Battle of Leuthen

At Borne, Frederick the Great and his staff develop their battle plan, as illustrated by Hugo Ungewitter

Aware of Frederick's approach, Charles and his second in command, Count Leopold Joseph von Daun, positioned the army facing west on a 8 km (5 mi) front in country of undulating plains.[4] The Prince deployed his troops in two lines, the right wing at his northernmost point, anchored at Nypern.[7] Leuthen served as the Austrian center. Charles established his command post there, using a church tower as his observation post, and stationing seven battalions in the village itself. The majority of Charles' forces stood on his right wing.[4] A small advanced post stood at Borne, but with Frederick's arrival in force, they withdrew immediately to the east. The Austrian position intersected at right angles with the principal road between Borne and Breslau, passing through Frobelwitz and Lissa. He secured Nypern with eight grenadier companies and placed his cavalry at Guckerwitz (present-day Kokorzyce, a part of the village Krępice). The Austrian line extended as far south as Sagschütz (present-day Zakrzyce). There, his cavalry stood at right angles to the infantry, creating a line between Sagschütz and Gohlau. The positions were secured with additional grenadiers and pickets. Troops filled villages and woods, and hastily made abatis and redoubts. Pickets guarded all communication points as well as road and path crossings. The left wing was his shortest, with cavalry placed at the far end, near a stream by the village of Gohlau. Charles had an amalgamated force of Habsburg troops, including several contingents from the military frontier, and imperial troops from the duchies Württemberg and Bavaria.[7]

Frederick had learned the countryside by heart on previous maneuvers. On 4 December 1757, from his position on the Schönberg, a knoll about 1.5 km (1 mi) west of Borne, he surveyed the familiar landscape with his generals. A plan emerged. In front of him, a cluster of low hills dotted the landscape along an axis approximately parallel to the Austrian line. He knew the names of the hills: Schleierberg, Sophienberg, Wachberg, Butterberg. They were hardly hills, more like hillocks, but they were high enough to provide a screen for his troops. Facing an army twice his size, he had to rely on his own army's tactical training and use the terrain to maneuver his men into optimal position.[8] Frederick had one of the finest armies in Europe: his troops—any company—fired at least four volleys a minute, and some of them could fire a phenomenal five, twice the rate of fire of most European armies. Only the Russians could come close to achieving this rate. The Prussians could maneuver better than any of the armies in Europe and march faster, and they had just come from a resounding success at Rossbach. His artillery could quickly deploy and redeploy to support his infantry; his cavalry, superbly trained, could maneuver and charge with horses flank to flank and riders knee to knee, while moving at a full gallop.[3]

Prussians advance at Leuthen—as imagined and illustrated by Carl Röchling (c. 1890)

The Prussian infantry marched southward, remaining out of Austrian sight, behind a line of low hills. When the heads of the two superbly drilled Prussian columns—the distances between the marching platoons remaining exactly the width of each platoon's front—had passed the Austrian left flank, the columns veered left toward the enemy and continued their march until they had passed beyond the left Austrian flank. Then, on command, the platoons of the columns faced left at Lobetinz, and the whole Prussian army stood in line of battle, two to three men deep, at nearly a right angle to the weakest point of the Austrian left. Similarly, Hans Joachim von Zieten's cavalry had traversed the entire Austrian front, and positioned itself at a 45-degree angle to the Austrian flank. The Prussian artillery perched on the reverse slopes of the Butterberg, hidden from Austrian view but prepared to move to the crest to time their bombardment with the infantry's attack.[4] The bulk of the repositioned Prussian army now faced the smallest component of the Austrian line. The one column of Prussian cavalry and the small reserve of infantry remaining at the Austrian far right continued to demonstrate in front of the Austrians, even moving further north, as if an attack would occur there.[7]

The Austrians were astonished at the Prussian appearance on their left flank. The objective was soon clear: the Prussian infantry, now arrayed in the conventional two lines of battle, advanced on the weakest part of the Austrian line, intending to roll up the flank. The Austrian colonels on the scene did the best they could: by turning their own lines 90 degrees, they tried to take advantage of a shallow ditch facing the Prussian line. Franz Leopold von Nádasdy, commanding the flank, asked Charles for support, a request the Prince ignored: even at late morning, with most of the Prussian army on his left flank, he still believed that any attack would come at the northern flank.[10] Most of the men in the first Austrian line were Württembergers, Protestant troops whose willingness to fight the Lutheran Prussians had been called into question by the Austrian command. The Württembergers held out, maintaining steady musket fire until the mass of Prussians emerged through the haze of gunpowder. Then they ran for their lives, sweeping the Bavarians Nádasdy had deployed to support his flank with them.[11]

The first wave of Prussian infantry, supported by Frederick's artillery now pounding away from the crest of one of the hillocks, pushed steadily toward Leuthen. Commanded by Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau, the seasoned infantry and grenadiers went into battle with 60 rounds per man, according to Prussian regulation; by the time they overwhelmed the first Austrian line, they already were out of ammunition.[12] Nádasdy sent his own small cavalry against the Prussian grenadier column and its infantry support, but to no avail. Nádasdy withdrew his men in chaos, his troops disarrayed. Prince Charles and Daun finally realized they had been tricked and rushed troops from the right to the left, but they had extended the front, originally about 4 km (2 mi) long, to almost 10 km (6 mi), when they repositioned forces earlier in the day to meet Frederick's diversion.[13] As the Austrians withdrew, the Prussian artillery raked them with enfilade fire.[14] The Prussian infantry and grenadiers reached Leuthen in 40 minutes, pushing the Austrian troops into the village. Prussian grenadiers breached the wall first and stormed the church, where many of the defenders were killed. Hand-to-hand fighting raged throughout the village. Charles-Joseph Lamoral, eventually Prince de Ligne, was then a captain in an Austrian regiment of foot:[15]

