Second Battle of Komárom (1849)

After the Battle of Győr in 1849, the Hungarian army retreated to the fortress of Komárom, which was one of the most powerful and modern fortifications of the Habsburg Empire.[4]

Görgei's chief of the Hungarian Operational Office, Colonel József Bayer (as well as the government's commissioner János Ludvigh) wrote to Lajos Kossuth in Pest about the news of the lost battle, pointing that the enemy may arrive in the vicinity the Hungarian capital in a short time, advising him to move with the Szemere-Government to Nagyvárad under the protection of General Józef Bem's army, while Görgei wanted to remain at Komárom, and lead a decisive attack against the Austrians, before the arrival of the Russian army. Initially, Kossuth did not wanted to leave Pest, declaring to Bayer that the government will leave the capitals only together with the Hungarian army.[5] Görgei wrote to Kossuth on June 30th, summarizing his plans: "For our nearest future I have a simple operational plan: here, under the protection of Komárom['s walls] to concentrate all our forces, except Bem's, Vetter's and [Lajos] Kazinczy's [troops], and to attack decisively the Austrians."[5]

The cause of Görgei's drastic plan of "putting all eggs in one basket" was that the military situation and the fate of Hungary was in a very grave danger. As the result of the Austrian governments official asking for help from Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, in mid-June 1849, Hungary was invaded by a Russian army, consisting of 200,000 soldiers, which, together with the 170,000 Austrian soldiers already operating in Hungary, outnumbering the 170,000 Hungarian soldiers. Furthermore, the Russians also put 80,000 soldiers in stand-by, near the Carpathian Mountains, to intervene in the war if necessary.[6] There was also several tens of thousands of Romanian insurgents in the Western Carpathians of Transylvania,[7] and Serbian insurgents and Croatian troops from Délvidék and Syrmia.[8] The Austro-Russian troops also had a large amount of superior-quality weapons, while the Hungarians suffered from the shortage of both weapons and the ammunition. Among the riffles used by the Hungarians were the outdated flintlocks, and hunting and ceremonial riffles, but also some percussion rifles and muskets.[2] Regarding the artillery, the enemy armies had 1354 cannons, while the Hungarians 857.[8] At the end of June 1849 the military situation in Hungary started to become more and more desperate for the Hungarians: the Russian troops, led by Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich, which entered from the North in 15 June, now were approaching Debrecen,[9] South-Eastern and Eastern Transylvania was invaded by two Austrian armies led by General Alexander von Lüders,[10] in Southern Hungary the Austrian and Croatian troops led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić were advancing towards Szeged,[11] while the main Austrian army, led by Julius Jacob von Haynau, reinforced by a Russian division of Lieutenant General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin from West, pushed Görgei's troops towards Komárom.[5] In this situation the political and military leaders of Hungary started to think that militarily its impossible to defeat these huge enemy forces, hoping that the only way its to convince them to open political discussions with them for a compromise. In this situation the armies role was only to win time, with successful military operations, for the Hungarian political class, to bring the emperor to the negotiation table.[12]

Görgei believed that it is impossible against these so powerful enemies to win the war. He believed that, in this situation, the only chance to save at least partly the Hungarian independence, is to apply a crushing defeat against the Austrian main troops led by Haynau, before the arrival of the Russian main forces in the vicinity of the Hungarian capitals and Komárom. He hoped that with the concentrated Hungarian forces under his command, he will force the Habsburgs to make an agreement with Hungary, instead of asking the Russian troops to defeat the Hungarians, because this would cause a great loss of the prestige of Austria in Europe. Görgei hoped, that if he applied a great defeat on the Austrian army, the Habsburgs would accept the Hungarian April Laws from 1848, trying to abrogate by the by emperor Franz Joseph I. with the March Constitution, issued at the beginning of March 1849, while Hungary would renounce to its full independence, declared at 14 April 1849, recognizing Franz Joseph as the Hungarian king.[12] From the middle of June under the command of Paskevich, the main Russian army of 120,000 soldiers advanced in Northern Hungary towards south. Only the IX corps of 8,000 Hungarian soldiers under the lead of General Józef Wysocki tried to stop them. From Transylvania Józef Bem sent news that Russian troops invaded this province too.[13]

On 24 June, Görgei, who, besides of being the main commander of the Hungarian army, was also the Minister of War, discussed with the Hungarian Government about the military situation after the defeat in the Battle of Győr. He blamed for the defeats in the fights around the river Vág his subalterns, their mistakes in the reconnaissance and the intervention of the Russian troops in the Battle of Pered and Győr, but he still believed that with a decisive attack against the army led by Haynau, he can impose his will on the Austrians.[13] On 25 June the Hungarian Government received the news from General Józef Wysocki about the Russian intervention in Northern Hungary. So in the 26 of June the Council of Ministers resembled again in Budapest to discuss this situation, and which strategy to follow. Görgei, accepting that the Hungarian army is not powerful enough to fight on every front, proposed gather all the Hungarian armies in two major groups. One of them, comprising the troops from the Bácska and Bánság regions, together with the Army of Transylvania led by General Józef Bem, and the division of Colonel Kazinczy Lajos, had to gather in the Eastern part of Hungary, to defend the line of the Tisza river, having the headquarters in Nagyvárad. The other group under the lead of Görgei, designed as the main army, had to remain around Komárom and comprised the I., II., III., VII. corps, some brigades which were separated from the VIII. corps (designated to defend the fortress of Komárom)the division of György Kmety, and the columns led by Ármin Görgey, János Horváth és Lajos Beniczky, while Wysocki's IX. corps was let to hinder the Russian advance from the North.[13] Görgei proposed to Kossuth to come with the Szemere-Government to Komárom under the protection of his army, but Kossuth refused this, but the Council of Ministers accepted Görgei's plans to concentrate the armies in two major groups and to attack and crush the Austrian army.[14] Hungarian historian Tamás Csikány also points out that Kossuth's refuse to go to Komárom, was wrong because his presence among the Hungarian troops from Komárom would had helped in keeping the morale of the army high, knowing Kossuth's exceptional popularity in Hungary. At the same time the emperor Franz Joseph I was present among Haynau's troops, having a very positive effect on their morale.[15] After he agreed with Kossuth on this plan, he leaved Budapest, in order to go to the front, because he heard about the enemy troops preparation to attack Győr.[14]

Görgei arrived to Győr only towards the end of the battle from 28 June, and seeing the overwhelming superiority of the enemy army (69 350 Austrians against 17 480 Hungarians), ordered the retreat, which was carried out excellently by General Ernő Poeltenberg and Görgei himself.[16]

