HMS Royalist (89)

The Royal Navy (RN) intended in late 1943 to use the Bellona class as flagships for escort carrier and cruiser groups for the projected invasion of Normandy and of southern France and for operations with the United States Navy and with the RN fleet in the Pacific. Royalist was a class of one from the start being fitted out - within months of commissioning - with further modifications. These modifications gave it two extra rooms for additional communications with aircraft carriers and Fleet Air Arm aircraft and one of the first implementations of an "Action Information Office" (AIO) – an early operations room for plotting and display of the tactical position and associated mechanical computers to make it more effective. Intended to enhance the vessel's role as a command ship in northern Atlantic waters for operations against the German capital ships Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, the extra equipment took the ship to the limit leaving minimal comfort and sleeping provision for crew.[1] The wartime development of radar and the requirement to equip Royalist as a "Carrier Flagship"[2] fitted with AIO increased the crew complement from 484 to 600, adding to the problem.

Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company of Greenock built Royalist, with the keel being laid down on 21 March 1940. She was launched on 30 May 1942 and commissioned on 10 September 1943. She returned to the dockyard for alterations in November which were not complete until February 1944.

Her motto, Surtout Loyal, translates to "Loyal above all".[2]

A Supermarine Seafire of 807 Naval Air Squadron Fleet Air Arm flying above HMS Royalist during a training flight from the Royal Naval Air Station at Dekhelia, near Alexandria, Egypt in February 1945

Following her commissioning, Royalist spent several months working up, during which time she underwent repairs for trial defects and for alterations and additions. These included modifications for service as a carrier flagship.[2]

In March 1944 Royalist joined the Home Fleet and served for a short period in the Arctic theatre. In this capacity she took part in Operation Tungsten, the carrier raid in April 1944 against the German battleship Tirpitz at her base in Norway.

Royalist was then ordered to the Mediterranean to support the Operation Dragoon landings in the south of France in August 1944, as part of the escort carrier squadron TF88.1 under the United States Navy's Task Force 88.

After Dragoon, Royalist joined the Aegean Force preventing enemy evacuation from the islands. On 15 September, accompanied by the destroyer HMS Teazer, she sank the transports KT4 and KT26 off Cape Spatha. She was then stationed in the Aegean Sea until late 1944, when she was ordered to the East Indies.

By April 1945 she was with the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron as flagship, supporting the Rangoon landings (Operation Dracula), and the following month was part of a force that failed to join the Battle of the Malacca Strait where five Royal Navy destroyers intercepted the Japanese cruiser Haguro and the destroyer Kamikaze evacuating troops from Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. For the remainder of the war she covered the carrier raids against targets in the East Indies and Sumatra.

Scottish author Alistair MacLean served on Royalist during the Second World War, and used his experiences as background for his acclaimed first novel HMS Ulysses (1955) as well as for some of his subsequent works.

Royalist was withdrawn from the East Indies after the conclusion of hostilities, and returned home to be mothballed and dehumidified in 1946. The reconstruction of Royalist from deep preservation with new superstructure and advanced interim fire control fitted involved major work but was intended to extend the cruiser's life for only 6 years. Diadem was better sealed to USN Std mothballing in 1951, and was offered to the RNZN as an alternative in 1955. In an 18-month refit, Diadem was updated and renamed Babur for Pakistan,[3] As with the transfer of Royalist to the RNZN, the transfer of Diadem to Pakistan was controversial over the high cost of the refit.[4] Royalist and Diadem were complex warships even as built in 1944. After refit and rewiring in 1956 they could never be more updated and had to be kept running with 200 men aboard even for short periods in reserve and refit; difficult for small navies such as the RNZN. In March 1953 Royalist had started a three year major reconstruction [5] The "facelift' (new superstructure and electronics, but old engines) of Royalist was announced to start a large Dido/Bellona update programme.[6] However the new PM, Churchill, favoured the RAF and the 1952 Navy Estimates was reduced.[7]

