People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by the Joint staff.

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. With the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense and nuclear technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and United States threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.

China made fast progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a 32-month period, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964 at Lop Nor, launched its first nuclear missile on October 25, 1966 and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 14, 1967. Deployment of the Dongfeng-1 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) occurred in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years.

Gansu hosted a missile launching area.[10] China destroyed 9 U-2 surveillance craft while two went missing when they attempted to spy on it.[11]

In the 1970s the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.

By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In 1980 China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the western Soviet Union and the United States. In 1981 China launched three satellites into space orbit from a single launch vehicle, indicating that China might possess the technology to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched the Type 092 submarine SSBN (Xia-class) in 1981, and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of the Julang-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (CSS-NX-4). In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.

In 1986 China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers.

China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (no first use), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets. The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.

In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a 3,000–5,000-kilometre (1,900–3,100 mi) long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in the Hebei province.[12] 47 News reported that the facility was likely located in the Taihang Mountains.[13]

On 9 January 2014, a Chinese hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) referred to as the WU-14 was allegedly spotted flying at high speeds over the country. The flight was confirmed by the Pentagon as a hypersonic missile delivery vehicle capable of penetrating the U.S. missile defense system and delivering nuclear warheads. The WU-14 is reportedly designed to be launched as the final stage of a Chinese ICBM traveling at Mach 10, or 12,360 km/h (7,680 mph). Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show the country has concluded hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems. China is the third country to enter the "hypersonic arms race" after Russia and the United States. Russia is jointly developing with India the Mach 6 (7,300 km/h (4,500 mph)) scramjet-powered Brahmos-II. The U.S. Air Force has flown the X-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.[14] China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.[15]

US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimated that by 2022 the number of Chinese nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100.[16]

The PLARF is organised into Bases, sometimes called Armies, with each Base commanding a number of Brigades, and each Brigade commanding a number of Battalions. As a rule of thumb, each Base operates between 3 and 5 brigades, with a mix of conventional and nuclear-capable Brigades in each. The exception is Base 61, which is believed to have 7 Brigades, all of which are conventional. In addition, it is currently somewhat unclear as to whether the Chinese theater commands or the PLARF itself has operational control over the conventional ballistic missile units, though it seems likely that the PLARF acts in coordination with, but not taking orders from, the theater commands with regards to the use of conventional ballistic missiles, with control of nuclear weapons continuing to be exercised at the Central Military Commission level.[18] Furthermore, it appears that the number of missiles assigned to each Brigade differs by missile type, as well as the individual Brigade itself.

The PLARF has operated a separate command and control structure from the rest of the PLA since 1967.[23] The goal of the system is to ensure tight control of nuclear warheads at the highest levels of government. This is done by the Central Military Commission having direct control of the PLARF, outside of the structure of military regions. For nuclear weapons, the command structure is believed to run from the CMC, to the headquarters of the PLARF in Beijing, from there to each Artillery Base, and from each Artillery Base down to the individual Brigade. From there, the Brigade transmits firing orders to the launch companies under its control. In the case of conventional ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assume that more autonomy will be provided in wartime, with command likely being issued from the Bases, which are believed to coordinate with their respective Military Regions on targeting and conventional missile use.

Chinese nuclear C3 capabilities are centered around fibre-optic and satellite-based communication networks, replacing older radio command networks that made up the-then Second Artillery's C3 infrastructure before the 1990s. While historically Chinese nuclear missile forces had to launch from pre-prepared sites, the newest generation of nuclear-capable missiles (the DF-26 and DF-31AG) have been seen deploying to, and launching from, unprepared sites in exercises. This would corroborate reports that PLARF communications regiments are being trained in the ability to set up telephone and command networks "on-the-fly". The reason for these changes likely has to do with concerns about PLARF survivability; China's commitment to a no-first-use policy means that its nuclear forces have to be capable of both surviving a first-strike, and receiving the orders required to fire back.

• TA580/TAS5380
• TA5450/TAS5450
• HTF5680A1
• WS2300
• WS2400
• WS2500
• WS2600
• WS21200 (used exclusively by Pakistan)
• WS51200 (used exclusively by North Korea)

• Hanyang HY4260
• Hanyang HY4330

The PLARF Golden Wheel Project (金轮工程) co-operates the DF-3 and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles in Saudi Arabia since the establishment of Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force in 1984.

• Dongfeng (missile)
• Nuclear triad
• List of states with nuclear weapons
• Qian Xuesen (also known as Tsien Hsue-shen)

• Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006): Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
• China Nuclear Forces Guide Federation of American Scientists
• Enrico Fels (February 2008): Will the Eagle strangle the Dragon? An Assessment of the U.S. Challenges towards China's Nuclear Deterrence, Trends East Asia Analysis No. 20.

• Strategic Missile Force SinoDefence.com (WaybackMachine Dec. 2013)
• PLA Second Artillery Corps SinoDefence.com (Dec. 2010)
• Second Artillery Corps FAS.org
• Second Artillery Corps (SAC) NTI.org (WaybackMachine Dec. 2011)