On 27 June Wysocki sent a letter to the capital that he cannot hold against the Russian army, and he must retreat to avoid annihilation.[13] The news about the defeat at Győr arrived to Budapest on 29 June.[17] After the defeat at Győr, Görgei wrote a letter, in which he declared that the Government is weak, and without defense in Budapest, advising them to leave the capital, and move to East, under the protection of Bem's army, without renouncing to the plan that his army should remain at Komárom, and defeat the Austrians decisively.[14] After hearing all this negative news, Kossuth gathered the Council of Ministers, which, in the absence of Görgei, unanimously decided the followings. Fearing that the Russians will enter in the capital, cutting the country in two, separating the Eastern and Western Hungarian armies from each others, announced that, instead of Görgei's plan of the concentration of the troops in two points, all the Hungarian troops must retreat from Komárom, and concentrate under Józef Bem in South-Eastern Hungary, around Szeged, appointed as the governments new headquarters, leaving only 15 000 soldiers in Komárom.[18] Kossuth believed that Lieutenant-General Bem can defeat the Russian armies which invaded Transylvania, while Lieutenant-General Antal Vetter will defeat the troops of Josip Jelačić in Southern Hungary, then they can come Northwards to defeat the Russian army led by Paskevich.[14]

The Hungarian historians Róbert Hermann and Tamás Csikány believe that Kossuth's plan was wrong, and he should have stick to Görgei's plan. Csikány writes that the plan of retreating from Komárom meant to surrender of the greatest, more developed part of the country to the enemy, enabling them to unite all their forces against the much weaker Hungarians. He assumes that the main reason was to remove Görgei, envied by Kossuth and also by many other political and military leaders.[18] Hermann believes that Görgei's plan was right because Komárom was one of the best fortifications of the Habsburg empire, and Haynau's troops could not move towards Budapest until this fortification was not occupied or neutralized, because an important army garrisoned in Komárom could easily attack Vienna from there. The troops from Komárom could easily supply themselves from the rich regions both from the Northern and Southern banks of the Danube, and these troops could have been easily moved on the Szolnok-Pest-Vác railroad, the only railroad from Hungary in that period.[14]

The decision of the Council of Ministers contradicted Görgei's plan to keep the dual concentration, and ordered to him and his troops to retreat from Komárom to South-Eastern Hungary. This plan was made, without Görgei's knowledge, by one of his rivals, Lieutenant-General Henryk Dembiński, although, as the Minister of War and the Main Leader of the Army, Görgei had the highest authorization to make such kinds of military plans and decisions.[17] Kossuth and the politicians and officers around him knew, that this could enrage Görgei, making him to oppose them. So Kossuth decided to send this decision to him by three very carefully chosen persons. One was his old friend General Lajos Aulich, the second was the Minister of Public Works and Transport László Csány respected by Görgei as his own father. The third was Lieutenant-General Ernő Kiss, Görgei's superior by military rank, who, in the case if these two old friends were unable to convince him, was authorized by Kossuth, to take over the leadership of the army from Görgei, and lead them to Southern Hungary.[19]

After meeting with the delegation sent from Budapest, Görgei, after a discussion with József Bayer, agreed that the plan of the Council of Ministers was wrong, pointing out, among others, that the region was empty of food resources because of the long months of fighting there, and in Southern Hungary the two main strongholds, Temesvár and Arad were in Austrian hands, thus this region was unsuitable as military operational basis.[20] Despite of this, Görgei, in order to avoid a renewed conflict with Kossuth, sent him a letter, agreeing to retreat from Komárom towards South Hungary, but he explained that he can start his march only after he gathered all his troops positioned on strategical points North and South from Komárom, which will take him several days. He pointed that, because of this, he will be able to retreat from Komárom on 3 July.[20] But before the arrival of the delegation of the Council of Ministers, with the order to retreat from Komárom, Görgei sent a letter to Kossuth in which he wrote about remaining in the fortress, and responding harshly to the Scorched earth tactic proposed by the Government, which ordered to burn the villages and crops of the regions from which the Hungarian army had to retreat, showing his disapproval, declaring that I never fought for the Government, but for the People, and if today I would be convinced that the People will feel itself better, I will be the first to put my weapons down.[12]

By accident, this letter was given to Kossuth on June 31, after he read the letter sent by Görgei as a response to the order of the Council of Ministers, to which Görgei answered that he will obey to it. When Kossuth read the letter, he thought that Görgei disobeyed him. Görgei's words that he fights for the People and not for the Government were interpreted as a sign of revolt as well by Kossuth, who was outraged, and decided to revoke Görgei from the leadership of the army, and call him to Budapest to continue his work as war minister, appointing Lieutenant General Lázár Mészáros, as leader of the army in his place.[12] But neither Görgei nor his officers learned about this until after the end of the upcoming battle, because Mészáros who set out for Komárom to take the leadership of the army from Görgei, when he heard, at Dunaalmás the boom of the cannons, he turned back to Budapest.[12]

In the mean after the victory at Győr on June 28, Haynau immediately gave the order to move towards Komárom. On June 30 the I corps moved towards Lovad and Ács, the IV Corps towards Nagyigmánd, the III Corps towards Csép and Kisbér, the Bechtold cavalry division towards Bábolna and the Russian Panyutyin decision towards Bana.[21]

