Final offensive of the Spanish Civil War

After the fall of Catalonia in February 1939, the military situation of the Republic was hopeless. Despite still having the capital city and approximately 30% of Spanish territory, it had lost 220,000 soldiers, the second most populated city in the country and the industrial resources of Catalonia.[9] Furthermore, on 27 February, President Manuel Azaña resigned. The United Kingdom and France then recognised the Nationalist government.[10]

The Republican army still had between 250,000[11] and 500,000 men[12] but only 40 aircraft (three Natasha and two Katiuska bomber squadrons, and 25 Chatos and Moscas fighters),[13] little artillery and few automatic weapons.[14] Many soldiers were unarmed (in December 1938, the Republican army had only 225,000 rifles),[15] and lacked shoes and overcoats.[16] In Madrid, there was food for only two months and no water, heating, medicine or surgical dressings.[17] On the other hand, the Nationalist army had more than a million men at the end of 1938, with 35,000 Moroccans, 32,000 Italians and 5,000 Germans,[18] as well as 600 aircraft.[19]

On 16 February, the high command of the Republican Army told Prime Minister Juan Negrín that further military resistance was impossible.[20] Most of the members of the Republican Army, the PSOE, the UGT and the CNT believed that it was necessary to initiate peace negotiations.[21] Nevertheless, Negrín, backed by the Communist PCE, wanted to continue fighting because Franco rejected giving any guarantee against reprisals and another world war was believed to be imminent.[22] Furthermore, Negrín wanted to organise the evacuation of those who were most at risk.[23]

From the end of February 1939, Colonel Segismundo Casado had been preparing a coup against the Negrín government to start peace negotiations with the Nationalists, believing that the government was too subordinate to the Communists. Colonel José Cendaño, a fifth column agent in the Republican army, promised to him that Franco would guarantee the lives of the Republican officers who had committed no crimes.[24] Most noncommunist elements of the Popular Front in Madrid supported the plot, including one of the leaders of the PSOE, Julián Besteiro, because they believed that continuing the war was useless.[25] Furthermore, after the surrender of Menorca, many Republican officers in the central zone believed that they could negotiate a deal with the Nationalists.[26]

On 2 March, Negrín announced a number of new appointments in the Central Zone.[27] Colonel Casado and the communists Juan Modesto and Antonio Cordón García became generals, General Manuel Matallana was appointed as head of the central general staff[28] and communist officers were appointed to command the ports of Murcia (Manuel Tagüeña), Alicante (Etelvino Vega) and Cartagena (Francisco Galán).[29](according to Beevor, Francisco Galán was appointed military governor of Cartagena, Etelvino Vega governor of Alicante, Leocadio Mendiola commander of Murcia and Inocencio Curto commander of Albacete).[30] The noncommunist elements believed that the communists wanted to control the evacuation harbors[31] and joined the plot against Negrín.[32]

On 5 March 1939, Colonel Segismundo Casado, supported by General Matallana, the CNT[33] (Cipriano Mera), the secret service of the Republic (the Military Investigation Service, Servicio de Investigación Militar, or SIM),[34] a section of the PSOE (Julian Besteiro) and a section of the UGT (Wenceslao Carrillo), deposed Negrín and formed a military junta, the National Council of Defense (Consejo Nacional de Defensa) in order to negotiate a peace deal with Franco.[35] On 6 March, Miaja joined the rebellion and was appointed president of the junta.[36] The other members of the junta were Casado, Julian Besteiro, Wenceslao Carrillo, Gonzalez Marín and Eduardo Val (CNT), Antonio Perez (UGT), and the republicans Miguel San Andrés and Jose del Río.[37]

Julian Besteiro, one of the leaders of the PSOE, supported Casado's coup.

