M249 light machine gun

Left to right: XM234 (Ford), XM233 (Maremont), XM235 (Rodman)

XM106 (BRL)

XM248 (Rodman/Ford Aerospace)

XM249 (FN)

XM262 (HK)

In 1965, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps' primary machine guns were the M2 Browning and M60. The M2 was a large-caliber heavy machine gun, usually mounted on vehicles or in fixed emplacements.[6] The M60 was a more mobile general-purpose machine gun intended to be carried with the troops to provide heavy automatic fire.[7] Both were very heavy weapons and usually required a crew of at least two to operate efficiently.[8] The Browning automatic rifle, the army's main individual machine gun since its introduction in World War I, was phased out in 1957 with the introduction of the M14 rifle, which had a fully automatic mode.[9] "Designated riflemen" in every squad were ordered to use their weapons on the fully automatic setting, while other troops were required to use their rifle's semi-automatic mode on most occasions to increase accuracy and conserve ammunition.[10] Because the M14 and M16 rifles had not been designed with sustained automatic fire in mind, they often overheated or jammed.[10] The 20-round and 30-round magazines of these weapons limited their sustained automatic effectiveness when compared to belt-fed weapons.[6]

The Army decided that an individual machine gun, lighter than the M60, but with more firepower than the M16, would be advantageous; troops would no longer have to rely on rifles for automatic fire.[11] Through the 1960s, the introduction of a machine gun into the infantry squad was examined in various studies.[12] While there was a brief flirtation with the concept of a flechette- or dart-firing Universal Machine Gun during one study, most light machine gun experiments concentrated on the Stoner 63 light machine gun, a modular weapon that could be easily modified for different purposes.[13][14] The Stoner 63 LMG saw combat for a brief period in Vietnam with the Marine Corps, and later on a wider scale with the U.S. Navy SEALs.[14]

In 1968, the Army Small Arms Program developed plans for a new 5.56 mm caliber LMG, though no funds were allocated (5.56 mm ammunition was viewed as underpowered by many in the armed forces). Studies of improved 5.56 mm ammunition, with better performance characteristics, began.[15] The earliest reference to studies of other caliber cartridges for the LMG did not appear until 1969.[16] In July 1970, the U.S. Army finally approved development of an LMG, with no specified caliber. At this time, the nomenclature "Squad Automatic Weapon" (SAW) was introduced.[12] Actual design of alternative cartridges for the LMG did not begin until July 1971. A month later, Frankford Arsenal decided on two cartridge designs for the new LMG: a 6 mm cartridge and a new 5.56 mm cartridge with a much larger case.[17] Neither design was finalized by March 1972, when the Army published the specifications document for the planned SAW.[18] The 6 mm cartridge design was eventually approved in May that year.[19] Prior to July 1972, SAW development contracts were awarded to Maremont, Philco Ford, and the Rodman Laboratory at Rock Island Arsenal. These companies produced designs with Army designations XM233, XM234 and XM235 respectively – X denoting "experimental". Designs were required to have a weight of less than 9.07 kg (20 lb) including 200 rounds of ammunition, and a range of at least 800 meters (2,600 ft).[20][21]

Initial Belgian-designed Minimi prototype delivered to the U.S. Infantry Board for evaluation, before it received its XM249 designation[22] (note the difference)

When the time came for developmental and operational testing of the SAW candidates, three 5.56 mm candidate weapons were included with the 6 mm candidates: the M16 HBAR, a heavy-barrel variant of the M16 designed for prolonged firing; the Fabrique Nationale de Herstal (FN) Minimi; and the HK 23A1. The initial round of tests ended in December 1974.[20] In February 1976, the Minimi and Rodman XM235 SAW were selected for further development. At this time, opinions of the 6 mm cartridge were beginning to sour due to the logistical implications of providing yet another ammunition type to the infantry.[23] In June, it was requested that the SAW specifications document be revised to emphasize standard 5.56 mm ammunition. In October, the requested revisions were approved, and bids were solicited for the conversion of the Rodman XM235 to 5.56 mm. Production of the converted XM235 was awarded to Ford Aerospace, and its designation was changed to XM248.[24] A new M16 HBAR variant, the XM106, was developed in 1978, and soon after, Heckler & Koch lobbied to include a 5.56 mm conversion of its HK 21A1 (instead of the standard 7.62 mm NATO ammunition it was built for) in future SAW testing. The latter model was designated the XM262. At this time, the Minimi received the designation XM249.[25] Testing of the four candidates resumed in April 1979.[26]

In May 1980, the FN XM249 was selected as the best choice for future development on the grounds of performance and cost, while the HK XM262 reportedly came a close second.[26] In September, FN was awarded a "maturity phase" contract for further development of the XM249,[27] and testing of the new weapon began in June 1981.[28] The official adoption took place in February 1982.[29][30]

An early model of the M249

The new gun entered U.S. Army service as the M249 squad automatic weapon in 1984, and was adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps a year later. The U.S. production model has a different butt from that of the regular Minimi.[31] It is manufactured in the FN factory in Columbia, South Carolina.[32]