Komárom and its surroundings were one of Hungary's most important strategic locations. It was a, from many directions easily accessible favourable crossing point of both the Danube and the river Vág, which, in the same time could be easily defended thanks to the fort system of Komárom was one of the most important and modern strongholds of the Habsburg Empire.[22] The most important elements of the Komárom fort system were the Old and the New Castles in the East edges of Csallóköz on the left side of the Danube, while on the right side (the future battlefield) were mostly temporary defensive elements, with only the so-called Star Trench (Csillagsánc), which was a bridgehead fort made of stone.[23] In the Summer of 1849, on the right bank of the Danube, a fortified encampment relying on the Star Trench, was built around the locality of Újszőny.[24] On 28 May the commander of Komárom, György Klapka, ordered the building of a fortress with casemates at Monostor, called in its official, German name Sandberg (Sand Mountain). This fortress had to defend the fortified encampment from the attacks coming from the west, to control the road coming from Ács, and the vessel traffic of the Danube.[25] The Sandberg (Monostor) was the first fortress of the fortified encampment under construction, and its defenders were protected by three covering defenses made of the earth at 300-400 steps distance in front of it.[26] These defences were wedge-shaped, as well as quadrilateral, their sides towards the fortress being open. The earth parapets were reinforced with piles, and in front of them they dug trenches.[27] In front of the fortresses the trees were cut down and the houses were burned and demolished in order to prevent the enemy to use them for cover. At the moment of the imperial attack, the trenches and fortresses were unfinished, but the Hungarians did their best to make them hard to be conquered.[28] South from the fortress, until the Ács road, there were another two fortresses, and also on the other side of the road there were some earthworks with cannons which closed the road. The 2-6. fortresses were classical triangular encampment fortresses made of earth and wood. The fortress no 7. was horn shaped, and enabled the positioning of more cannons in it, enabling suppressive fire towards the Herkály wasteland, and together with the cannons from the other fortresses covered each others dead angles and vulnerable portions.[29] On the southernmost point of the entrenched encampment on a height the fortress no. 8 was built, which defended the road from Nagyigmánd and the portion of the camp which leied Westward from it. Inside it a log cabin was built for the guards.[30] The entrenched encampment was defended from the East by the Star Trench, built of stone, which was surrounded, both from right and left by three earth trenches. Between the Igmánd and "Star Trench" were the fortress no. 9. and 10., similar to the fortress no. 8.[31] Between the fortresses connecting obstacles were made, which were cut by gateways, through which the vanguards, the patrols and the units which executed sorties, coul get out or retreat back.[32] The encampment could be accessed through a pontoon bridge behind the Star Trench, and a bridge made over the Hadi-Island, protected by some cannon batteries.[33] The number of the cannons protecting the fortified encampment was 62 (among them four 24, six 18 pounder cannons and eight 10 pounder howitzers), but their exact number of them of each defensive position is unknown.[34]

The relatively plain ground surrounding the encampment was very suitable for a battle. This place was partially undulating, with low hill ridges and heights, without passing 20 meters height difference.[35] Although excepting the Ács wood no compact wooded areas were present on the battlefield, the heights in question enabled the passing of quite numerous units, and even cavalry troops between them without being detected by the enemy. There were only a few heights on this ground from which all the battlefield could be observed. One of them was a 133,5 m high heigh at 1 km West to the wineyards of Ószőny, the other one was the 139,8 m high hill, which was South-West from the Herkály waste.[36] Both these places will play crucial roles in the battle.[37] The ground was sandy, and in dry, sunny weather, this helped the commanders to detect the enemy movement thanks to the dust kicked up by them. In the day before 2 July it rained, but afterwards, and during the battle the weather was sunny, very hot, which at latest in the next days afternoon enabled huge dust to be kicked up.[38] The huge battleground south of the entrenchment was suitable for troop movements, which was facilitated even more by the dense cobbled roads network which criss crossed it. The only important obstacles on it were the Concó creek and the Ács wood.[39] For the troops which participated in the battle not the obstacles created problems but the huge distances between the Eastern and Western edge of it. Between the Concó creek and the Eastern edge of Ószőny (the twoo West-East extreme points of the battlefield) was 13,35 km distance.

The Ács forest stretched between Komárom in the north and Ács in the south, and was made of separate parts. It was 200 to 300 meters above sea level, with a slightly undulating surface.[40] From North it was bordered by the Danube, from the west by the Concó creek, from the east by wine-yards, and from South by the Herkály waste.[41] From north to south the woods were 3 to 3.5 kilometers long, and was very easy to cross because it had regular openings throughout it and the roads which crossed the woods.[42] The forest had smaller and bigger clearings, but there were also some thicker portions of oak trees. In some parts the forest was very thick, in which the people could not see over 30 to 50 steps ahead.[43] East from the Ács forest was an open field until the so called "Cherry Forest" (Meggyfa-erdő), which was 1 kilometer long and 0,5 km wide, then further to the East, was where Komárom's above mentioned defensive works started.[44]

Ószőny was a market town which lay outside Komárom's defensive system to the East. The locality was quite big, with 1754 inhabitants, with beautiful houses, a castle of the noble Zichy family, a granary, a guest house, a brewery and a toll bridge.[45] The town was crossed by the Buda-Vienna road, which was both a trade and a war route. Other routes, coming both from Tata and from South crossed the town. Ószőny was surrounded from many directions by swamps, and West from the town the Szila creek run into the Danube, but despite of these, Ószőny was quite accessible on the above mentioned roads.[46] The firing range of the cannons installed in the Star Trench could reach only to the Western boundary of Ószőny, but the grenades launched from the easternmost defenses of Komárom could reach the center of the town.[47]

The Herkály waste was near the village of Herkály, which was 4 km's away from the trenches of Komárom. South-East from the village it was a hill ridge which was wide enough to station a few brigades and batteries on it, and enabled to look over the battlefield.[48] This hill ridge secured protection to the troops which marched behind it, but it was not so abrupt to make difficult the climbing on the by the enemy. At 1,5 km South from it lies the bigger Csém waste, and 1 km to the North-West started the Southern section of the Ács forrest.[49]

Austrian troops:

• I. corps: 119 infantry companies and 16 cavalry squadrons = 18 523 men + 2340 horses + 54 cannons - led by Lieutenant-General Franz Schlik
• III. corps: 65 infantry companies and 14 cavalry squadrons = 12 558 men + 2338 horses + 42 cannons - led by Lieutenant-General Georg Heinrich von Ramberg
• IV. (Reserve) corps: 97 infantry companies and 8 cavalry squadrons = 15 549 men + 1880 horses + 48 cannons - led by Lieutenant-General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth
• Ramberg cavalry division: 32 cavalry squadrons = 4254 men + 4249 horses + 12 cannons - led by Lieutenant-General Philipp von Bechtold
• other units: 2187 men + 932 horses + 72 cannons
  

Russian troops:

• Panyutyin's (9th) division: 64 infantry companies = 11 672 men + 715 horses + 54 cannons - led by Major-General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin
  

These were in total 352 infantry companies and 70 cavalry squadrons = 64 743 men + 12 454 horses + 276 cannons - commander Field Marshal Lieutenant Julius Jacob von Haynau
The III corps did not participated in the battle, so the imperial troops engaged in the Second Battle of Komárom consisted from
287 infatry companies and 56 cavalry squadrons = 52 185 men + 10 116 horses + 234 cannons.[1]

According to Tamás Csikány in the Second Battle of Komárom Haynau commanded an army of 58 938 men (of which 12 907 were the Russian soldiers of Panyutyin) and 216 guns.[50]
The proportion of the infantry-cavalry-artillery of the imperial army was ideal for a modern army of that period: there were 3-4 cannons per 1000 soldiers, and the cavalry was one sixth of the army.[50]

