Parex Bank

Parex Bank was a Latvian bank founded in 1992 by Valērijs Kargins and Viktors Krasovickis as a privately owned full-service banking company in Riga, Latvia that was very dominant in currency exchange in the 1990s promoting itself as "We are closer than Switzerland!" (Russian: «Мы ближе, чем Швейцария!»). It had local and international clients in both the West and Russia with close ties to the Tambovskaya Russian mafia in St Petersburg and Vladimir Putin. As the second largest bank in Latvia in 2008, its failure and state takeover was one of the major events of the 2008-2010 Latvian financial crisis.[1] On 1 August 2010, Parex Banka was split into a new bank Citadele Banka and Reverta, an asset recovery company.[1] Citadele was then sold to a group of United States investors while Reverta sued the founders Kargins and Krasovickis for €88 million due to 14 highly irregular loans and deposits between 1995 and 2008.[1]

Parex Bank
TypePrivate company
IndustryFinancial services
Founded1992 (1992) in Riga, Latvia
Key people
 Valērijs Kargins, Viktors Krasovickis
ProductsBanking
Websitewww.reverta.lv/lv//

History
Valērijs Kargins

On 5 August 1986 under the Riga's City Committee of the Komsomol, Gint Marga created Parex, which is a portmanteau of export parity, as a self supporting youth enterprise.[2][3][lower-alpha 1] Valērijs Kargins had been working at VEF but could not live on its salary so, in 1987, he purchased for five thousand Soviet rubles the Parex shell which was later reorganized into a cooperative and then a limited liability company for tourism.[2][3][4] After Kargins had travelled to Yugoslavia in 1985, then Vietnam, and then the United Kingdom in 1988 where he facilitated an exchange between Riga and Durham for youth tourist groups, he realized that he needed to establish a currency exchange among groups from France and the United Kingdom in Latvia.[3] The first youth group to exchange currency at Parex was from Czechoslovakia.[3] In 1988, he and Viktors Krasovickis, who had a tourism agency, became partners in Parex.[5]

On April 3, 1991, Parex Bank received the first licence issued to a private company for currency exchange operations in the territory of the Soviet Union – issued by the second President of the Bank of Latvia, Paul Sakss.[6] In May, Parex opened the first exchange office which was used by many clients from all over USSR.[7][lower-alpha 2]

On 13 August 1991, Kargins, along with Viktors Krasovickis and his wife Nina Kondratyev reorganized Parex and became the new bank AS PAREX's sole owners. Kargins owned half of the shares (valued at 1,086,200 Soviet rubles), while the remaining 50% were distributed in similar amounts between Viktors Krosovickis and his wife.[8][lower-alpha 3]

In January 1992, Parex Bank was founded, with the owners Valērijs Kargins and Viktors Krasovickis having equal shares in the bank. Krasovicki`s wife Nina did not participate in the bank`s future activities as they divorced that year. However, she continued to hold significant deposit in it.[11]

Persons from all over the Soviet Union and later the former Soviet Union exchanged through Parex and, when the Russian ruble fell into the abyss of inflation, the Latvian rublis and later the Latvian lats were much more stable in which to exchange currency.[9][10][12][13] Riga was intended to become the global financial center in the former Soviet Union and Parex Bank advertised that "We are closer than Switzerland" (Russian: «Мы ближе, чем Швейцария!»)[14][15][16][17][lower-alpha 4]

In 1993, about 30% of Parex Bank`s shares were bought by offshore company Europe Holdings Ltd and by the year 2001 its share (without voting rights) reached 51%.[19] The company remained in the list of owners until 2002, when Kargins and Krasovickis formally repurchased parts of Europe Holdings Ltd, again becoming the sole owners of the bank. However, by the end of 2007, around 14% of the Bank`s total paid-in share capital was in the hands of 59 small shareholders.[20]

Parex was closely involved with Enron, Arthur Andersen and later Ernst & Young prior to the collapse of Enron in 2002.[21]

In the early 2000s, John Christmas, a United States banker who joined Parex in 2002 and was the head of the Parex's International Relations, informed the Financial Services Authority in London about a massive money laundering network involving shell companies with accounts at Parex but the Financial Services Authority took no action to stop the illicit affairs.[21] In 2005, Christmas informed Ilmars Rimsevics[lower-alpha 5] that Parex was involved in money laundering schemes but Rimsevics took no action.[22][23][24]

