Canada and the Iraq War

Jean Chrétien in 2003, the prime minister of Canada during the lead up to the Iraq War

By August 2002, Canadian officials held no doubts that the United States was planning on targeting Iraq.[4] On 14 August 2002, Chrétien had received a memorandum from Alex Himelfarb, the clerk of the Canadian privy council where he bluntly states that US actions against Iraq was an attempt to implement regime change.[9] The majority of the members of the Cabinet of Canada had little general knowledge of Iraq, although most were sceptical of the American cause.[10] However, some cabinet members held concerns that not joining the coalition would damage Canada-US relations because American rhetoric had linked Iraq to the vital interests of the United States.[10]

However, during the lead up to the war, Chrétien did not take a count of opinions with the entire Cabinet over joining the coalition, instead having only really consulted key members within the cabinet, including John McCallum, the Canadian minister of national defence and Bill Graham, the Canadian minister of foreign affairs.[10] During this period, he also consulted key diplomats including Michael Kergin, the Canadian ambassador to the United States, and Paul Heinbecker, the Canadian ambassador to the UN.[10] In particular, in the months leading up to war, Heinbecker and Chrétien maintained contact in an attempt to find a resolution that satisfied the American positions and the anti-war position held by France, although Heinbecker had little belief that his efforts would succeed.[11]

Chrétien also regularly updated himself with his parliamentary caucus, whose near unanimous opposition to the war without support from the UN helped Chrétien make his final decision.[10] Opposition within the parliamentary caucus largely stemmed from members having to respond to constituents who collected petitions critical of going to war.[10] This may have reflected the view of the general Canadian public, as reflected through a poll conducted in March 2003 by EKOS Research Associates for the Toronto Star;[12] and by the Montreal newspaper La Presse, whose results found 71 per cent of those questioned did not support the United States-led invasion, with 27 per cent expressing disapproval.[13] However, the leader of the Canadian Alliance Party, Stephen Harper, objected to the Prime Minister's position on Iraq, stating that Canada should be fighting alongside the US,[2][13] In spite of the large anti-war sentiment in the country, the Canadian government did not attribute its decision to public opinion; with anti-war demonstrations in 2003 only confirming for Chrétien the position he held with the Americans in 2002.[14]

Demonstrations against the Iraq War in Montreal, 15 March 2003.

Protests against the Iraq War and counter-protests supporting the conflict took place in Canada both before and after the invasion of Iraq. One of the first large scale demonstrations in opposition to the war took place at Queen's Park, Toronto, where approximately 2,000 people gathered on 16 November 2002.[15][16] The following day, as part of a cross-country day of action, a 3,000 strong anti-war coalition held a peace march from Peace Flame Park in Vancouver, approximately 1,000 people marched in Montreal, and about 500 individuals gathered in a snow storm on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, while other rallies took place in Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Halifax.[15][16]

Canadians also took part in a set of protests that took place in towns and cities around the world in February 2003,[17] the biggest in Canada being the gathering of more than 100,000 people in Montreal, despite wind-chill temperatures of −30 °C (−22 °F). A further 10,000 people joined a demonstration in Toronto, 20,000 in Vancouver, 18,000 in Edmonton, 8,000 in Victoria, 4,000 in Halifax, 2,000 in Ottawa; altogether, protests were held in close to 60 communities across the country.[18]

Assessments from Canadian diplomats, as well as the Canadian intelligence community played a constructive role in shaping Chrétien's view on US policy towards Iraq, as well as claims that Iraq possessed WMDs.[19] During the lead up to the conflict, Canadian intelligence reports were primarily relayed to Chrétien through verbal briefings from Claude Laverdure, the prime minister's foreign and defence policy advisor.[19] In addition to the prime minister, reports from the Canadian intelligence community were also distributed to cabinet members, senior Canadian officials, and officers within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.[20] However, intelligence reports had varying degrees of effect to those who received it; with Eddie Goldenberg, the prime minister's chief of staff later remarking that none of the intelligence assessments played a factor in the advice he gave to the prime minister.[20]

Chrétien shakes hands with Bush during a meeting in September 2002. In the same year, Bush offered to provide intelligence experts to brief him on Iraq, although this was declined.

