Andrew Cunningham, 1st Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope

Cunningham saw much action in the interwar years. In 1919, he commanded the S-class destroyer Seafire, on duty in the Baltic. The Communists, the White Russians, several varieties of Latvian nationalists, Germans, and the Poles were trying to control Latvia; the British Government had recognised Latvia's independence after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was on this voyage that Cunningham first met Admiral Walter Cowan. Cunningham was impressed by Cowan's methods, specifically his navigation of the potentially dangerous seas, with thick fog and minefields threatening the fleet.[21] Throughout several potentially problematic encounters with German forces trying to undermine the Latvian independence movement, Cunningham exhibited "good self control and judgement". Cowan was quoted as saying "Commander Cunningham has on one occasion after another acted with unfailing promptitude and decision, and has proved himself an Officer of exceptional valour and unerring resolution."[22]

For his actions in the Baltic, Cunningham was awarded a second bar to his DSO,[13] and promoted to captain in 1920. On his return from the Baltic in 1922, he was appointed captain of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla. Further commands were to follow; the 1st Destroyer Flotilla in 1923, and the destroyer base, HMS Lochinvar, at Port Edgar in the Firth of Forth, from 1927 to 1926. Cunningham renewed his association with Vice Admiral Cowan between 1926 and 1928, when Cunningham was flag captain and chief staff officer to Cowan while serving on the North America and West Indies Squadron. In his memoirs Cunningham made clear the "high regard"[23] in which he held Cowan, and the many lessons he learned from him during their two periods of service together.[23] The late 1920s found Cunningham back in the UK participating in courses at the Army's Senior Officers' School at Sheerness, as well as at the Imperial Defence College.[24] While Cunningham was at the Imperial Defence College, in 1929, he married Nona Byatt (daughter of Horace Byatt, MA; the couple had no children). After a year at the College, Cunningham was given command of his first big ship; the battleship Rodney.[13] Eighteen months later, he was appointed commodore of HMS Pembroke, the Royal Naval Barracks, Chatham.[25]

The battlecruiser HMS Hood, Cunningham's flagship as second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet

In September 1932, Cunningham was promoted to flag rank, and aide-de-camp to the King. He was appointed Rear Admiral (Destroyers) in the Mediterranean in December 1933 and was made a Companion of the Bath in 1934. Having hoisted his flag in the light cruiser Coventry, Cunningham used his time to practice fleet handling for which he was to receive much praise in the Second World War.[26] There were also fleet exercises in the Atlantic Ocean in which he learnt the skills and values of night actions that he would also use to great effect in years to come.[26]

On his promotion to vice admiral in July 1936, due to the interwar naval policy, further active employment seemed remote. However, a year later due to the illness of Sir Geoffrey Blake, Cunningham assumed the combined appointment of commander of the Battlecruiser Squadron and second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet, with HMS Hood as his flagship.[27] After his long service in small ships, Cunningham considered his accommodation aboard Hood to be almost palatial,[27] even surpassing his previous big ship experience on Rodney.[28]

He retained command until September 1938, when he was appointed to the Admiralty as Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, although he did not actually take up this post until December 1938. He accepted this shore job with reluctance since he loathed administration, but the Board of Admiralty's high regard of him was evident. For six months during an illness of Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse, the then First Sea Lord, he deputised for Backhouse on the Committee of Imperial Defence and on the Admiralty Board.[13] In 1939 he was made a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (KCB), becoming known as Sir Andrew Cunningham.[29]

In his role as Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Cunningham had to negotiate with the French Admiral René-Émile Godfroy for the demilitarisation and internment of the Force X, the French squadron at Alexandria, in June 1940, following the Fall of France. Churchill had ordered Cunningham to prevent the French warships from leaving port, and to ensure that French warships did not pass into enemy hands. Stationed at the time at Alexandria, Cunningham entered into delicate negotiations with Godfroy to ensure his fleet, which consisted of the battleship Lorraine, four cruisers, three destroyers and a submarine, posed no threat.[33] The Admiralty ordered Cunningham to complete the negotiations on 3 July.[33] Just as an agreement seemed imminent Godfroy heard of the British action against the French at Mers el Kebir and, for a while, Cunningham feared a battle between French and British warships in the confines of Alexandria harbour. The deadline was overrun but negotiations ended well, after Cunningham put them on a more personal level and had the British ships appeal to their French opposite numbers.[34] Cunningham's negotiations succeeded and the French emptied their fuel bunkers and removed the firing mechanisms from their guns.[35] Cunningham in turn promised to repatriate the ships' crews.[35]

