Khrushchev Thaw

Khrushchev's denouncement of Stalin came as a shock to the Soviet people. Many in Georgia, Stalin's homeland, especially the young generation, bred on the panegyrics and permanent praise of the "genius" of Stalin, perceived it as a national insult. In March 1956, a series of spontaneous rallies to mark the third anniversary of Stalin's death quickly evolved into an uncontrollable mass demonstration and political demands such as the change of the central government in Moscow and calls for the independence of Georgia from the Soviet Union appeared,[20] leading to the Soviet army intervention and bloodshed in the streets of Tbilisi.[21]

The first big international failure of Khrushchev's politics came in October–November 1956.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was suppressed by a massive invasion of Soviet tanks and Red Army troops in Budapest. The street fighting against the invading Red Army caused thousands of casualties among Hungarian civilians and militia, as well as hundreds of the Soviet military personnel killed. The attack by the Soviet Red Army also caused massive emigration from Hungary, as hundreds of thousands of Hungarians had fled as refugees.[22]

At the same time, the Polish October emerged as the political and social climax in Poland. Such democratic changes in the internal life of Poland were also perceived with fear and anger in Moscow, where the rulers did not want to lose control, fearing the political threat to Soviet security and power in Eastern Europe.[23]

A faction of the Soviet communist party was enraged by Khrushchev's speech in 1956, and rejected Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and liberalization of Soviet society. One year after Khrushchev's secret speech, the Stalinists attempted to oust Khrushchev from the leadership position in the Soviet Communist Party.[1]

Khrushchev's enemies considered him hypocritical as well as ideologically wrong, given Khrushchev's involvement in Stalin's Great Purges, and other similar events as one of Stalin's favorites. They believed that Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence would leave the Soviet Union open to attack. Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Georgy Malenkov and joined by Dmitri Shepilov[17] at the last minute after Kaganovich convinced him the group had a majority, attempted to depose Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Party in May 1957.[1]

But Khrushchev had used Marshal Georgy Zhukov again. Khrushchev was saved by several strong appearances in his support – especially powerful was support from both Zhukov and Mikoyan.[24] At the extraordinary session of the Central Committee held in late June 1957, Khrushchev labeled his opponents the Anti-Party Group[17] and won a vote which reaffirmed his position as First Secretary.[1] Then he expelled Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov from the Secretariat and ultimately from the Communist Party itself.

Khrushchev's attempts in reforming the Soviet industrial infrastructure led to his clashes with professionals in most branches of the Soviet economy. His reform of administrative organization caused him more problems. In a politically motivated move to weaken the central state bureaucracy in 1957, Khrushchev replaced the industrial ministries in Moscow with regional Councils of People's Economy, sovnarkhozes, causing himself many new enemies among the ranks in Soviet government.[24]

Eventually Khrushchev's power, although indisputable, was slowly eroding and never became comparable to that of Stalin's. Some of the new people who came into the Soviet hierarchy, like Mikhail Gorbachev were younger, better educated and more independent thinkers.[25]

In 1956, Khrushchev introduced the concept of a minimum wage. The idea was met with much criticism with communist hardliners, they claimed that the minimum wage was so small, that most people were still underpaid in reality. The next step was a contemplated financial reform. However, Khrushchev stopped short of real monetary reform, when he ordered the replacement of old money bearing portraits of Stalin, and made a simple redenomination of the ruble 10:1 in 1961.

In 1961, Khrushchev finalized his battle against Stalin: the body of the dictator was removed from Lenin's Mausoleum on the Red Square and then buried outside the walls of the Kremlin.[1][10][14][24][26] The removal of Stalin's body out of Lenin's Mausoleum was arguably among the most provocative moves made by Khrushchev during the Thaw. The removal of Stalin's body consolidated pro-Stalinists against Khrushchev,[1][14] and alienated even his loyal apprentices, such as Leonid Brezhnev.