In May 2005, President George W. Bush travelled to Latvia to discuss Latvian banking irregularities.[26] The Lithuanian branches of Parex were associated with pro-Russia, pro-Kremlin, and pro-Putin Viktor Yanukovych money laundering scandals in the 2004 Ukrainian elections according to the Lithuanian newspaper Respublika.[26] The United States branch of Deutsche Bank had a correspondent account with Parex, but shut it down after pressure from the United States Treasury Department.[26] Closely associated with Parex is International Overseas Services (Russian: Международные зарубежные услуги) which has dummy directors.[27]

Russian mafia connections

Parex and its successor ABLV Bank are connected to the St Petersburg based Tambovskaya Russian mafia which is close to Vladimir Putin during his political rise.[28][29][30][31][32][33]

$100 million loan

In 2005, Severneft CEO Zhan Khudainatov received a $100 million loan from Parex which led to the collapse of the Parex Bank and, later, was revealed in the Panama Papers.[28][lower-alpha 6] At the time of the loan, Denis Sherstyukov, a close business associate of both Kargin's son and Georgy Krasovitsky, a son of Viktor Krasovitsky, was on the council of Parex and has close ties to Vladimir Putin through Nils Usakovs and his Harmony Centre which is close to Putin's United Russia.[28][lower-alpha 7] From 2004 to 2008, Denis Sherstyukov expanded Parex into countries of the former Soviet Union.[28]

Alfa Bank offer

In 2007, the Latvian-Russian Petr Aven of Alfa Bank offered to buy Parex Banka from Kargins and Krasovitsky.[34] However, Kargins and Krasovitsky wanted €1 billion which was not acceptable to Aven.[34]

In October 2008, Baltic Screen estimated that Krasovitsky's wealth was 207 million lats (€291 million) and Kargin's wealth was 220 million lats (€309 million).[34]

2008-2010 Financial Crisis and PAREX takeover

Background

Prior to the financial crisis, JSC Parex Banka was the second largest bank in Latvia in 2008.[1]

By the beginning of 2008, Britain had fully nationalized Northern Rock to save it from bankruptcy. In the second half of 2008, a number of large and pre-eminent banks and financial institutions went bankrupt, such as Lehman Brothers in the United States and Carnegie in Sweden.[35]

In autumn of 2008, after the bankruptcy of several major banks and financial institutions, the global financial crisis began in earnest. Several countries in the world had to seek international financial assistance, many countries provided support or even took over state-controlled banks and other credit institutions. In October 2008, the European Commission agreed on a plan to allow governments to engage in bank rescues with the rescue of JSC Parex Banka outlined on 25 November 2008.[36][37]

Following events

On July 30, 2008, in a letter from Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC) to the Chairman of the Board of Parex Bank titled, "On the results of the risk assessment of the bank," it was stated that an inspection had been carried out for the period from 12 November 2007 to 18 January 2008 and that the test results indicated that "the bank's performance [was] characterized by a moderate level of risk, and the methods used by the institution to manage risk [were] satisfactory, although improvements [were] needed in some areas."[35]

From August 18 until October 3, 2008, the FCMC conducted an inspection with the aim of reviewing and evaluating Parex's lending process. The inspection revealed significant shortcomings in the lending process; as the economic situation in Latvia and the world changed and the solvency of borrowers worsened, Parex had not set up the amount of provisions corresponding to the quality of the loan portfolio (40 million lats shortfall), as well as weaknesses in credit risk management.[35]

On October 14, 2008, the FCMC authorized Parex to include audited profit for the first half of 2008 in Tier 1 capital and to include Parex Group's audited profit for the first half of 2008 in Tier 1 capital of Parex Consolidation Group. This decision showed that Parex's capital adequacy position was relatively stable in mid-October 2008.[35]

On October 20, 2008, as a result of the inspection, more accurate information was obtained about the current or current financial situation of Parex. The FCMC informed Parex of the deficiencies found during the inspection and invited Parex representatives to negotiate the improvements of deficiencies. After the initial refusal, a meeting between FCMC and Parex representatives took place only a week later.[35]

