortis held firm. The Genoese promised to safeguard the lives of its crew if they surrendered, but Duaro refused, claiming that the ship was laden with gold, and inviting the Genoese to come and take it. The Genoese then launched a fireship against it, but the Venetians managed to drive it off. In the end, a favourable wind allowed the Roccafortis to escape pursuit and find refuge in the southern Adriatic port of Ragusa.[34][35]

The battle was a major success for the Genoese. The captured merchandise and ships were valued at more than 100,000 Genoese pounds, an enormous sum for the period, of which 30,000 went into the Genoese treasury through the sale of the plunder; while conversely the Venetians were deprived altogether of all commerce with the east for that year.[20][36][37] Equally important was the blow to Venetian prestige and morale, for which Duaro found himself confronted with accusations of cowardice. As the Italian naval historian Camillo Manfroni points out, however, his was a grossly unequal fight; and ultimately Duaro preferred to save the lives of his fleet's crews—and the not inconsiderable treasures carried by the Roccafortis—to a doomed stand to the end.[35][38] The wrath of Doge Reniero Zeno was somewhat lessened when he learned that no Venetians were made prisoners during the evacuation of the taride, and that Duaro was not well assisted by his subaltern officers.[35]

As Dotson writes, "This operation [...] reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the Genoese and Venetian capacity for war in the mid-thirteenth century. It also illustrates the part played by intelligence-gathering, rumor, and disinformation in a campaign."[11]

In the meantime, Barozzi was pressing on eastwards, searching in vain for Grillo's fleet.[37] Arriving at Tyre on 2 September, he encountered a Genoese merchantman, the Oliva, carrying 11,000 bezants worth of silk, in the harbour. With the Genoese fleet nowhere in sight, Barozzi resolved to seize the ship, despite the warnings of the city's lord, Philip of Montfort, a Genoese ally, that he would confiscate double the amount in Venetian properties if they did so. Barozzi did not hesitate long: he not only captured the Oliva, but also began a siege of Tyre itself, in the hopes of depriving Genoa of access to this, the second-most important port city of the Levant. The Venetians had to interrupt the siege after a few days, however, when news of the events at Saseno reached them. Instead, Barozzi hurried to Acre to escort the previous year's returning convoy back to Venice.[39][40]

Important as it was, the Genoese success at Saseno proved ephemeral: in 1266, the Venetians captured the entire Genoese battle fleet at the Battle of Trapani.[41][42][43] Meanwhile, Michael VIII Palaiologos grew increasingly dissatisfied with the poor Genoese performance against the Venetians, and distrustful of their loyalty. In 1264, he expelled the Genoese from Constantinople and sought a rapprochement with Venice that culminated in a provisional non-aggression pact in 1265, although it was not finally ratified until three years later.[44][45] The stalemate between Venice and Genoa continued, until in 1269 King Louis IX of France, keen to use the Venetian and Genoese fleets in his planned Eighth Crusade, coerced both to sign a five-year-truce in the Treaty of Cremona.[46][47][48]

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• Stanton, Charles D. (2015). Medieval Maritime Warfare. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-4738-5643-1.
• Wiel, Alethea (1910). The Navy of Venice. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. OCLC 4198755.