Censorship of the arts relaxed throughout the Soviet Union. During this time of liberalization, Russian composers, performers, and listeners of music experienced a newfound openness in musical expression which led to the foundation of an unofficial music scene from the mid 1950s to the 1970s.[29]

Despite these liberalizing reforms in music, many argue that Khrushchev's legislation of the arts was based, not enough on freedom of expression of the Soviet people per se, and too much on his own personal tastes. Following the emergence of some unconventional, avant-garde music as a result of his reforms, on 8 March 1963, Khrushchev delivered a speech which began to reverse some of his de-Stalinization reforms, in which he stated: "We flatly reject this cacophonous music. Our people can't use this garbage as a tool for their ideology." and "Society has a right to condemn works which are contrary to the interests of the people." [30] Although the Thaw was considered a time of openness and liberalization, Khrushchev continued to place restrictions on these newfound freedoms.

Nonetheless, despite Khrushchev's inconsistent liberalization of musical expression, his speeches were not so much "restrictions" as "exhortations".[30] Artists, and especially musicians, were provided access to resources that had previously been censored or altogether inaccessible prior to Khrushchev's reforms. The composers of this time, for example, were able to access scores by composers such as Arnold Schoenberg and Pierre Boulez, gaining inspiration from and imitating previously concealed musical scores.[31]

As Soviet composers gained access to new scores and were given a taste of freedom of expression during the late 1950s, two separate groups began to emerge. One group wrote predominantly "official" music which was "sanctioned, nourished, and supported by the Composers' Union". The second group wrote "unofficial", "left", "avant-garde", or "underground" music, marked by a general state of opposition against the Soviet Union. Although both groups are widely considered to be interdependent, many regard the unofficial music scene as more independent and politically influential than the former in the context of the Thaw.[32]

The unofficial music that emerged during the Thaw was marked by the attempt, whether successful or unsuccessful, to reinterpret and reinvigorate the "battle of form and content" of the classical music of the period.[29] Although the term "unofficial" implies a level of illegality involved in the production of this music, composers, performers, and listeners of "unofficial" music actually used "official" means of production. Rather, the music was considered unofficial within a context that counteracted, contradicted, and redefined the socialist realist requirements from within their official means and spaces.[29]

Unofficial music emerged in two distinct phases. The first phase of unofficial music was marked by performances of "escapist" pieces. From a composer's perspective, these works were escapist in the sense that their sound and structure withdrew from the demands of socialist realism. Additionally, pieces developed during this phase of unofficial music allowed the listeners the ability to escape the familiar sounds that Soviet officials officially sanctioned.[29] The second phase of unofficial music emerged during the late 1960s, when the plots of the music became more apparent, and composers wrote in a more mimetic style, writing in contrast to their earlier compositions of the first phase.[29]

Throughout the musical Thaw, the generation of "young composers" who had matured their musical tastes with broader access to music that had previously been censored was the prime focus of the unofficial music scene. The Thaw allowed these composers the freedom to access old and new scores, especially those originating in the Western avant-garde.[29] During the late 1950s and early 1960s, young composers such as Andrei Volkonsky and Edison Denisov, among others, developed abstract musical practices that created sounds that were new to the common listener's ear. Socialist realist music was widely considered "boring", and the unofficial concerts that the young composers presented allowed the listeners "a means of circumventing, reinterpreting, and undercutting the dominant socialist realist aesthetic codes".[31]

Despite the seemingly rebellious nature of the unofficial music of the Thaw, historians debate whether the unofficial music that emerged during this time should truly be considered as resistance to the Soviet system. While a number of participants in unofficial concerts "claimed them to be a liberating activity, connoting resistance, opposition, or protest of some sort",[29] some critics claim that rather than taking an active role in opposing Soviet power, composers of unofficial music simply "withdrew" from the demands of the socialist realist music and chose to ignore the norms of the system.[29] Although Westerners tend to categorize unofficial composers as "dissidents" against the Soviet system, many of these composers were afraid to take action against the system in fear that it might have a negative impact on their professional advancement.[29] Many composers favored a less direct, yet significant method of opposing the system through their lack of musical compliance.

