Angola–United States relations

Starting in the 1970s, the U.S. supported the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and then UNITA, insurgents opposing the ruling political party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Geopolitical situation, 1978–79.

  SWAPO allies

  South African allies

  South West Africa (Namibia)

  South Africa

When it was discovered that Communist Cuba had 30,000 troops in Angola,[1] the Republican administration of President Ford attempted to counter them. This was thwarted by the Tunney/Clark amendment, passed by a Democratic congress forbidding any involvement.[2]

The United States opposed Angola's membership in the United Nations from its declaration of independence in 1975 to its acceptance in December 1976. Angola did not have formal relations with the United States until 1993.[3]

Fidel Castro regarded the attitude of the United States:

Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before 11 November? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of Internationalism.[4]

In a meeting by the National Security Council (NSC) on 27 June 1975 including President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA Director William Egan Colby among others, the U.S. took a closer look at the development in Angola, especially after they became aware of Soviet aid for the MPLA. They found that the Portuguese left the country without any preparation for independence. It was clear that whoever owned the capital owned the country, similar to the situation during the civil war in the Congo, where the U.S. helped their allies succeed in holding the capital Leopoldville, thus eventually securing or regaining control of all of Zaire.[5]

The U.S. considered neutrality or a diplomatic campaign, both of which Kissinger dismissed. In the further course of the conversation President Ford declared, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get "his man" in first, referring to Savimbi. Secretary Schlesinger thought that the US "might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources". In any case success must be certain before anything is done otherwise the US should remain neutral. For the president it was unacceptable to do nothing. He ordered the preparation of options.[6]

The United States had known of South Africa's covert invasion plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as the version in his memoirs and what President Ford told the Chinese, who were worried about South African engagement in Angola.[7][8]

A report by Henry Kissinger of 13. January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:

. There follows an updated situation report based on classified sources.[9]

• A: Diplomatic
• (1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Addis Ababa. During the just concluded Organization for African Unity (OAU) meeting, one .....(delegation?), headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, PCC ? Official concerned with Africa and Middle East and member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Algeria prior to the OAU meeting. Another Cuban delegation was headed by Cuba's ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
• (2) In late December early January an MPLA delegation visited Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela and Panama to obtain support for its cause. The delegation is still in the region.
• B: Military
• (1) It is estimated that Cuba may now have as many as 9,000 troops in Angola, based on the number of Cuban airlifts and sealifts which have presently transited Angola. Military assistance to the MPLA may have cost Cuba the equivalent of U.S. $30 million. This figure includes the value of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola, the costs of transporting men and materiel, and the cost of maintaining troops in the field.
• (2) Cuban troops bore the brunt of fighting in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week which resulted in MPLA capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partially at the request of the SWAPO (South Africas Peoples Organization).
• (3) Eight Soviet fighters, probably MiG-17s, are reported being assembled in Luanda. These fighters arrived from an unknown source at the end of December. Eight MiGs, type unknown, are expected to be sent to Angola from Nigeria, numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots are operating many aircraft now available to the MPLA including a Fokker Friendship F-27. The Cubans will operate the MiGs.
• (4) Cuban troops are in complete control of Luanda by January 9. They are conducting all security patrols, operating police checkpoints, and will apparently soon assume control of Luanda's airport complex.
• (5) Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-42 aircraft (Soviet) in its airlift support operations. The IL-42 has double the capacity of Bristol Britannias and IL ? which Cuba has previously employed and has a longer range as well. IL-42 left Havana for Luanda Jan. 10. and Jan. 11.
• C: Other: All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.

In 1977, Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA's representative to the United States, convinced the U.S. to shift their support from the FNLA to UNITA following the MPLA's decisive defeat of the FNLA at the Battle of Quifangondo.[10]

Despite human rights concerns, Carter continued U.S. support for Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, who defeated Angolan-backed insurgents in conflicts known as Shaba I and Shaba II. Until 1975, Washington ignored southern Africa because the Cold War was in play there. Weak insurgencies existed in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia, but did not appear to threaten white rule after the colonial powers left. The collapse of the last colonial power, Portuguese, in April 1974 meant the end of white rule in Angola and Mozambique. Cuba, with Soviet help, sent a large military force. It took control of Angola in 1976. The region now became a Cold War battleground. The Carter administration negotiated endlessly with South Africa and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), which was the guerrilla movement fighting for the independence of Namibia from South Africa. Vance and Brzezinski battled over policy but the U.S. never sent troops. Instead Cuba and the Soviet Union strongly supported the Namibian insurgents and 20,000 Cuban soldiers were poised in neighboring Angola. The Carter team failed to find a solution.[11][12]

War between western supported movements and the communist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and Cuban forces had produced to decades of civil war that cost up to 1 million lives.[13] The Reagan administration offered covert aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a group of anti-communist and pro capitalist fighters led by Jonas Savimbi, whose attacks were backed by South Africa and the US.

Human rights observers have accused the MPLA of "genocidal atrocities," "systematic extermination," "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity."[14] The MPLA held blatantly rigged elections in 1992, which were rejected by eight opposition parties. An official observer wrote that there was little UN supervision, that 500,000 UNITA voters were disenfranchised and that there were 100 clandestine polling stations. UNITA sent peace negotiators to the capital, where the MPLA murdered them, along with 20,000 UNITA members. Savimbi was still ready to continue the elections. The MPLA then massacred tens of thousands of UNITA and National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) voters nationwide.[15][16]

After the government renounced Communism, the U.S. recognized the Angolan government. In 1995 António Franca became the first Angolan ambassador to the United States. United States Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Angola and Gabon in September 2002 and among other subjects, discussed petroleum.[17]

U.S. assistance to Angola amounted to US$188 million in 2003, much of it in the field of health services and disease control. USAID's food for peace program gave over US$30 million to Angola's population in 2005. Angola is currently the second biggest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa of the U.S., primarily because of oil; Angola produces .0014 billion barrels (220,000 m³) of oil per day, second only to Nigeria in all of Africa. This is expected to rise to .002 billion barrels (320,000 m³) per day by 2008. A 2005 visit by Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos to Washington, D.C. was a sign of warm relations between the two nations. In May 2007 the Council on Foreign Relations said, "Few African countries are more important to U.S. interests than Angola."