Our Lieutenant-Colonel fell[,] killed almost at the first; beyond this we lost our Major, and indeed all the Officers but three ... We had crossed two successive ditches, which lay in an orchard to the left of the first houses in Leuthen; and were beginning to form in front of the village. But there was no standing of it. Besides a general cannonade such as can hardly be imagined, there was a rain of case-shot upon this Battalion, of which I, as there was no Colonel left, had to take command.[15][Note 1]

Leuthen was not a big village. Troops were so closely packed they stood 30 to 100 ranks deep and the killing was terrible. Lamoral commented later that his battalion, usually some 1,000 strong, plus some Hungarians and some grenadiers who had been separated from their own companies, gave him almost (and only) 200 men. He drew them back to the height at the edge of the village, where there was a windmill around which they could take shelter. Eventually, though, the Prussian Life Guards, commanded by Wichard Joachim Heinrich von Möllendorf, then a captain, broke through the village cemetery, and forced them to abandon their post.[15]

The Austrians briefly took the advantage when they moved a battery from the ridge north of the village to cover their infantry; the fire from the battery allowed the infantry to deploy at right angles to their original front. Frederick responded by ordering the last of his reserved left wing to advance, but the Austrian battery drove it back. Finally, Frederick's heavy cannons on the Butterberg, a small knoll to the west of town, laid down a barrage. Some participants said it was this barrage, more than the Prussian infantry, which won the battle.[15]

The assault on the wall briefly exposed General Wolf Frederick von Retzow's infantry line. More than two hours had elapsed since the Prince had ordered his cavalry back to Leuthen, but they arrived opportunely. Commanded by Joseph Count Lucchesi d’ Averna[Note 2] the cavalry hurried to take them in the flank: a successful cavalry charge at this critical point could have turned the tide of battle. Unfortunately for the Austrians, 40 squadrons of Zieten's cavalry awaited them at Radaxdorf and charged their flank; another 30 squadrons commanded by Georg Wilhelm von Driesen charged their front; the Bayreuth Dragoons hit their other flank; and the Puttkammer Hussars charged the rear. Lucchessi was killed—decapitated by a cannonball[16]—and his troopers were scattered. The cavalry mêlée soon swirled into the Austrian infantry line behind Leuthen, causing more confusion. Overrun by the Prussian horse, the Austrian infantry broke. First the infantry, then the cavalry retreated toward Breslau, where they crossed the Schweidnitzer Weistritz river, then called the "Black Water".[17]

Solid red lines indicate Habsburg positions. Solid blue lines indicate Prussian positions. Dotted lines show movement. Rectangles with a diagonal line indicate cavalry.

• The Battle in Four Maps
• 
  Upon Frederick's approach, Charles' advanced post (dotted red line) withdrew to Nypern. From Borne, Frederick evaluated the size and disposition of the Austrian force (solid red line); he organized his troops for the oblique maneuver. Note the village of Lissa to the far right. That is where Frederick ends his day.
• 
  While Charles sent most of his reserve north (red dotted lines) to protect his flank from the Prussian advance Frederick maneuvered his troops past the Austrians and surprised them on their left flank.
• 
  Charles finally realized his danger and tried to bring his cavalry and troops from his right flank into the fray. The length of his line (solid red), extended for 8 km (5 mi), meant that the troops had to march too far. The Prussians (dotted blue line) pushed the Austrians back.
• 
  Charles' troops withdrew from the field. Frederick entered the small castle at Lissa.

Out of an army of approximately 66,000 men, the Austrians lost 22,000, including 3,000 dead, 7,000 wounded, and an astonishing 12,000 captured. Of the dead and wounded, Austrian demographer and historian Gaston Bodart estimated that almost five percent were officers;[21] he also placed such other losses as capture and desertion at 17,000, almost 26 percent.[22] Charles lost entire regiments, either scattered in the first attacks or overrun at the end; they simply dissolved in the waves of Prussian blue coats.[20] The Prussians also captured 51 standards and 116 of the 250 Austrian cannons. Of the Prussian army of 36,000, Frederick lost 6,344, including 1,141 dead, 5,118 wounded and 85 captured. He lost none of his artillery.[23] Despite the victory, its cost was high: Frederick lost one fifth of the men he had taken into battle,[20] including two of his major generals.[Note 5][24]

The battle presented a severe blow to Austrian morale. The army had been soundly beaten by an army half its size, with fewer guns, and tired after a long march over twelve days. Charles and his second in command, Count Leopold Joseph von Daun, sank "in the depths of despondency", and the Prince could not fathom what had happened. Charles had a mixed-to-poor record against Frederick in past encounters, but he had never fared so badly as at Leuthen. After this crushing defeat, Maria Theresa replaced him with Daun; Charles retired from military service and later served as the governor of the Habsburg Netherlands.[23] The Austrians also learned some lessons, such as not to fight the Prussians in open fields; they had to choose their own ground for battle, and they employed this lesson in the future.[25]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Leuthen.

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