Request for state support

On October 22, 2008, Parex owners privately requested state support to maintain the bank's solvency by proposing a state treasury deposit to Parex Bank. The Ministry of Finance rejected this suggestion. The outflow of money from Parex continued. Finance Minister Atis Slakteris discussed the situation with the FCMC and the Bank of Latvia, and on October 28 the Minister of Finance informed Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis. The authorities involved at the beginning of November concluded that Parex needs to be taken over by the state. Several options were considered - the full takeover of Parex banka into state ownership, the transfer of 51% of Parex banka's shares to the Mortgage and Land Bank, as well as the refusal of assistance. In the latter case, the state would have to pay the bank's customers at least LVL 660 million as a state guarantee for deposits. The Cabinet of Ministers supported the takeover of the bank into state ownership. It was considered that there would be no security for the use of public funds if the bank remained in the hands of its shareholders.[35]

On October 27, 2008, withdrawals from Parex began to accelerate rapidly. Due to the risk of default of capital adequacy ratios and taking into account the promise of Parex's major shareholders to increase the capital base in case of necessity, FCMC requested Parex to submit by 29 October 2008 the Parex Capital Adequacy Recovery Plan. On this day along, around 29 million lats of capital left Parex.[35]

Government takeover

In early November 2008, it was already clear that Parex's problems were so serious that it would involve the Cabinet of Ministers, and that Parex's takeover could be one of the most effective options for stabilizing the Latvian financial system by providing support to Parex.

On November 8, 2008, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to acquire a controlling interest in Parex Bank. The country, represented by the Privatization Agency, became the largest shareholder of Parex Bank. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also acquired a share in Parex Bank over time.[38]

Split into Reverta and Citadele

As a result of the restructuring carried out on August 1, 2010, Parex was split into two separate institutions; Reverta was founded as a "solution bank" with the aim of recovering the public funds invested in its rescue. At the same time, Parex's "good" assets along with its credit institution services such as account and deposit servicing, credit lending were taken on by Citadele.[38]

In December 2010, Reverta paid LVL 9.7 million in interest payments on the use of the state deposit.[39]

Reverta had recovered 58 million lats by the end of the reporting period within five months of August 1, 2010.[39]

On December 28, 2011, a Reverta shareholders' meeting made a decision on voluntary withdrawal from the credit institution's license.[38]

On March 15, 2012, the Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC) supports the request of Parex banka and revokes the license of the bank's credit institution. The change of the company's operating model was a natural and carefully considered step, considering that the services characteristic of credit institutions are not provided by Parex since 1 August 2010.[38]

May 8, 2012 marked a major milestone in Parex banka's operations: the bank is starting to work as a professional asset management company - Reverta Joint Stock Company. With an active portfolio of nearly one billion euros, Reverta is the largest asset manager in the Baltic region and ranked among the leading analogue companies in Eastern and Central Europe.[38]

Causes of Parex's demise

According to investigations carried out in the wake of the crisis, it has been suggested that causes included

  • Global financial turmoil;
  • Increased withdrawal of deposits from Parex rig and Parex customer due to lack of financial resources, especially for residents of neighboring countries of Latvia;
  • Two contracts with syndicated lenders on June 29, 2007 for a EUR 500 million loan and on February 21, 2008 for a loan of EUR 275 million. Loans had to be repaid early in 2009, but Parex would not be able to do so due to the fall in the value of the securities portfolio;
  • As a result of the global financial crisis, the quality of Parex's foreign securities portfolio had deteriorated; Parex did not have a parent bank that would give Parex creditors additional guarantees or other collateral.[35]

Economic effects

The state takeover of Parex has been seen as one of the major causes of the 2008-2010 financial crisis in Latvia, causing a chain reaction in the Latvian economy and requiring the government to take a €4.5 billion in bailout loans from the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the World Bank.[40]

Reverta sued the founders, Kargins and Krasovickis, for nearly €88 million from 14 highly irregular loans and deposits at Parex Banka which occurred between 1995 and 2008. In October 2016, Kargins and Krasovickis were ordered to pay €4,284,792 to Reverta.[1]