Although found to be reliable and accurate, the M249 was considered to present unacceptable hazards in the form of an exposed hot barrel and sharp edges. There were complaints that the front sight required special adjustment tools. On August 23, 1985, then-U.S. Under Secretary of the Army James R. Ambrose suspended M249 production pending the development of the product improvement program (PIP) intended to fix these problems.[33] Congress deleted funds for the M249 from the Fiscal Year 1986 defense budget, then retroactively set aside the program's prior year's funds from the M249 program for other purposes, including retirement and pay raises. Over 1,100 M249s already issued were to remain in use, but be retrofitted with the PIP kit when it became available. Over 7,000 remaining M249s were to stay in storage at depots until corrective changes could be made. The PIP kit was eventually developed and implemented, and production of the M249 resumed.[31] In 1994 the M249 squad automatic weapon was re-designated the M249 light machine gun.[34]

A supply of 929 M249 SAWs was issued to personnel from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps during the Persian Gulf War. Although exposure to combat was scarce, M249 gunners who were involved in fighting mainly used their weapons to provide cover fire for friendly maneuvering troops from fixed positions, rather than maneuvering with them.[47] There were many complaints about the weapons clogging up with sand after prolonged use in the desert environment.[48]

The standard squad automatic weapon in Afghanistan is the M249 with PIP kit, which serves alongside its heavier counterpart, the M240 machine gun. Most M249s were given a collapsible buttstock immediately prior to the invasion to reduce its length and make the weapons more practical for parachuting and close-quarters combat.[49] Special Operations troops typically favor the shorter Para version of the weapon, which weighs much less.[1]

A report entitled Lessons Learned in Afghanistan was released by Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Dean and SFC Sam Newland of the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center in 2002. They found that 54% of SAW gunners had problems maintaining their weapons, and 30% reported that the gun rusted easily. Soldiers reported ammunition boxes rattling and falling off. 80% percent of soldiers surveyed were pleased with the weapon's accuracy and lethality, yet only 64% claimed they were "confident in their weapon". Weapons clogging up with sand in the desert seems to be the main complaint.[50]

A cloth pouch in Universal Camouflage Pattern used for holding belts of linked ammunition, this one being capable of holding 200 rounds.

The PIP and Para versions of the M249 have been used in the Iraq war since the invasion. By 2004, many M249s had been in service for almost 20 years and were becoming increasingly unreliable. Soldiers were requesting replacements and new features, and there are reports of soldiers holding their weapons together with duct tape.[48] The lethality of the 5.56 mm ammunition has been called into question by reports of enemy soldiers still firing after being hit multiple times.[51] As in previous conflicts, the sandy environment causes the M249s and other weapons to clog up and jam if they are not cleaned frequently.[48]

Operation Iraqi Freedom PEO Soldier Lessons Learned, a report on the performance of weapons in the Iraq War, was published by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Smith of the U.S. Army on May 15, 2003. Smith spoke positively of the M249, claiming that it "provided the requisite firepower at the squad level as intended". He praised the SPW variant, noting that its "short barrel and forward pistol grip allowed for very effective use of the SAW in urban terrain". At the National Defense Industrial Association in 2007, Lieutenant Colonel Al Kelly of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry gave a presentation describing the M249 as having "good range, excellent reliability" and an "excellent tracer". He said that a cloth pouch was preferred over the plastic box for holding linked ammunition, and that "knock-down power is poor, but is compensated by rate of fire".[52]

In December 2006, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) released a report on U.S. small arms in combat. The CNA conducted surveys on 2,608 troops returning from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 12 months. Only troops who fired their weapons at enemy targets were allowed to participate. Three hundred forty-one troops were armed with M249 SAWs, making up 13 percent of the survey. 71 percent of M249 users (242 troops) reported that they were satisfied with the weapon. 40 percent of users preferred feeding the SAW with the soft 100-round pouch, while 21 percent chose the soft and hard 200-round pouches each. 60 percent (205 troops) were satisfied with handling qualities, such as handguards, size, and weight. Of those dissatisfied, just under half thought that it was too heavy. M249 users had the lowest levels of satisfaction with weapon maintainability at 70 percent (239 troops), most due to the difficulty in removing and receiving small components and poor corrosion resistance. The SAW had the highest levels of stoppages at 30 percent (102 troops), and 41 percent of those that experienced a stoppage said it had a large impact on their ability to clear the stoppage and re-engage their target. Sixty-five percent (222 troops) did not need their machine guns repaired while in theater. Sixty-five percent (222 troops) were confident in the M249's reliability, defined as level of soldier confidence their weapon will fire without malfunction, and 64 percent (218 troops) were confident in its durability, defined as level of soldier confidence their weapon will not break or need repair. Both factors were attributed to high levels of soldiers performing their own maintenance. 60 percent of M249 users offered recommendations for improvements. Seventeen percent of requests were for making the weapon lighter, and another 17 percent were for more durable belt links and drums, as well as other modifications, such as a collapsible stock.[53]

Government publications