In autumn 2002, Bush had offered to send intelligence experts to brief the prime minister, and later offered to come personally to brief him; although Chretien instead choose to have said information pass through regular intelligence-sharing channels where Canadian analysts analyzed the information and passed it on to him.[21][19] Reliance on Canadian analysis may have helped Chrétien reach a different conclusion from his American and British counterparts; with Blair at one point expressing frustration on how the Canadian prime minister failed to "see the evidence," despite the fact they largely shared the same intelligence sources.[20] Canadian intelligence assessment of Iraq in 2002 and 2003 was notable in that it deviated from the assessments provided by its Five Eyes partners, even though they all had access to the same information.[21][22] This has largely been attributed to the fact that the Canadian intelligence community saw no external political pressures placed on it.[23] Subsequent inquiries after the 2003 invasion into American intelligence on Iraq also found that American analysts had assumed Iraq was determined to restart its WMD program as soon as possible.[22] This contrasted the assumptions held by Canadian analysts, who believed Iraq would temporarily suspend its WMD program for immediate economic relief; providing Canadian analysts the possibility to entertain the idea that Iraq may not have WMDs to begin with.[22]

In the decade following the Gulf War, Iraq had been a high priority within the Canadian intelligence community. During the mid-1990s, Canadian intelligence analysts had compiled a number of reports on UN inspections in Iraq, Iraqi internal developments, as well as deception efforts by the Iraqi government.[24] However, the frequency of intelligence reports on Iraq dropped after the 1998 bombing of Iraq.[24]

In early 2002, the International Assessments Staff (IAS), the intelligence assessment branch for the Canadian Privy Council Office and the foreign affairs department, held oral briefings with Canadian officials where they stressed that there was no credible evidence linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks; in response to claims made by the Bush administration. IAS analysts worked closely with members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) who also shared the same view.[25] In June 2002, the Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC), a committee that coordinated the analytical units of CSIS, IAS, and the Department of National Defence's (DND) Director General Intelligence, had also concluded that there was little evidence that regimes like Iraq were providing chemical weapons to terrorist organizations.[26]

On 30 August 2002, the IAC published another assessment to determine whether or not Iraq had any WMD stockpiles, and whether or not the country was attempting to reconstitute its WMD program after the 1998 bombings.[21][26] In its assessment, it could not conclude with certainty that Iraq had completely destroyed its WMDs, although it did note that any chemical agents or ballistic missiles that Iraq may possess would be in very small quantities, and would most likely be out of service due to poor storage of the materials.[26] The assessment also could find no real indications that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear program.[21][27] The IAC assessment was also sceptical of the evidence presented by the Americans, and was specifically critical of how there was little evidence of the wide range of equipment and resources needed to start such a program; even when accounting for potential deception efforts by the Iraqis.[27] The Interdepartmental Experts Groups, a group that supported the work of the IAC, also found no evidence of that the Iraqi chemical weapons program was reconstituted; although did make note that Iraqi ballistic missiles may have exceeded the 150-kilometre-range (93 mi), although only by a limited amount.[27] The IAS also assessed that Iraq did not appear to have taken the technical steps required to weaponize a biological agent like smallpox, although DND analysts have also highlighted that Iraq may be in possession of the virus.[27] However, scientific analysis from the DND largely corroborated with the IAC's assessment. The DND reported with high confidence, although not with absolute certainty, that Iraq no longer possessed chemical agents or munitions dating to the Gulf War.[28] The DND also could not find credible evidence that the Iraqi nuclear program had been restarted.[28] In March 2003, in the weeks prior to the invasion of Iraq, the DND published a report called Iraq: No Smoke, No Gun, where it assessed the coalition forces would fail to find WMDs in Iraq. Given that it contradicted the intelligence assessment from the UK and US, as well as the claims made by the coalition, the report was not shared with Canada's allies in order to not endanger the country's relationship with its Five Eyes partners.[29] IAS reports that also disagreed with the intelligence assessments of its Five Eyes partners were also marked as "Canadian-Eyes Only".[29]