See also

Notes
  1. In the mid 1980s, Gint Marga felt that the Soviet Union needed to have "white cash". He had studied economics and especially post war Germany where there had been a convertible Mark and wanted to facilitate more "white cash" into the Soviet Union.[3]
  2. After May 1991, only licensed banks were allowed to exchange currency.[7]
  3. Viktors Krasovickis (also spelled Viktor Krasovitsky) (Russian: Виктор Красовицкий b. 1954) graduated from the Riga Polytechnic Institute as a specialist in automation and telemechanics. He worked at Komutator in Riga and later in a travel and excursion agency. Later, he created his own travel agency. His wife Nina Kondratyev was a software engineer.[5][8][9][10]
  4. Richard L. Palmer, president of Cachet International, Inc., was the CIA station chief at the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1992 to 1994. He has an extensive background in studying international money laundering and Russian organized crime and is considered an expert in these fields.[17][18]
  5. In the early 2000s, Ilmars Rimsevics was a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. He served as the top banker in Latvia beginning in 1992 as chairman and then had the top policy role of governor in 2001. As governor of the Bank of Latvia, he was the person that nominates the chairman of Latvia's banking regulator the Financial and Capital Markets Commission (FCMC).[22][23][24] On 18 February 2018, Rimsevics was arrested by the Corruption Prevention Bureau (KNAB) for bribery and money laundering schemes including schemes involving Latvia, Ukraine, North Korea, and Russia.[22][23][25]
  6. Nezavisimaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya (Russian: Независимая Нефтяная Компания) (Independent Oil Company) which is headed by Eduard Khudainatov (b. 11 September 1960), a brother of Zhan Khudainatov, is under United States financial sanctions because of its closeness to the North Korean regime. As a former vice president of Rosneft, Eduard Khudainatov is close to Igor Sechin.[28]
  7. Georgy Krasovitsky is on the council of the VIA SMS Group with a 19% stake.[28] Financial Investment, a Latvian company, owns 50 percent of VIA SMS Group, and Denis Sherstyukov had 31 percent.[28] The CEO of FinnQ, a subsidiary of VIA SMS Group which in 2018 was entering the Lithuanian market along with another VIA SMS Group subsidiary Vialet, is Denis Sherstyukov.[28]