Attack directions of British planes at Taranto

Although the threat from the French Fleet had been neutralised, Cunningham was still aware of the threat posed by the Italian Fleet to British North African operations, based in Egypt. Although the Royal Navy had won in several actions in the Mediterranean, considerably upsetting the balance of power, the Italians who were following the theory of a fleet in being had left their ships in harbour. This made the threat of a sortie against the British Fleet a serious problem.[2] At the time the harbour at Taranto contained six battleships (five of them battle-worthy), seven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eight destroyers. The Admiralty, concerned with the potential for an attack, had drawn up Operation Judgement; a surprise attack on Taranto Harbour. To carry out the attack, the Admiralty sent the new aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, commanded by Lumley Lyster, to join HMS Eagle in Cunningham's fleet.[36]

The attack started at 21:00, 11 November 1940, when the first of two waves of Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers took off from Illustrious, followed by the second wave an hour later. The attack was a great success:[2] the Italian fleet lost half its strength in one night. The "fleet-in-being" diminished in importance and the threat to the Royal Navy's control of the Mediterranean had been considerably reduced. Cunningham said of the victory: "Taranto, and the night of 11–12 November 1940, should be remembered for ever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon."[2] The Royal Navy had launched the first all-aircraft naval attack in history, flying a small number of aircraft from an aircraft carrier. This, and other aspects of the raid, were important facts in the planning of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941: the Japanese planning staff were thought to have studied it intensively.[2]

Cunningham's official reaction at the time was memorably terse. After landing the last of the attacking aircraft, Illustrious signalled "Operation Judgement executed". After seeing aerial reconnaissance photographs the next day which showed several Italian ships sunk or out of action, Cunningham replied with the two-letter code group which signified, "Manoeuvre well executed".[37]

Battle summary of Cape Matapan

At the end of March 1941, Hitler wanted the convoys supplying the British Expeditionary force in Greece stopped, and the Italian Navy was the only force able to attempt this.[38] Cunningham stated in his biography: "I myself was inclined to think that the Italians would not try anything. I bet Commander Power, the Staff Officer, Operations, the sum of ten shillings that we would see nothing of the enemy."[38]

Under pressure from Germany, the Italian Fleet planned to launch an attack on the British Fleet on 28 March 1941. The Italian commander, Admiral Angelo Iachino, intended to carry out a surprise attack on the British Cruiser Squadron in the area (commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell), executing a pincer movement with the battleship Vittorio Veneto.[39] Cunningham though, was aware of Italian naval activity through intercepts of Italian Enigma messages. Although Italian intentions were unclear, Cunningham's staff believed an attack upon British troop convoys was likely and orders were issued to spoil the enemy plan and, if possible, intercept their fleet. Cunningham wished, however, to disguise his own activity and arranged for a game of golf and a fictitious evening gathering to mislead enemy agents (he was, in fact, overheard by the local Japanese Consul).[40]

After sunset, he boarded HMS Warspite and left Alexandria. Cunningham, realising that an air attack could weaken the Italians,[39] ordered an attack by the Formidable's Albacore torpedo-bombers. A hit on the Vittorio Veneto slowed her temporarily[41] and Iachino, realising his fleet was vulnerable without air cover, ordered his forces to retire. Cunningham gave the order to pursue the Italian Fleet.[38]

An air attack from the Formidable had disabled the cruiser Pola, and Iachino, unaware of Cunningham's pursuing battlefleet, ordered a squadron of cruisers and destroyers to return and protect the Pola. Cunningham, meanwhile, was joining up with Pridham-Wippell's cruiser squadron.[39] Throughout the day several chases and sorties occurred with no overall victor.[39] None of the Italian ships were equipped for night fighting, and when night fell, they made to return to Taranto.[38] The British battlefleet equipped with radar detected the Italians shortly after 22:00. In a pivotal[39] moment in naval warfare during the Second World War, the battleships Barham, Valiant and Warspite opened fire on two Italian cruisers at only 3,800 yards (3.5 km), destroying them in only five minutes.[38]