The imperial infantry used mainly muzzleloaders, although the more modern breechloaders were already in use in the Prussian army, but the army commandment considered them not very accurate and using too much ammunition.[51] The infantry had mostly Augustin M 1842 smoothbore muzzleloader tube lock rifles, considered a modern weapon in those times, the effectiveness of which stretched to 250 meters, its hitting accuracy being around 75% within about 100 steps.[50] Another rifle used by the Austrian army was the 1842M kammerlader smoothbore rifled musket, which was more accurate and had a longer range thane the previous. The light infantry was equipped with short barrel smoothbore hunter rifle, which were more accurate and reliable than the smooth-barrelled hunter rifles used by the same units.[50]
The imperial cavalry used the 1844 M short and smooth-barrelled cavalry percussion carbines, which were effective over 50 steps. They used the handguns in the close-combat, but their main weapon were the swords and sabers.[50]

The morale of the imperial troops was high, due to the succession of victories achieved by Haynau, after he took over the Austrian army in Hungary. The presence of the young emperor, Franz Joseph the I., together with the Archdukes Ferdinand Maximilian and Karl Ludwig in the camp contributed even more to their high morale before the battle.[50][52]

According to Róbert Hermann, the Hungarian army was composed by the following corps and units:

• II. corps: 61 infantry companies and 8 cavalry squadrons = 5925 men + 885 horses for riding + 411 horses for carriages + 37 cannons - led by Colonel József Kászonyi
  
• III. corps: 53 infantry companies and 12 cavalry squadrons = 7766 men + 1293 horses for riding + 520 horses for carriages + 40 cannons - led by General György Klapka
  
• VII. corps: 57 infantry companies and 18 cavalry squadrons = 10 661 men + 2683 horses for riding + 663 horses for carriages + 46 cannons - led by General Ernő Poeltenberg
  
• units of the VIII. corps: 20 infantry companies = 2444 men + 10 horses for riding + 55 horses for carriages + 8 cannons - led by Colonel János Janik
  

These were in total 191 infantry companies and 38 cavalry squadrons = 26 796 men + 4871 horses + 1649 horses for carriages + 131 cannons - commander General Artúr Görgei[1]

According to Tamás Csikány in the Second Battle of Komárom Görgei commanded an army of 27 400 men and 134 guns.[53] The proportion of the infantry-cavalry-artillery of this Hungarian army was characterized by a high percentage of the cavalry, this making almost one fourth of the entire army. Near Komárom the Hungarian artillery was supported also by the cannons of the fortress, but moving further from the trenches the numerical superiority of the enemy artillery was undisputed.[53]

The Hungarian army was equipped with all kinds of weapons which could be acquired in every way possible (hunter rifles, parade weapons, etc.). While the Austrian and Russian troops weapons were standardized, using the same weapon-type, considered to be the most efficient, for a particular military branch, the Hungarians usually used what they could find.[53] Some of their flints were modern percussion rifles, or tube lock firearms, but their majority was mainly old, outdated riffles, flintlock pistols. In the field of swords, used mostly by the hussars, who made up almost the entire cavalry, the diversity was even greater. Some of them were quite modern, but many of the swords, or their blades were remnants from the Turkish wars of the 16-17 centuries. So in the Hungarian army we cannot talk about uniformity in the field of weapons.[53]

Because of the defeats from the previous engagements, the morale of the Hungarian troops was lower than the imperials, but they still believed that Görgei's military genius will prevail. They believed that these failures were only minor setbacks, and with a counterattack similar to the Spring Campaign, the final victory can be achieved.[53] But the officers and especially Görgei, because of the alarming news from the Russian invasion and his worsening conflict with Kossuth, felt an ever growing stress and concern.[53] The Hungarian troops, quartered in the barracks or in the trenches of Komárom, were more rested than the moving imperials. An important problem was the fact that many of the Hungarian soldiers, especially those which were part of the VIII corps, designated to defend the fortress, had no close combat experience.[53]

After the victory from Győr on 28 June, the strategic purpose of Field Marshal Lieutenant Julius von Haynau was to march to Buda and Pest, and occupy the capitals before the Russians arrived there. He wanted to obtain a decisive victory against the Hungarians, and force them to capitulate before the Russians could do the same, demonstrating in this way that he won the war without the Russian help.[50] But the fortress of Komárom was in his way, and he knew that he cannot continue his way towards Buda and Pest, and letting behind the extensive fortifications, which could hide tens of thousands of Hungarian soldiers, who could disrupt his troops supply routs, line of communications, and could organize attacks towards Pozsony or even Vienna.[50] Haynau had no clue how many Hungarian soldiers were in Komárom, so he knew that he must detach an important part of his army to blockade the fortress. But this could endanger his plan of winning the war without the Russian help. He hoped that only a smaller Hungarian corps remained in the fortress, if so, he could continue his march towards the capitals with an army big enough to win the war, leaving behind smaller units to blockade the fortress.[54] For that he did not planned a siege or a big battle, he just planned a demonstration of force, thanks to which he hoped to chase the Hungarian units in the fortress, to organize the blockade around it, and then quickly move on with his army towards Buda and Pest.[54]
On the other hand General Artúr Görgei did not planned anything for that day. His conflict with Kossuth and the Hungarian government preoccupied him at that moment, and their contradictory orders resulted in his and his staffs total indecision and perplexity. Trying to obey the order of the Council of Ministers, about the retreat of the Hungarian troops towards Eastern Hungary, Görgei waited for the arrival of the scattered units of the I corps, in order to start his march in the next day.[55] But Görgei and his officers were against this plan, preferring their old plan of fighting with the Austrians at Komárom, and because of this they did not hurried the units of the I corps. This is why the I corps led by General József Nagysándor moved very slowly, and did not arrived to Komárom before or during the battle. Görgei did not expected an Austrian attack on 2 July.[55] So the Hungarian leadership was characterized by an indecision between their own plan and the order of the Government, and Görgei did not expected a battle on 2 July.[56]