References
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  2. Лапса, Лато (Lapsa, Lato) (2009-05-16). "Vesti.lv: Каргин Superstar. Часть 10" [Kargin Superstar. Part 10]. vesti.lv (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2020-12-01. Retrieved 2020-12-01.
  3. Лапса, Лато (Lapsa, Lato) (2009-05-16). "Vesti.lv: Каргин Superstar. Часть 11" [Kargin Superstar. Part 11]. vesti.lv (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2020-11-24. Retrieved 2020-11-24.
  4. "Каргин и Красовицкий: все о Parex banka" [Kargin and Krasovitsky: everything about Parex banka]. Delfi from Baltkom 93.9 and MIX FM 102.7 (in Latvian). 16 December 2008. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 24 November 2020.
  5. Белинская, Ирина (Belinskaya, Irina) (1996-09-11). "Валерий Каргин: "Люблю когда люди выживают"" [Valery Kargin: "I love when people survive."]. Журнал "Коммерсантъ Деньги" №32 от 11.09.1996, стр. 16 (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2020-12-01. Retrieved 2020-12-01.
  6. Лапса, Лато (Lapsa, Lato) (2009-05-16). "Vesti.lv: Каргин Superstar. Часть 14" [Kargin Superstar: Part 14]. vesti.lv (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2020-11-24. Retrieved 2019-05-08.
  7. Лапса, Лато (Lapsa, Lato) (2009-05-16). "Vesti.lv: Каргин Superstar. Часть 16" [Kargin Superstar. Part 16]. vesti.lv (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2020-11-24. Retrieved 2020-11-24.
  8. Лапса, Лато (Lapsa, Lato) (2009-05-16). "Vesti.lv: Каргин Superstar. Часть 12" [Kargin Superstar: Part 12]. vesti.lv (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2020-11-24. Retrieved 2019-05-08.
  9. Watts, Christopher (October 2, 2000). "Survival Of The Fittest". Forbes. p. 1. Archived from the original on August 10, 2001. Retrieved November 29, 2011.
  10. Watts, Christopher (October 2, 2000). "Survival Of The Fittest". Forbes. p. 2. Archived from the original on August 22, 2001. Retrieved November 29, 2011.
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  15. Caruana Galizia, Paul (1 June 2019). "Dirty money, bloody murder". Archived from the original on 16 June 2020. Retrieved 27 November 2020.
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  17. Palmer, Richard L. (September 21, 1999). "Statement of Richard L. Palmer, president of Cachet International, Inc. on the Infiltration of the Western Financial System by Elements of Russian Organized Crime before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services". House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. Archived from the original on July 29, 2019. Retrieved December 7, 2020.
  18. Foer, Franklin (March 1, 2019). "Russian-Style Kleptocracy Is Infiltrating America: When the U.S.S.R. collapsed, Washington bet on the global spread of democratic capitalist values—and lost". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on December 7, 2020. Retrieved December 7, 2020.
  19. (PDF) https://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/prx/2002_ar_lv_lvl.pdf. Missing or empty |title= (help)
  20. Li, Tong Shu; Spaulding, Jesse (2016-01-13). "A PDF upload option for proposal creation". doi:10.15363/thinklab.d138. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  21. Brooks, Richard (2017). "Looting with Putin: How City of London suits joined the Moscow gold rush" (PDF). Private Eye. Retrieved 28 January 2021.
  22. Piovano, Carlo (19 February 2018). "'A nightmare': Banker tells tale of Latvian corruption". Washington Post. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 20 February 2018. Retrieved 29 January 2021.
  23. Higgins, Andrew (23 April 2018). "Banker Finds He Has 'Even More Enemies Than I Thought'". New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 January 2021. Retrieved 29 January 2021.
  24. Christmas, John (18 January 2021). "Welcome to Lawless Latvia: All 2020 Articles". Lawless Latvia website. Archived from the original on 18 January 2021. Retrieved 29 January 2021.
  25. EURACTIV.com staff (19 February 2018). "Latvia's chief banker arrested by anti-corruption officials". EURACTIV. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 29 January 2021.
  26. Мещанов, Вадим (Meshcanov, Vadim) (5 May 2005). "Буш едет в Ригу за PAREX банком" [Bush goes to Riga for PAREX bank]. "Утренняя газета" Утро.ru (utro.ru) (in Russian). Archived from the original on 7 May 2005. Retrieved 28 January 2021.
  27. "Yanukovych laundered through Latvia". Lawless Latvia website. 28 February 2014. Retrieved 28 January 2021.
  28. BNS (14 August 2018). "VIA SMS Group linked to Parex collapse, Lithuanian MP says". Lithuania Tribune. Archived from the original on 25 November 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  29. Christmas, John (6 August 2020). "Two countries, two murders that deserve answers". The Shift. Malta. Archived from the original on 8 August 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  30. Demarco, Joanna (15 June 2020). "Raids on Latvian bank that transferred funds to 17 Black reinforce call for Europol Joint Investigation Team". The Shift. Malta. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  31. "Documented: Parex Bank and Tambovskaya Mafia". Lawless Latvia website. 30 July 2016. Archived from the original on 26 November 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  32. "Krisjanis Karins & Tambovskaya Mafia". Lawless Latvia website. 13 March 2019. Archived from the original on 26 November 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  33. "Кровь на счетах: Как связаны "латвийская прачечная" и расстрел адвоката, мешавшего банку ABLV Эрнеста Берниса и Олега Филя самоликвидироваться" [Blood on the bills: How are the "Latvian laundry" and the shooting of the lawyer who prevented the ABLV bank Ernest Bernis and Oleg Filya from self-liquidation?]. www.compromat.ru (in Russian). 10 July 2019. Retrieved 27 November 2020.
  34. Петрова, Светлана (Petrova, Svetlana) (17 November 2008). ""Ориентация на восток."" [Orientation to the east.]. Ведомости (Vedomosti) - SmartMoney # 43 (133) (in Russian). Archived from the original on 31 January 2009. Retrieved 1 December 2020.
  35. "AS "PAREX BANKA" PĀRŅEMŠANAS APSKATS" (PDF). 2009-05-12.
  36. "Pasaules finanšu krīze. Turpinājums sekos". TVNET (in Latvian). 2008-11-07. Retrieved 2019-05-13.
  37. "State aid: Commission approves Latvian state support for JSC Parex Banka (IP/08/1766)". European Commission. Brussels. 25 November 2008. Archived from the original on 25 November 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2020.
  38. "Vēsture - Reverta". 2012-10-09. Archived from the original on 2012-10-09. Retrieved 2019-05-13.
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