Regardless of the intentions of the composers, the effect of their music on audiences throughout the Soviet Union and abroad "helped audiences imagine alternative possibilities to those suggested by Soviet authorities, principally through the ubiquitous stylistic tropes of socialist realism".[29] Although the music of the younger generation of unofficial Soviet composers experienced little widespread success in the West, its success within the Soviet Union was apparent throughout the Thaw (Schwarz 423). Even after Khrushchev's fall from power in October 1964, the freedoms that composers, performers, and listeners felt through unofficial concerts lasted into the 1970s.[29]

However, despite the powerful role that unofficial music played in the Soviet Union during the Thaw, much of the music that was composed during that time continued to be controlled. As a result of this, a great deal of this unofficial music remains undocumented. Consequently, much of what we know now about unofficial music in the Thaw can be sourced only through interviews with those composers, performers, and listeners who witnessed the unofficial music scene during the Thaw.[29]

In 1959, the American National Exhibition came to Moscow with the goals of displaying United States' productivity and prosperity. The latent goal of the Americans was to get the Soviet Union to reduce production of heavy industry. If the Soviet Union started putting their resources towards producing consumer goods, it would also mean a reduction of war materials. An estimated number of over twenty million Soviet citizens viewed the twenty-three U.S. exhibitions during a thirty-year period.[35] These exhibitions were part of the Cultural Agreement formed by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to acknowledge the long-term exchange of: science, technology, agriculture, medicine, public health, radio, television, motion pictures, publications, government, youth, athletics, scholarly research, culture, and tourism.[36] In addition to the influences of European and Western culture, the spoils of the Cold War exposed the Soviet people to a new way of life.[37] Through motion pictures from the United States, viewers learned of another way of life.[35]

The Kitchen Debate at the 1959 Exhibition in Moscow fueled Khrushchev to catch up to Western consumerism. The "Khrushchev regime had promised abundance to secure its legitimacy."[38] The ideology of strict functionality concerning material goods evolved into a more relaxed view of consumerism. American sociologist David Riesman coined the term "Operation Abundance" also known as the "Nylon War" which predicted "Russian people would not long tolerate masters who gave them tanks and spies instead of vacuum cleaners and beauty parlors."[39] The Soviets would have to produce more consumer goods to quell mass discontent. Riesman's theory came true to some extent as the Soviet culture changed to include consumer goods such as vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and sewing machines. These items were specifically targeted at women in the Soviet Union with the idea that they relieved women of their domestic burden. Additionally an interest in changing the western image of a dowdy Russian woman led to the cultural acceptance of beauty products. The modern Russian woman wanted the clothing, cosmetics, and hairstyles available to Western women. Under the Thaw, beauty shops selling cosmetics and perfume, which had previously only been available to the wealthy, became available for common women.[40]

Khrushchev responded to consumerism more diplomatically than to cultural consumption. In response to American jazz Khrushchev stated: "I don't like jazz. When I hear jazz, it's as if I had gas on the stomach. I used to think it was static when I heard it on the radio."[41] Concerning commissioning artists during the Thaw, Khrushchev declared: "As long as I am president of the Council of Ministers, we are going to support a genuine art. We aren't going to give a kopeck for pictures painted by jackasses."[41] In comparison, the consumption of material goods acted as a measure of economic success. Khrushchev stated: "We are producing an ever-growing quantity of all kinds of consumer goods; all the same, we must not force the pace unreasonably as regards the lowering of prices. We don't want to lower prices to such an extent that there will be queues and a black market."[42] Previously, excessive consumerism under Communism was seen as detrimental to the common good. Now, it was not enough for the consumer goods to be made more available; quality of consumer goods needed to be raised as well.[43] A misconception surrounding the quality of consumer goods existed because of advertising's role in the market. Advertising controlled sale quotas by increasing the desirability of surplus sub-standard goods.[44]

The roots of consumerism started as early as the 1930s when in 1935 each Soviet Republic capital city established a model department store.[45] The department stores acted as representatives of Soviet economic success. Under Khrushchev the retail sectors gained prevalence as Soviet department stores GUM (department store) and TsUM (Central Department Store), both located in Moscow, began to focus on trade and social interaction.[46]

On 31 July 1957 the Communist party decreed to increase housing construction and Khrushchev launched plans for building private apartments that differed from the old, communal apartments that had come before. Khrushchev stated that it was important "not only to provide people with good homes, but also to teach them…to live correctly." He saw a high living standard as a precondition leading the path on the transition to full communism and believed that private apartments could achieve this.[47] Although the Thaw marked a time of openness and liberalization primarily located in the public sphere, the emergence of private housing allowed for a new formulation of a private sphere in Soviet life.[48] This resulted in a changing ideology that needed to make room for women, who were traditionally associated with the home, and consumption of goods in order to create a well-ordered "Soviet" home.