From late-August 2002, the IAC focused its efforts on reviewing incoming intelligence reports that would alter its assessment.[30] However, the conclusion reached by the IAC was reinforced by Canadian defence intelligence analysts who maintained regular contact with their counterparts in the UK, and to a lesser extent, in the US; where on a one-on-one basis, allied analyst seemingly expressed reservations about the evidence being shared through the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement.[30]

The IAS had also received intelligence passed along from the informant referred to as Curveball; concluding that the information provided by the informant was only circumstantial, and provided no direct evidence that Iraq had an active WMD program, or that they had the necessary delivery capabilities.[21] In early 2003, the US provided Canada with the classified version of a National Intelligence Estimate for Iraqi WMDs. Issues within the National Intelligence Estimate, including dissenting views taken from various US departments within the classified version of the document further reinforced IAS's assessment that Iraq didn't have WMDs.[31]

However, CSIS may have provided the impression to the Americans that the Canadian intelligence community had suspicions that Iraq possessed WMDs in early 2002, owing to a report from the organization which raised such concerns in February 2002.[28] Although that report was later withdrawn after the IAS raised several concerns about it, it had already been forwarded to the US.[28]

The Canadian intelligence community's assessment on the situation was also influenced by their own intelligence on the United States. Shortly after the September 11th attacks in 2001, Kergin, returned to Ottawa to brief government officials on the ramifications of the events within the American administration; with Kergin noting that the Americans had adopted a "Manichean worldview," and warned Canadian officials to prepare for a United States that viewed global affairs in only a black and white lens.[32] Sentiments shared by Heinbecker, where he perceived US security strategy had changed towards emphasizing unilateral military commitments also reinforced Chrétien's suspicions of American claims against Iraq.[33]

Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan began, Canadian officials noticed an uptick in American intelligence reports that paid close attention to Iraq.[32] After it became evident that the US administration was targeting Iraq, the IAS produced an assessment in February 2002 on the likely policy direction the Americans would pursue with Iraq; having assessed that there was a high probability the US would ultimately invade Iraq.[24] In April, the IAS built upon this assessment, evaluating how the US administration would justify an invasion.[24] In the assessment, they concluded that the US would most likely attempt to link Iraq to the September 11th attacks or al-Qaida, as it provides grounds for self-defence; although it also noted that in the event that failed, they would seek to justify military actions on the grounds that Iraq had continued to develop WMDs.[24] Within the following months, the IAS produced a number of assessments on how the US would conduct a military campaign in Iraq.[25] By mid-2002, as the US administration failed to convince the public of Iraqi links to the September 11th attacks, it had become obvious to IAS analysts that the second option would be pursued by the US, justifying an intervention on the grounds that Iraq's WMD program was active.[25]

A UN weapons inspector in Iraq in December 2002

In the months before the war, Canadian intelligence liaisons in Washington had noted that the Central Intelligence Agency was under political pressure to find evidence that confirmed the existence of a WMD program in Iraq.[7] Canadian analysts were also critical of how the US intelligence community were dismissive of the information being collected by UN inspector in Iraq, with the Americans viewing the UN inspectors as disorganized and ineffective.[31]