The RAF had priority and the Royal Navy view that development should centre on frigates and large carriers was not liked by the old PM and the cruiser reconstruction programme was suspended for three years; also delayed by the immediate and changing priorities of the Korean War and the great difficulty and expense of developing compact steam propulsion with adequate range and speed and good close in defence for the destroyers and frigates. A radical defence review in June 1953 saw heavy naval cuts but Royalists modernisation continued under a revised defence White Paper in February 1954 which restored the RN programme and plans to complete Hermes and the Tigers, but rejected starting further Dido/ Bellona conversions; they lacked the 'dual war and peace, cold war capabilities' required for the RN.[8][9] The postwar RN programme envisaged that Soviet bombers would be improved Boeing B-29 Superfortress (Tupolev Tu-4) or Lincolns flying at 320 mph at 4.4 miles height, however on May Day 1954, it was clear 5.25 guns would be marginal against the new Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 "Badger" and Myasishchev M-4 "Bison" bombers flying 7 miles high at 600 mph (520 kn); it took 30 seconds for 5.25-inch shells to reach that height. A frigate with just one Mk 6 4.5-inch turret could not destroy jets 5.5 miles high. [10] But Royalist was then suspended and reviewed in the 1955 Defence White Paper which decided on a scaled down cruiser programme of extended refit for colonial rather than NATO service.[11]

The NZ Prime Minister Sid Holland decided to accept to purchase a reconditioned Royalist for £4 million in March 1955 after a seven week visit to the US and UK where he met Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles and Churchill who stressed the reality of hydrogen bombs. Holland told the NZ Parliament than he was more influenced by the advice of the British Minister of Defence Harold Macmillan,[12] to refocus NZ defence on the Pacific and shorter lines of communication to the SE Asia[13] rather than Middle East. British First Sea Lord and Admiralty Minister stressed the availability of 'Royalist' and that an order of two or three anti-submarine frigates would probably proceed,[14] the T12 type was untested and unproven, and the RN viewed it was desirable to wait for new types of frigates suitable for NZ conditions with more gun power and anti-submarine capability: modified Whitby-class frigates or redesigned Type 41 frigates with 3/70 or 4/62 gun turrets effective against missiles and jets[15]

The cost of Royalist's reconstruction reached £4.5 million.[16] (the cost of two new 2500-ton frigates). A minority of RNZN opinion, including Cpt Phipps, saw it as a policy reversal stopping the RNZN maintaining a six frigate fleet, good training conditions and commonality with the RN. The Royalist, with massive RN/USN assistance, however returned over nine years of almost continuous service. After Suez in 1956 the Royal Navy transferred the bulk of the fleet to the Indian and Pacific oceans from 1957 to 1967 where, prior to 1955, there was only a token presence of a couple of cruisers and destroyers. As a result Royalist could be deployed effectively in 1957 with the RN carrier fleet.

The ship was handed over to the Royal New Zealand Navy on 9 July 1956. When Captain Peter Phipps went to take command of Royalist in 1955, New Zealand diplomat Frank Corner showed his own view, when he noted that Phipps agreed that the ship was a white elephant, unsuitable for use in the Pacific. However The RNZN had operated the Bellona and Black Prince (the same class as Royalist) since 1946 as part of NZ Defence contribution in 1946–54.[17] Phipps claimed the cruiser's range was limited and it could not even reach Panama without refuelling. However, Captain Phipps also stated when the cruiser reached Auckland, that it was updated, as a most modern warship, with the capability to take "three targets simultaneously, and shoot down air targets with reasonable frequency often on the first salvo"[18]

While the Type 12 frigates approved by Phipps had less endurance, it would have been more logical to order longer-range diesel versions of the Type 12, i.e. the Type 41 or Type 61. The Type 41/Type 61 original radar and fire control fit was similar to Royalist and the Type 12 HMNZS Otago [19][20] except the frigates had AC electrics and radar variants.