The majority of the Hungarian units of the VIII corps were positioned on the Nádor-line (the defensive line which defended the city of Komárom from the North) at the left bank of the Danube.[55]
But the majority of the Hungarian troops were positioned on the right (Southern) bank of the Danube in the fortified trenches which defended the fortress from the South. The detached four battalions of the Janik-division, which belonged to the VIII corps defended the 1.,2., 3. defensive works, the 4-7. defensive works were guarded by the VII corps, and in the last three defensive works (8-10.), together with the Star Trench (Csillagsánc) the III corps was stationed.[55] The camp beside the trenches was occupied by the II corps, which was kept as the reserve.[55] Around the fortress there were infantry and cavalry patrols, which had to announce the Hungarian troops if the Austrian troops attacked, but except of them, no serious Hungarian reconnaissance was organized, and no strategical point around the fortress (for example the, or the town of Ószőny) was seriously strengthened and assured with troops.
During the battle

The West flank
In the moment the battle started, the forest of Ács, which assured the fortress from the West, and in which the longest fight of the battle was about to start, was held only by a few Hungarian units: the 71. battalion and the Straube-column of the VIII corps, two companies and the jägers of the 51. battalion of the VII corps, and some Hussar units.[55]
In the second phase of the battle the VII Hungarian corps, led by General Ernő Poeltenberg joined the fight, and dominated the military actions from the Hungarian side. Poeltenberg's corps had two divisions, one cavalry brigade, and the reserve platoon, which was 10 468 soldiers and 44 cannons. The VII corps was supported also by some units of the II corps, of 5925 soldiers and 37 cannons (two infantry and one cavalry division). But because of being the reserve of the Hungarian army, only a part of it took part in the battle.[57]
The Austrian troop designated to attack the Ács forrest was the I corps led by Lieutenant General count Franz Schlik of Bassano and Weissenkichen, one of the most respected and capable generals in the enemy army. The I. corps consisted of two divisions with four infantry and a cavalry brigade, and the artillery reserve, made of 19 000 soldiers and 54 cannons.[55]

The East flank
The main strategical point of this flank was the town of Ószőny, which in the battle will play a key role. For the defense of this flank the III corps led by General Károly Leiningen-Westerburg was designated. The corps had two infantry and one cavalry divisions, consisting of 6892 infantry soldiers, 1494 Hussars and 46 cannons. This corps, which, under the lead of General János Damjanich, who led the corps until 27 April, when he broke his leg, was one of the most renowned corps of the Hungarian army. The 3. and the 9. (red capped) divisions, or the 3. division of the 19. (Schwarzenberg) infantry regiment were considered some of the bravest units of the Hungarian army.[58] In the days before the battle in the town of Ószőny no Hungarian unit was placed, these being stationed in the above mentioned fortifications around Komárom. The 9'th division was stationed in the Star Trench, and in the ramparts around it, while the 3'd division in the 8. fortress. Ószőny and the roads around it, were observed by Hungarian Hussar units and a few cavalry batteries.[59] The Austrian troops which were about to attack Ószőny were the Benedek-brigade of the IV (Reserve) corps and the Simschen-cavalry brigade of the I corps. The Benedek-brigade was led by the Hungarian Major-General Ludwig von Benedek, consisting of 5 infantry battalions, 8 chevau-léger cavalry squadrons and 12 cannons. The Simbschen-brigade was led by Colonel Karl von Simbschen, consisting of 16 cavalry (6 chevau-léger, 2 dragoon and 8 lancer) squadrons and 6 cannons.[60]

The Center
The Herkály waste was the centre of the battlefield, but it will have a role only in the final part of the battle, in the famous cavalry battle.[61] At the start of the battle the Herkály waste was held by the IV. (Reserve) corps, made of 15 549 soldiers led by Lieutenant-General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth, but at the first parts of the battle his troops were only watching the fights from the other places, and the battles most emblematic and crucial confruntation will happen here only in its final stage.[62]