It was also noted that the Prime Minister's advice to the viceroy was also based on feasibility problems for Canada, with Maclean's magazine reporting that "Canada has committed about 2,000 troops to Afghanistan this summer, a significant contribution given the stretched state of the Canadian military."[6] However, deploying Canadian troops to Iraq was not a major point of consideration in deciding not to participate in the US-led coalition. Neither the Pentagon, or the office of the US secretay of defence had pressured Canada for military support;[33] with US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld having made clear to McCallum that the Americans were not seeking military support from Canada, and preferred if the Canadian Armed Forces focused on their deployment in Afghanistan.[33] Pressure for Canada to participate in the coalition primarily originated from the White House, who "sought the Canadian flag and the political cover it granted an invasion."[10]

Though no declaration of war was issued, the Governor General-in-Council did order the mobilization of a number of Canadian Forces personnel to serve actively in Iraq.[2] On 31 March 2003, it was reported in Maclean's that in the previous month Canadian officers, aboard three frigates and a destroyer, had been placed in command of the multinational naval group Task Force 151, which patrolled the Persian Gulf region. A further 30 Canadians worked at the US Central Command in Qatar, and 150 troops were on exchange with US and British forces in proximity to combat.[6] North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) stationed Canadian Air Force pilots also flew combat missions with the US Air Force E-3 Sentry, and exchange officers fought with US units. Canadian pilots also flew Boeing C-17s into Iraq to "season" the flight crews.[34] In all, 40 to 50 Canadian military members participated in the conflict.

General Walter Natynczyk, one of the Canadian officers who served in Iraq, then a Brigadier General

Because of this Canadian involvement in Iraq, the Ministers of the Crown at the time were criticised by Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition as hypocritical, and demands were made for the return of these Canadian Forces personnel. The Prime Minister stated that the Canadian military was not involved in direct combat, while still fulfilling its commitment to NORAD. However, it was claimed by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang in The Unexpected War that people from Canadian ministries were in Washington, D.C., openly vaunting Canada's participation in Iraq;[2] as Stein and Lang put it: "in an almost schizophrenic way, the government bragged publicly about its decision to stand aside from the war in Iraq because it violated core principles of multilateralism and support for the United Nations. At the same time, senior Canadian officials, military officers and politicians were currying favour in Washington, privately telling anyone in the State Department of the Pentagon who would listen that, by some measures, Canada's indirect contribution to the American war effort in Iraq– three ships and 100 exchange officers– exceeded that of all but three other countries that were formally part of the coalition."[2][35]

Amongst the Canadian officers who were sent to Iraq were: Brigadier General Walter Natynczyk, who was later appointed Chief of the Defence Staff; Major General Peter Devlin, who served since 14 December 2006 as Multi-National Corps-Iraq Deputy Command General as part of his role as Deputy Commander of the US III Corps through an officer exchange program;[36] and General Nicolas Matern, a special forces officer and former commander of Canada's elite counter-terrorism unit, who in mid February 2008 began service as deputy to Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin.

Eight Canadians were taken hostage in Iraq over the course of the conflict there; one, Zaid Meerwali, an Iraqi-Canadian truck driver, was killed in 2005, and another Iraqi-Canadian, Rifat Mohammed Rifat, has been missing since 2004 and is presumed dead. The 2005 abduction of James Loney and Harmeet Singh Sooden, both members of the organization Christian Peacemaker Teams, garnered wide attention, as did their release the following year in a multi-national operation led by Task Force Black, involving British, American, and Canadian special forces, supported by Task Force Maroon,[37] Joint Task Force 2, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Canadian Security Intelligence Service.[38] The remaining four Canadians taken hostage included: Fadi Ihsan Fadel, a Syrian-Canadian employed by the International Rescue Committee who was taken hostage in Najaf on 8 April 2004 and released eight days later; Naji al-Kuwaiti, was taken hostage on 28 April 2004 and released on 4 May of the same year; Fairuz Yamucky, who was abducted on 6 September 2004 and rescued by a United States National Guard unit sixteen days later; and Scott Taylor, a journalist abducted by Ansar al-Islam in Tal Afar on 9 September 2004 and held captive for five days.