The New Zealand Navy Board, of which three members were RN officers, argued the RN view that the RNZN needed a cruiser in the South Pacific and to support the RAN/RN. The point of Royalist from the RN viewpoint was a powerful interim late 1950s medium range AA platform with 30rpm on two channels from 4 twin 5.25. The space and comfort problems were only minimally altered by any economy in the AIO suite or 40mm light AA and reducing to 3 main turrets destroyed the cruisers primary AA value. The cruiser was a RN cruiser on loan, and not renamed "HMNZS New Zealand". The UK did not regard the RNZN as an independent force compared to the RAN and RCN. Phipps demanded some improvements and refused on 6/4/56, in front of the Dockyard superintendent and 40 assembled dockyard and Royalist RN/RNZN officers to sign the standard RN D448 release form, accepting the Royalist refit was completed to specified standard, [21] while in command of HMS Bellona as an accommodation ship. Phipps finally accept the cruiser three weeks later, after the minimum adjustment; 4 showers added; officers baths removed and minor ventillation improvements.

The Royal Navy, Phipps action as disrupting the Suez naval preparations by a colonial upstart and an action, unfitting of a serious RN senior officer and gentleman.[22] Post Suez the RNZN view of Phipps, the RNZN its officers and men was unchanged. New Zealand was viewed as having zero capability for strategic assessment [23] and the RN requested confirmatiion from the NZ Government that in 1957 the RN East Asian sfaff would have authoirity of the Royalist.

Royalist lacked the pre-wetting, ABC spraydown equipment, specifically requested by the RNZN in 1955.[24] The Devonport UK, dockyard noted that installing spraydown to wash nuclear fallout was possible, providing a wall-size copy of the plan of the pre-wetting system under installation in HMS Sheffield, and suggested the New Zealand dockyard could do the job. After modernisation, in 1957, Sheffield operated for only 15 months with the fleet, maintained as a static HQ ship capable of GFS, it had space, comfort, and elaborate staterooms. Royalist like the other Dido cruisers had a margin, allowing only the 47 officers, a standard cabin. Royalist offered speed and extra communications systems and an AIO (Action Information Office) fitted late 1943. The Dido cruiser, HMS Scylla, was also fitted with AIO as Admiral Vian, RN D-Day command ship, Scylla detonated a mine, 23 June 1944, uneconomic to return to wartime service Long term reconstruction at Chatham dockyard began and in 1945 it was approved for fitting with two twin Mk 6 Twin 3/ 70 mounts and 992 radar, [25] In 1947 after 3 years and 350,000 pounds work, defence cuts and delays, saw the cruiser written off.[26] AIO fitted cruisers usually late Colony and Minotaurs[27] doubled the effectiveness of armament in RN postwar assessment,[28] but less space for senior ratings and petty office, than RNZN's earlier Dido cruisers.

The concern of New Zealand naval servicemen and Phipps was on living conditions, recruitment,5.25 AA shell resupply in the Pacific and an affordable schedule of new frigates. The New Zealand Department of External Affairs viewed the British Treasury as getting rid of a unique cruiser and getting New Zealand to pay for the refit and other RN warships "Then Whitehall thought of New Zealand!"[29][30] However, as with Bellona and Black Prince in 1946, transferring Royalist was arguably a backdoor supplement to Australian defence. By 1955 the RAN had only light 4.5-inch gun, Battle-class and Daring-class destroyers (building) and the light carriers, HMAS Melbourne and Sydney, with obsolete Sea Venom fighters just for Melbourne, the Royalist provided the only escort for Melbourne and Sydney and its surface 82 lb shells some deterrence to Sverdlov and Royalist, alone among RN cruisers had all turrets manned. Centreline 5.25 DP guns good in AA and GFS role with modern two-channel fire control and in the later 1950s the best British cruiser for radar processing and communications with the RN/ RAN Fleet air arm [31] Australian PM Robert Menzies was dubious that RN policy in the age of nuclear deterrence was simply "minor fleet to the Far East in peacetime only" and no real counter to piecemeal communist erosion in SE Asia.[32][33][34] The Radical UK Defence Review released 10 July 1953 in the wake of the new hydrogen bomb which lessened the likelihood of a lengthy broken backed war cut the cruiser modernisation programme, and the enormous cost and difficulty of both medium-range missile or AA gun development meant Britain had decided to concentrate on Seaslug missiles and abandon new AA guns-[35] Mountbatten publicly defended Royalist as the most modern British cruiser in Auckland when it arrived in 1956[36] and regarded Phipps as inexperienced and unsuitable.[37] Mountbatten viewed New Zealand's Cabinet and officials as out of touch with the Cold War need to maintain ready, broad-based naval and defence capabilities and frequently visited New Zealand to make appeals.[38]