The brigades of Schlik's I corps had the following orders. The Sartori-brigade, together with the 6. jäger battalion, had to advance in parallel with the Reischach-brigade, and occupy the middle portion of the woods. The Bianchi-brigade with the 5. 12 pounder artillery battery, had to support the Sartori-brigade, advancing on their behind.
The Ludwig-cavalry brigade had to occupy the southern portion of the Ács-woods, and to try to keep the connection with Wohlgemuth's reserve corps from the Herkály waste.
The Schneider-brigade was ordered to remain in reserve on the heights in front of Ács.[63]
The Reischach-brigade, after crossing the bridge over the Concó river, had to advance along the Danube, and to occupy the vineyards behind the woods, then the Northern side of the Ács-woods.
On 2 July, the Austrian military activity started at 5 o'clock. The sappers started to build a bridge over the Concó at 5 o clock, ending it at 7,45. Their work was supervised and protected by five infantry and jäger platoons and a half battery of rockets.[64] The Ludwig cavalry brigade started the advancement at 7 o'clock, occupying his designated positions on the right wing of Schlik's brigades, supporting the troops with artillery fire.[65] The Reischach-brigade reached the Ács-wood without important opposition, but here they met Hungarian units which threatened the two Austrian platoons which marched on the shores of the Danube.[64] Seeing this the commander of the brigade Major General Sigmund Reischach personally led a bayonet charge with the Landwehr-battalion, supported by the imperial jägers, against which the Hungarians could not withstand, and started to flee towards the Danube.[64]
The commander of the Hungarian right flank General Poeltenberg, seeing the Imperial advance and the retreat of the Hungarian vanguards, commanded an immediate counter attack with four battalions of the Janik-division and four battalions of the Liptay-brigade, from the VII corps, together with some hussar units, but, lacking artillery support, the units were pushed back immediately by the vigour of the imperials, and their numerical superiority. The inexperienced Hungarians started to flee in disorder.[66] Seeing the success of Landwehr-battalion, the other Austrian battalions too started to charge and chase the Hungarians, but as they neared to 1,5 km from the Hungarian fortified encampment from Komárom, their 12 and 24 pounder cannons started to cause more and more damage among them. This did not stopped the Reischach-brigade, which continued the chasing of the Hungarians, while Reischach put the rockets to respond to the cannons.[67] Although Haynau forbid him to attack Komárom's trenches and defensive works, Reischahch did not stopped his brigade, when they got near to those, furthermore he ordered the two battalions of jägers, and the 1. battalion of the Parma-infantry regiment and the Landwehr-battalion to lead the attack.[68] The charging imperials occupied a portion of the Hungarian defensive works, managing to chase out the Hungarians also from the wine yards which were left to the defence.[69] The I. Austrian battalion then neared to the Fortification nr. 1. of Komárom from which they were met with strong cannonade and shootings, retreating behind a hill nearby.[70] In the meanwhile the Parma infantry occupied another Hungarian trench, in which remained cannons too, so they turned them on the fleeing Hungarians, shooting in them.[70] In the same time two companies of the 6. jäger battalion with a bayonet charge occupied two trenches, while the 3. company captured a Hungarian howitzer. Here they were hit by the cannonade and shootings from the Fortification nr. 1., and retreated in disorder behind the same hill as the Parma-infantry. After this attack, still three smaller defences in front of Fortification nr. 1 remained in the hands of the Reischach-brigade. They also took over two 12 pounder, another 18 pounder cannons, one mortar, and an ammunition wagon.[70] In order to keep these defences in the brigades hands, the Bianchi-brigade sent its 5. 12 pounder battery, as well a cavalry battery sent by Lieutenant General Lichtenstein.[70] At 7 o'clock, in the center of the left flank the Sartori-brigade, the 6. jäger battalion and the 11. rocket battery, preceded by skirmishers entered the Ács wood, and only after a while, at a big clearing, they met a Hungarian infantry and a jäger brigade who attacked them, but with the help of the rockets the imperials counter attacked, and pushed the Hungarians out of the wood.[71] The Sartoris continued their attack to help the Reisach-brigade, and after their artillery and rockets chased away the Hungarian batteries, complemented with three battalions of the Archduke Ludwig infantry regiment, advancing in two lines (in the first the infantry, followed by the jägers) they cleared the wheat fields which lied after the woods, until a line of hills with some burned houses.[72] Here the brigade rested, then a staff officer came and ordered them to send reinforcements to the Reisach-brigade to keep the occupied Hungarian trenches in Austrian hands. A platoon of jägers and another one of infantry advanced to the closest defence to the Danube.[73] But here the Hungarian artillery shooting from an island of the Danube, hit the Sartori-brigade hard, and the Hungarian counter attack forced them to retreat from the defence occupied by them.[74] The Bianchi-brigade, enforced the Sartori-brigades right wing. After arriving there, they suffered a lot from the Hungarian artillery behind the trenches.[75] At this moment arrived Görgei on the battlefield. He did not expected a battle for that day, this is why in the night from 1 to 2 July, foresensing that Kossuth will remove him from the leadership of the army, Görgei was dictating a memorandum to Kálmán Rochlitz, one of his officers, in which he explained his actions, thinking that the government propaganda will blame him for every military failure. Towards dawn suddenly he heard cannon fire from the direction of Monostor. One of his officers came, and reported him that the battle has begun. Görgei immediately stood up, and departed, saying to Rochlitz: We will resume it [the writing of the memorandum] at evening, and then to his chief of general staff: Or maybe this will be not needed. Adieu Bayer![76] Görgei immediately went to the battlefield. On his way he met general Kalpka, with whom the discussed the situation, and agreed that Klapka will lead the operations on the left flank, while Görgei will go on the right flank, to stop the imperial advance in the porttion of the battlefield, attacked by Schlik's corps.[77] Görgei and his staff arrived on the right flank, Poeltenberg's troops were retreating in disorder, and not even the high commanders appearance could not stopped them. Görgei saw with his own eyes how the enemy brigades occupied the trenches with the Hungarian cannons and ammunition.[78] He immediately tried to reoccupy the lost trenches with the 71. battalion, which, organized in three columns, counterattacked, and with bayonnet charge, with heavy losses, reoccupied the lost three trenches. But lacking the support of other Hungarian units, and being attacked by the Austrians from the direction of the Danube, they had to retreat again.[79] The further advancement of the imperials was finally stopped by the Hungarian artillery from the fortress and from the Hadi-Island of the Danube, as well the cannons from the 1. bastion of the Nádor-line from the other shore of the Danube.[80] But this did not stopped the fleeing Hungarian right wing, hit hardly by the Austrian rockets, to continue their retreat in disorder, which put in danger the trenches and all the Hungarian fortifications from the right shore of the Danube, which could be catastrophical for the Hungarian army, because the way for the Austrians was open towards Újszőny and the Danube bridge, which could caused the cutting of the Hungarian troops way back to Komárom, and eventually their encirclement and surrender.[81] To prevent this Görgei decided to stop them at all cost, so he ordered to a cavalry battery to move towards the shore of the Danube, and to fill two cannons with grapeshots, and to shot in his fleeing soldiers.[82] He took this drastic measure, although he mistakenly thought, that his younger brother, Captain István Görgey, was among the fleeing soldiers, but he felt that he has no other choice to save his army.[83] The cannons shot twice in them, and because the soldiers did not halted, but turned and run in disorder towards the Austrians.[84] So he ordered to the soldiers of the 48 battalion to shot a salvo in them. Finally these shootings and a group of Hussars managed to stop and reorganize the fleeing soldiers, and he finally could now to start to organize the counter-attack.[85]

The IV. (reserve) corps under Lieutenant-General Wohlgemuth, started their march from the Csém waste towards the Herkály waste, designated as the Center at 4,30 o'clock. They departed under the encourageing eyes of emperor Franz Joseph the I., the Archdukes Ferdinand Maximilian and Karl Ludwig and the staff of the imperial headquarters, probably parading on the music of the military band.[86] At Csém Haynau established his headquarters for this battle, and here remained the emperor and the two archdukes to observe the military operations.[87] Csém was not a good choice because near Herkály streched a row of hills, which hid Komárom and the area which lay before it from Haynau's and his staffs eyes.[88]
When the IV. corps departed, their duty was to advance on the road towards Újszőny to the Herkály waste, and to establish contact with Schlik's I. corps.[89] When the IV corps approached to Herkály, General Benedek, the leader of the brigade, named after him, sent one of his infantry companies and a half company of chevau-légers, which, advanced, forming a skirmish line, but they were attacked by the Hussars, and forced to retreat.[90] At 8 o'clock the IV. corps arrived to the Herkály waste and occupied their designated positions, and the strategic heights. From Herkály Wohlgemuth's troops supported both Schlik's corps advance on the left flank through the Ács woods towards Komárom, and also started to show activity towards Ószőny, on the right wing, engaging mainly in artillery duels with the Hungarian batteries.[91] General Benedek's brigade had the orders to move towards Ószőny, while the Bechtold cavalry brigade from the right wing of the IV. corps was ordered to support them.