Khrushchev's policies showed an interest in rebuilding the home and the family after the devastation of World War II. Soviet rhetoric exemplified a shift in emphasis from heavy industry to the importance of consumer goods and housing.[49] The Seven-Year Plan was launched in 1958 and promised to build 12 million city apartments and 7 million rural houses.[50] Alongside the increased number of private apartments was the emergence of changing attitudes toward the family. The prior Soviet ideology disdained conceptions of the traditional family, especially under Stalin, who created the vision of a large, collective family under his paternal leadership. The new emphasis on private housing created hope that the Thaw-era private realm would provide an escape from the intensities of public life and the eye of the government.[51] Indeed, Khrushchev introduced the ideology that private life was valued and was ultimately a goal of social development.[52] The new political rhetoric regarding the family reintroduced the concept of the nuclear family, and, in doing so, cemented the idea that the women were responsible for the domestic realm and running the home.

Recognizing the necessity of rebuilding the family in the postwar years, Khrushchev enacted policies that attempted to reestablish a more conventional domestic realm, moving away from the policies of his predecessors, and most of these were aimed at women.[53] Despite being an active part of the workforce, women's conditions were considered by the western, capitalist world to exemplify the "backwardness" of the Soviet Union. This concept goes back to traditional Marxism, which found the roots of woman's inherent backwardness in fact that she was confined to the home; Lenin spoke of woman as a "domestic slave" who would remain in confinement as long as housework remained an activity for individuals inside the home. The prior abolition of private homes and the individual kitchen attempted to move away from the domestic regime that imprisoned women. Instead, the government tried to implement public dining, socialized housework, and collective childcare. These programs that fulfilled the original tenets of Marxism were widely resisted by traditionally-minded women.[54]

In March 1958, Khrushchev admitted to the Supreme Soviet his embarrassment about the public perception of Soviet women as unhappily relegated to the ranks of a manual laborer.[55] The new private housing provided individual kitchens for many families for the first time. The new technologies of the kitchen came to be associated with the projects of modernization in the era of the Cold War's "peaceful competition." In this time, the primary competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the battle of providing the better quality of life.[56] In 1959, at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon declared the superiority of the capitalist system while standing in front of an example of a modern American kitchen. Known as the "Kitchen Debate," the exchange between Nixon and Khrushchev foreshadowed Khrushchev's increased attention to the needs of women, especially by creating modern kitchens. While affirming his dedication to increasing the living standard, Khrushchev associated the transition to communism with abundance and prosperity.[57]

The Third Party Programme of 1961, the defining document of Khrushchev's policies, related social progress with technological progress, especially technological progress inside the home. Khrushchev spoke of a commitment to increasing production of consumer goods, specifically household goods and appliances that would decrease the intensity of housework. The kitchen was defined as a "workshop" that relied on the "correct organization of labour" to be most efficient. Creating what were perceived to be the best conditions for the woman's work in the kitchen was an attempt on the part of the government to ensure that the Soviet woman would be able to continue her labor inside and outside of the home. Despite the increasing demands of housework, women were expected to maintain jobs outside the home in order to sustain the national economy as well as fulfill the ideals of a Soviet well-rounded individual.[58]

During this time, women were flooded with pamphlets and magazines teeming with advice on how best to run a household. This literature emphasized the virtues of simplicity and efficiency.[59] Additionally, furniture was designed to suit the average height of Moscow women, emphasizing a modern, simple style that allowed for efficient mass production. However, in the newly built apartments of the Khrushchev era, the individual kitchens were rarely up to the standards invoked by the government's rhetoric. Providing fully fitted kitchens were too expensive and time-consuming to be realized in the mass housing project.[60]

The streamlined, simple design and aesthetic of the kitchen was promoted throughout the rest of the home.[61] Previous styles were labeled as petit-bourgeois once Khrushchev came to power.[62] Khrushchev denounced the ornate style of high Stalinism for its wastefulness.[63] The arrangement of the home during the Thaw emphasized that which was simple and functional, for those items could be easily mass-produced. Khrushchev promoted a culture of increased consumption and publicly announced that the per capita consumption of the Soviet Union would exceed that of the United States. However, consumption consisted of modern goods that lacked decorative qualities and were often poor quality, which spoke to the society's emphasis on production rather than consumption.[64]