Royalist had common DC and radars with RN frigates commissioned in 1956–58 and better speed in the Pacific seaway and real surface and anti-air defence. Actually more impressive than HMAS Melbourne,for AA and surface fighting. THe RAN flagship was a legacy hull, primarily an anti submarine carrier its Sea Venoms, with AW/AD radar, but little speed a and caried only 20mm cannons a 500lb bomb or rockets . Royalist's close-in air defence of 40 mm STAAG 2 were initially sharper than other RN warships, used standard RN 40 mm ammunition, but by 1961 were a complicated, maintenance nightmare [39] and withdrawn from other British warships by 1961.[40] Britain could not afford escorts larger than destroyers in addition to its carrier and frigate force but the 5.25-inch DP guns, fitted to Vanguard, and at Gibraltar to control the narrow straights as well as Royalist were accurate unlike the 4-inch AA on other 1950s RN cruisers. Royalist modernization for AA/AW and particularly AD support of RN carrier fighters and strike aircraft was useful for Musketeer and future operations of RN carriers East of Suez.

Royalist could escort convoys across the whole distance at a speed of 19 knots (35 km/h; 22 mph), compared with the Type 12's ability to make the long leg from Suva to Honolulu at 10/15. It was arguable that the traditional cruiser role in trade defence against Soviet cruisers and raiders was relevant,[41] and contributing effective AW/AD for the RN/ RAN aircraft carriers was still the RNZN priority[42] rather than impossible defence of Tasman and Pacific shipping against an undefined but modern Russian submarine threat.

HMNZS Royalist at the Devonport Naval Base, 1956

After refitting, Royalist was re-equipped with new equipment as an AA and AD escort ship for carriers, retaining the 5.25-inch as more powerful high level AA and surface weapons rather than the usual 4-inch or 4.5-inch guns. However RN and British defence documents released under the 30-year rule showed the refit was to prepare it for all-out hot wars and high-level gun engagement of shadowers,[43] Except for Royalist and Diadem, this modernisation was cancelled in 1953 on cost grounds[44] and a radical defence review and RAF assessments that the Sverdlov threat and capability was exaggerated, as was the Russian air threat and likely bomber numbers in the 1955–58 period. The RAF estimated 300 Badger jet bombers in 1956 - the actual number was 500. The delay in the cruiser programme meant the cruisers were now more than ten years old doubling the cost of structural modernisation and reducing the programme to extended refits for Crown Colony-cruisers. Royalists update and a ten year life extension of HMS Ceylon was approved in.1953[45]

In transferring Royalist to New Zealand, the Royal Navy assumed the RNZN as an extension of the RN and the junior New Zealand service and government following British command. Around 25% of the officers on Royalist were RN officers on loan or exchange, as were many of the specialist ratings. The RNZN officers on the cruiser were usually of junior experience and had lengthy training with the RN in the UK. Even on the cruiser's final deployment in 1965 on Confrontation patrols in southeast Asia, many RN and RAN officers occupied higher-ranking officer positions on board.[46]