Colonel Adolfo Prada was appointed commander of the Army of the Centre, the communist commanders of the I, II and III Army Corps of the Army of the Centre were relieved, the PCE's newspaper Mundo Obrero was closed and Casado ordered massive arrests of communist commissars and militants.[38] Ironically, Casado's justification for the coup was that Negrín and the PCE wanted to carry out a communist takeover, an identical justification to that of the Nationalist uprising, which began the Civil War, but in fact, he rose against the government because he wanted to negotiate peace and believed that removing Negrín and the communists was a precondition to negotiations with Franco. In addition to other assurances, the British government said to him that Franco would guarantee the lives of the Republicans.[39] Casado had said to the commander of the Republican Air Force, Hidalgo de Cisneros: "I give you my word...that I can obtain better terms from Franco than Negrín ever can. I can even assure you that they will res our ranks".[40]

After a failed attempt to negotiate with Casado, Negrín fled to France from the Monòver's airfield, near Elda, with Hidalgo de Cisneros, the leaders of the PCE (La Pasionaria and Vicente Uribe), and the foreign minister Julio Álvarez del Vayo on 6 March to avoid capture by the supporters of Casado[41] (Casado wanted to arrest the government and the PCE's leaders and to hand them over to the Nationalists).[42]

Casado's coup was supported by the commanders of the other three Armies of the Republican Army (Leopoldo Menéndez López, commander of the Levante Army; Antonio Escobar, commander of the Estremadura Army; and Domingo Moriones, commander of the Andalusia Army).[43] Nevertheless, the army units settled around Madrid and controlled by the PCE (the I corps of the Army of the Centre led by Luis Barceló and the Emilio Bueno’s II and Colonel Antonio Ortega’s III Corps), rose against the junta on 7 March, starting a brief civil war inside the Republic. Barceló appointed himself as commander of the Army of the Centre, and his troops closed all the entrances to Madrid, occupied most of the city centre and detained and shot three of Casado's colonels. Casado's supporters held only some government buildings and the southeast of the city.[44] Nevertheless, Mera's IV corps counterattacked and occupied Torrejón and Alcalá de Henares as the Nationalists started an offensive towards the Manzanares.[45] By 10 March, Barceló's troops had been surrounded, and a ceasefire was arranged. On 11 March, after days of bloody combat, Casado, backed by the IV corps of Cipriano Mera, defeated Barceló’s troops. Barceló and his commissar, José Conesa, were arrested and executed.[46] There were hundreds of dead (Thomas: 230,[47] Jackson: 1,000,[48] and Beevor: 2,000 dead[49]).

There was also combat in Ciudad Real and Cartagena. In Ciudad Real, Escobar's Extremadura Army crushed the communist resistance led by the deputy Martínez Cárton.[50] Nevertheless, in Cartagena (the main base of the Spanish Republican Navy), where the supporters of Casado, backed by elements of the a fifth column, had started the uprising against Negrín's government on 4 March, they were defeated by the PCE's 206th Brigade, of the IV Division, led by colonel Joaquín Rodríguez, after a brief battle, on 7 March. Nevertheless, on 5 March, the Republican Navy (three cruisers and eight destroyers), led by Admiral Buiza, had fled to Bizerte after a Nationalist aerial bombardment.[51] One Nationalist transport ship, the Castillo de Olite, sent by the Nationalists in order to support the uprising, was sunk by the coastal batteries of Cartagena, killing 1,200 Nationalist soldiers.[52]

After the defeat of Barceló's troops, the Council tried to start peace negotiations with Franco, hoping to achieve a guarantee against political reprisals. On 12 March, the Council proposed a peace deal with a guarantee against reprisals and a period of 25 days to allow anyone who wanted to leave Spain to do so. On 16 March, Franco answered that he would only accept an unconditional surrender.[53] On 23 March, the Council sent two negotiators to Burgos (Colonel Antonio Garijo and Major Leopoldo Ortega), and the Nationalists told them that on 25 March, the Republican Air Force had to be surrendered and by 27 March, the Republican troops had to raise the white flag.[54] Nevertheless, on 25 March, the Republicans did not surrender their Air Force because of bad weather and Franco then broke off negotiations with the junta.[55][56]