Thornton v. United States

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of an automobile's occupant, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution allows the officer to search the vehicle's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest.[1] Thornton extended New York v. Belton, ruling that it governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle. Thornton also suggests a separate justification for an evidentiary search "when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."[2]

Thornton v. United States
Argued March 31, 2004
Decided May 24, 2004
Full case nameMarcus Thornton, Petitioner v. United States
Citations541 U.S. 615 (more)
124 S.Ct. 2127; 158 L. Ed. 2d 905; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3681
ArgumentOral argument
Case history
Prior325 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2003); cert. granted, 540 U.S. 980 (2003).
Holding
Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
PluralityRehnquist, joined by Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer
ConcurrenceO'Connor
ConcurrenceScalia, joined by Ginsburg
DissentStevens, joined by Souter
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV

Thornton and Belton were distinguished by Arizona v. Gant,[3] which restricted searches incident to arrest to circumstance where: 1) it is reasonable to believe that the arrested individual might access the vehicle at the time of the search; or 2) it is reasonable to believe that arrested individual's vehicle contains evidence of the offense that led to the arrest; or 3) the officer has probable cause to believe that there may be evidence of a crime concealed within the vehicle. Thus, while Arizona v. Gant modifies the search incident to arrest doctrine, it also leaves intact certain legal justifications for warrantless searches set forth in Chimel v. California,[4] Thornton, and United States v. Ross.[5]

See also

References
  1. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).  This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  2. 541 U.S. at 632.
  3. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
  4. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
  5. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

Further reading
  • Ball, Dane C. (2005). "Thornton v. United States: Blurring Belton′s Bright Line Rule Spells Disaster for Lower Courts and the Fourth Amendment". Southwestern University Law Review. 35: 1. ISSN 0886-3296.
  • Dery, G.; Hernandez, M. J. (2005). "Turning a Government Search into a Permanent Power: Thornton v. United States and the 'Progressive Distortion' of Search Incident to Arrest". William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal. 14 (2): 677–710. ISSN 1065-8254.
  • Jones, C. J. (2006). "Thornton v. United States: Expanding the Scope of Search Incident to Arrest on America's Roadways". American Journal of Trial Advocacy. 30: 627. ISSN 0160-0281.
  • Lewis, J. (2004). "To Serve and Protect: Thornton v. United States and the Newly Anemic Fourth Amendment". Mercer Law Review. 56: 1471. ISSN 0025-987X.
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