After working up in UK waters, Royalist was operational with the British fleet in the Mediterranean. From August 1956, NZ PM Sid Holland was persuaded by Anthony Eden to maintain Royalist on station in the Med as an invaluable, 'strategic deployment' and 'deterrent' [47] against Egyptian or Israeli aggression. It was purely precautionary move,[48] Eden assured Holland. At the same time Eden and the RN continued the dual strategy [49] while both negotiating with Egypt and preparing with war, and attempting to lock Royalist into the strategy, through the persuasion by the CNS Mountbatten of Lord of the Admiralty,Lord Hailsham. The fleet awaited the possibility of action against Egyptian air force during the Suez crisis. Royalist was intended to be mainly a radar picket and aircraft direction ship for the RAF English Electric Canberra bombers and RN carrier-based Hawker Sea Hawk and de Havilland Sea Venom aircraft. Royalist had the standard RN long-range air warning Type 960 radar carried by other British cruisers and carriers in the area, but Royalist was somewhat better equipped for aircraft direction than its other counterparts in the area.

After hostilities with Egypt commenced, the resulting international outrage caused Prime Minister Sidney Holland to reverse his support for the British - calling for Captain Peter Phipps to withdraw from operations against Egypt. At that point the only other immediately available replacement cruiser was HMS Jamaica, a surface fighting unit without modern AA systems or the equipment to process air-warning radar data and "multiple communication channels" with Fleet Air Arm aircraft. Royalist continued for some time as the primary coastal AD ship - possibly for 24 hours - until HMS Ceylon transferred from shore bombardment duty off Port Said and the risk from Egypt's Gloster Meteors, MiGs and Badger bombers was suppressed. After about a day, HMNZS Royalist also withdrew from a scheduled bombardment mission in support of a RN destroyer squadron, moved further offshore away from the main body of the RN fleet (changing identity to the undefined, RNZN cruiser Black Swan according to some British published accounts) continuing to assist the RN fleet in its primary passive soft air warning and communications role.[50] Holland had officially ordered a withdrawal from operations but allowed the cruiser to stay with the Operation Musketeer fleet as "there was insufficient time for a decision not to withdraw" - an apparent non-decision.[50] Much of the Soviet-supplied Tupolev Tu-16 and MiGs of the Egyptian Air Force remained a threat to the RN fleet, making the presence of Royalist crucial to fleet defence.[51] The reality of the pro-Musketeer sentiments of the RNZN/RN crew in which most of the key officer and senior rating positions were RN officers and many of the RNZN officers were also essentially professional RN career officers on the return voyage to New Zealand via South Africa. Captain Phipps told the crew they deserved the recognition given to RN personnel for their involvement in the incident.[52] In the 2000s the New Zealand Labour Government and the RNZN awarded these personnel battle honours for war service in the Mediterranean. The cruiser's log for the crucial days of the Suez War was destroyed at the time meaning the full account of her Suez service will never be known.

In early 1957 Royalist was involved in exercises with the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.[53] The cruiser made two shore bombardment missions in 1957–1958 during the Malayan Emergency against suspected terrorist areas in south east Johore, firing about 240 5.25-inch rounds.[54] In AA exercises with the British Far East Fleet in 1956–57, Royalist outperformed the (pre-war) RN Town-class cruisers, shooting down five jet Meteor unmanned targets and many towed targets immediately on opening fire.[55]

In 1960 Royalist had a major five month refit. It was expected the cruiser would only serve another two and a half years; the New Zealand navy board was seeking loan of a third Whitby-class frigate (Type 12) from the Royal Navy[56] However the RN was only just introducing and trialling the improved Rothesay class (Type 12M) frigates and was short of effective frigates and cruisers. In February 1964 after HMAS Voyager was lost after it collided with the aircraft carrier Melbourne, the UK offered Australia the Daring-class destroyers, HMS Duchess (available immediately) and HMS Defender then in mid life refit with new MRS3 fire control. [57]Defender was available to replace Royalist from February 1965.