The initial order of Haynau towards the commander of the IV. (Reserve) Corps, Wohlgemuth, was to carry out a reconnaissance the Eastern flank, and to find out if in Ószőny is held, and if the road towards Esztergom and Buda is secured by important Hungarian troops.[92] Wohlgemuth assigned for this duty the brigade of Major-General Ludwig (Lajos) von Benedek, who, prior to this battle, was already successful in commanding the vanguards.[93]

The Benedek-brigade departed from the region of the Herkály-waste, and started its march towards Ószőny around 9 o'clock, arriving in its viciniy around 11.[94] In the way towards their goal, they were hit from distance by the Hungarian artillery from the Star Trench, but they did not suffered too much from them.[95] When the Benedek-brigade, reinforced by the Simbschen cavalry brigade, arrived in the vicinity of Ószőny, the cavalry of Leiningen's Hungarian III. corps with two cavalry battery moved foreward to meet them. The leader of the III. corps cavalry, Colonel Gusztáv Pikéthy ordered this bold move to his hussars although he had no informations about the number and composition of the enemy troops. In this action participated the Ferdinánd hussar regiment, two squadrons of the Hannover hussars, the 3th and the 5th cavalry batteries, started to move towards the vineyards of Ószőny, trying to move around the Austrian Simbschen cavalry brigade.[96] The Hungarian batteries, guarded by a battalion of hussars, moved forward to meet the Austrians distancing themselves from the bulk of the Hussar companies.[97] The Hungarian batteries crossed the Szila creek, limbered and were preparing their cannons to shoot, when the Austrian chevau-légers appeared galloping towards them at 200 steps distance, while the lancers attacked the Hussars.[98] The Hungarian artillery fired towards the chevau-légers, but because they were on a hill, the grapeshot just fled over the lancers heads, living them practically unharmed.[99]

In the same time the lancers advanced towards the hussar battalion. Right in the moment when the lancers were galloping towards the hussars, one of the Hungarians ammunition waggons exploded, which threw the Hungarian ranks in confusion, helping the Austrians to chase them away.[100] On the other flank the imperial chevau-légers which attacked the batteries, split in two, and one battalion of them attacked the hussar battalion designed to guard the batteries, while their other battalion attacked the batteries from the left.[101] Because of the inefficiency of the Hungarian grapeshot and the explosion of their ammunition waggon, the Hungarian batteries and the hussars were overwhelmed; the majority of the Hungarian artillerists were killed by the Austrian cavalrymen, and only a few could escape, hiding in the bushes and among the trees alongside the Szila creek. The guns, two ammunition waggons and the limbers were captured by the Austrian cavalrymen, while the hussars fled towards the wineyards of Ószőny, chased by the imperial cavalrymen.[102]

The hussars considered the loss of the artillery a great damage for their reputation. As Major Emil Zámbory, one of the Ferdinánd hussars officers, later wrote: This loss depressed our hussars very deeply, because our regiment had not suffered such a shame even in the time of [the wars with] Napoleon, the less in the 1848 and 1849 campaign.[103] The hussars from the two regiments attacked the lancers from the left flank, surprizing the chevau-légers, which retreated in disorder, leaving the captured Hungarian batteries behind. They were reorganized with the help of the Austrian war minister Lieutenant General Count Ferenc Gyulai present on the battlefield, and sent back against the hussars, with whom they fought on a plain West to the wineyards.[104] The Austrian cavalry was supported from the distance by the artillery of the Benedek-brigade, installed on a height behind the wineyards. The fight was very harsh, both sides suffering heavy losses, but the Austrians managed to keep the cannons. The hussars reorganized, and 69 of them attacked again, but ae hidden Austrian infantry unit fired on them from the wineyards of Ószőny, wounding 20 of them and many horses.[105] The hussars retreated, but wanted to attack again, but in that moment, around 5 o'clock General György Klapka, the commander of the Hungarian left flank arrived, and, despite their objections, ordered them to retreat behind the trenches. According to Tamás Csikány, in that moment he was affraid that the Austrian troops attacking the Hungarian right flank, could break in the fortified encampment of Komárom, and occupy it, cutting their way across the Danube back into the fortress of Komárom.[106]

During these cavalry skirmishes, General Benedek sent out the 1. company of his jäger battalion to find out if Ószőny is protected by Hungarian infantry and artillery.[107] After the Hungarian hussars stopped the fight, and the scouts reported that in Ószőny is almost completely unprotected by the Hungarian troops, Lajos Benedek ordered to his brigade to occupy the town, in which the Benedek infantry brigade and the Simbschen cavalry brigade entered, heavily barricading all its entrances.[108]

Although Görgei, with the help of grape-shots and salvos, which definitely caused many wounds and maybe even deaths, he managed to stop his soldiers fleeing, he knew that he cannot recapture the lost defences with them. He let them in the hands of the artillery colonel Mór Psotta, then rode to the II. corps, which, according to Lieutenant Alajos Beniczky, waited inpantiently under the heavy bombardment of the enemy artillery.[109] Petty officer Endre Mihálka in his memoirs wrote that Görgei stopped before the 48. battalion, known as one of the most renown units of the Hungarian army, and asked its leader, Major Samu Rakovszky, if his soldiers can chase away the enemy from the trenches, which they occupied from the Hungarians? Rakovszky turned to his soldiers and shouted:

You heard what Mr. General said?

The soldiers, as one man, shouted back:

We will occupy it! Yes, we will chase them out! Long live the homeland! Long live Görgei![110]

Then Görgei rode to the 63. battalion, asking them to support the counter-attack of the 48. battalion. He sent also one of his adjutants to the Dom Miguel battalion to ask them the same thing. The adjutant did what his commander ordered, but he heard somebodies voice from the battalion:

Every time only the Dom-Miguel!

The adjutant turned back to Görgei and reported him about this. Gorgei galloped to the Dom Miguels, who already started their march towards the enemy, and shouted:

Stop! Who was [the man] who replied?

Nobody stepped forwards, so Görgei continued:

I ask, who was that? - If he had the courage to speak [then], now he must have the courage to identify himself!

A young lieutenant stepped forward from the ranks. Görgei drew his sword, and struck on the officers head, then he shouted to the troops:

Move forward!