Although the Vittorio Veneto escaped from the battle by returning to Taranto, there were many accolades given to Cunningham for continuing the pursuit at night, against the advice of his staff.[39] After the previous defeat at Taranto, the defeat at Cape Matapan dealt another strategic blow to the Italian Navy. Five ships—three heavy cruisers and two destroyers—were sunk, and around 2,400 Italian sailors were killed, missing or captured.[42] The British lost only three aircrew when one torpedo bomber was shot down. Cunningham had lost his bet with Commander Power but he had won a strategic victory in the war in the Mediterranean.[39] The defeats at Taranto and Cape Matapan meant that the Italian Navy did not intervene[42] in the heavily contested evacuations of Greece and Crete, later in 1941. It also ensured that, for the remainder of the war, the Regia Marina conceded the Eastern Mediterranean to the Allied Fleet, and did not leave port for the remainder of the war.[42]

British wounded evacuated to Alexandria

On the morning of 20 May 1941, Nazi Germany launched an airborne invasion of Crete, under the code-name Unternehmen Merkur (Operation Mercury). Despite initial heavy casualties,[43] Maleme airfield in western Crete fell to the Germans and enabled them to fly in heavy reinforcements and overwhelm the Allied forces.[43]

After a week of heavy fighting, British commanders decided that the situation was hopeless and ordered a withdrawal from Sfakia.[43] During the next four nights, 16,000 troops were evacuated to Egypt by ships (including HMS Ajax[43] of Battle of the River Plate fame). A smaller number of ships were to withdraw troops on a separate mission from Heraklion, but these ships were attacked en route by Luftwaffe dive bombers. Without air cover, Cunningham's ships suffered serious losses. Cunningham was determined, though, that the "navy must not let the army down", and when army generals feared he would lose too many ships, Cunningham famously said,

It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition. The evacuation will continue.[44]

The "never say die" attitude of Cunningham and the men under his command meant that of 22,000 men on Crete, 16,500 were rescued but at the loss of three cruisers and six destroyers. Fifteen other major warships were damaged.[45]

Plaque commemorating Operation Torch, Gibraltar.

Cunningham standing behind Winston Churchill at the Yalta conference.

Cunningham became a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB), "in recognition of the recent successful combined operations in the Middle East", in March 1941[46] and was created a baronet, of Bishop's Waltham in the County of Southampton, in July 1942.[47] From late 1942 to early 1943, he served under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who made him Naval Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. In this role Cunningham commanded the large fleet that covered the Anglo-American landings in North Africa (Operation Torch). General Eisenhower said of him in his diary:

Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham. He remains in my opinion at the top of my subordinates in absolute selflessness, energy, devotion to duty, knowledge of his task, and in understanding of the requirements of allied operations. My opinions as to his superior qualifications have never wavered for a second.[48]

On 21 January 1943, Cunningham was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet.[49] February 1943 saw him return to his post as Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. Three months later, when Axis forces in North Africa were on the verge of surrender, he ordered that none should be allowed to escape.[50] Entirely in keeping with his fiery character he signalled the fleet "Sink, burn and destroy: Let nothing pass".[50] He oversaw the naval forces used in the joint Anglo-American amphibious invasions of Sicily, during Operation Husky, Operation Baytown and Operation Avalanche. On the morning of 11 September 1943, Cunningham was present at Malta when the Italian Fleet surrendered. Cunningham informed the Admiralty with a telegram; "Be pleased to inform their Lordships that the Italian battle fleet now lies at anchor under the guns of the fortress of Malta."[51]

In October 1943, Cunningham became First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, after the death of Sir Dudley Pound. This promotion meant that he had to relinquish his coveted post of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, recommending his namesake Admiral John H. D. Cunningham as his successor.[52] In the position of First Sea Lord, and as a member of the Chiefs of Staff committee, Cunningham was responsible for the overall strategic direction of the navy for the remainder of the war. He attended the major conferences at Cairo, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam,[50] at which the Allies discussed future strategy, including the invasion of Normandy and the deployment of a British fleet to the Pacific Ocean.[50]

While the port of Antwerp was vital for the Allies after D-Day, Admirals Cunningham and Ramsay warned SHAEF and Montgomery that the port was of no use while the Germans held the approaches. But Montgomery postponed the Battle of the Scheldt, and the delay in opening the port was a grave blow to the Allied build-up before winter approached.[53]