In 1962 the still joint-crewed RNZN/RAN/RN Royalist suffered permanent damage in rough weather in the Tasman Sea ,the keel twisted out of alignment. It would never be possible again for cruisers, gun fire directors to determine the cruisers datum, centre line, necessary for accurate targeting [58]The back of the cruiser was technically broken, and it could have been assessed as a constructive loss, uneconomic to repair, and scrapped then. The RAN, Captain was running at excess speed, into a head sea, determined to make Auckland for a Rugby Union test between the Wallabies and All Blacks at Eden Park.[59] The cruiser operated with the British Far East Fleet, in three tours of duty in 1963, 1964 & 1965, during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation the crews being belatedly awarded General Service Medals for the 1963–64 tours and Operational Service Medals for active service in combat zones in 1956, 1957–1958 and 1965, finally recognised by the New Zealand government in 2000. From mid-1963, reports by the captain of Royalist noted that one of the two Mk 6/275 HALADCTs were often unserviceable, as often one or two STAAGs were, while the ship's hull and lower structure was marginal requiring constant work and frequent painting, requiring an extra Asian workforce due to the construction of the cruiser out of "low quality wartime steel", and the ship's below-deck humidity and constant temperature at a minimum of 85 °F (29 °C). The ship's modernisation had provided only for a lifespan of six years, so these conditions were expected. Effective modernisation of the ship after acquisition from the Royal Navy only amounted to several ECM/ESM updates.

By May 1964 the Indonesian Confrontation had escalated with Indonesian forces conducting cross-border raids in Kalimantan and landings in Borneo. The British Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft and Mountbatten requested the use of carriers and major units to conduct provocative passages,[60] to encourage a revolt against Sukarno and his generals. After rest and recreation in Singapore, Royalist took on 580 tons of fuel oil on 14 July 1964 and the following morning took ammunition on from lighters.[61] It left Singapore in the afternoon returning to Auckland from Singapore via the Cairns races in Queensland, transited the Carmat Straits on 15 July, Sapud on 16 July (at ABC state Yankee, at 2130 raised to condition X Ray at 2230)[62] as it was in the Java Sea between Jakarta and SW Kalimatan and then ran along the coast of Java thru the night to arrive off Bail at sunrise about 6.00 am and through the Lombok Strait on 17 July 1964[63] on what was described as "routine passage" in the highly confidential communication to Canberra.

The two transits of the straits made the task group led by HMS Victorious, a month apart that followed were both also described as routine passage only the second was even notified with a note from the British embassy, RN attaché to the Indonesian Navy, which was a concession the track would be through Lombok not Djakarta and the major Indonesian military bases. During the transit of the straits, the guns were fully manned with the crews closed up; if the cruiser had been "buzzed" by Indonesia MiGs or patrol craft, the captain was instructed to take "precautionary measures" and not train or elevate the guns or test fire them again during the deployment, a "diplomatic artifact" given a scenario of undetectable possible threat of surprise long-range air-launched Kangaroo cruise missile attack from Indonesia bombers[64] and full ABC protection at X Ray state 9[65] as was the task force led by aircraft carrier HMS Victorious on 19 September 1964, two County-class guided missile destroyers HMS Hampshire, (which replaced the cruiser HMS Lion) and the anti-submarine frigates HMS Dido and HMS Berwick. Victoriouss assertion of the right of innocent passage by a carrier with Blackburn Buccaneer and de Havilland Sea Vixen aircraft painted in grey anti flash paint, and believed to be nuclear-armed was viewed as one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War,[66] with mass panic in Java, but proved effective in establishing rights for naval passage and that Indonesia's assertion was unlikely to be outright war to stop Malaysian independence.

