Operation Véronique

The Algerian War after the Toussaint Rouge terror attacks, was centered around the Aurès (and to a lesser extent the Kabylia, and Constantine) mountains, because of a lack of FLN influence in other parts of the country. Knowing this, the French administration launched multiple operations into the mountains, in hopes halting the FLN's fledgling rebellion.

The Operation, which was one of the first ones in the Algerian war, encompassed the region of the Ahmar Khaddou mountain in the Aurès. The Operation was developed by the chief of staff of the army, André Zeller,[5]and the chief of staff of the algerian army, Paul Cherriére. The goal of the Operation was to isolate the ALN combatants from the population who, deprived of supplies by closures, controls and rationing, would no longer provide logistical support to these combatants. The effect of this operation will be insignificant, as the military and civil authorities of the region were almost completely ignorant of the social structures of the inhabitants of the Aures and especially the relations established between them and the men of the insurrection who, since long before November 1 1954, were already living in the mountains.[6] In the first few days of the operation, caves, and other places where Fellaghas would hide, were bombed by the Air Force, but to no avail. During the operations, Napalm bombs were also utilized by the Air Force.[7] The Algerian response, which was organized by Mostefa Ben Boulaid was mostly irregular hit and run attacks,[8] which were rather successful, even though the FLN forces in the region were severely underequipped. Towards the end of the operation the French army also started utilizing artillery pieces, to bombard suspected rebel positions. Following the capture of Ben Boulaid, the leader of Wilaya I became Bachir Chihani, who commanded the local forces for the last few days of the operation. On the military level and according to the French press, only nine combatants were killed on the Algerian side. This result clearly showed the ineffectiveness of the means implemented in the face of the ALN. This was just one, of many of Cherrière's large scale ratissages, such as Violette, or Eckmühl, all of which were ineffective against the guerilla style tactics of the ALN.[9]

The French failure to destroy the roots of the Algerian rebellion, caused FLN influence to rapidly grow over the country. By the next months, some rural parts of the Aurés mountains were already controlled by the FLN.[10]