Then he continued to ride to the other battalions too, and ask them personally to participate in the counter-attack.[111]

The Hungarian troops, led by the 48. battalion and Dom Miguel battalion of the II. corps, started the attack against the defences occupied by the Austrians. In this attack engaged also the units of the VII. and VIII. corps, stopped from fleeing by the grapeshots and salvos ordered by Görgei.[112] The Hungarian battalions did not attacked in compact formations as before, but advanced in loose formation with fixed bayonets, using, against the hails bullets of the enemy, the piles of bricks brought there before for, the unfinished construction of the trenches from Monostor, and firing back.[113] And when they passed the portion with the piles of bricks, twoo pltatoons of the 48. battalion, charged the Austrian artillery, recapturing the lost Hungarian cannons.[114] The Reischach brigade fought harshly but finally it was forced to leave back almost all the previously captured Hungarian cannons and ammunition carriages, although they spiked the cannons or pushed them in the Danube.[115]

In the meantime the rest of the battalion attacked the Austrian jägers, who retreated from the trenches to the wineyard, and, hiding in ditches, continued to shoot on them. A bayonet skirmish started, and a part of the defeated jägers started to root towards the Ács woods, while the others lay on the ground, surrendering themselves to the Hungarians.[116] In the same time the Dom Miguel battalion attacked another trench occupied by the Austrians, and after a short fight, chase them out from their positions.[117]

Görgei, seeing the success of his elite troops, ordered them to continue the attack.[118] The newly created inexperienced units of the VIII. corps, which were formerly chasen out of the defences, returned there, occuying their pre-battle positions again, while the elite battalions of the II. corps (except some of them, like the 56. battalion which he recalled to defend the 4. earth fortification) reinforced by the VII. corps were ordered to attack the troops of Schlik retreated in the Ács woods.[119] The Hungarian troops led by General Poeltenberg, started the advancement around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. He positioned his infantry and artillery towards the center, while his cavalry attacked the Southern projection of the woods.[120]

The fight to recapture the Ács woods started with heavy artillery duel, as the Hungarian infantry units slowly advanced towards the forrest. First the 51. battalion from the right flank, managed to enter in the woods. Here, the skirmish lines and the communication between the soldiers broke, and a harsh, man against man, from tree to tree fight begun. Because of this, as the leader of the battalion remembered, many times the soldiers from a rear rows wrongly started to shoot at their comrades from the front row, this causing further breaks in the skirmish lines, and the retreat of many of the soldiers.[121] This was explained as a sign that the Hungarian soldiers were not trained for the forrest fight.[122] This caused some important losses to the Hungarians, like for example when the 1 Hungarian battalion, breaking apart from the other battalions, managed to encircle an Austrian unit, but suddenly they were attacked from two directions by the enemy with bayonets, as a result of which the battalion fell apart, and an Austrian officer, Armand Schaumburg, with eight soldiers, went to them, demanding them to hand over their flag. When a Hungarian captain with 30 soldiers attacked the Austrians, these responded with a salvo, and Schaumburg cut the Hungarian captain, which convinced the 50-60 Hungarian soldiers to surrender, handing over the battalions flag and drum, which was considered an important shame to the unit.[123]

The chances of success of th Hungarian counter-attack were augmented by the fact that Görgei noticed that the enemy troops from the center of the battlefield (the Csém and Herkály wastes) disappeared almost completely, and this convinced him to order the units of the II. corps, which he kept in reserve in the fortified encampment of Komárom - mainly cavalry and artillery - to support the VII. corps.[124]

The cause of the retreat of the Austrian troops from the center of the battlefield was Haynau's misjudgement of the situation on the battlefield. Hearing about the successful Austrian advance on the Western wing, and the Hungarian's rout, caused by Schlik's forces, he taught that his troops achieved their goal: the locking of the Hungarian army behind the walls of Komárom. He taught that the battle is over, and now he has only to create a strong blockade from South around the fortress, and on the next day he can move towards Buda and Pest with the rest of his army.[125] As a result of this, at 10,30 o'clock, he ordered to the Lichtenstein-division of the I. corps to move to the Herkály waste, the Wallmoden division to hold the Concó creeks line, while the IV (reserve) corps had to retreat from Herkály to Mocsa, the III. corps to Nagyigmánd, Panyutyun's Russian division to Csém, while Benedek's infantry and Bechtold's cavalry divisions had to guard Ószőny.[126] Schlik seemed to agree with Haynau's order, because of the ever growing Hungarian pression over his troops, forwarding it to his brigades. Unfortunately the Reischach brigade, which was in continuous fight with the advancing Hungarians had to retreat under a tremendous pression, this causing panic and disorder among them. Lieutenant field marshal Karl von Wallmoden-Gimborn the commander of a cavalry division tried to relieve them from the Hungarian pression, by ordering to portions of the Sartori brigade, reinforced with battalions of other brigades, to hold the Western edge of the clearing behind the "Cherry forrest", to replace them and to pull back the Hungarians.[127] Colonel Sartori received this order around 2 o'clock, sent the brigades artillery behind the Concó, and placed the infantry battalions on the designated area, managing from this position to push back the pursuing Hungarians for a while, but the counter-attack of the Hungarian skirmishers, forced the Austrians to restart their retreat, but now in a more ordered, phased manner. They crossed to the Western shore of the Concó creek under the protection of the Braisach battalion and the 17. six pounder battery.[128]

The attack of the Hungarian infantry in the Ács woods was supported by the Hungarian artillery, which also helped the cavalries attack against the Southern portion of the forrest.[129] The Hungarians assembled on this wing around 10 batteries with circa 80 cannons, which, because their unusually high number, were very hard to be coordinated. This created instability among the artillerists, who, sensing the ever growing Austrian pressure, started to pull back.[130] Sensing the danger, Görgei appeared with his staff, and according to the memoirs of an artillerist, after he shortly surveyed from a platform the battlefield, then, relying on a gun barrel, he wrote on a paper the following words:

Why [you] retreat constantly, why [you] not advance, is there no Hungarian left, who is ready to die for the homeland?

Then, after descending from the platform, gave the paper to an adjutant, then Görgei galopped with his staff towards the battlefield. This short order had an important effect on the artillerists, who started to push forwards, forcing the enemy to retreat towards their camp.[131]

The Hungarian artilleries effective fire helped the hussars of the II. corps to occupy the territory between the Herkály waste and the Southern projection of the Ács forrest, which forced the Austrian brigade holding the Southern section of the woods, to retreat. Their retreat was caused also by the Hungarian infantry battalions, which pressured them from the left.[132] The cavalry of the Hungarian VII. corps tried also to put pressure on the retreating Austrians, but they were attacked from the left by an imperial cavalry brigade. Seeing this, general Poeltenberg rushed there with two cavalry batteries.[133]

The Hungarian attack forced Schlik's corps to retreat from the Ács woods, pushing them back on the other side of the Concó creek, and if the and a successful attack of the Hungarian cavalry on the Austrian right wing would had been successful, then the Austrian 1. corps would had been cut from rest of the imperial army, producing catastrophical results for them, because Poeltenberg's troops could drive Schlik's units in the Danube, but in the last moment from Panyutyin's Russian division and Simbscne's cavalry brigade.[134]