There was considerable doubt among RNZN staff whether Royalist, which had not had a major refit since 1956, could deploy again in 1965. It managed to deploy again after a seven-week refit working round the clock in Devonport dockyard and work up in the Hauraki Gulf, where it managed 27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph) at half power. The cruiser was still visually impressive, and provided the appearance of capability and ability to operate. It was judged that the fire control systems needed either a year's refit or $140,000 of new parts,[67] and one of two STAAG CIWS mounts was refitted with a worn spare, after rust removal, the two UA3 ESM systems were playing up.[68] It was hoped the worn steam turbines could last 15 months to allow a final 1966 visit to all the New Zealand ports if "hope prevailed over fear".

Against most RNZN staff advice it was decided not to inform the Commander of the British Far East Fleet, of the situation as "Commander Far East has enough trouble fitting Royalist in his operational plans now with limitations on his main capability in the Confrontation War."[69] The Royal Navy was desperately overstretched during the confrontation, and keeping one carrier fully operational in the theatre at all times was difficult [70] to provide nuclear deterrence to Jakarta with the threat of potential aerial nuclear strike. The high-maintenance Tiger-class cruisers required far too much human and technical resources to be operate East of Suez in a complimentary role, for GFS and carrier escort role with the Far East Fleet; HMS Lion was withdrawn after a boiler explosion on anti-infiltration patrol, and HMS Blake was put into reserve from December 1963 due to crew shortages in the RN. HMS Royalist was still perceived by the RN as useful and needed in Singapore, even if it could not run at the 25+ knots a carrier group needed to launch aircraft as an escort for amphibious carriers like HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and it was decided Royalist would proceed to Pearl Harbor for a second workup, rather than a longer refit in the Devonport dockyard, before deploying to Hong Kong and Singapore in support of RN forces. During Royalist stay at Pearl Harbor the USN Staff and naval dockyard provided substantial assistance in alleviating some of the cruiser's faults and adjustments to allow the fire control system to be aligned for brief periods. During the subsequent workup Royalist achieved "E Excellent" for Efficiency, meaning maximum efficiency within system capability though, like all peacetime naval or weapon tests, actual effectiveness was not measured. During a brief spell on station at Singapore in 1965, Royalist conducted anti-infiltration patrols, boarding boats, deployed shore patrols, and participated in Exercise Guardrail as the simulated "enemy Sverdlov cruiser"[71] and provided extra men, potential heavy gunfire support and AD support for HMS Bulwark on a vulnerable deployment transferring a new helicopter squadron to Borneo.[72] For the 1965 Far East tour, the crew were awarded Operational Service Medals. This reflects the general build up in tension with Indonesia, the probable use of weapons by landing parties, the higher grade of main munition preparation and the political support for the mission, but the earlier deployments of Royalist when its system were more effective were much more important in the tactical and even strategic sense.

The 1965 deployment was somewhat marred by the refusal of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs and British ambassadors to allow Royalist to dock with RN ships at Tokyo or Yokohama.[73] According to the Royal Navy attaché in Tokyo, the RNZN sailors "could not afford the one pound per minute price in the Ginza nightclubs and bars."[74] The captain of Royalist, J.P. Vallant replied to the Deputy Secretary of Defence in Wellington, "find it quaint that ... the New Zealand navy is persona non grata in the Tokyo Bay area."[75] Royalist was confined to the Japanese provincial ports with New Zealand diplomats persuading the local police chiefs against a curfew and to keep bars open 24 hours.[76] After further shore leave in Bangkok, Singapore, and Subic Bay, Royalist returned to New Zealand, after a valiant repair of a milking boiler and turbine en route. It was unable to make its final scheduled 1966 visit for Waitangi Day and tour of the New Zealand ports, and was effectively paid off five months early.

Royalist was paid off on 4 June 1966. After eleven years in the RNZN, Royalist reverted to Royal Navy control in 1967. She was sold for scrap to the Nissho Co, Japan, in November 1967 and was towed from Auckland to Osaka on 31 December 1967.

Citations

Bibliography

• Media related to HMS Royalist (ship, 1942) at Wikimedia Commons
• HMS Royalist at navalhistory.net